OFFICE OF SENATOR MARK DAYTON v. HANSON

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511 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
OFFICE OF SENATOR MARK DAYTON v. HANSON
appeal from the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 06–618. Argued April 24, 2007—Decided May 21, 2007
After his discharge from employment with former Senator Dayton, appel
lee Hanson sued appellant, the Senator’s office (Office), invoking the Dis
trict Court’s jurisdiction under the Congressional Accountability Act of
1995 (Act). The court denied a motion to dismiss based on a claim of
immunity under the Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause, and the
D. C. Circuit affirmed. The Office then sought to appeal under § 412 of
the Act, which authorizes review in this Court of “any . . . judgment . . .
upon the constitutionality of any provision” of the Act.
Held: This Court lacks jurisdiction under § 412 because neither the dis
missal denial nor the D. C. Circuit’s affirmance can fairly be character
ized as a ruling “upon the constitutionality” of any Act provision. The
District Court’s order does not state any grounds for decision, so it
cannot be characterized as a constitutional holding. Moreover, neither
the Court of Appeals’ rejection of the Office’s argument that forcing
the Senator to defend against Hanson’s allegations would necessarily
contravene the Speech or Debate Clause, nor that court’s leaving open
the possibility that the Clause may limit the proceedings’ scope in some
respects, qualifies as a ruling on the Act’s validity. The Office’s argu
ment that the appeals court’s holding amounts to a ruling that the Act
is constitutional “as applied” cannot be reconciled with § 413’s declara
tion that the Act’s authorization to sue “shall not constitute a waiver
of . . . the privileges of any Senator . . . under [the Clause].” Nor do
any special circumstances justify exercise of this Court’s discretionary
certiorari jurisdiction, the D. C. Circuit having abandoned an earlier
decision that was in conflict with another Circuit on the Clause’s applica
tion to suits challenging a congressional Member’s personnel decisions.
Pp. 513–515.
459 F. 3d 1, appeal dismissed; certiorari denied.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem
bers joined, except Roberts, C. J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.

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512 OFFICE OF SEN. MARK DAYTON v. HANSON
Opinion of the Court
Jean M. Manning argued the cause for appellant. With
her on the briefs were Toby R. Hyman, Claudia A. Kostel,
Dawn Bennett-Ingold, and Thomas C. Goldstein.
Richard A. Salzman argued the cause for appellee. With
him on the brief were Douglas B. Huron and Tammany M.
Kramer.
Thomas E. Caballero argued the cause for the United
States Senate as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With
him on the brief were Morgan J. Frankel, Patricia Mack
Bryan, and Grant R. Vinik.*
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prior to January 3, 2007, Mark Dayton represented the
State of Minnesota in the United States Senate. Appellee,
Brad Hanson, was employed in the Senator’s Ft. Snelling
office prior to his discharge by the Senator, which he alleges
occurred on July 3, 2002. Hanson brought this action for
damages against appellant, the Senator’s office (Office), in
voking the District Court’s jurisdiction under the Congres
sional Accountability Act of 1995 (Act), 109 Stat. 3, as
amended, 2 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV),
and alleging violations of three other federal statutes.1 The
District Court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the com
plaint based on a claim of immunity under the Speech or
*A brief of amicus curiae urging reversal was filed for the President
pro tempore of the Senate of Pennsylvania by John P. Krill, Jr., Linda J.
Shorey, and George A. Bibikos.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for Congressman
Barney Frank et al. by Glen D. Nager, Traci L. Lovitt, and Virginia A.
Seitz.
A brief of amicus curiae was filed for AARP by Thomas W. Osborne
and Melvin Radowitz.
1 Appellee alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 107 Stat. 6, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp.
IV), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327, 42 U. S. C.
§ 12101 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. (2000 ed.
and Supp. IV).

