ARIZONA v. GANT

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332 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
ARIZONA v. GANT
certiorari to the supreme court of arizona
No. 07–542. Argued October 7, 2008—Decided April 21, 2009
Respondent Gant was arrested for driving on a suspended license, hand
cuffed, and locked in a patrol car before officers searched his car and
found cocaine in a jacket pocket. The Arizona trial court denied his
motion to suppress the evidence, and he was convicted of drug offenses.
Reversing, the State Supreme Court distinguished New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454—which held that police may search the passenger com
partment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous
incident of a recent occupant’s lawful arrest—on the ground that it con
cerned the scope of a search incident to arrest but did not answer the
question whether officers may conduct such a search once the scene has
been secured. Because Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, requires
that a search incident to arrest be justified by either the interest in
officer safety or the interest in preserving evidence and the circum
stances of Gant’s arrest implicated neither of those interests, the State
Supreme Court found the search unreasonable.
Held: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident
to a recent occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the
arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Pp. 338–351.
(a) Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable,” “subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357. The exception for a search incident
to a lawful arrest applies only to “the area from within which [an ar
restee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”
Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763. This Court applied that exception to the au
tomobile context in Belton, the holding of which rested in large part on
the assumption that articles inside a vehicle’s passenger compartment
are “generally . . . within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach.’ ”
453 U. S., at 460. Pp. 338–341.
(b) This Court rejects a broad reading of Belton that would permit a
vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest even if there were
no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time
of the search. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chi
mel’s exception authorize a vehicle search only when there is a reason
able possibility of such access. Although it does not follow from Chi
mel, circumstances unique to the automobile context also justify a

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333 Cite as: 556 U. S. 332 (2009)
Syllabus
search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evi
dence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”
Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 632 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment). Neither Chimel’s reaching-distance rule nor Thornton’s
allowance for evidentiary searches authorized the search in this case.
In contrast to Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with
four unsecured arrestees, five officers handcuffed and secured Gant and
the two other suspects in separate patrol cars before the search began.
Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search.
An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking. Belton and
Thornton were both arrested for drug offenses, but Gant was arrested
for driving with a suspended license—an offense for which police could
not reasonably expect to find evidence in Gant’s car. Cf. Knowles v.
Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118. The search in this case was therefore unrea
sonable. Pp. 341–344.
(c) This Court is unpersuaded by the State’s argument that its expan
sive reading of Belton correctly balances law enforcement interests with
an arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his vehicle. The State seri
ously undervalues the privacy interests at stake, and it exaggerates
both the clarity provided by a broad reading of Belton and its impor
tance to law enforcement interests. A narrow reading of Belton and
Thornton, together with this Court’s other Fourth Amendment deci
sions, e. g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, and United States v. Ross,
456 U. S. 798, permit an officer to search a vehicle when safety or eviden
tiary concerns demand. Pp. 344–347.
(d) Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of
Belton. The experience of the 28 years since Belton has shown that
the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is
unfounded, and blind adherence to its faulty assumption would authorize
myriad unconstitutional searches. Pp. 348–351.
216 Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Sou
ter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring
opinion, post, p. 351. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 354.
Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Ken
nedy, J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined except as to Part II–E,
post, p. 355.
Joseph T. Maziarz, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona,
argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs
were Terry Goddard, Attorney General, Mary R. O’Grady,

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334 ARIZONA v. GANT
Syllabus
Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Randall
M. Howe, Former Chief Counsel, and Nicholas D. Acedo, As
sistant Attorney General.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were former Solicitor General Clement, former Assistant
Attorney General Fisher, and Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben.
Thomas F. Jacobs argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Jeffrey T. Green.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Flor
ida et al. by Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, Scott D. Makar,
Solicitor General, and Craig D. Feiser and Courtney Brewer, Deputy Solic
itors General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Edmund G.
Brown, Jr., of California, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Mark J. Bennett of
Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve
Carter of Indiana, Steven N. Six of Kansas, Douglas F. Gansler of Mary
land, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Jeremiah
W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, Gary K.
King of New Mexico, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, W. A. Drew
Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett,
Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Robert E.
Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, J. B. Van
Hollen of Wisconsin, and Bruce A. Salzburg of Wyoming; for Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Wayne W. Schmidt, James
P. Manak, Richard Weintraub, Michael E. McNeff, Eric B. Edwards, and
Bernard J. Farber; for the National Association of Police Organizations,
Inc., by William J. Johnson and Devallis Rutledge; and for Los Angeles
County District Attorney Steve Cooley et al. by Mr. Cooley, pro se, Lael
R. Rubin, Brentford J. Ferreira, and Phyllis C. Asayama.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by James J. Tomkovicz, Steven R. Shapiro,
and Graham A. Boyd; for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers by Jeffrey L. Fisher, Pamela S. Karlan, Amy Howe, Kevin K.
Russell, and Thomas C. Goldstein; and for the National Association of
Federal Defenders by Beth S. Brinkmann, Seth M. Galanter, Ketanji
Brown Jackson, Lila M. Bateman, Frances H. Pratt, Philip J. Lynch,
Judith H. Mizner, and Stephen C. Moss.

