KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. et al.

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KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 04–1350. Argued November 28, 2006—Decided April 30, 2007
To control a conventional automobile’s speed, the driver depresses or re
leases the gas pedal, which interacts with the throttle via a cable or
other mechanical link. Because the pedal’s position in the footwell nor
mally cannot be adjusted, a driver wishing to be closer or farther from
it must either reposition himself in the seat or move the seat, both of
which can be imperfect solutions for smaller drivers in cars with deep
footwells. This prompted inventors to design and patent pedals that
could be adjusted to change their locations. The Asano patent reveals
a support structure whereby, when the pedal location is adjusted, one
of the pedal’s pivot points stays fixed. Asano is also designed so that
the force necessary to depress the pedal is the same regardless of lo
cation adjustments. The Redding patent reveals a different, sliding
mechanism where both the pedal and the pivot point are adjusted.
In newer cars, computer-controlled throttles do not operate through
force transferred from the pedal by a mechanical link, but open and close
valves in response to electronic signals. For the computer to know
what is happening with the pedal, an electronic sensor must translate
the mechanical operation into digital data. Inventors had obtained a
number of patents for such sensors. The so-called ’936 patent taught
that it was preferable to detect the pedal’s position in the pedal mecha
nism, not in the engine, so the patent disclosed a pedal with an electronic
sensor on a pivot point in the pedal assembly. The Smith patent taught
that to prevent the wires connecting the sensor to the computer from
chafing and wearing out, the sensor should be put on a fixed part of the
pedal assembly rather than in or on the pedal’s footpad. Inventors had
also patented self-contained modular sensors, which can be taken off the
shelf and attached to any mechanical pedal to allow it to function with
a computer-controlled throttle. The ’068 patent disclosed one such
sensor. Chevrolet also manufactured trucks using modular sensors
attached to the pedal support bracket, adjacent to the pedal and en
gaged with the pivot shaft about which the pedal rotates. Other pat
ents disclose electronic sensors attached to adjustable pedal assemblies.
For example, the Rixon patent locates the sensor in the pedal footpad,
but is known for wire chafing.

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After petitioner KSR developed an adjustable pedal system for cars
with cable-actuated throttles and obtained its ’986 patent for the design,
General Motors Corporation (GMC) chose KSR to supply adjustable
pedal systems for trucks using computer-controlled throttles. To make
the ’986 pedal compatible with the trucks, KSR added a modular sensor
to its design. Respondents (Teleflex) hold the exclusive license for the
Engelgau patent, claim 4 of which discloses a position-adjustable pedal
assembly with an electronic pedal position sensor attached to a fixed
pivot point. Despite having denied a similar, broader claim, the U. S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) had allowed claim 4 because it in
cluded the limitation of a fixed pivot position, which distinguished the
design from Redding’s. Asano was neither included among the Engel
gau patent’s prior art references nor mentioned in the patent’s prosecu
tion, and the PTO did not have before it an adjustable pedal with a fixed
pivot point. After learning of KSR’s design for GMC, Teleflex sued for
infringement, asserting that KSR’s pedal system infringed the Engelgau
patent’s claim 4. KSR countered that claim 4 was invalid under § 103 of
the Patent Act, which forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art.”
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 17–18, set out
an objective analysis for applying § 103: “[T]he scope and content of the
prior art are . . . determined; differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue are . . . ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary
considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, fail
ure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”
While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any partic
ular case, the factors define the controlling inquiry. However, seeking
to resolve the obviousness question with more uniformity and consist
ency, the Federal Circuit has employed a “teaching, suggestion, or moti
vation” (TSM) test, under which a patent claim is only proved obvious
if the prior art, the problem’s nature, or the knowledge of a person
having ordinary skill in the art reveals some motivation or suggestion
to combine the prior art teachings.
The District Court granted KSR summary judgment. After review
ing pedal design history, the Engelgau patent’s scope, and the relevant
prior art, the court considered claim 4’s validity, applying Graham’s
framework to determine whether under summary-judgment standards

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KSR had demonstrated that claim 4 was obvious. The court found “lit
tle difference” between the prior art’s teachings and claim 4: Asano
taught everything contained in the claim except using a sensor to detect
the pedal’s position and transmit it to a computer controlling the throt
tle. That additional aspect was revealed in, e. g., the ’068 patent and
Chevrolet’s sensors. The court then held that KSR satisfied the TSM
test, reasoning (1) the state of the industry would lead inevitably to
combinations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) Rixon pro
vided the basis for these developments, and (3) Smith taught a solution
to Rixon’s chafing problems by positioning the sensor on the pedal’s
fixed structure, which could lead to the combination of a pedal like
Asano with a pedal position sensor.
Reversing, the Federal Circuit ruled the District Court had not ap
plied the TSM test strictly enough, having failed to make findings as to
the specific understanding or principle within a skilled artisan’s knowl
edge that would have motivated one with no knowledge of the invention
to attach an electronic control to the Asano assembly’s support bracket.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court’s recourse to the
nature of the problem to be solved was insufficient because, unless the
prior art references addressed the precise problem that the patentee
was trying to solve, the problem would not motivate an inventor to look
at those references. The appeals court found that the Asano pedal was
designed to ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is the
same no matter how the pedal is adjusted, whereas Engelgau sought to
provide a simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable electronic pedal. The
Rixon pedal, said the court, suffered from chafing but was not designed
to solve that problem and taught nothing helpful to Engelgau’s purpose.
Smith, in turn, did not relate to adjustable pedals and did not necessarily
go to the issue of motivation to attach the electronic control on the pedal
assembly’s support bracket. So interpreted, the court held, the patents
would not have led a person of ordinary skill to put a sensor on an
Asano-like pedal. That it might have been obvious to try that combina
tion was likewise irrelevant. Finally, the court held that genuine issues
of material fact precluded summary judgment.
Held: The Federal Circuit addressed the obviousness question in a nar
row, rigid manner that is inconsistent with § 103 and this Court’s prece
dents. KSR provided convincing evidence that mounting an available
sensor on a fixed pivot point of the Asano pedal was a design step well
within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art and
that the benefit of doing so would be obvious. Its arguments, and the
record, demonstrate that the Engelgau patent’s claim 4 is obvious.
Pp. 415–428.