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513 Cite as: 550 U. S. 511 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
Debate Clause of the Constitution.2 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, Em
ploying Office, United States Congress, 459 F. 3d 1 (CADC
2006), the Office invoked our appellate jurisdiction under
§ 412 of the Act, 2 U. S. C. § 1412, and we postponed consider
ation of jurisdiction pending hearing the case on the merits,
549 U. S. 1177 (2007). Because we do not have jurisdiction
under § 412, we dismiss the appeal. Treating appellant’s ju
risdictional statement as a petition for a writ of certiorari,
we deny the petition.
Under § 412 of the Act, direct review in this Court is avail
able “from any interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or
order of a court upon the constitutionality of any provision”
of the statute.3 Neither the order of the District Court de
nying appellant’s motion to dismiss nor the judgment of the
Court of Appeals affirming that order can fairly be charac
terized as a ruling “upon the constitutionality” of any provi
sion of the Act. The District Court’s minute order denying
the motion to dismiss does not state any grounds for decision.
App. to Juris. Statement 59a. Both parties agree that that
order cannot, therefore, be characterized as a constitutional
holding.4 The Court of Appeals’ opinion rejects appellant’s
2 “[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Repre
sentatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.” Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
3 Section 412 reads in full:
“Expedited review of certain appeals
“(a) In general
“An appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States from any interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of a court
upon the constitutionality of any provision of this chapter.
“(b) Jurisdiction
“The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on the question,
accept jurisdiction over the appeal referred to in subsection (a) of this
section, advance the appeal on the docket, and expedite the appeal to the
greatest extent possible.” 2 U. S. C. § 1412.
4 Had the District Court’s order qualified as a ruling “upon the consti
tutionality” of a provision of the Act, the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction
to hear the appeal would have been called into serious doubt. See 28

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514 OFFICE OF SEN. MARK DAYTON v. HANSON
Opinion of the Court
argument that forcing Senator Dayton to defend against the
allegations in this case would necessarily contravene the
Speech or Debate Clause, although it leaves open the possi
bility that the Speech or Debate Clause may limit the scope
of the proceedings in some respects. Neither of those hold
ings qualifies as a ruling on the validity of the Act itself.
The Office argues that the Court of Appeals’ holding
amounts to a ruling that the Act is constitutional “as ap
plied.” According to the Office, an “as applied” constitu
tional holding of that sort satisfies the jurisdictional require
ments of § 412. We find this reading difficult to reconcile
with the statutory scheme. Section 413 of the Act pro
vides that
“[t]he authorization to bring judicial proceedings under
[the Act] shall not constitute a waiver of sovereign im
munity for any other purpose, or of the privileges of any
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
under [the Speech or Debate Clause] of the Constitu
tion.” 2 U. S. C. § 1413.
This provision demonstrates that Congress did not intend
the Act to be interpreted to permit suits that would other
wise be prohibited under the Speech or Debate Clause.
Consequently, a court’s determination that jurisdiction at
taches despite a claim of Speech or Debate Clause immunity
is best read as a ruling on the scope of the Act, not its consti
tutionality. This reading is faithful, moreover, to our estab
lished practice of interpreting statutes to avoid constitu
tional difficulties.5 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371,
381–382 (2005).
U. S. C. § 1291 (granting jurisdiction to the courts of appeals from final
decisions of federal district courts “except where a direct review may be
had in the Supreme Court”).
5 Nor does this reading make a dead letter out of § 412’s limitation of
appellate review in this Court to constitutional rulings. The possibility
remains that provisions of the Act could be challenged on constitutional
grounds unrelated to the Speech or Debate Clause.

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515 Cite as: 550 U. S. 511 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
The provision for appellate review is best understood as
responding to a congressional concern that if a provision of
the statute is declared invalid there is an interest in prompt
adjudication by this Court. To extend that review to in
stances in which the statute itself has not been called into
question, giving litigants under the Act preference over liti
gants in other cases, does not accord with that rationale.
This is also consistent with our cases holding that “statutes
authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed.” Perry
Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 43
(1983); see also Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42,
n. 1 (1970) (per curiam).
Nor are there special circumstances that justify the exer
cise of our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction to review the
Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the interlocutory order en
tered by the District Court. Having abandoned its decision
in Browning v. Clerk, U. S. House of Representatives, 789
F. 2d 923 (1986), the D. C. Circuit is no longer in obvious
conflict with any other Circuit on the application of the
Speech or Debate Clause to suits challenging the personnel
decisions of Members of Congress. Compare 459 F. 3d 1
(case below) with Bastien v. Office of Sen. Ben Nighthorse
Campbell, 390 F. 3d 1301 (CA10 2004).
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdic
tion, and certiorari is denied. We express no opinion on the
merits, nor do we decide whether this action became moot
upon the expiration of Senator Dayton’s term in office.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.