DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

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724 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
appeal from the united states district court for the
district of columbia
No. 07–320. Argued April 22, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008
Federal-law limits on the amount of contributions a House of Representa
tives candidate and his authorized committee may receive from an indi
vidual, and the amount his party may devote to coordinated campaign
expenditures, 2 U. S. C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A), (c), and (d), normally
apply equally to all competitors for a seat and their authorized commit
tees. However, § 319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), 2 U. S. C. § 441a–1(a), part of the so-called “Millionaire’s
Amendment,” fundamentally alters this scheme when, as a result of a
candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, the “opposition personal
funds amount” (OPFA) exceeds $350,000. The OPFA is a statistic com
paring competing candidates’ personal expenditures and taking account
of certain other fundraising. When a “self-financing” candidate’s per
sonal expenditure causes the OPFA to pass $350,000, a new, asymmet
rical regulatory scheme comes into play. The self-financing candidate
remains subject to the normal limitations, but his opponent, the “non
self-financing” candidate, may receive individual contributions at treble
the normal limit from individuals who have reached the normal limit on
aggregate contributions, and may accept coordinated party expendi
tures without limit. See §§ 441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C). Because calculating
the OPFA requires certain information about the self-financing candi
date’s campaign assets and personal expenditures, § 319(b) requires him
to file an initial “declaration of intent” revealing the amount of personal
funds the candidate intends to spend in excess of $350,000, and to make
additional disclosures to the other candidates, their national parties, and
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as his personal expenditures
exceed certain benchmarks.
Appellant Davis, a candidate for a House seat in 2004 and 2006 who
lost both times to the incumbent, notified the FEC for the 2006 election,
in compliance with § 319(b), that he intended to spend $1 million in per
sonal funds. After the FEC informed him it had reason to believe he
had violated § 319 by failing to report personal expenditures during the
2004 campaign, he filed this suit for a declaration that § 319 is unconsti
tutional and an injunction preventing the FEC from enforcing the sec
tion during the 2006 election. The District Court concluded sua sponte

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that Davis had standing, but rejected his claims on the merits and
granted the FEC summary judgment.
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Davis’ appeal. Pp. 732–736.
(a) Davis has standing to challenge § 319(b)’s disclosure require
ments. When he filed suit, he had already declared his 2006 candidacy
and had been forced by § 319(b) to disclose to his opponent that he in
tended to spend more than $350,000 in personal funds. He also faced
the imminent threat that he would have to follow up on that disclosure
with further notifications once he passed the $350,000 mark. Securing
a declaration that § 319(b) is unconstitutional and an injunction against
its enforcement would have spared him from making those disclosures
and also would have removed the real threat that the FEC would pursue
an enforcement action based on alleged § 319(b) violations during his
2004 campaign. Davis also has standing to challenge § 319(a)’s asym
metrical contribution limits. The standing inquiry focuses on whether
the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome
when the suit was filed, see, e. g., Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180, and a party
facing prospective injury has standing where the threatened injury is
real, immediate, and direct, see, e. g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95,
102. Davis faced the requisite injury from § 319(a) when he filed suit:
He had already declared his candidacy and his intent to spend more than
$350,000 of personal funds in the general election campaign whose onset
was rapidly approaching. Section 319(a) would shortly burden his per
sonal expenditure by allowing his opponent to receive contributions on
more favorable terms, and there was no indication that his opponent
would forgo that opportunity. Pp. 733–735.
(b) The FEC’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction because
Davis’ claims are moot also fails. In Federal Election Comm’n v. Wis
consin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, this Court rejected a very
similar claim of mootness, finding that the case “fit comfortably within the
established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet
evading review.” Id., at 462. That “exception applies where ‘(1) the
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior
to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.’ ”
Ibid. First, despite BCRA’s command that the case be expedited to
the greatest possible extent and Davis’ request that his case be resolved
before the 2006 election, the case could not be resolved before the
2006 election. See ibid. Second, the FEC has conceded that Davis’

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726 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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§ 319(a) claim would be capable of repetition if he planned to self-finance
another bid for a House seat, and he subsequently made a public state
ment expressing his intent to do so. See id., at 463. Pp. 735–736.
2. Sections 319(a) and (b) violate the First Amendment. If § 319(a)’s
elevated contribution limits applied across the board to all candidates,
Davis would have no constitutional basis for challenging them. Section
319(a), however, raises the limits only for non-self-financing candidates
and only when the self-financing candidate’s expenditure of personal
funds causes the OPFA threshold to be exceeded. This Court has
never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different contri
bution limits for candidates competing against each other, and it agrees
with Davis that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amend
ment right to spend his own money for campaign speech. In Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, the Court soundly rejected a cap on a candidate’s
expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech, holding that
a “candidate . . . has a First Amendment right to . . . vigorously and
tirelessly . . . advocate his own election,” and that a cap on personal
expenditures imposes “a substantial,” “clea[r,]” and “direc[t]” restraint
on that right, id., at 52–53. It found the cap at issue not justified by
“[t]he primary governmental interest” in “the prevention of actual and
apparent corruption of the political process,” id., at 53, or by “[t]he ancil
lary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates
competing for elective office,” id., at 54. Buckley is instructive here.
While BCRA does not impose a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of
personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate
who robustly exercises that First Amendment right, requiring him to
choose between the right to engage in unfettered political speech and
subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. The resulting
drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply because it
attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice. Id., at 54–57,
and n. 65, distinguished. The burden is not justified by any governmen
tal interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption,
see id., at 53. Nor can an interest in leveling electoral opportunities
for candidates of different personal wealth justify § 319(a)’s asym
metrical limits, see id., at 56–57. The Court has never recognized this
interest as a legitimate objective and doing so would have ominous im
plications for the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candi
dates competing for office. Finally, the Court rejects the Government’s
argument that § 319(a) is justified because it ameliorates the deleterious
effects resulting from the tight limits federal election law places on in
dividual campaign contributions and coordinated party expenditures.
Whatever this argument’s merits as an original matter, it is funda
mentally at war with Buckley’s analysis of expenditure and contri