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1. Graham provided an expansive and flexible approach to the ob
viousness question that is inconsistent with the way the Federal Circuit
applied its TSM test here. Neither § 103’s enactment nor Graham’s
analysis disturbed the Court’s earlier instructions concerning the need
for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements
found in the prior art. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Super
market Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152. Such a combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
when it does no more than yield predictable results. See, e. g., United
States v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 50–52. When a work is available in one
field, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations
of it, either in the same field or in another. If a person of ordinary skill
in the art can implement a predictable variation, and would see the
benefit of doing so, § 103 likely bars its patentability. Moreover, if a
technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in
the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application
is beyond that person’s skill. A court must ask whether the improve
ment is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according
to their established functions. Following these principles may be diffi
cult if the claimed subject matter involves more than the simple substi
tution of one known element for another or the mere application of a
known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement. To
determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known
elements in the way a patent claims, it will often be necessary to look
to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; to the effects of demands
known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and to
the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill
in the art. To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit.
But it need not seek out precise teachings directed to the challenged
claim’s specific subject matter, for a court can consider the inferences
and creative steps a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
Pp. 415–422.
(a) The TSM test captures a helpful insight: A patent composed of
several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that
each element was, independently, known in the prior art. Although
common sense directs caution as to a patent application claiming as inno
vation the combination of two known devices according to their estab
lished functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have
prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements
as the new invention does. Inventions usually rely upon building blocks
long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost necessarily will be
combinations of what, in some sense, is already known. Helpful in

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sights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas. If it
is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with this Court’s precedents.
The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels
against confining the obviousness analysis by a formalistic conception of
the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasizing
the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued
patents. In many fields there may be little discussion of obvious tech
niques or combinations, and market demand, rather than scientific litera
ture, may often drive design trends. Granting patent protection to ad
vances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation
retards progress and may, for patents combining previously known ele
ments, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility. Since the TSM
test was devised, the Federal Circuit doubtless has applied it in accord
with these principles in many cases. There is no necessary inconsist
ency between the test and the Graham analysis. But a court errs
where, as here, it transforms general principle into a rigid rule limiting
the obviousness inquiry. Pp. 418–419.
(b) The flaws in the Federal Circuit’s analysis relate mostly to its
narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry consequent in its applica
tion of the TSM test. The Circuit first erred in holding that courts and
patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was try
ing to solve. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known
in the field and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combin
ing the elements in the manner claimed. Second, the appeals court
erred in assuming that a person of ordinary skill in the art attempting
to solve a problem will be led only to those prior art elements designed
to solve the same problem. The court wrongly concluded that because
Asano’s primary purpose was solving the constant ratio problem, an
inventor considering how to put a sensor on an adjustable pedal would
have no reason to consider putting it on the Asano pedal. It is common
sense that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary
purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the
teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. Regard
less of Asano’s primary purpose, it provided an obvious example of an
adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point, and the prior art was replete
with patents indicating that such a point was an ideal mount for a sen
sor. Third, the court erred in concluding that a patent claim cannot be
proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements
was obvious to try. When there is a design need or market pressure to
solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill in the art has good reason to pursue
the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to
the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of

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ordinary skill and common sense. Finally, the court drew the wrong
conclusion from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to
hindsight bias. Rigid preventative rules that deny recourse to common
sense are neither necessary under, nor consistent with, this Court’s case
law. Pp. 419–422.
2. Application of the foregoing standards demonstrates that claim 4
is obvious. Pp. 422–426.
(a) The Court rejects Teleflex’s argument that the Asano pivot
mechanism’s design prevents its combination with a sensor in the man
ner claim 4 describes. This argument was not raised before the Dis
trict Court, and it is unclear whether it was raised before the Federal
Circuit. Given the significance of the District Court’s finding that com
bining Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell within
claim 4’s scope, it is apparent that Teleflex would have made clearer
challenges if it intended to preserve this claim. Its failure to clearly
raise the argument, and the appeals court’s silence on the issue, lead
this Court to accept the District Court’s conclusion. Pp. 422–424.
(b) The District Court correctly concluded that when Engelgau de
signed the claim 4 subject matter, it was obvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the art to combine Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal position
sensor. There then was a marketplace creating a strong incentive to
convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the prior art taught
a number of methods for doing so. The Federal Circuit considered the
issue too narrowly by, in effect, asking whether a pedal designer writing
on a blank slate would have chosen both Asano and a modular sensor
similar to the ones used in the Chevrolet trucks and disclosed in the
’068 patent. The proper question was whether a pedal designer of ordi
nary skill in the art, facing the wide range of needs created by develop
ments in the field, would have seen an obvious benefit to upgrading
Asano with a sensor. For such a designer starting with Asano, the
question was where to attach the sensor. The ’936 patent taught the
utility of putting the sensor on the pedal device. Smith, in turn, ex
plained not to put the sensor on the pedal footpad, but instead on the
structure. And from Rixon’s known wire-chafing problems, and Smith’s
teaching that the pedal assemblies must not precipitate any motion in
the connecting wires, the designer would know to place the sensor on a
nonmoving part of the pedal structure. The most obvious such point is
a pivot point. The designer, accordingly, would follow Smith in mount
ing the sensor there. Just as it was possible to begin with the objective
to upgrade Asano to work with a computer-controlled throttle, so too
was it possible to take an adjustable electronic pedal like Rixon and
seek an improvement that would avoid the wire-chafing problem. Tel
eflex has not shown anything in the prior art that taught away from the

