CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

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122 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 06–11206. Argued November 10, 2008—Decided January 13, 2009
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory
prison term on a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm who has
three prior convictions for committing certain drug crimes or “a violent
felony,” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1), defined as a crime punishable by more
than one year’s imprisonment that, inter alia, “involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,”
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). At petitioner Chambers’ sentencing for being a felon
in possession of a firearm, the Government sought ACCA’s 15-year man
datory prison term. Chambers disputed one of his prior convictions—
failing to report for weekend confinement—as falling outside the ACCA
definition of “violent felony.” The District Court treated the failure to
report as a form of what the relevant state statute calls “escape from
[a] penal institution,” and held that it qualified as a “violent felony”
under ACCA. The Seventh Circuit agreed.
Held: Illinois’ crime of failure to report for penal confinement falls outside
the scope of ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. Pp. 125–130.
(a) For purposes of ACCA’s definitions, it is the generic crime that
counts, not how the crime was committed on a particular occasion.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 602. This categorical approach
requires courts to choose the right category, and sometimes the choice
is not obvious. The nature of the behavior that likely underlies a statu
tory phrase matters in this respect. The state statute at issue places
together in a single section several different kinds of behavior, which,
as relevant here, may be categorized either as failure to report for de
tention or as escape from custody. Failure to report is a separate crime
from escape. Its underlying behavior differs from the more aggressive
behavior underlying escape, and it is listed separately in the statute’s
title and body and is of a different felony class than escape. At the
same time, the statutory phrases setting forth the various kinds of fail
ure to report describe roughly similar forms of behavior, thus constitut
ing a single category. Consequently, for ACCA purposes, the statute
contains at least two separate crimes, escape and failure to report.
Pp. 125–127.
(b) The “failure to report” crime does not satisfy ACCA’s “violent
felony” definition. Although it is punishable by imprisonment exceed

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Opinion of the Court
ing one year, it satisfies none of the other parts of the definition. Most
critically, it does not “involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.” Conceptually speaking, the crime
amounts to a form of inaction, and there is no reason to believe that an
offender who fails to report is otherwise doing something that poses a
serious potential risk of physical injury. The Government’s argument
that a failure to report reveals the offender’s special, strong aversion to
penal custody—pointing to three state and federal cases over 30 years
in which individuals shot at officers attempting to recapture them—is
unconvincing. Even assuming the relevance of violence that may occur
long after an offender fails to report, the offender’s aversion to penal
custody is beside the point. The question is whether such an offender is
significantly more likely than others to attack or resist an apprehender,
thereby producing a serious risk of physical injury. Here a United
States Sentencing Commission report, showing no violence in 160 fed
eral failure-to-report cases over two recent years, helps provide a nega
tive answer. The three reported cases to which the Government points
do not show the contrary. Simple multiplication (2 years versus 30
years; federal alone versus federal-plus-state) suggests that they show
only a statistically insignificant risk of physical violence. And the Gov
ernment provides no other empirical information. Pp. 127–130.
473 F. 3d 724, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas,
J., joined, post, p. 131.
Robert N. Hochman argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Jeffrey T. Green, Julie Morian,
and Sarah O’Rourke Schrup.
Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney General Friedrich, and
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether a “failure to report” for
penal confinement is a “ ‘violent felony’ ” within the terms of
the Armed Career Criminal Act. 18 U. S. C. § 924(e). We
hold that it is not.

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124 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
I
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15
year mandatory prison term on an individual convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm if that individual has
“three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a seri
ous drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different
from one another.” § 924(e)(1). ACCA defines a “violent
felony” as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year” that also either
“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pre
sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an
other.” § 924(e)(2)(B).
Clause (ii), ACCA’s so-called residual clause, is at issue here.
II
The petitioner, Deondery Chambers, pleaded guilty to a
charge of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm.
§ 922(g). At sentencing the Government asked the District
Court to apply ACCA’s 15-year mandatory prison term be
cause, in its view, three of Chambers’ prior convictions quali
fied as an ACCA “serious drug offense” or “violent felony.”
Chambers conceded that two of his prior convictions, namely,
a 1998 conviction for robbery and aggravated battery and a
1999 drug crime conviction, fell within ACCA’s definitions.
But he disputed the Government’s claim as to a third convic
tion. That third conviction arose out of Chambers’ sentence
for his 1998 robbery and battery offense. The sentence re
quired Chambers to report to a local prison for 11 weekends
of incarceration. He failed to report for weekend confine
ment on four occasions, and was later convicted of the crime