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butions limits, which this Court has applied in subsequent cases.
Pp. 736–744.
3. Because § 319(a) is unconstitutional, § 319(b)’s disclosure require
ments, which were designed to implement the asymmetrical contribu
tion limits, are as well. “[C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, so the Court closely scrutinizes
such requirements, id., at 75. For significant encroachments to survive,
there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between
the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed,”
and the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the bur
den on First Amendment rights. Id., at 64. Given § 319(a)’s unconsti
tutionality, the burden imposed by the § 319(b) requirements cannot be
justified. P. 744.
501 F. Supp. 2d 22, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Sou
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II, post, p. 749. Gins
burg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 758.
Andrew D. Herman argued the cause for appellant. With
him on the briefs was Stanley M. Brand.
Former Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for
appellee. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor Gen
eral Garre, Malcolm L. Stewart, Thomasenia P. Duncan,
David Kolker, Kevin Deeley, and Holly J. Baker.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Center for
Competitive Politics by Erik S. Jaffe; and for Gene DeRossett et al. by
Kathleen M. Sullivan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Common Cause
by Bradley S. Phillips; and for Democracy 21 et al. by Seth P. Waxman,
Randolph D. Moss, Roger M. Witten, Donald J. Simon, J. Gerald Hebert,
Paul S. Ryan, Tara Malloy, Scott L. Nelson, Fred Wertheimer, and Debo
rah Goldberg.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Cato Institute by Benjamin D.
Wood, William J. McGinley, Glenn M. Willard, and Ilya Shapiro; and for

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728 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we consider the constitutionality of federal
election law provisions that, under certain circumstances,
impose different campaign contribution limits on candidates
competing for the same congressional seat.
I
A
Federal law limits the amount of money that a candidate
for the House of Representatives and the candidate’s author
ized committee may receive from an individual, as well as
the amount that the candidate’s party may devote to coordi
nated campaign expenditures. 2 U. S. C. § 441a (2006 ed.).1
Under the usual circumstances, the same restrictions apply
to all the competitors for a seat and their authorized commit
tees. Contributions from individual donors during a 2-year
election cycle are subject to a cap, which is currently set at
$2,300. See §§ 441a(a)(1)(A), (c); 72 Fed. Reg. 5295 (2007).
In addition, no funds may be accepted from an individual
whose aggregate contributions to candidates and their com
mittees during the election cycle have reached the legal
limit, currently $42,700. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 441a(a)(3)(A), (c);
72 Fed. Reg. 5295. A candidate also may not accept general
election coordinated expenditures by national or state politi
cal party committees that exceed an imposed limit. See 2
U. S. C. §§ 441a(c), (d). Currently, the limit for candidates in
States with more than one House seat is $40,900. 72 Fed.
Reg. 5294.2
the James Madison Center for Free Speech et al. by James Bopp, Jr., and
Richard E. Coleson.
1 All undesignated references in this opinion to 2 U. S. C. are to the
2006 edition.
2 These limits are adjusted for inflation every two years. 2 U. S. C.
§ 441a(c).

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Section 319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 109, 2 U. S. C. § 441a–1(a),3 part of
the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,” fundamentally al
ters this scheme when, as a result of a candidate’s expendi
ture of personal funds, the “opposition personal funds
amount” (OPFA) exceeds $350,000.4 The OPFA, in simple
terms, is a statistic that compares the expenditure of per
sonal funds by competing candidates and also takes into
account to some degree certain other fundraising.5 See
§ 441a–1(a). When a candidate’s expenditure of personal
funds causes the OPFA to pass the $350,000 mark (for con
venience, such candidates will be referred to as “self
financing”), a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme comes
into play. The self-financing candidate remains subject to
the limitations noted above, but the candidate’s opponent
(the “non-self-financing” candidate) may receive individual
contributions at treble the normal limit (e. g., $6,900 rather
than the current $2,300), even from individuals who have
reached the normal aggregate contributions cap, and may
accept coordinated party expenditures without limit. See
§§ 441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C). Once the non-self-financing candi
date’s receipts exceed the OPFA, the prior limits are re
vived. § 441a–1(a)(3). A candidate who does not spend the
3 BCRA §§ 319(a) and (b) are set out in an appendix to this opinion.
Although what we refer to as §§ 319(a) and (b) are actually § 315A(a) and
(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which were added to
that Act by BCRA § 319(a), we follow the convention of the parties in
making reference to §§ 319(a) and (b).
4 BCRA § 304 similarly regulates self-financed Senate bids. 116 Stat.
97, 2 U. S. C. § 441a(i).
5 The OPFA is calculated as follows. For each candidate, expenditures
of personal funds are added to 50% of the funds raised for the election at
issue measured at designated dates in the year preceding the election.
The resulting figures are compared, and if the difference is greater than
$350,000, the asymmetrical limits take effect. See §§ 441a–1(a)(1), (2).

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contributions received under the asymmetrical limits must
return them. § 441a–1(a)(4).
In order to calculate the OPFA, certain information is
needed about the self-financing candidate’s campaign assets
and personal expenditures. Section 319(b) thus requires
self-financing candidates to make three types of disclosures.
First, within 15 days after entering a race, a candidate must
file a “[d]eclaration of intent” revealing the amount of
personal funds the candidate intends to spend in excess
of $350,000. 2 U. S. C. § 441a–1(b)(1)(B). A candidate who
does not intend to cross this threshold may simply declare
an intent to spend no personal funds. 11 CFR § 400.20(a)(2)
(2008). Second, within 24 hours of crossing or becoming ob
ligated to cross the $350,000 mark, the candidate must file an
“[i]nitial notification.” 2 U. S. C. § 441a–1(b)(1)(C). Third,
the candidate must file an “[a]dditional notification” within
24 hours of making or becoming obligated to make each addi
tional expenditure of $10,000 or more using personal funds.
§ 441a–1(b)(1)(D). The initial and additional notifications
must provide the date and amount of each expenditure from
personal funds, and all notifications must be filed with the
Federal Election Commission (FEC), all other candidates for
the seat, and the national parties of all those candidates.
§ 441a–1(b)(1)(E). Failure to comply with the reporting
requirements may result in civil and criminal penalties.
§§ 437g(a)(5)–(6), (d)(1).
A non-self-financing candidate and the candidate’s commit
tee face less extensive disclosure requirements. Within 24
hours after receiving an “initial” or “additional” notification
filed by a self-financing opponent, a non-self-financing candi
date must provide notice to the FEC and the national and
state committees of the candidate’s party if the non-self
financing candidate concludes based on the newly acquired
information that the OPFA has passed the $350,000 mark.
11 CFR § 400.30(b)(2). In addition, when the additional con
tributions that a non-self-financing candidate is authorized