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335 Cite as: 556 U. S. 332 (2009)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
After Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a sus
pended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol
car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in
the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could
not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence
at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme Court held
that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel
v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and applied to vehi
cle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), did
not justify the search in this case. We agree with that
conclusion.
Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only
the space within an arrestee’s “ ‘immediate control,’ ” mean
ing “the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence.” 395 U. S., at 763. The
safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel’s
reaching-distance rule determine Belton’s scope. Accord
ingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has
been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.
Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States,
541 U. S. 615 (2004), and following the suggestion in Justice
Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, id.,
at 632, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when
it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of ar
rest might be found in the vehicle.
I
On August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that the
residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to
sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked
on the front door and asked to speak to the owner. Gant
answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that

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he expected the owner to return later. The officers left the
residence and conducted a records check, which revealed
that Gant’s driver’s license had been suspended and there
was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a
suspended license.
When the officers returned to the house that evening, they
found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a
car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they
arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman
for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were
handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant
arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the
driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the
driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him.
Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car,
and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet away,
called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10
to-12 feet from Gant’s car. Griffith immediately arrested
Gant and handcuffed him.
Because the other arrestees were secured in the only pa
trol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two
more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of
their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed
in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One
of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of co
caine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.
Gant was charged with two offenses—possession of a nar
cotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia (i. e.,
the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found). He moved
to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground
that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.
Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not author
ize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to
the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and
because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no
evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the

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suppression hearing why the search was conducted, Officer
Griffith responded: “Because the law says we can do it.”
App. 75.
The trial court rejected the State’s contention that the of
ficers had probable cause to search Gant’s car for contraband
when the search began, id., at 18, 30, but it denied the mo
tion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the police saw
Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and
apprehended him only shortly after he exited his car, the
court held that the search was permissible as a search inci
dent to arrest. Id., at 37. A jury found Gant guilty on both
drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of
imprisonment.
After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Su
preme Court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was un
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The court’s opinion discussed at length our decision in Bel
ton, which held that police may search the passenger com
partment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a con
temporaneous incident of an arrest of the vehicle’s recent
occupant. 216 Ariz. 1, 3–4, 162 P. 3d 640, 642–643 (2007)
(citing 453 U. S., at 460). The court distinguished Belton as
a case concerning the permissible scope of a vehicle search
incident to arrest and concluded that it did not answer “the
threshold question whether the police may conduct a search
incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure.” 216 Ariz.,
at 4, 162 P. 3d, at 643. Relying on our earlier decision
in Chimel, the court observed that the search-incident-to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement is justified by
interests in officer safety and evidence preservation. 216
Ariz., at 4, 162 P. 3d, at 643. When “the justifications under
lying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and
the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol
car, and under the supervision of an officer,” the court con
cluded, a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be
justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or

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prevent the destruction of evidence.” Id., at 5, 162 P. 3d, at
644. Accordingly, the court held that the search of Gant’s
car was unreasonable.
The dissenting justices would have upheld the search of
Gant’s car based on their view that “the validity of a Belton
search . . . clearly does not depend on the presence of the
Chimel rationales in a particular case.” Id., at 8, 162 P. 3d,
at 647. Although they disagreed with the majority’s view
of Belton, the dissenting justices acknowledged that “[t]he
bright-line rule embraced in Belton has long been criticized
and probably merits reconsideration.” 216 Ariz., at 10, 162
P. 3d, at 649. They thus “add[ed their] voice[s] to the others
that have urged the Supreme Court to revisit Belton.” Id.,
at 11, 162 P. 3d, at 650.
The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes
courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have ques
tioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth
Amendment principles. We therefore granted the State’s
petition for certiorari. 552 U. S. 1230 (2008).
II
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it
should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a war
rantless search, with the basic rule that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389
U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). Among the excep
tions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392
(1914). The exception derives from interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation that are typically impli
cated in arrest situations. See United States v. Robinson,
414 U. S. 218, 230–234 (1973); Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763.