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125 Cite as: 555 U. S. 122 (2009)
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of “fail[ing] to report to a penal institution.” Ill. Comp.
Stat., ch. 720, § 5/31–6(a) (West Supp. 2008).
The District Court treated the “failure to report” as a form
of what the relevant Illinois statute calls “escape from [a]
penal institution,” ibid., and held that the crime qualified as
a “violent felony” under ACCA. The Court of Appeals
agreed. 473 F. 3d 724 (CA7 2007). In light of disagreement
among the Circuits as to whether failure to report for impris
onment falls within the scope of ACCA’s definition of “violent
felony,” we granted certiorari. Compare United States v.
Winn, 364 F. 3d 7, 12 (CA1 2004) (failure to report is a “vio
lent felony”), with United States v. Piccolo, 441 F. 3d 1084,
1088 (CA9 2006) (failure to report is not a “violent felony”).
III
We initially consider the classification of the crime. In or
dinary speech, words such as “crime” and “felony” can refer
not only to a generic set of acts, say, burglary in general, but
also to a specific act committed on a particular occasion, say,
the burglary that the defendant engaged in last month. We
have made clear, however, that, for purposes of ACCA’s
definitions, it is the generic sense of the word “felony” that
counts. Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990);
see also Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 16–17 (2005).
The statute’s defining language, read naturally, uses “felony”
to refer to a crime as generally committed. And by so con
struing the statute, one avoids the practical difficulty of try
ing to ascertain at sentencing, perhaps from a paper record
mentioning only a guilty plea, whether the present defend
ant’s prior crime, as committed on a particular occasion, did
or did not involve violent behavior. See id., at 20–21.
Thus, to determine, for example, whether attempted bur
glary is a “violent felony,” we have had to examine, not the
unsuccessful burglary the defendant attempted on a particu
lar occasion, but the generic crime of attempted burglary.
James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 204–206 (2007).

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126 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES
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This categorical approach requires courts to choose the
right category. And sometimes the choice is not obvious.
The nature of the behavior that likely underlies a statutory
phrase matters in this respect. Where Massachusetts, for
example, placed within a single, separately numbered statu
tory section (entitled “Breaking and entering at night,”
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266, § 16 (West 2008)) burglary of
a “building, ship, vessel or vehicle,” this Court found that
the behavior underlying, say, breaking into a building differs
so significantly from the behavior underlying, say, breaking
into a vehicle that for ACCA purposes a sentencing court
must treat the two as different crimes. See Shepard, supra,
at 16–17; see also Taylor, supra, at 598.
The Illinois statute now before us, like the Massachusetts
statute, places together in a single numbered statutory sec
tion several different kinds of behavior. It separately de
scribes those behaviors as (1) escape from a penal institution,
(2) escape from the custody of an employee of a penal institu
tion, (3) failing to report to a penal institution, (4) failing to
report for periodic imprisonment, (5) failing to return from
furlough, (6) failing to return from work and day release, and
(7) failing to abide by the terms of home confinement. Ill.
Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 5/31–6(a); see Appendix A, infra. We
know from the state-court information in the record that
Chambers pleaded guilty to “knowingly fail[ing] to report”
for periodic imprisonment “to the Jefferson County Jail, a
penal institution.” App. 68; see Shepard, supra, at 25 (sen
tencing court may look, for example, to charging document,
plea agreement, jury instructions, or transcript of plea collo
quy to determine crime at issue). But we must decide
whether for ACCA purposes a failure to report counts as a
separate crime.
Unlike the lower courts, we believe that a failure to report
(as described in the statutory provision’s third, fourth, fifth,
and sixth phrases) is a separate crime, different from escape