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to receive pursuant to the asymmetrical limitations scheme
equals the OPFA, the non-self-financing candidate must no
tify the FEC and the appropriate national and state com
mittees within 24 hours. § 400.31(e)(1)(ii). The non-self
financing candidate must also provide notice regarding any
refunds of “excess funds” (funds received under the in
creased limits but not used in the campaign). §§ 400.50,
400.54. For their part, political parties must notify the FEC
and the candidate they support within 24 hours of making
any expenditures that exceed the normal limit for coordi
nated party expenditures. § 400.30(c)(2).
B
Appellant Jack Davis was the Democratic candidate for
the House of Representatives from New York’s 26th Con
gressional District in 2004 and 2006. In both elections, he
lost to the incumbent. In his brief, Davis discloses having
spent $1.2 million, principally his own funds, on his 2004 cam
paign. Brief for Appellant 4. He reports spending $2.3
million in 2006, all but $126,000 of which came from personal
funds. Id., at 13. His opponent in 2006 spent no personal
funds. Indeed, although the OPFA calculation provided the
opportunity for Davis’ opponent to raise nearly $1.5 million
under § 319(a)’s asymmetrical limits, Davis’ opponent ad
hered to the normal contribution limits.
Davis’ 2006 candidacy began in March 2006, when he filed
with the FEC a “Statement of Candidacy” and, in compliance
with § 319(b), declared that he intended to spend $1 million
in personal funds during the general election. Two months
later, in anticipation of this expenditure and its § 319 conse
quences, Davis filed suit against the FEC, requesting that
§ 319 be declared unconstitutional and that the FEC be en
joined from enforcing it during the 2006 election.
After Davis declared his candidacy but before he filed suit,
the FEC’s general counsel notified him that it had reason to
believe that he had violated § 319 by failing to report per

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sonal expenditures during the 2004 campaign. The FEC
proposed a conciliation agreement under which Davis would
pay a substantial civil penalty. Davis responded by agree
ing to toll the limitations period for an FEC enforcement
action until resolution of this suit.
Davis filed this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, and a three-judge panel was
convened. BCRA § 403, 116 Stat. 113, note following 2
U. S. C. § 437h. While Davis requested that the case be de
cided before the general election campaign began on Septem
ber 12, 2006, the FEC opposed the request, asserting the
need for extensive discovery, and the request was denied.
Ultimately, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.
Ruling on those motions, the District Court began by ad
dressing Davis’ standing sua sponte. The court concluded
that Davis had standing, but rejected his claims on the mer
its and granted summary judgment for the FEC. 501
F. Supp. 2d 22 (2007). Davis then invoked BCRA’s exclusive
avenue for appellate review—direct appeal to this Court.
Note following § 437h. We deferred full consideration of our
jurisdiction, 552 U. S. 1135 (2008), and we now reverse.
II
Like the District Court, we must first ensure that we have
jurisdiction to hear Davis’ appeal. Article III restricts fed
eral courts to the resolution of cases and controversies. Ar
izonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 64
(1997). That restriction requires that the party invoking
federal jurisdiction have standing—the “personal interest
that must exist at the commencement of the litigation.”
Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But it is not enough that the requisite in
terest exist at the outset. “To qualify as a case fit for

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federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be
extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is filed.’ ” Arizonans for Official English, supra,
at 67. The FEC argues that Davis’ appeal fails to present
a constitutional case or controversy because Davis lacks
standing and because his claims are moot. We address each
of these issues in turn.
A
As noted, the requirement that a claimant have “stand
ing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or
controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defend
ers of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Arizonans
for Official English, supra, at 64. To qualify for standing,
a claimant must present an injury that is concrete, partic
ularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
defendant’s challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed
by a favorable ruling. Lujan, supra, at 560–561.
The District Court held, and the parties do not dispute,
that Davis possesses standing to challenge the disclosure re
quirements of § 319(b). When Davis filed suit, he had al
ready declared his 2006 candidacy and had been forced by
§ 319(b) to disclose to his opponent that he intended to spend
more than $350,000 in personal funds. At that time, Davis
faced the imminent threat that he would have to follow up
on that disclosure with further notifications after he in fact
passed the $350,000 mark. Securing a declaration that
§ 319(b)’s requirements are unconstitutional and an injunc
tion against their enforcement would have spared him from
making those disclosures. That relief also would have re
moved the real threat that the FEC would pursue an
enforcement action based on alleged violations of § 319(b)
during his 2004 campaign. As a result, Davis possesses
standing to challenge § 319(b)’s disclosure requirement.
The fact that Davis has standing to challenge § 319(b) does
not necessarily mean that he also has standing to challenge

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the scheme of contribution limitations that applies when
§ 319(a) comes into play. “[S]tanding is not dispensed in
gross.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 358, n. 6 (1996).
Rather, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim
he seeks to press” and “ ‘for each form of relief ’ ” that is
sought. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 352
(2006) (quoting Friends of Earth, supra, at 185).
In light of these principles, the FEC argues that Davis
lacks standing to attack § 319(a)’s asymmetrical limits.
When Davis commenced this action, his opponent had not
yet qualified for the asymmetrical limits, and later, when his
opponent did qualify to take advantage of those limits, he
chose not to do so. Accordingly, the FEC argues that
§ 319(a) did not cause Davis any injury.
While the proof required to establish standing increases
as the suit proceeds, see Lujan, supra, at 561, the standing
inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking juris
diction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit
was filed. Friends of Earth, supra, at 180; Arizonans for
Official English, supra, at 68, n. 22. As noted above, the
injury required for standing need not be actualized. A
party facing prospective injury has standing to sue where
the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct. Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983); see also Babbitt
v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979) (A plaintiff may
challenge the prospective operation of a statute that pre
sents a realistic and impending threat of direct injury).
Davis faced such an injury from the operation of § 319(a)
when he filed suit. Davis had declared his candidacy and
his intent to spend more than $350,000 of personal funds in
the general election campaign whose onset was rapidly ap
proaching. Section 319(a) would shortly burden his expend
iture of personal funds by allowing his opponent to receive
contributions on more favorable terms, and there was no in
dication that his opponent would forgo that opportunity. In

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deed, the record at summary judgment indicated that most
candidates who had the opportunity to receive expanded con
tributions had done so. App. 89. In these circumstances,
we conclude that Davis faced the requisite injury from
§ 319(a) when he filed suit and has standing to challenge that
provision’s asymmetrical contribution scheme.
B
The FEC’s mootness argument also fails. This case
closely resembles Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (2007). There, Wisconsin
Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit, ideological advocacy cor
poration, wished to run radio and TV ads within 30 days of
the 2004 Wisconsin primary, contrary to a restriction im
posed by BCRA. WRTL sued the FEC, seeking declara
tory and injunctive relief. Although the suit was not re
solved before the 2004 election, we rejected the FEC’s claim
of mootness, finding that the case “fit comfortably within the
established exception to mootness for disputes capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” Id., at 462. That “excep
tion applies where ‘(1) the challenged action is in its duration
too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration,
and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same com
plaining party will be subject to the same action again.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 17 (1998)).
In WRTL, “despite BCRA’s command that the cas[e] be
expedited ‘to the greatest possible extent,’ ” WRTL’s claims
could not reasonably be resolved before the election con
cluded. 551 U. S., at 462 (quoting § 403(a)(4), 116 Stat. 114,
note following 2 U. S. C. § 437h). Similarly, in this case de
spite BCRA’s mandate to expedite and Davis’ request that
his case be resolved before the 2004 general election season
commenced, Davis’ case could not be resolved before the
2006 election concluded, demonstrating that his claims are
capable of evading review.