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use of Asano, nor any secondary factors to dislodge the determination
that claim 4 is obvious. Pp. 424–426.
3. The Court disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s holding that genu
ine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The ultimate
judgment of obviousness is a legal determination. Graham, 383 U. S.,
at 17. Where, as here, the prior art’s content, the patent claim’s scope,
and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute and
the claim’s obviousness is apparent, summary judgment is appropriate.
Pp. 426–427.
119 Fed. Appx. 282, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
James W. Dabney argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Stephen S. Rabinowitz, Henry C. Leb
owitz, Mitchell E. Epner, Darcy M. Goddard, and John F.
Duffy.
Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Keisler, Jeffrey P. Minear, Anthony J.
Steinmeyer, Anthony A. Yang, John M. Whealan, and Wil
liam G. Jenks.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the briefs were Garreth A. Sarosi, Kenneth C.
Bass III, Robert G. Sterne, Rodger D. Young, Samuel J.
Haidle, and David M. LaPrairie.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AARP et al. by
Barbara A. Jones, Sarah L. Lock, Stacy Canan, and Michael Schuster; for
the Business Software Alliance by Andrew J. Pincus, Miriam R. Nemetz,
and Evan P. Schultz; for Cisco Systems Inc. et al. by Peter A. Sullivan
and William R. Stein; for the Computer & Communications Industry As
sociation by Jonathan Band; for Economists and Legal Historians by
Joshua D. Sarnoff; for Intel Corp. et al. by Theodore B. Olson, Matthew
D. McGill, Amir C. Tayrani, and Tina M. Chappell; for the Progress &
Freedom Foundation by James V. Delong; and for Joseph V. Colaianni, Sr.,
et al. by Mr. Colaianni, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Altitude Capital
Partners et al. by Lawrence S. Robbins and Roy T. Englert, Jr.; for the
American Bar Association by Karen J. Mathis, Mark T. Banner, and Paul

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Teleflex Incorporated and its subsidiary Technology Hold
ing Company—both referred to here as Teleflex—sued KSR
International Company for patent infringement. The pat
ent at issue, United States Patent No. 6,237,565 B1, is enti-
M. Rivard; for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by
Jeffrey I. D. Lewis, Melissa Mandrgoc, and Melvin C. Garner; for the
Biotechnology Industry Organization by Beth S. Brinkmann and Seth M.
Galanter; for Chemistry and Bioengineering Professors by Henry L.
Brinks, Meredith Martin Addy, and K. Shannon Mrksich; for Fallbrook
Technologies, Inc., et al. by Don W. Martens, Justin A. Nelson, and Brooke
A. M. Taylor; for the Franklin Pierce Law Center Intellectual Property
Amicus Clinic by Thomas G. Field, Jr., and J. Scott Anderson; for the
Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago by Patrick G. Burns,
Edward D. Manzo, and Dean A. Monco; for Michelin North America, Inc.,
et al. by Richard W. Hoffmann and Cary W. Brooks; for Technology Prop
erties Limited by Roger L. Cook; for Tessera, Inc., et al. by Adam H.
Charnes; for the United Inventors Association by Robert F. Redmond, Jr.;
for the 3M Co. et al. by Gary L. Griswold, Q. Todd Dickinson, Steven W.
Miller, and Philip S. Johnson; for Harold W. Milton, Jr., by Mr. Milton,
pro se; and for Lee Thomason by Mr. Thomason, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Bar Association of the District
of Columbia—Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section by Blair E. Taylor
and Lynn E. Eccleston; for Business and Law Professors by Christopher
A. Cotropia, F. Scott Kieff, and Mark A. Lemley, all pro se; for the Elec
tronic Frontier Foundation by Jason Schultz and Corynne McSherry; for
the Federal Circuit Bar Association by Frank A. Angileri; for Ford Motor
Co. et al. by Catherine E. Stetson, William J. Coughlin, and Franklin
A. Mackenzie; for Intellectual Property Law Professors by Katherine J.
Strandburg, Joseph Scott Miller, Thomas F. Cotter, Eileen Kane, Malla
Pollack, and Pamela Samuelson, all pro se; for the Intellectual Property
Owners Association by Paul H. Berghoff and Richard F. Phillips; for the
International Business Machines Corp. by Traci L. Lovitt, Glen D. Nager,
Gregory A. Castanias, and Kenneth R. Adamo; for the New York Intellec
tual Property Law Association by Rochelle K. Seide, John K. Hsu, and
Marylee Jenkins; for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America by Allen M. Sokal; for Practicing Patent Attorneys by William
W. Cochran, Samuel M. Freund, and Christopher R. Benson, all pro se;
for Time Warner Inc. et al. by Kathleen M. Sullivan and Daniel H.
Bromberg; for the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. by Rich
ard B. Nettler; and for Lee A. Hollaar by David M. Bennion.

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tled “Adjustable Pedal Assembly With Electronic Throttle
Control.” Supp. App. 1. The patentee is Steven J. Engel
gau, and the patent is referred to as “the Engelgau patent.”
Teleflex holds the exclusive license to the patent.
Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent describes a mechanism
for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable auto
mobile pedal so the pedal’s position can be transmitted to a
computer that controls the throttle in the vehicle’s engine.
When Teleflex accused KSR of infringing the Engelgau pat
ent by adding an electronic sensor to one of KSR’s previously
designed pedals, KSR countered that claim 4 was invalid
under the Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. § 103 (2000 ed. and Supp.
IV), because its subject matter was obvious.
Section 103(a) forbids issuance of a patent when “the dif
ferences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.”
In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1
(1966), the Court set out a framework for applying the statu
tory language of § 103, language itself based on the logic of
the earlier decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248
(1851), and its progeny. See 383 U. S., at 15–17. The analy
sis is objective:
“Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are
to be determined; differences between the prior art and
the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against
this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of
the subject matter is determined. Such secondary con
siderations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented.” Id., at 17–18.