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In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may
only include “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his
immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.” Ibid. That limitation, which con
tinues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that
the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with
its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding
any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might
conceal or destroy. See ibid. (noting that searches incident
to arrest are reasonable “in order to remove any weapons
[the arrestee] might seek to use” and “in order to prevent
[the] concealment or destruction” of evidence (emphasis
added)). If there is no possibility that an arrestee could
reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to
search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest
exception are absent and the rule does not apply. E. g.,
Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367–368 (1964).
In Belton, we considered Chimel’s application to the auto
mobile context. A lone police officer in that case stopped a
speeding car in which Belton was one of four occupants.
While asking for the driver’s license and registration, the
officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed an envelope on
the car floor marked “Supergold”—a name he associated with
marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe the occu
pants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered them
out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them
down. Without handcuffing the arrestees,1 the officer “ ‘split
them up into four separate areas of the Thruway . . . so they
would not be in physical touching area of each other’ ” and
searched the vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the
backseat, in which he found cocaine. 453 U. S., at 456.
1 The officer was unable to handcuff the occupants because he had only
one set of handcuffs. See Brief for Petitioner in New York v. Belton, O. T.
1980, No. 80–328, p. 3 (hereinafter Brief in No. 80–328).

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The New York Court of Appeals found the search uncon
stitutional, concluding that after the occupants were arrested
the vehicle and its contents were “safely within the exclusive
custody and control of the police.” State v. Belton, 50 N. Y.
2d 447, 452, 407 N. E. 2d 420, 423 (1980). The State asked
this Court to consider whether the exception recognized in
Chimel permits an officer to search “a jacket found inside an
automobile while the automobile’s four occupants, all under
arrest, are standing unsecured around the vehicle.” Brief
in No. 80–328, p. i. We granted certiorari because “courts
ha[d] found no workable definition of ‘the area within the
immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably
includes the interior of an automobile.” 453 U. S., at 460.
In its brief, the State argued that the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that the jacket was under the officer’s
exclusive control. Focusing on the number of arrestees and
their proximity to the vehicle, the State asserted that it was
reasonable for the officer to believe the arrestees could have
accessed the vehicle and its contents, making the search per
missible under Chimel. Brief in No. 80–328, at 7–8. The
United States, as amicus curiae in support of the State, ar
gued for a more permissive standard, but it maintained that
any search incident to arrest must be “ ‘substantially contem
poraneous’ ” with the arrest—a requirement it deemed “sat
isfied if the search occurs during the period in which the
arrest is being consummated and before the situation has so
stabilized that it could be said that the arrest was com
pleted.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in New
York v. Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80–328, p. 14. There was no
suggestion by the parties or amici that Chimel authorizes a
vehicle search incident to arrest when there is no realistic
possibility that an arrestee could access his vehicle.
After considering these arguments, we held that when an
officer lawfully arrests “the occupant of an automobile, he
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the

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passenger compartment of the automobile” and any contain
ers therein. Belton, 453 U. S., at 460 (footnote omitted).
That holding was based in large part on our assumption “that
articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passen
ger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even
if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee
might reach.’ ” Ibid.
The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton
as merely delineating “the proper scope of a search of the
interior of an automobile” incident to an arrest, id., at 459.
That is, when the passenger compartment is within an ar
restee’s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization
that the entire compartment and any containers therein may
be reached. On that view of Belton, the state court con
cluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable be
cause Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the
time of the search. It also found that no other exception to
the warrant requirement applied in this case.
Gant now urges us to adopt the reading of Belton followed
by the Arizona Supreme Court.
III
Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Ari
zona Supreme Court’s reading of Belton, our opinion has
been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to
the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility
the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of
the search. This reading may be attributable to Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in which he characterized the
Court’s holding as resting on the “fiction . . . that the interior
of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee
who has recently been in the car.” Id., at 466. Under the
majority’s approach, he argued, “the result would presum
ably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton
and his companions in the patrol car” before conducting the
search. Id., at 468.