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As to the second prong of the exception, even though
WRTL raised an as-applied challenge, we found its suit capa
ble of repetition where “WRTL credibly claimed that it
planned on running ‘materially similar’ future” ads subject
to BCRA’s prohibition and had, in fact, sought an injunction
that would permit such an ad during the 2006 election. 551
U. S., at 463 (some internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
the FEC conceded in its brief that Davis’ § 319(a) claim
would be capable of repetition if Davis planned to self-finance
another bid for a House seat. Brief for Appellee 14, 20–21,
and n. 5. Davis subsequently made a public statement ex
pressing his intent to do so. See Reply Brief 16 (citing Ter
reri, Democrat Davis Confirms He’ll Run Again for Con
gress, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Mar. 27, 2008,
p. 5B). As a result, we are satisfied that Davis’ facial chal
lenge is not moot.6
III
We turn to the merits of Davis’ claim that the First
Amendment is violated by the contribution limits that apply
when § 319(a) comes into play. Under this scheme, as pre
viously noted, when a candidate spends more than $350,000
in personal funds and creates what the statute apparently
regards as a financial imbalance, that candidate’s opponent
may qualify to receive both larger individual contributions
than would otherwise be allowed and unlimited coordinated
party expenditures. Davis contends that § 319(a) unconsti
tutionally burdens his exercise of his First Amendment right
to make unlimited expenditures of his personal funds be
cause making expenditures that create the imbalance has the
effect of enabling his opponent to raise more money and to
use that money to finance speech that counteracts and thus
diminishes the effectiveness of Davis’ own speech.
6 In light of this conclusion, we need not decide whether the threat of an
FEC enforcement action for alleged 2004 violations would be sufficient to
keep this controversy alive.

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A
If § 319(a) simply raised the contribution limits for all can
didates, Davis’ argument would plainly fail. This Court has
previously sustained the facial constitutionality of limits on
discrete and aggregate individual contributions and on coor
dinated party expenditures. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1,
23–35, 38, 46–47, and n. 53 (1976) (per curiam); Federal Elec
tion Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 437, 465 (2001) (Colorado II). At the
same time, the Court has recognized that such limits impli
cate First Amendment interests and that they cannot stand
unless they are “closely drawn” to serve a “sufficiently im
portant interest,” such as preventing corruption and the ap
pearance of corruption. See, e. g., McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 136, 138, n. 40 (2003); Colo
rado II, supra, at 456; Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern
ment PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 387–388 (2000); Buckley, supra, at
25–30, 38. When contribution limits are challenged as too
restrictive, we have extended a measure of deference to the
judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law. See,
e. g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 248 (2006) (plurality
opinion); Nixon, supra, at 396–397; Buckley, supra, at 30,
111, 103–104. But we have held that limits that are too low
cannot stand. Randall, 548 U. S., at 246–262; id., at 263
(Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
There is, however, no constitutional basis for attacking
contribution limits on the ground that they are too high.
Congress has no constitutional obligation to limit contribu
tions at all; and if Congress concludes that allowing contribu
tions of a certain amount does not create an undue risk of
corruption or the appearance of corruption, a candidate who
wishes to restrict an opponent’s fundraising cannot argue
that the Constitution demands that contributions be regu
lated more strictly. Consequently, if § 319(a)’s elevated con
tribution limits applied across the board, Davis would not
have any basis for challenging those limits.

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738 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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B
Section 319(a), however, does not raise the contribution
limits across the board. Rather, it raises the limits only
for the non-self-financing candidate and does so only when
the self-financing candidate’s expenditure of personal funds
causes the OPFA threshold to be exceeded. We have never
upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different
contribution limits for candidates who are competing against
each other, and we agree with Davis that this scheme imper
missibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his
own money for campaign speech.
In Buckley, we soundly rejected a cap on a candidate’s
expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech.
We held that a “candidate . . . has a First Amendment right
to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously
and tirelessly to advocate his own election” and that a cap
on personal expenditures imposes “a substantial,” “clea[r],”
and “direc[t]” restraint on that right. 424 U. S., at 52–53.
We found that the cap at issue was not justified by “[t]he
primary governmental interest” proffered in its defense, i. e.,
“the prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the po
litical process.” Id., at 53. Far from preventing these
evils, “the use of personal funds,” we observed, “reduces the
candidate’s dependence on outside contributions and thereby
counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of
abuse to which . . . contribution limitations are directed.”
Ibid. We also rejected the argument that the expenditure
cap could be justified on the ground that it served “[t]he an
cillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources
of candidates competing for elective office.” Id., at 54.
This putative interest, we noted, was “clearly not sufficient
to justify the . . . infringement of fundamental First Amend
ment rights.” Ibid.
Buckley’s emphasis on the fundamental nature of the right
to spend personal funds for campaign speech is instructive.
While BCRA does not impose a cap on a candidate’s expendi

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ture of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty
on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amend
ment right. Section 319(a) requires a candidate to choose
between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered
political speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising
limitations. Many candidates who can afford to make large
personal expenditures to support their campaigns may
choose to do so despite § 319(a), but they must shoulder a
special and potentially significant burden if they make that
choice. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F. 3d 1356, 1359–1360 (CA8
1994) (concluding that a Minnesota law that increased a can
didate’s expenditure limits and eligibility for public funds
based on independent expenditures against her candidacy
burdened the speech of those making the independent ex
penditures); Brief for Appellee 29 (conceding that “[§] 319
does impose some consequences on a candidate’s choice to
self-finance beyond certain amounts”). Under § 319(a), the
vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance
campaign speech produces fundraising advantages for op
ponents in the competitive context of electoral politics.
Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal.,
475 U. S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality opinion) (finding infringement
on speech rights where if the plaintiff spoke it could “be
forced . . . to help disseminate hostile views”).
The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not con
stitutional simply because it attaches as a consequence of a
statutorily imposed choice. In Buckley, we held that Con
gress “may engage in public financing of election campaigns
and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agree
ment by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limi
tations” even though we found an independent limit on over
all campaign expenditures to be unconstitutional. 424 U. S.,
at 57, n. 65; see id., at 54–58. But the choice involved in
Buckley was quite different from the choice imposed by
§ 319(a). In Buckley, a candidate, by forgoing public financ
ing, could retain the unfettered right to make unlimited per