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While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in
any particular case, the factors continue to define the inquiry
that controls. If a court, or patent examiner, conducts this
analysis and concludes the claimed subject matter was obvi
ous, the claim is invalid under § 103.
Seeking to resolve the question of obviousness with more
uniformity and consistency, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has employed an approach referred to by the
parties as the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test
(TSM test), under which a patent claim is only proved obvi
ous if “some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior
art teachings” can be found in the prior art, the nature of
the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary
skill in the art. See, e. g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc.,
174 F. 3d 1308, 1323–1324 (CA Fed. 1999). KSR challenges
that test, or at least its application in this case. See 119
Fed. Appx. 282, 286–290 (CA Fed. 2005). Because the Court
of Appeals addressed the question of obviousness in a man
ner contrary to § 103 and our precedents, we granted certio
rari, 548 U. S. 902 (2006). We now reverse.
I
A
In car engines without computer-controlled throttles, the
accelerator pedal interacts with the throttle via cable or
other mechanical link. The pedal arm acts as a lever rotat
ing around a pivot point. In a cable-actuated throttle con
trol the rotation caused by pushing down the pedal pulls a
cable, which in turn pulls open valves in the carburetor or
fuel injection unit. The wider the valves open, the more
fuel and air are released, causing combustion to increase and
the car to accelerate. When the driver takes his foot off the
pedal, the opposite occurs as the cable is released and the
valves slide closed.
In the 1990’s it became more common to install computers
in cars to control engine operation. Computer-controlled

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throttles open and close valves in response to electronic sig
nals, not through force transferred from the pedal by a me
chanical link. Constant, delicate adjustments of air and fuel
mixture are possible. The computer’s rapid processing of
factors beyond the pedal’s position improves fuel efficiency
and engine performance.
For a computer-controlled throttle to respond to a driver’s
operation of the car, the computer must know what is hap
pening with the pedal. A cable or mechanical link does not
suffice for this purpose; at some point, an electronic sensor
is necessary to translate the mechanical operation into digi
tal data the computer can understand.
Before discussing sensors further we turn to the mechani
cal design of the pedal itself. In the traditional design a
pedal can be pushed down or released but cannot have its
position in the footwell adjusted by sliding the pedal forward
or back. As a result, a driver who wishes to be closer or
farther from the pedal must either reposition himself in the
driver’s seat or move the seat in some way. In cars with
deep footwells these are imperfect solutions for drivers of
smaller stature. To solve the problem, inventors, beginning
in the 1970’s, designed pedals that could be adjusted to
change their location in the footwell. Important for this
case are two adjustable pedals disclosed in U. S. Patent Nos.
5,010,782 (filed July 28, 1989) (Asano) and 5,460,061 (filed
Sept. 17, 1993) (Redding). The Asano patent reveals a sup
port structure that houses the pedal so that even when the
pedal location is adjusted relative to the driver, one of the
pedal’s pivot points stays fixed. The pedal is also designed
so that the force necessary to push the pedal down is the
same regardless of adjustments to its location. The Redd
ing patent reveals a different, sliding mechanism where both
the pedal and the pivot point are adjusted.
We return to sensors. Well before Engelgau applied for
his challenged patent, some inventors had obtained patents
involving electronic pedal sensors for computer-controlled

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throttles. These inventions, such as the device disclosed in
U. S. Patent No. 5,241,936 (filed Sept. 9, 1991) (’936), taught
that it was preferable to detect the pedal’s position in the
pedal assembly, not in the engine. The ’936 patent disclosed
a pedal with an electronic sensor on a pivot point in the pedal
assembly. U. S. Patent No. 5,063,811 (filed July 9, 1990)
(Smith) taught that to prevent the wires connecting the sen
sor to the computer from chafing and wearing out, and to
avoid grime and damage from the driver’s foot, the sensor
should be put on a fixed part of the pedal assembly rather
than in or on the pedal’s footpad.
In addition to patents for pedals with integrated sensors
inventors obtained patents for self-contained modular sen
sors. A modular sensor is designed independently of a
given pedal so that it can be taken off the shelf and attached
to mechanical pedals of various sorts, enabling the pedals to
be used in automobiles with computer-controlled throttles.
One such sensor was disclosed in U. S. Patent No. 5,385,068
(filed Dec. 18, 1992) (’068). In 1994, Chevrolet manufactured
a line of trucks using modular sensors “attached to the pedal
assembly support bracket, adjacent to the pedal and engaged
with the pivot shaft about which the pedal rotates in opera
tion.” 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (ED Mich. 2003).
The prior art contained patents involving the placement
of sensors on adjustable pedals as well. For example, U. S.
Patent No. 5,819,593 (filed Aug. 17, 1995) (Rixon) discloses
an adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic sensor for
detecting the pedal’s position. In the Rixon pedal the sen
sor is located in the pedal footpad. The Rixon pedal was
known to suffer from wire chafing when the pedal was de
pressed and released.
This short account of pedal and sensor technology leads to
the instant case.
B
KSR, a Canadian company, manufactures and supplies auto
parts, including pedal systems. Ford Motor Company hired

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KSR in 1998 to supply an adjustable pedal system for vari
ous lines of automobiles with cable-actuated throttle con
trols. KSR developed an adjustable mechanical pedal for
Ford and obtained U. S. Patent No. 6,151,986 (filed July 16,
1999) (’986) for the design. In 2000, KSR was chosen by
General Motors Corporation (GMC or GM) to supply adjust
able pedal systems for Chevrolet and GMC light trucks that
used engines with computer-controlled throttles. To make
the ’986 pedal compatible with the trucks, KSR merely took
that design and added a modular sensor.
Teleflex is a rival to KSR in the design and manufacture
of adjustable pedals. As noted, it is the exclusive licensee of
the Engelgau patent. Engelgau filed the patent application
on August 22, 2000, as a continuation of a previous applica
tion for U. S. Patent No. 6,109,241, which was filed on Janu
ary 26, 1999. He has sworn he invented the patent’s subject
matter on February 14, 1998. The Engelgau patent dis
closes an adjustable electronic pedal described in the specifi
cation as a “simplified vehicle control pedal assembly that is
less expensive, and which uses fewer parts and is easier to
package within the vehicle.” Engelgau, col. 2, ll. 2–5, Supp.
App. 6. Claim 4 of the patent, at issue here, describes:
“A vehicle control pedal apparatus comprising:
“a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle structure;
“an adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm move
able in for[e] and aft directions with respect to said
support;
“a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal
assembly with respect to said support and defining a
pivot axis; and
“an electronic control attached to said support for con
trolling a vehicle system;
“said apparatus characterized by said electronic control
being responsive to said pivot for providing a signal that
corresponds to pedal arm position as said pedal arm piv