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(the subject matter of the statute’s first and second phrases),
and from the potentially less serious failure to abide by the
terms of home confinement (the subject of the final phrase).
The behavior that likely underlies a failure to report would
seem less likely to involve a risk of physical harm than the
less passive, more aggressive behavior underlying an escape
from custody. See Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137,
144–146 (2008). Moreover, the statute itself not only lists
escape and failure to report separately (in its title and its
body) but also places the behaviors in two different felony
classes (Class Two and Class Three) of different degrees of
seriousness. See Appendix A, infra.
At the same time, we believe the statutory phrases setting
forth various kinds of failure to report (or to return) describe
roughly similar forms of behavior. Each is characterized by
a failure to present oneself for detention on a specified occa
sion. All amount to variations on a single theme. For that
reason we consider them as together constituting a single
category. Cf. James, supra, at 207–209 (determining that
where separately listed behaviors pose a similar degree of
risk, sentencing courts may consider all listed behaviors as a
single crime). We consequently treat the statute for ACCA
purposes as containing at least two separate crimes, namely,
escape from custody on the one hand, and a failure to report
on the other. Failure to abide by home confinement terms—
potentially the least serious of the offenses—is not at issue
here.
IV
We now must consider whether the “failure to report”
crime satisfies ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. It clearly
satisfies the first part of that definition, for it is a “crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B). But it satisfies none of the other
parts. It does not have “as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

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128 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). It does not consist of “burglary,
arson, or extortion,” or “involv[e] use of explosives.”
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And, more critically for present purposes,
it does not “ ‘involve conduct that presents a serious poten
tial risk of physical injury to another.’ ” See Begay, 553
U. S., at 141–142; id., at 153–154 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (treating serious risk of physical injury to another
as critical definitional factor); id., at 156–158 (Alito, J., dis
senting) (same).
Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of in
action, a far cry from the “purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggres
sive’ conduct” potentially at issue when an offender uses ex
plosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling
or residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion.
Cf. id., at 144–145. While an offender who fails to report
must of course be doing something at the relevant time,
there is no reason to believe that the something poses a seri
ous potential risk of physical injury. Cf. James, 550 U. S.,
at 203–204. To the contrary, an individual who fails to re
port would seem unlikely, not likely, to call attention to his
whereabouts by simultaneously engaging in additional vio
lent and unlawful conduct.
The Government argues that a failure to report reveals
the offender’s special, strong aversion to penal custody.
And it points to three cases arising over a period of 30 years
in which reported opinions indicate that individuals shot at
officers attempting to recapture them. See United States v.
Eaglin, 571 F. 2d 1069, 1072 (CA9 1977); State v. Johnson,
245 S. W. 3d 288, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jones, 96
Wash. App. 369, 371–372, 979 P. 2d 898, 899 (1999). But even
if we assume for argument’s sake the relevance of violence
that may occur long after an offender fails to report, we are
not convinced by the Government’s argument. The offend
er’s aversion to penal custody, even if special, is beside the
point. The question is whether such an offender is signifi

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cantly more likely than others to attack, or physically to re
sist, an apprehender, thereby producing a “serious potential
risk of physical injury.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And here a
United States Sentencing Commission report helps provide a
conclusive, negative answer. See Report on Federal Escape
Offenses in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, p. 7 (Nov. 2008) (here
inafter Commission’s Report), reprinted in part in Appendix
B, infra. See also 473 F. 3d, at 727 (Posner, J.) (urging that
such research be done).
The Commission’s Report identifies every federal case in
2006 or 2007 in which a federal sentencing court applied the
Sentencing Guideline, “Escape, Instigating or Assisting Es
cape,” 1 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual § 2P1.1 (Nov. 2008), and in which sufficient detail was
provided, say, in the presentence report, about the circum
stances of the crime to permit analysis. The analysis in
cluded calculation of the likelihood that violence would ac
company commission of the escape or the offender’s later
apprehension.
Of 414 such cases, 160 involved a failure to report either
for incarceration (42) or for custody after having been tempo
rarily released (118). Commission’s Report 7; see also Ap
pendix B, infra. Of these 160 cases, none at all involved
violence—not during commission of the offense itself, not
during the offender’s later apprehension—although in 5 in
stances (3.1%) the offenders were armed. Ibid. The up
shot is that the study strongly supports the intuitive belief
that failure to report does not involve a serious potential risk
of physical injury.
The three reported cases to which the Government points
do not show the contrary. The Sentencing Commission
culled its 160 instances from a set of federal sentences im
posed over a period of two years. The Government appar
ently culled its three examples from a set of state and federal
sentences imposed over a period of 30 years. Compare Eag