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740 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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sonal expenditures. Here, § 319(a) does not provide any way
in which a candidate can exercise that right without abridg
ment. Instead, a candidate who wishes to exercise that
right has two choices: abide by a limit on personal expendi
tures or endure the burden that is placed on that right by the
activation of a scheme of discriminatory contribution limits.
The choice imposed by § 319(a) is not remotely parallel to
that in Buckley.
Because § 319(a) imposes a substantial burden on the exer
cise of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for
campaign speech, that provision cannot stand unless it is
“justified by a compelling state interest,” Federal Election
Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S.
238, 256 (1986); see also, e. g., McConnell, 540 U. S., at 205;
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652,
657–658 (1990); id., at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id., at
701, 702–703 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Federal Election
Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U. S. 480, 500–501 (1985); First Nat. Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978); Colorado Republican Fed
eral Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518
U. S. 604, 609 (1996) (Colorado I) (principal opinion); id., at
640–641 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting
in part). No such justification is present here.7
The burden imposed by § 319(a) on the expenditure of per
sonal funds is not justified by any governmental interest in
eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption. The
Buckley Court reasoned that reliance on personal funds re
7 Even if § 319(a) were characterized as a limit on contributions rather
than expenditures, it is doubtful whether it would survive. A contribu
tion limit involving “ ‘ “significant interference” ’ ” with associational rights
must be “ ‘ “closely drawn” ’ ” to serve a “ ‘ “sufficiently important inter
est.” ’ ” McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 136 (2003).
For the reasons explained infra, at 742, the chief interest proffered
in support of the asymmetrical contribution scheme—leveling electoral
opportunities—cannot justify the infringement of First Amendment
interests.

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duces the threat of corruption, and therefore § 319(a), by dis
couraging use of personal funds, disserves the anticorruption
interest. Similarly, given Congress’ judgment that liberal
ized limits for non-self-financing candidates do not unduly
imperil anticorruption interests, it is hard to imagine how
the denial of liberalized limits to self-financing candidates
can be regarded as serving anticorruption goals sufficiently
to justify the resulting constitutional burden.
The Government maintains that § 319(a)’s asymmetrical
limits are justified because they “level electoral opportuni
ties for candidates of different personal wealth.” Brief for
Appellee 34. “Congress enacted Section 319,” the Govern
ment writes, “to reduce the natural advantage that wealthy
individuals possess in campaigns for federal office.” Id., at
33 (emphasis added). Our prior decisions, however, provide
no support for the proposition that this is a legitimate gov
ernment objective. See Nixon, 528 U. S., at 428 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“ ‘[P]reventing corruption or the appearance
of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling govern
ment interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances’ ” (quoting National Conservative Political Action
Comm., supra, at 496–497)); Randall, 548 U. S., at 268
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (noting “the interests
the Court has recognized as compelling, i. e., the prevention
of corruption or the appearance thereof ”). On the contrary,
in Buckley, we held that “[t]he interest in equalizing the fi
nancial resources of candidates” did not provide a “justifica
tion for restricting” candidates’ overall campaign expendi
tures, particularly where equalization “might serve . . . to
handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recogni
tion or exposure of his views before the start of the cam
paign.” 424 U. S., at 56–57. We have similarly held that
the interest “in equalizing the relative ability of individuals
and groups to influence the outcome of elections” cannot sup
port a cap on expenditures for “express advocacy of the elec
tion or defeat of candidates,” as “the concept that govern

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742 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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ment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment.” Id., at 48–49; see also
McConnell, supra, at 227 (noting, in assessing standing, that
there is no legal right to have the same resources to influence
the electoral process). Cf. Austin, supra, at 705 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (rejecting as “antithetical to the First Amend
ment” “the notion that the government has a legitimate in
terest in restricting the quantity of speech to equalize the
relative influence of speakers on elections”).
The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted
in order to “level electoral opportunities” has ominous impli
cations because it would permit Congress to arrogate the
voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates
competing for office. See Bellotti, supra, at 791–792 (“[T]he
people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibil
ity for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflict
ing arguments” and “may consider, in making their judg
ment, the source and credibility of the advocate”). Different
candidates have different strengths. Some are wealthy;
others have wealthy supporters who are willing to make
large contributions. Some are celebrities; some have the
benefit of a well-known family name. Leveling electoral op
portunities means making and implementing judgments
about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to
the outcome of an election. The Constitution, however, con
fers upon voters, not Congress, the power to choose the
Members of the House of Representatives, Art. I, § 2, and it
is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws
to influence the voters’ choices. See Bellotti, supra, at 791,
n. 31 (The “[g]overnment is forbidden to assume the task
of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to gov
ern themselves”).
Finally, the Government contends that § 319(a) is justified
because it ameliorates the deleterious effects that result
from the tight limits that federal election law places on indi

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vidual campaign contributions and coordinated party ex
penditures. These limits, it is argued, make it harder for
candidates who are not wealthy to raise funds and therefore
provide a substantial advantage for wealthy candidates.
Accordingly, § 319(a) can be seen, not as a legislative effort
to interfere with the natural operation of the electoral proc
ess, but as a legislative effort to mitigate the untoward con
sequences of Congress’ own handiwork and restore “the ‘nor
mal relationship’ between a candidate’s financial resources
and the level of popular support for his candidacy.” Brief
for Appellee 33.
Whatever the merits of this argument as an original mat
ter, it is fundamentally at war with the analysis of expendi
ture and contributions limits that this Court adopted in
Buckley and has applied in subsequent cases. The advan
tage that wealthy candidates now enjoy and that § 319(a)
seeks to reduce is an advantage that flows directly from
Buckley’s disparate treatment of expenditures and contribu
tions. If that approach is sound—and the Government does
not urge us to hold otherwise 8—it is hard to see how undoing
the consequences of that decision can be viewed as a compel
ling interest. If the normally applicable limits on individual
contributions and coordinated party contributions are seri
ously distorting the electoral process, if they are feeding a
“public perception that wealthy people can buy seats in Con
gress,” Brief for Appellee 34, and if those limits are not
needed in order to combat corruption, then the obvious rem
edy is to raise or eliminate those limits. But the unprece
8 Justice Stevens would revisit and reject Buckley’s treatment of ex
penditure limits. Post, at 750–752 (opinion concurring in part and dissent
ing in part). The Government has not urged us to take that step, and
in any event, Justice Stevens’ proposal is unsound. He suggests that
restricting the quantity of campaign speech would improve the quality of
that speech, but it would be dangerous for the Government to regulate
core political speech for the asserted purpose of improving that speech.
And in any event, there is no reason to suppose that restricting the quan
tity of campaign speech would have the desired effect.