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ots about said pivot axis between rest and applied posi
tions wherein the position of said pivot remains constant
while said pedal arm moves in fore and aft directions
with respect to said pivot.” Id., col. 6, ll. 17–36, Supp.
App. 8 (diagram numbers omitted).
We agree with the District Court that the claim discloses “a
position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic pedal
position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal
assembly. Attaching the sensor to the support member
allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position while the
driver adjusts the pedal.” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 586–587.
Before issuing the Engelgau patent the U. S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) rejected one of the patent claims
that was similar to, but broader than, the present claim 4.
The claim did not include the requirement that the sensor be
placed on a fixed pivot point. The PTO concluded the claim
was an obvious combination of the prior art disclosed in
Redding and Smith, explaining:
“ ‘Since the prior ar[t] references are from the field of
endeavor, the purpose disclosed . . . would have been
recognized in the pertinent art of Redding. Therefore
it would have been obvious . . . to provide the device of
Redding with the . . . means attached to a support mem
ber as taught by Smith.’ ” Id., at 595.
In other words Redding provided an example of an adjust
able pedal, and Smith explained how to mount a sensor on a
pedal’s support structure, and the rejected patent claim
merely put these two teachings together.
Although the broader claim was rejected, claim 4 was later
allowed because it included the limitation of a fixed pivot
point, which distinguished the design from Redding’s. Ibid.
Engelgau had not included Asano among the prior art refer
ences, and Asano was not mentioned in the patent’s prosecu
tion. Thus, the PTO did not have before it an adjustable

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pedal with a fixed pivot point. The patent issued on May
29, 2001, and was assigned to Teleflex.
Upon learning of KSR’s design for GM, Teleflex sent a
warning letter informing KSR that its proposal would vio
late the Engelgau patent. “ ‘Teleflex believes that any sup
plier of a product that combines an adjustable pedal with
an electronic throttle control necessarily employs technology
covered by one or more’ ” of Teleflex’s patents. Id., at 585.
KSR refused to enter a royalty arrangement with Teleflex;
so Teleflex sued for infringement, asserting KSR’s pedal in
fringed the Engelgau patent and two other patents. Ibid.
Teleflex later abandoned its claims regarding the other pat
ents and dedicated the patents to the public. The remaining
contention was that KSR’s pedal system for GM infringed
claim 4 of the Engelgau patent. Teleflex has not argued that
the other three claims of the patent are infringed by KSR’s
pedal, nor has Teleflex argued that the mechanical adjustable
pedal designed by KSR for Ford infringed any of its patents.
C
The District Court granted summary judgment in KSR’s
favor. After reviewing the pertinent history of pedal de
sign, the scope of the Engelgau patent, and the relevant prior
art, the court considered the validity of the contested claim.
By direction of 35 U. S. C. § 282, an issued patent is presumed
valid. The District Court applied Graham’s framework to
determine whether under summary-judgment standards
KSR had overcome the presumption and demonstrated that
claim 4 was obvious in light of the prior art in existence
when the claimed subject matter was invented. See
§ 103(a).
The District Court determined, in light of the expert testi
mony and the parties’ stipulations, that the level of ordinary
skill in pedal design was “ ‘an undergraduate degree in me
chanical engineering (or an equivalent amount of industry
experience) [and] familiarity with pedal control systems for

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vehicles.’ ” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 590. The court then set
forth the relevant prior art, including the patents and pedal
designs described above.
Following Graham’s direction, the court compared the
teachings of the prior art to the claims of Engelgau. It
found “little difference.” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 590. Asano
taught everything contained in claim 4 except the use of a
sensor to detect the pedal’s position and transmit it to the
computer controlling the throttle. That additional aspect
was revealed in sources such as the ’068 patent and the sen
sors used by Chevrolet.
Under the controlling cases from the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, however, the District Court was not per
mitted to stop there. The court was required also to apply
the TSM test. The District Court held KSR had satisfied
the test. It reasoned (1) the state of the industry would
lead inevitably to combinations of electronic sensors and ad
justable pedals, (2) Rixon provided the basis for these devel
opments, and (3) Smith taught a solution to the wire-chafing
problems in Rixon, namely, locating the sensor on the fixed
structure of the pedal. This could lead to the combination
of Asano, or a pedal like it, with a pedal position sensor.
The conclusion that the Engelgau design was obvious was
supported, in the District Court’s view, by the PTO’s rejec
tion of the broader version of claim 4. Had Engelgau in
cluded Asano in his patent application, it reasoned, the PTO
would have found claim 4 to be an obvious combination of
Asano and Smith, as it had found the broader version an
obvious combination of Redding and Smith. As a final mat
ter, the District Court held that the secondary factor of Tel
eflex’s commercial success with pedals based on Engelgau’s
design did not alter its conclusion. The District Court
granted summary judgment for KSR.
With principal reliance on the TSM test, the Court of Ap
peals reversed. It ruled the District Court had not been
strict enough in applying the test, having failed to make

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“ ‘finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle
within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have
motivated one with no knowledge of [the] invention’ . . . to
attach an electronic control to the support bracket of the
Asano assembly.” 119 Fed. Appx., at 288 (quoting In re Kot
zab, 217 F. 3d 1365, 1371 (CA Fed. 2000); brackets in origi
nal). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court
was incorrect that the nature of the problem to be solved
satisfied this requirement because unless the “prior art ref
erences address[ed] the precise problem that the patentee
was trying to solve,” the problem would not motivate an in
ventor to look at those references. 119 Fed. Appx., at 288.
Here, the Court of Appeals found, the Asano pedal was
designed to solve the “ ‘constant ratio problem’ ”—that is, to
ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is the
same no matter how the pedal is adjusted—whereas Engel
gau sought to provide a simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable
electronic pedal. Ibid. As for Rixon, the court explained,
that pedal suffered from the problem of wire chafing but was
not designed to solve it. In the court’s view Rixon did not
teach anything helpful to Engelgau’s purpose. Smith, in
turn, did not relate to adjustable pedals and did not “neces
sarily go to the issue of motivation to attach the electronic
control on the support bracket of the pedal assembly.” Ibid.
When the patents were interpreted in this way, the Court of
Appeals held, they would not have led a person of ordinary
skill to put a sensor on the sort of pedal described in Asano.
That it might have been obvious to try the combination of
Asano and a sensor was likewise irrelevant, in the court’s
view, because “ ‘ “[o]bvious to try” has long been held not to
constitute obviousness.’ ” Id., at 289 (quoting In re Deuel,
51 F. 3d 1552, 1559 (CA Fed. 1995)).
The Court of Appeals also faulted the District Court’s con
sideration of the PTO’s rejection of the broader version of
claim 4. The District Court’s role, the Court of Appeals ex
plained, was not to speculate regarding what the PTO might