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130 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES
Appendix A to opinion of the Court
lin, supra (CA9 1977), with Johnson, supra (Mo. Ct. App.
2008). Given the larger set, the presence of three instances
of violence is consistent with the Commission’s data. Sim
ple multiplication (2 years versus 30 years; federal alone
versus federal-plus-state) suggests that they show only a
small risk of physical violence (less than one in several thou
sand). And the Government provides no other empirical
information.
For these reasons we conclude that the crime here at issue
falls outside the scope of ACCA’s definition of “violent fel
ony.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The judgment of the Court of Ap
peals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIXES
A
“Escape; failure to report to a penal institution or to report
for periodic imprisonment.
“A person convicted of a felony, adjudicated a delinquent
minor for the commission of a felony offense under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or charged with the commis
sion of a felony who intentionally escapes from any penal
institution or from the custody of an employee of that
institution commits a Class 2 felony; however, a person
convicted of a felony or adjudicated a delinquent minor
for the commission of a felony offense under the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 who knowingly fails to report to a
penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment
at any time or knowingly fails to return from furlough
or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to
abide by the terms of home confinement is guilty of a
Class 3 felony.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 5/31–6(a)
(West Supp. 2008).

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131 Cite as: 555 U. S. 122 (2009)
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
B
Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years 2006 and
2007, p. 7, fig. 1 (Nov. 2008).*
Leaving
Secure
Custody
Leaving
Law
Enforce
ment
Custody
Leaving
Non
secure
Custody
Failing
to
Report
Failing
to
Return
Number
of Cases
64 13 177 42 118
Force 10
(15.6%)
1
(7.7%)
3
(1.7%)
0
(0.0%)
0
(0.0%)
Dangerous
Weapon
20
(31.3%)
1
(7.7%)
4
(2.3%)
3
(7.1%)
2
(1.7%)
Injury 7
(10.9%)
2
(15.4%)
3
(1.7%)
0
(0.0%)
0
(0.0%)
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, con
curring in the judgment.
As I have previously explained, I believe that the Court’s
approach in Begay, like its approach in this case, “cannot be
reconciled with the statutory text.” Begay v. United States,
553 U. S. 137, 155 (2008) (dissenting opinion). I nonetheless
recognize that “stare decisis in respect to statutory interpre
tation has ‘special force,’ ” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 552 U. S. 130, 139 (2008), and I am sympathetic
to the majority’s efforts to provide a workable interpretation
of the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), while retaining the “categorical approach” that we
*Cases can fall into more than one category. For example, one case
could involve both force and injury. Such a case would be represented in
the table for force and also for injury. Therefore, the reader should not
aggregate the numbers in any column.