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dented step of imposing different contribution and coordi
nated party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the
same seat is antithetical to the First Amendment.
IV
The remaining issue that we must consider is the constitu
tionality of § 319(b)’s disclosure requirements. “[W]e have
repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seri
ously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed
by the First Amendment.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64. As a
result, we have closely scrutinized disclosure requirements,
including requirements governing independent expenditures
made to further individuals’ political speech. Id., at 75. To
survive this scrutiny, significant encroachments “cannot be
justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental
interest.” Id., at 64. Instead, there must be “a ‘relevant
correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmen
tal interest and the information required to be disclosed,”
and the governmental interest “must survive exacting scru
tiny.” Ibid. (footnotes omitted). That is, the strength of
the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the
actual burden on First Amendment rights. Id., at 68, 71.
The § 319(b) disclosure requirements were designed to im
plement the asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in
§ 319(a), and as discussed above, § 319(a) violates the First
Amendment. In light of that holding, the burden imposed
by the § 319(b) requirements cannot be justified, and it fol
lows that they too are unconstitutional.9
* * *
In sum, we hold that §§ 319(a) and (b) violate the First
Amendment. The judgment of the District Court is re
9 Because we conclude that §§ 319(a) and (b) violate the First Amend
ment, we need not address Davis’ claim that they also violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

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versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
BCRA §§ 319(a) and (b) provide:
“(a) Availability of increased limit
“(1) In general
“Subject to paragraph (3), if the opposition personal funds
amount with respect to a candidate for election to the office
of Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner
to, the Congress exceeds $350,000—
“(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) with respect to
the candidate shall be tripled;
“(B) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply with
respect to any contribution made with respect to the candi
date if the contribution is made under the increased limit
allowed under subparagraph (A) during a period in which
the candidate may accept such a contribution; and
“(C) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any
expenditure by a State or national committee of a political
party on behalf of the candidate shall not apply.
“(2) Determination of opposition personal funds amount
“(A) In general
“The opposition personal funds amount is an amount equal
to the excess (if any) of—
“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from
personal funds (as defined in subsection (b)(1) of this section)
that an opposing candidate in the same election makes; over
“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal
funds made by the candidate with respect to the election.
“(B) Special rule for candidate’s campaign funds
“(i) In general
“For purposes of determining the aggregate amount of ex
penditures from personal funds under subparagraph (A),

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746 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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such amount shall include the gross receipts advantage of
the candidate’s authorized committee.
“(ii) Gross receipts advantage
“For purposes of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts advan
tage’ means the excess, if any, of—
“(I) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts
of a candidate’s authorized committee during any election
cycle (not including contributions from personal funds of the
candidate) that may be expended in connection with the elec
tion, as determined on June 30 and December 31 of the year
preceding the year in which a general election is held, over
“(II) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts
of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee during any
election cycle (not including contributions from personal
funds of the candidate) that may be expended in connection
with the election, as determined on June 30 and December
31 of the year preceding the year in which a general election
is held.
“(3) Time to accept contributions under increased limit
“(A) In general
“Subject to subparagraph (B), a candidate and the candi
date’s authorized committee shall not accept any contribu
tion, and a party committee shall not make any expenditure,
under the increased limit under paragraph (1)—
“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the op
position personal funds amount under subsection (b)(1) of
this section; and
“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to
the aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted
and party expenditures previously made under the increased
limits under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds
100 percent of the opposition personal funds amount.
“(B) Effect of withdrawal of an opposing candidate
“A candidate and a candidate’s authorized committee shall
not accept any contribution and a party shall not make any

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Appendix to opinion of the Court
expenditure under the increased limit after the date on
which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to the
extent that the amount of such increased limit is attributable
to such an opposing candidate.
“(4) Disposal of excess contributions
“(A) In general
“The aggregate amount of contributions accepted by a can
didate or a candidate’s authorized committee under the in
creased limit under paragraph (1) and not otherwise ex
pended in connection with the election with respect to which
such contributions relate shall, not later than 50 days after
the date of such election, be used in the manner described
in subparagraph (B).
“(B) Return to contributors
“A candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee shall
return the excess contribution to the person who made the
contribution.
“(b) Notification of expenditures from personal funds
“(1) In general
“(A) Definition of expenditure from personal funds
“In this paragraph, the term ‘expenditure from personal
funds’ means—
“(i) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal
funds; and
“(ii) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using per
sonal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the candi
date’s authorized committee.
“(B) Declaration of intent
“Not later than the date that is 15 days after the date
on which an individual becomes a candidate for the office of
Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to,
the Congress, the candidate shall file a declaration stating
the total amount of expenditures from personal funds that
the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to make, with
respect to the election that will exceed $350,000.

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“(C) Initial notification
“Not later than 24 hours after a candidate described in
subparagraph (B) makes or obligates to make an aggregate
amount of expenditures from personal funds in excess of
$350,000 in connection with any election, the candidate shall
file a notification.
“(D) Additional notification
“After a candidate files an initial notification under subpar
agraph (C), the candidate shall file an additional notification
each time expenditures from personal funds are made or obli
gated to be made in an aggregate amount that exceeds
$10,000. Such notification shall be filed not later than 24
hours after the expenditure is made.
“(E) Contents
“A notification under subparagraph (C) or (D) shall
include—
“(i) the name of the candidate and the office sought by
the candidate;
“(ii) the date and amount of each expenditure; and
“(iii) the total amount of expenditures from personal funds
that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, with re
spect to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is
the subject of the notification.
“(F) Place of filing
“Each declaration or notification required to be filed by a
candidate under subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) shall be filed
with—
“(i) the Commission; and
“(ii) each candidate in the same election and the national
party of each such candidate.
“(2) Notification of disposal of excess contributions
“In the next regularly scheduled report after the date of
the election for which a candidate seeks nomination for elec
tion to, or election to, Federal office, the candidate or the
candidate’s authorized committee shall submit to the Com

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Opinion of Stevens, J.
mission a report indicating the source and amount of any
excess contributions (as determined under subsection (a) of
this section) and the manner in which the candidate or the
candidate’s authorized committee used such funds.
“(3) Enforcement
“For provisions providing for the enforcement of the re
porting requirements under this subsection, see section 437g
of this title.” 2 U. S. C. § 441a–1 (footnotes omitted).
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join as to Part II, concur
ring in part and dissenting in part.
The “Millionaire’s Amendment” of the Bipartisan Cam
paign Reform Act of 2002, § 319, 116 Stat. 109, 2 U. S. C.
§ 441a–1 (2006 ed.), is the product of a congressional judg
ment that candidates who are willing and able to spend over
$350,000 of their own money in seeking election to Congress
enjoy an advantage over opponents who must rely on contri
butions to finance their campaigns. To reduce that advan
tage, and to combat the perception that congressional seats
are for sale to the highest bidder, Congress has relaxed the
restrictions that would otherwise limit the amount of contri
butions that the opponents of self-funding candidates may
accept from their supporters. In a thorough and well
reasoned opinion, the District Court held that because the
Millionaire’s Amendment does not impose any burden what
soever on the self-funding candidate’s freedom to speak, it
does not violate the First Amendment, and because it does
no more than diminish the unequal strength of the self
funding candidate, it does not violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. I agree completely
with the District Court’s opinion, specifically its adherence
to our decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n,
540 U. S. 93 (2003). While I would affirm for the reasons
given by the District Court, I believe it appropriate to add
these additional comments on the premise that underlies the