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have done had the Engelgau patent mentioned Asano.
Rather, the court held, the District Court was obliged first
to presume that the issued patent was valid and then to ren
der its own independent judgment of obviousness based on
a review of the prior art. The fact that the PTO had re
jected the broader version of claim 4, the Court of Appeals
said, had no place in that analysis.
The Court of Appeals further held that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment. Teleflex had
proffered statements from one expert that claim 4 “ ‘was a
simple, elegant, and novel combination of features,’ ” 119 Fed.
Appx., at 290, compared to Rixon, and from another expert
that claim 4 was nonobvious because, unlike in Rixon, the
sensor was mounted on the support bracket rather than the
pedal itself. This evidence, the court concluded, sufficed to
require a trial.
II
A
We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of
Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the
question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expan
sive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the
Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here. To be sure,
Graham recognized the need for “uniformity and definite
ness.” 383 U. S., at 18. Yet the principles laid down in
Graham reaffirmed the “functional approach” of Hotchkiss,
11 How. 248. See 383 U. S., at 12. To this end, Graham set
forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate,
to look at any secondary considerations that would prove in
structive. Id., at 17.
Neither the enactment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham
disturbed this Court’s earlier instructions concerning the
need for caution in granting a patent based on the combina
tion of elements found in the prior art. For over a half cen
tury, the Court has held that a “patent for a combination

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which only unites old elements with no change in their re
spective functions . . . obviously withdraws what already is
known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the re
sources available to skillful men.” Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152–
153 (1950). This is a principal reason for declining to allow
patents for what is obvious. The combination of familiar el
ements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
when it does no more than yield predictable results. Three
cases decided after Graham illustrate the application of
this doctrine.
In United States v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 40 (1966), a com
panion case to Graham, the Court considered the obvious
ness of a “wet battery” that varied from prior designs in two
ways: It contained water, rather than the acids convention
ally employed in storage batteries; and its electrodes were
magnesium and cuprous chloride, rather than zinc and silver
chloride. The Court recognized that when a patent claims
a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by
the mere substitution of one element for another known in
the field, the combination must do more than yield a predict
able result. 383 U. S., at 50–51. It nevertheless rejected
the Government’s claim that Adams’ battery was obvious.
The Court relied upon the corollary principle that when the
prior art teaches away from combining certain known ele
ments, discovery of a successful means of combining them is
more likely to be nonobvious. Id., at 51–52. When Adams
designed his battery, the prior art warned that risks were
involved in using the types of electrodes he employed. The
fact that the elements worked together in an unexpected and
fruitful manner supported the conclusion that Adams’ design
was not obvious to those skilled in the art.
In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,
396 U. S. 57 (1969), the Court elaborated on this approach.
The subject matter of the patent before the Court was a
device combining two pre-existing elements: a radiant-heat

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burner and a paving machine. The device, the Court con
cluded, did not create some new synergy: The radiant-heat
burner functioned just as a burner was expected to function;
and the paving machine did the same. The two in combina
tion did no more than they would in separate, sequential op
eration. Id., at 60–62. In those circumstances, “while the
combination of old elements performed a useful function, it
added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-heat
burner already patented,” and the patent failed under § 103.
Id., at 62 (footnote omitted).
Finally, in Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U. S. 273 (1976),
the Court derived from the precedents the conclusion that
when a patent “simply arranges old elements with each per
forming the same function it had been known to perform”
and yields no more than one would expect from such an ar
rangement, the combination is obvious. Id., at 282.
The principles underlying these cases are instructive when
the question is whether a patent claiming the combination of
elements of prior art is obvious. When a work is available
in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market
forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or
a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement
a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.
For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve
one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same
way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual applica
tion is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida and Anderson’s-
Black Rock are illustrative—a court must ask whether the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions.
Following these principles may be more difficult in other
cases than it is here because the claimed subject matter may
involve more than the simple substitution of one known ele
ment for another or the mere application of a known tech
nique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement.

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Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known
to the design community or present in the marketplace; and
the background knowledge possessed by a person having or
dinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether
there was an apparent reason to combine the known ele
ments in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue. To fa
cilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. See
In re Kahn, 441 F. 3d 977, 988 (CA Fed. 2006) (“[R]ejections
on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclu
sory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness”). As our precedents make
clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise teach
ings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and cre
ative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ.
B
When it first established the requirement of demonstrat
ing a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known
elements in order to show that the combination is obvious,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals captured a helpful
insight. See Application of Bergel, 292 F. 2d 955, 956–957
(1961). As is clear from cases such as Adams, a patent com
posed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by
demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently,
known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one
to look with care at a patent application that claims as inno
vation the combination of two known devices according to
their established functions, it can be important to identify a
reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill
in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the
claimed new invention does. This is so because inventions
in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long
since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity

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will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already
known.
Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and man
datory formulas; and when it is so applied, the TSM test is
incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness analy
sis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the
words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overem
phasis on the importance of published articles and the ex
plicit content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive
pursuits and of modern technology counsels against limiting
the analysis in this way. In many fields it may be that there
is little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and
it often may be the case that market demand, rather than
scientific literature, will drive design trends. Granting pat
ent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary
course without real innovation retards progress and may, in
the case of patents combining previously known elements,
deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.
In the years since the Court of Customs and Patent Ap
peals set forth the essence of the TSM test, the Court of
Appeals no doubt has applied the test in accord with these
principles in many cases. There is no necessary inconsist
ency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Gra
ham analysis. But when a court transforms the general
principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry,
as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.
C
The flaws in the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate
for the most part to the court’s narrow conception of the
obviousness inquiry reflected in its application of the TSM
test. In determining whether the subject matter of a patent
claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the
avowed purpose of the patentee controls. What matters is
the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends to
what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103. One of the ways