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132 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
adopted in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 602 (1990).
In light of Taylor and Begay, I agree that this case should
be remanded for resentencing. I write separately, however,
to emphasize that only Congress can rescue the federal
courts from the mire into which ACCA’s draftsmanship and
Taylor’s “categorical approach” have pushed us.
In 1986, when Congress enacted ACCA’s residual clause,
18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), few could have foreseen the dif
ficulties that lay ahead.1 Only four months before Congress
framed the residual clause, this Court upheld a state sentenc
ing provision that imposed a mandatory minimum sentence
where the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the
commission of certain felonies (including robbery). See Mc-
Millan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986). Legislating
against the background of McMillan, Congress may have
assumed that ACCA’s residual clause would similarly require
federal sentencing judges to determine whether the particu
lar facts of a particular case triggered a mandatory mini
mum sentence.
But history took a different track. In Taylor, the Court
held that ACCA requires “the sentencing court to look only
to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes
falling within certain categories, and not to the facts under
lying the prior convictions.” 495 U. S., at 600. Thus, we
held that sentencing judges should apply a “categorical ap
proach” to determine whether an underlying state offense
meets the “generic” definition of burglary that this Court—
1 Congress originally enacted ACCA in 1984. See § 1802, 98 Stat. 2185,
18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. II) (repealed in 1986 by Fire
arms Owners’ Protection Act, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 459). That statute, how
ever, applied a mandatory sentencing enhancement to only two predicate
felonies—robbery and burglary—which the statute expressly defined. 18
U. S. C. App. §§ 1202(c)(8)–(9) (1982 ed., Supp. II). Congress did not add
the undefined “otherwise clause” until 1986. See Career Criminals
Amendment Act of 1986, § 1402, 100 Stat. 3207–39.

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Alito, J., concurring in judgment
not Congress—created. Id., at 598. The Court justified its
decision with a 10-page discussion of ACCA’s purpose and
legislative history, id., at 581–590; see also id., at 603
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(criticizing the Court’s approach), and explained that its con
clusion was necessary to undo “an inadvertent casualty [in
ACCA’s] complex drafting process,” id., at 589–590.
ACCA’s clarity has been the true inadvertent casualty.
After almost two decades with Taylor’s “categorical ap
proach,” only one thing is clear: ACCA’s residual clause is
nearly impossible to apply consistently. Indeed, the “cate
gorical approach” to predicate offenses has created numerous
splits among the lower federal courts,2 the resolution of
which could occupy this Court for years. What is worse is
2 For example, the lower courts have split over whether it is a “violent
felony” under ACCA’s residual clause to commit rape, compare United
States v. Sawyers, 409 F. 3d 732 (CA6 2005) (statutory rape not categori
cally violent), with United States v. Williams, 120 F. 3d 575 (CA5 1997)
(inducement of minor to commit sodomy violent), and United States v.
Thomas, 231 Fed. Appx. 765 (CA9 2007) (all rape violent); retaliate against
a government officer, compare United States v. Montgomery, 402 F. 3d
482 (CA5 2005) (not violent), with Sawyers, supra (violent); attempt or
conspire to commit burglary, compare United States v. Fell, 511 F. 3d 1035
(CA10 2007) (even after James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007), and
even where statute requires an overt act, conspiracy to commit burglary
not violent), with United States v. Moore, 108 F. 3d 878 (CA8 1997) (at
tempted burglary violent if statute requires proof of overt act); carry a
concealed weapon, compare United States v. Whitfield, 907 F. 2d 798 (CA8
1990) (not violent), with United States v. Hall, 77 F. 3d 398 (CA11 1996)
(violent); and possess a sawed-off shotgun as a felon, compare United
States v. Amos, 501 F. 3d 524 (CA6 2007) (not violent), with United States
v. Bishop, 453 F. 3d 30 (CA1 2006) (violent). Compare also United States
v. Sanchez-Garcia, 501 F. 3d 1208 (CA10 2007) (unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle not a “violent felony” under 18 U. S. C. § 16(b), which closely
resembles ACCA’s residual clause), with United States v. Reliford, 471
F. 3d 913 (CA8 2006) (automobile tampering violent under ACCA’s residual
clause), and United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F. 3d 217 (CA5 1999)
(per curiam) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle a “violent felony”
under § 16(b)).

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134 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES
Alito, J., concurring in judgment
that each new application of the residual clause seems to
lead us further and further away from the statutory text.
Today’s decision, for example, turns on little more than a
statistical analysis of a research report prepared by the
United States Sentencing Commission. Ante, at 129, 131
(Appendix B).
At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for
Congress to formulate a specific list of expressly defined
crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s sentencing
enhancement. That is the approach that Congress took in
1984, when it applied ACCA to two enumerated and ex
pressly defined felonies. See n. 1, supra. And that ap
proach is the only way to right ACCA’s ship.