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750 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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constitutional prohibition on expenditure limitations, and on
my reasons for concluding that the Millionaire’s Amendment
represents a modest, sensible, and plainly constitutional at
tempt by Congress to minimize the advantages enjoyed by
wealthy candidates vis-a` -vis those who must rely on the sup
port of others to fund their pursuit of public office.
I
According to the Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 18 (1976) (per curiam), the vice that condemns ex
penditure limitations is that they “impose direct quantity re
strictions” on political speech.1 A limitation on the amount
of money that a candidate is permitted to spend, the Buckley
Court concluded, “reduces the quantity of expression by re
stricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” Id.,
at 19. Accordingly, the Court determined that any regula
tion of the quantity of money spent on campaigns for office
ought to be viewed as a direct regulation of speech itself.
Justice White firmly disagreed with the Buckley Court’s
holding on expenditure limitations, explaining that such reg
ulations should be analyzed, not as direct restrictions on
speech, but rather as akin to time, place, and manner regula
tions, which will be upheld “so long as the purposes they
serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial.” Id., at
264 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Al
though I did not participate in the Court’s decision in Buck
ley, I have since been persuaded that Justice White—who
maintained his steadfast opposition to Buckley’s view of ex
1 The Buckley Court invalidated two different types of limits on cam
paign expenditures: limits on the amount of “personal or family resources”
a candidate could spend on his own campaign, 424 U. S., at 51–54, and
overall limits on campaign expenditures, id., at 54–60. In my judgment
the Court was mistaken in striking down both of those provisions; I treat
them together here.

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penditure limits, see, e. g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Na
tional Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480,
507–512 (1985) (dissenting opinion)—was correct. Indeed, it
was Buckley that represented a break from 65 years of es
tablished practice, as well as a probable departure from the
views of the Framers of the relevant provisions of the Con
stitution itself. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 274,
280–281 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In my view, a number of purposes, both legitimate and
substantial, may justify the imposition of reasonable limi
tations on the expenditures permitted during the course of
any single campaign. For one, such limitations would “free
candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden
of fundraising.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 649 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the imposition of rea
sonable limitations would likely have the salutary effect of
improving the quality of the exposition of ideas. After all,
orderly debate is always more enlightening than a shouting
match that awards points on the basis of decibels rather than
reasons. Quantity limitations are commonplace in any num
ber of other contexts in which high-value speech occurs.
Litigants in this Court pressing issues of the utmost impor
tance to the Nation are allowed only a fixed time for oral
debate and a maximum number of pages for written argu
ment. As listeners and as readers, judges need time to re
flect on the merits of an issue; repetitious arguments are
disfavored and are usually especially unpersuasive. Indeed,
experts in the art of advocacy agree that “lawyers go on for
too long, and when they do it doesn’t help their case.” 2 It
seems to me that Congress is entitled to make the judgment
that voters deserve the same courtesy and the same opportu
2 Brust, A Voice for the Write: Tips on Making Your Case From a Su
premely Reliable Source, 94 A. B. A. J. 37 (May 2008) (interview with
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner).

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752 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of Stevens, J.
nity to reflect as judges; flooding the airwaves with slogans
and sound bites may well do more to obscure the issues than
to enlighten listeners. At least in the context of elections,
the notion that rules limiting the quantity of speech are just
as offensive to the First Amendment as rules limiting the
content of speech is plainly incorrect.3
If, as I have come to believe, Congress could attempt to
reduce the millionaire candidate’s advantage by imposing
reasonable limits on all candidates’ expenditures, it follows
a fortiori that the eminently reasonable scheme before us
today survives constitutional scrutiny.
II
Even accepting the Buckley Court’s holding that expendi
ture limits as such are uniquely incompatible with the First
Amendment, it remains my firm conviction that the Million
aire’s Amendment represents a good-faith attempt by Con
gress to regulate, within the bounds of the Constitution, one
particularly pernicious feature of many contemporary politi
cal campaigns.4
It cannot be gainsaid that the twin rationales at the heart
of the Millionaire’s Amendment—reducing the importance of
wealth as a criterion for public office and countering the per
3 The Court is of course correct that “it would be dangerous for the
Government to regulate core political speech for the asserted purpose of
improving that speech.” Ante, at 743, n. 8. But campaign expenditures
are not themselves “core political speech”; they merely may enable such
speech (as well as its repetition ad nauseam). In my judgment, it is sim
ply not the case that the First Amendment “provides the same measure
of protection” to the use of money to enable speech as it does to speech
itself. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 398
(2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
4 I note at the outset of this discussion, however, that I agree with the
Court’s conclusion that Davis has standing to challenge §§ 319(a) and (b),
and that the case is not moot; I therefore join Part II of the Court’s
opinion.

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ception that seats in the United States Congress are avail
able for purchase by the wealthiest bidder—are important
Government interests. It is also evident that Congress, in
enacting the provision, crafted a solution that was carefully
tailored to those concerns. Davis insists, however, that the
Government’s interests are insufficiently weighty to justify
what he believes are intrusions upon his rights under the
First Amendment and the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment, and that, regardless of the strength of the
justifications offered, Congress’ solution is not sufficiently
tailored to addressing the twin concerns it has identified.
His arguments are unpersuasive on all counts.
A
The thrust of Davis’ First Amendment challenge is that
by relaxing the contribution limits applicable to the opponent
of a self-funding candidate, the Millionaire’s Amendment
punishes the candidate who chooses to self-fund. Extrapo
lating from the zero-sum nature of a political race, Davis in
sists that any benefit conferred upon a self-funder’s opponent
thereby works a detriment to the self-funding candidate.
Accordingly, he argues, the scheme burdens the self-funding
candidate’s First Amendment right to speak freely and to
participate fully in the political process.
But Davis cannot show that the Millionaire’s Amendment
causes him—or any other self-funding candidate—any First
Amendment injury whatsoever. The Millionaire’s Amend
ment quiets no speech at all. On the contrary, it does no
more than assist the opponent of a self-funding candidate in
his attempts to make his voice heard; this amplification in no
way mutes the voice of the millionaire, who remains able to
speak as loud and as long as he likes in support of his cam
paign. Enhancing the speech of the millionaire’s opponent,
far from contravening the First Amendment, actually ad
vances its core principles. If only one candidate can make