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in which a patent’s subject matter can be proved obvious is
by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known
problem for which there was an obvious solution encom
passed by the patent’s claims.
The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was to
foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and patent
examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was
trying to solve. 119 Fed. Appx., at 288. The Court of Ap
peals failed to recognize that the problem motivating the pat
entee may be only one of many addressed by the patent’s
subject matter. The question is not whether the combina
tion was obvious to the patentee but whether the combina
tion was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art.
Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in
the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed
by the patent can provide a reason for combining the ele
ments in the manner claimed.
The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assump
tion that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a
problem will be led only to those elements of prior art de
signed to solve the same problem. Ibid. The primary pur
pose of Asano was solving the constant ratio problem; so, the
court concluded, an inventor considering how to put a sensor
on an adjustable pedal would have no reason to consider put
ting it on the Asano pedal. Ibid. Common sense teaches,
however, that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond
their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordi
nary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents
together like pieces of a puzzle. Regardless of Asano’s pri
mary purpose, the design provided an obvious example of an
adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point; and the prior art
was replete with patents indicating that a fixed pivot point
was an ideal mount for a sensor. The idea that a designer
hoping to make an adjustable electronic pedal would ignore
Asano because Asano was designed to solve the constant

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ratio problem makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill
is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.
The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to
conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved ob
vious merely by showing that the combination of elements
was “[o]bvious to try.” Id., at 289 (internal quotation marks
omitted). When there is a design need or market pressure
to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good rea
son to pursue the known options within his or her technical
grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely
the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and com
mon sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was
obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.
The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion
from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to
hindsight bias. A factfinder should be aware, of course, of
the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious
of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. See Graham,
383 U. S., at 36 (warning against a “temptation to read into
the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue” and
instructing courts to “ ‘guard against slipping into use of
hindsight’ ” (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn
Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F. 2d 406, 412 (CA6 1964))). Rigid
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common
sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor
consistent with it.
We note the Court of Appeals has since elaborated a
broader conception of the TSM test than was applied in the
instant matter. See, e. g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co.
Deutschland KG v. C. H. Patrick Co., 464 F. 3d 1356, 1367
(CA Fed. 2006) (“Our suggestion test is in actuality quite
flexible and not only permits, but requires, consideration of
common knowledge and common sense”); Alza Corp. v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F. 3d 1286, 1291 (2006) (“There is
flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence because a moti

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vation may be found implicitly in the prior art. We do not
have a rigid test that requires an actual teaching to
combine . . . ”). Those decisions, of course, are not now be
fore us and do not correct the errors of law made by the
Court of Appeals in this case. The extent to which they
may describe an analysis more consistent with our earlier
precedents and our decision here is a matter for the Court
of Appeals to consider in its future cases. What we hold is
that the fundamental misunderstandings identified above led
the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent
with our patent law decisions.
III
When we apply the standards we have explained to the
instant facts, claim 4 must be found obvious. We agree with
and adopt the District Court’s recitation of the relevant prior
art and its determination of the level of ordinary skill in the
field. As did the District Court, we see little difference be
tween the teachings of Asano and Smith and the adjustable
electronic pedal disclosed in claim 4 of the Engelgau patent.
A person having ordinary skill in the art could have com
bined Asano with a pedal position sensor in a fashion encom
passed by claim 4, and would have seen the benefits of
doing so.
A
Teleflex argues in passing that the Asano pedal cannot be
combined with a sensor in the manner described by claim 4
because of the design of Asano’s pivot mechanisms. See
Brief for Respondents 48–49, and n. 17. Therefore, Teleflex
reasons, even if adding a sensor to Asano was obvious, that
does not establish that claim 4 encompasses obvious subject
matter. This argument was not, however, raised before the
District Court. There Teleflex was content to assert only
that the problem motivating the invention claimed by the
Engelgau patent would not lead to the solution of combining
Asano with a sensor. See Teleflex’s Response to KSR’s Mo

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tion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity in No. 02–74586
(ED Mich.), pp. 18–20, App. 144a–146a. It is also unclear
whether the current argument was raised before the Court
of Appeals, where Teleflex advanced the nonspecific, conclu
sory contention that combining Asano with a sensor would
not satisfy the limitations of claim 4. See Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 04–1152 (CA Fed.), pp. 42–44.
Teleflex’s own expert declarations, moreover, do not support
the point Teleflex now raises. See Declaration of Clark J.
Radcliffe, Ph.D., Supp. App. 204–207; Declaration of Timothy
L. Andresen, id., at 208–210. The only statement in either
declaration that might bear on the argument is found in the
Radcliffe declaration:
“Asano . . . and the Rixon . . . are complex mechanical
linkage-based devices that are expensive to produce and
assemble and difficult to package. It is exactly these
difficulties with prior art designs that [Engelgau] re
solves. The use of an adjustable pedal with a single
pivot reflecting pedal position combined with an elec
tronic control mounted between the support and the ad
justment assembly at that pivot was a simple, elegant,
and novel combination of features in the Engelgau ’565
patent.” Id., at 206, ¶ 16.
Read in the context of the declaration as a whole this is best
interpreted to mean that Asano could not be used to solve
“[t]he problem addressed by Engelgau ’565[:] to provide a
less expensive, more quickly assembled, and smaller package
adjustable pedal assembly with electronic control.” Id., at
205, ¶ 10.
The District Court found that combining Asano with a
pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell within the scope of
claim 4. 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 592–593. Given the significance
of that finding to the District Court’s judgment, it is appar
ent that Teleflex would have made clearer challenges to it if
it intended to preserve this claim. In light of Teleflex’s fail