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342 ARIZONA v. GANT
Opinion of the Court
Since we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given
different answers to the question whether a vehicle must
be within an arrestee’s reach to justify a vehicle search inci
dent to arrest,2 but Justice Brennan’s reading of the Court’s
opinion has predominated. As Justice O’Connor observed,
“lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search
a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a
police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by
the twin rationales of Chimel.” Thornton, 541 U. S., at 624
(opinion concurring in part). Justice Scalia has similarly
noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could
gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been
handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases
allowing a search in “this precise factual scenario . . . are
legion.” Id., at 628 (opinion concurring in judgment) (col
lecting cases).3 Indeed, some courts have upheld searches
2 Compare United States v. Green, 324 F. 3d 375, 379 (CA5 2003) (holding
that Belton did not authorize a search of an arrestee’s vehicle when he
was handcuffed and lying facedown on the ground surrounded by four
police officers 6-to-10 feet from the vehicle), United States v. Edwards, 242
F. 3d 928, 938 (CA10 2001) (finding unauthorized a vehicle search con
ducted while the arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car), and
United States v. Vasey, 834 F. 2d 782, 787 (CA9 1987) (finding unauthorized
a vehicle search conducted 30-to-45 minutes after an arrest and after the
arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police car), with
United States v. Hrasky, 453 F. 3d 1099, 1102 (CA8 2006) (upholding a
search conducted an hour after the arrestee was apprehended and after
he had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car), United
States v. Weaver, 433 F. 3d 1104, 1106 (CA9 2006) (upholding a search
conducted 10-to-15 minutes after an arrest and after the arrestee had been
handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car), and United States v.
White, 871 F. 2d 41, 44 (CA6 1989) (upholding a search conducted after the
arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police cruiser).
3 The practice of searching vehicles incident to arrest after the arrestee
has been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car has not abated since we
decided Thornton. See, e. g., United States v. Murphy, 221 Fed. Appx.
715, 717 (CA10 2007); Hrasky, 453 F. 3d, at 1100; Weaver, 433 F. 3d, at
1105; United States v. Williams, 170 Fed. Appx. 399, 401 (CA6 2006);
United States v. Dorsey, 418 F. 3d 1038, 1041 (CA9 2005); United States v.

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under Belton “even when . . . the handcuffed arrestee has
already left the scene.” 541 U. S., at 628 (same).
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would
be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s passenger
compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the
time of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle
search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus
untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chi
mel exception—a result clearly incompatible with our state
ment in Belton that it “in no way alters the fundamental
principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic
scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.” 453
U. S., at 460, n. 3. Accordingly, we reject this reading of
Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police
to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.4
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude
that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a
search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle.” Thornton, 541 U. S., at 632 (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment). In many cases, as when a re
cent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be
no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant
evidence. See, e. g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318,
Osife, 398 F. 3d 1143, 1144 (CA9 2005); United States v. Sumrall, 115 Fed.
Appx. 22, 24 (CA10 2004).
4 Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle
occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable to fully
effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s
vehicle remains. Cf. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), p. 525 (4th
ed. 2004) (hereinafter LaFave) (noting that the availability of protective
measures “ensur[es] the nonexistence of circumstances in which the arrest
ee’s ‘control’ of the car is in doubt”). But in such a case a search incident
to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

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344 ARIZONA v. GANT
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324 (2001); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118 (1998). But
in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of ar
rest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compart
ment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.
Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of dis
covering offense-related evidence authorized the search in
this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer
confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in
this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had
been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before
the officers searched Gant’s car. Under those circum
stances, Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his
car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the
search was also lacking in this case. Whereas Belton and
Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested
for driving with a suspended license—an offense for which
police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger com
partment of Gant’s car. Cf. Knowles, 525 U. S., at 118. Be
cause police could not reasonably have believed either that
Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or
that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might
have been found therein, the search in this case was
unreasonable.
IV
The State does not seriously disagree with the Arizona
Supreme Court’s conclusion that Gant could not have ac
cessed his vehicle at the time of the search, but it neverthe
less asks us to uphold the search of his vehicle under the
broad reading of Belton discussed above. The State argues
that Belton searches are reasonable regardless of the possi
bility of access in a given case because that expansive rule
correctly balances law enforcement interests, including the
interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s limited pri
vacy interest in his vehicle.
For several reasons, we reject the State’s argument.
First, the State seriously undervalues the privacy interests