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754 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of Stevens, J.
himself heard, the voter’s ability to make an informed choice
is impaired.5 And the self-funding candidate’s ability to en
gage meaningfully in the political process is in no way under
mined by this provision.6
Even were we to credit Davis’ view that the benefit con
ferred on the self-funding candidate’s opponent burdens the
self-funder’s First Amendment rights, the purposes of the
amendment surely justify its effects. The Court is simply
wrong when it suggests that the “governmental interest in
eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption,” ante,
at 740, is the sole governmental interest sufficient to support
campaign finance regulations. See ante, at 741–743. It is
true, of course, that in upholding the Federal Election Cam
paign Act of 1971’s (FECA) limits on the size of contributions
to political campaigns, the Buckley Court held that prevent
ing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption
were Government interests of sufficient weight that they jus
tified any infringement upon First Amendment freedoms
that resulted from FECA’s contribution limits; the Court ex
plained that, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are
given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of repre
sentative democracy is undermined. . . . Of almost equal
concern . . . is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for
5 “In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citi
zenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential,
for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course
that we follow as a nation.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14–15 (1976)
(per curiam).
6 The self-funder retains the choice to structure his campaign’s funding
as he pleases: He may choose to fund his own campaign subject to no
limitations whatsoever and still accept limited donations from supporters;
alternatively, he may forgo self-financing and rely on contributions alone,
at the same level as his opponent. In neither event is his engagement in
the political process in any sense impeded.

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abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial con
tributions.” 424 U. S., at 26–27. It is also true that the
Court found that same interest insufficient to justify FECA’s
expenditure limitations. Id., at 45–46, 52–56. But it does
not follow that the Buckley Court concluded that only
the interest in combating corruption and the appearance of
corruption can justify congressional regulation of campaign
financing.
Indeed, we have long recognized the strength of an inde
pendent governmental interest in reducing both the influ
ence of wealth on the outcomes of elections, and the appear
ance that wealth alone dictates those results. In case after
case, we have held that statutes designed to protect against
the undue influence of aggregations of wealth on the political
process—where such statutes are responsive to the identified
evil—do not contravene the First Amendment. See, e. g.,
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652,
660 (1990) (upholding statute designed to combat “the cor
rosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas”); Federal Elec
tion Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U. S. 238, 257 (1986) (“Th[e] concern over the corrosive influ
ence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction
that it is important to protect the integrity of the market
place of political ideas. . . . Direct corporate spending on po
litical activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in
the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace”); cf. Red Lion Broad
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding con
stitutionality of several components of the Federal Commu
nications Commission’s “fair coverage” requirements, and
explaining that “[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment
to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which

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756 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
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truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance mo
nopolization of that market”).
Although the focus of our cases has been on aggregations
of corporate rather than individual wealth, there is no reason
that their logic—specifically, their concerns about the corro
sive and distorting effects of wealth on our political proc
ess—is not equally applicable in the context of individual
wealth. For, as we explained in McConnell, “Congress’ his
torical concern with the ‘political potentialities of wealth’ and
their ‘untoward consequences for the democratic process’ . . .
has long reached beyond corporate money,” 540 U. S., at 116
(quoting United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567,
577–578 (1957)).
Minimizing the effect of concentrated wealth on our politi
cal process, and the concomitant interest in addressing the
dangers that attend the perception that political power can
be purchased, are, therefore, sufficiently weighty objectives
to justify significant congressional action. And, not only
was Congress motivated by proper and weighty goals in
crafting the Millionaire’s Amendment, the details of the
scheme it devised are genuinely responsive to the problems
it identified. The statute’s “Opposition Personal Funds
Amount” formula permits a self-funding candidate to spend
as much money as he wishes, while taking into account fund
raising by the relevant campaigns; it thereby ensures that
a candidate who happens to enjoy a significant fundraising
advantage against a self-funding opponent does not reap a
windfall as a result of the enhanced contribution limits.
Rather, the self-funder’s opponent may avail himself of the
enhanced contribution limits only until parity is achieved, at
which point he becomes again ineligible for contributions
above the normal maximum. See §§ 441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C).
It seems uncontroversial that “there is no good reason to
allow disparities in wealth to be translated into disparities in
political power. A well-functioning democracy distinguishes

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between market processes of purchase and sale on the one
hand and political processes of voting and reason-giving on
the other.” Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1390 (1994). In light of
that clear truth, Congress’ carefully crafted attempt to re
duce the distinct advantages enjoyed by wealthy candi
dates for congressional office does not offend the First
Amendment.
B
Davis’ equal protection argument, which the Court finds
unnecessary to address, ante, at 744, n. 9, fares no better. He
claims that by permitting only the self-funder’s opponent to
avail himself of the increased contribution limits, the statute
creates an unwarranted disparity between the self-funder
and his opponent. But, as we explained in McConnell,
“Congress is fully entitled to consider . . . real-world
differences . . . when crafting a system of campaign finance
regulation.” 540 U. S., at 188. And Buckley itself acknowl
edged, in the course of upholding FECA’s public financing
scheme, that “the Constitution does not require Congress to
treat all declared candidates the same.” 424 U. S., at 97. It
blinks reality to contend that the millionaire candidate is sit
uated identically to a nonmillionaire opponent, and Congress
was under no obligation to indulge any such fiction. Accord
ingly, Davis has failed to establish that he was deprived of
the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
III
In sum, I share Judge Wright’s view that nothing in the
Constitution “prevents us, as a political community, from
making certain modest but important changes in the kind of
process we want for selecting our political leaders,” Wright,
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 Yale
L. J. 1001, 1005 (1976). In my judgment, the Millionaire’s
Amendment represents just such a change. I therefore re
spectfully dissent.

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758 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Opinion of Ginsburg, J.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Agreeing with the Court that appellant Jack Davis has
standing and that this case is not moot, I join Part II of the
Court’s opinion. On the merits, however, I part ways with
the Court. The District Court’s careful and persuasive
opinion, as I see it, correctly concluded that the provisions
challenged in this case are entirely consistent with Buck
ley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and all other
relevant decisions of this Court. I therefore join Part II of
Justice Stevens’ opinion.
I resist joining other portions of Justice Stevens’ opin
ion, however, to the extent that they address Buckley’s dis
tinction between expenditure and contribution limits and,
correspondingly, Buckley’s holding that expenditure limits
impose “direct quantity restrictions on political communica
tion,” id., at 18. Appellee Federal Election Commission has
not asked us to overrule Buckley; consequently, the issue
has not been briefed. Convinced that the challenged statute
encounters no constitutional shoal under our precedents,
I would leave reconsideration of Buckley for a later day
and case.