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ure to raise the argument in a clear fashion, and the silence
of the Court of Appeals on the issue, we take the District
Court’s conclusion on the point to be correct.
B
The District Court was correct to conclude that, as of the
time Engelgau designed the subject matter in claim 4, it was
obvious to a person of ordinary skill to combine Asano with
a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor. There then existed
a marketplace that created a strong incentive to convert me
chanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the prior art taught
a number of methods for achieving this advance. The Court
of Appeals considered the issue too narrowly by, in effect,
asking whether a pedal designer writing on a blank slate
would have chosen both Asano and a modular sensor similar
to the ones used in the Chevrolet truckline and disclosed in
the ’068 patent. The District Court employed this narrow
inquiry as well, though it reached the correct result never
theless. The proper question to have asked was whether a
pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of
needs created by developments in the field of endeavor,
would have seen a benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor.
In automotive design, as in many other fields, the interac
tion of multiple components means that changing one compo
nent often requires the others to be modified as well. Tech
nological developments made it clear that engines using
computer-controlled throttles would become standard. As a
result, designers might have decided to design new pedals
from scratch; but they also would have had reason to make
pre-existing pedals work with the new engines. Indeed, up
grading its own pre-existing model led KSR to design the
pedal now accused of infringing the Engelgau patent.
For a designer starting with Asano, the question was
where to attach the sensor. The consequent legal question,
then, is whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill starting
with Asano would have found it obvious to put the sensor on

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a fixed pivot point. The prior art discussed above leads us
to the conclusion that attaching the sensor where both KSR
and Engelgau put it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill.
The ’936 patent taught the utility of putting the sensor on
the pedal device, not in the engine. Smith, in turn, ex
plained to put the sensor not on the pedal’s footpad but in
stead on its support structure. And from the known wire
chafing problems of Rixon, and Smith’s teaching that “the
pedal assemblies must not precipitate any motion in the con
necting wires,” Smith, col. 1, ll. 35–37, Supp. App. 274, the
designer would know to place the sensor on a nonmoving
part of the pedal structure. The most obvious nonmoving
point on the structure from which a sensor can easily detect
the pedal’s position is a pivot point. The designer, accord
ingly, would follow Smith in mounting the sensor on a pivot,
thereby designing an adjustable electronic pedal covered by
claim 4.
Just as it was possible to begin with the objective to up
grade Asano to work with a computer-controlled throttle, so
too was it possible to take an adjustable electronic pedal like
Rixon and seek an improvement that would avoid the wire
chafing problem. Following similar steps to those just ex
plained, a designer would learn from Smith to avoid sensor
movement and would come, thereby, to Asano because Asano
disclosed an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot.
Teleflex indirectly argues that the prior art taught away
from attaching a sensor to Asano because Asano in its view
is bulky, complex, and expensive. The only evidence Tel
eflex marshals in support of this argument, however, is the
Radcliffe declaration, which merely indicates that Asano
would not have solved Engelgau’s goal of making a small,
simple, and inexpensive pedal. What the declaration does
not indicate is that Asano was somehow so flawed that there
was no reason to upgrade it, or pedals like it, to be compati
ble with modern engines. Indeed, Teleflex’s own declara

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tions refute this conclusion. Dr. Radcliffe states that Rixon
suffered from the same bulk and complexity as did Asano.
See id., at 206. Teleflex’s other expert, however, explained
that Rixon was itself designed by adding a sensor to a pre
existing mechanical pedal. See id., at 209. If Rixon’s base
pedal was not too flawed to upgrade, then Dr. Radcliffe’s dec
laration does not show Asano was either. Teleflex may have
made a plausible argument that Asano is inefficient as com
pared to Engelgau’s preferred embodiment, but to judge
Asano against Engelgau would be to engage in the very
hindsight bias Teleflex rightly urges must be avoided. Ac
cordingly, Teleflex has not shown anything in the prior art
that taught away from the use of Asano.
Like the District Court, finally, we conclude Teleflex has
shown no secondary factors to dislodge the determination
that claim 4 is obvious. Proper application of Graham and
our other precedents to these facts therefore leads to the
conclusion that claim 4 encompassed obvious subject matter.
As a result, the claim fails to meet the requirement of § 103.
We need not reach the question whether the failure to dis
close Asano during the prosecution of Engelgau voids the
presumption of validity given to issued patents, for claim 4
is obvious despite the presumption. We nevertheless think
it appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the pre
sumption—that the PTO, in its expertise, has approved the
claim—seems much diminished here.
IV
A separate ground the Court of Appeals gave for revers
ing the order for summary judgment was the existence of a
dispute over an issue of material fact. We disagree with the
Court of Appeals on this point as well. To the extent the
court understood the Graham approach to exclude the possi
bility of summary judgment when an expert provides a con
clusory affidavit addressing the question of obviousness, it
misunderstood the role expert testimony plays in the analy

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sis. In considering summary judgment on that question the
district court can and should take into account expert testi
mony, which may resolve or keep open certain questions of
fact. That is not the end of the issue, however. The ulti
mate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination.
Graham, 383 U. S., at 17. Where, as here, the content of the
prior art, the scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordi
nary skill in the art are not in material dispute, and the ob
viousness of the claim is apparent in light of these factors,
summary judgment is appropriate. Nothing in the declara
tions proffered by Teleflex prevented the District Court from
reaching the careful conclusions underlying its order for
summary judgment in this case.
* * *
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpa
ble reality around us new works based on instinct, simple
logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and some
times even genius. These advances, once part of our shared
knowledge, define a new threshold from which innovation
starts once more. And as progress beginning from higher
levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the
results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclu
sive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise pat
ents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful
arts. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. These premises led
to the bar on patents claiming obvious subject matter estab
lished in Hotchkiss and codified in § 103. Application of the
bar must not be confined within a test or formulation too
constrained to serve its purpose.
KSR provided convincing evidence that mounting a modu
lar sensor on a fixed pivot point of the Asano pedal was a
design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant art. Its arguments, and the record,
demonstrate that claim 4 of the Engelgau patent is obvious.
In rejecting the District Court’s rulings, the Court of Ap

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peals analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid manner inconsist
ent with § 103 and our precedents. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.