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at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist’s
privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his
home, see New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 112–113 (1986),
the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving
of constitutional protection, see Knowles, 525 U. S., at 117.
It is particularly significant that Belton searches authorize
police officers to search not just the passenger compartment
but every purse, briefcase, or other container within that
space. A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a
search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic
offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the
offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. In
deed, the character of that threat implicates the central con
cern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about
giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will
among a person’s private effects.5
At the same time as it undervalues these privacy concerns,
the State exaggerates the clarity that its reading of Belton
provides. Courts that have read Belton expansively are at
odds regarding how close in time to the arrest and how prox
5 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 84 (1987); Chimel v. Califor
nia, 395 U. S. 752, 760–761 (1969); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 480–484
(1965); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 389–392 (1914); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624–625 (1886); see also 10 C. Adams, The
Works of John Adams 247–248 (1856). Many have observed that a broad
reading of Belton gives police limitless discretion to conduct exploratory
searches. See 3 LaFave § 7.1(c), at 527 (observing that Belton creates the
risk “that police will make custodial arrests which they otherwise would
not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth Amendment otherwise
prohibits”); see also United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d 889, 894 (CA9
1999) (Trott, J., concurring) (observing that Belton has been applied to
condone “purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers
with no definite objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage
around in a car to see what they might find”); State v. Pallone, 2001 WI
77, ¶¶ 87–90, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 203–204, and n. 9, 613 N. W. 2d 568, 588, and
n. 9 (2000) (Abrahamson, C. J., dissenting) (same); State v. Pierce, 136 N. J.
184, 211, 642 A. 2d 947, 961 (1994) (same).

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imate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s first contact with
the arrestee must be to bring the encounter within Belton’s
purview 6 and whether a search is reasonable when it com
mences or continues after the arrestee has been removed
from the scene.7 The rule has thus generated a great deal
of uncertainty, particularly for a rule touted as providing a
“bright line.” See 3 LaFave § 7.1(c), at 514–524.
Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of Bel
ton is also unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety
and evidentiary interests. Under our view, Belton and
Thornton permit an officer to conduct a vehicle search when
an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest. Other established exceptions to the war
rant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional
circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand.
For instance, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), per
mits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment
when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether
or not the arrestee, is “dangerous” and might access the vehi
6 Compare United States v. Caseres, 533 F. 3d 1064, 1072 (CA9 2008)
(declining to apply Belton when the arrestee was approached by police
after he had exited his vehicle and reached his residence), with Rainey v.
Commonwealth, 197 S. W. 3d 89, 94–95 (Ky. 2006) (applying Belton when
the arrestee was apprehended 50 feet from the vehicle), and Black v. State,
810 N. E. 2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2004) (applying Belton when the arrestee was
apprehended inside an auto repair shop and the vehicle was parked
outside).
7 Compare McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d, at 890–891 (upholding a search that
commenced five minutes after the arrestee was removed from the scene),
United States v. Snook, 88 F. 3d 605, 608 (CA8 1996) (same), and United
States v. Doward, 41 F. 3d 789, 793 (CA1 1994) (upholding a search that
continued after the arrestee was removed from the scene), with United
States v. Lugo, 978 F. 2d 631, 634 (CA10 1992) (holding invalid a search
that commenced after the arrestee was removed from the scene), and State
v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 427–428, 512 A. 2d 160, 169 (1986) (holding in
valid a search that continued after the arrestee was removed from the
scene).

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cle to “gain immediate control of weapons.” Id., at 1049 (cit
ing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)). If there is proba
ble cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal
activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 820–821 (1982),
authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the
evidence might be found. Unlike the searches permitted by
Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in
Thornton, which we conclude today are reasonable for pur
poses of the Fourth Amendment, Ross allows searches for
evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest,
and the scope of the search authorized is broader. Finally,
there may be still other circumstances in which safety or
evidentiary interests would justify a search. Cf. Maryland
v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that, incident to
arrest, an officer may conduct a limited protective sweep of
those areas of a house in which he reasonably suspects a
dangerous person may be hiding).
These exceptions together ensure that officers may search
a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns en
countered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant
justify a search. Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle
searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose ex
cept to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to
the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on
that basis. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the
State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would
meaningfully further law enforcement interests and justify
a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.8
8 At least eight States have reached the same conclusion. Vermont,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, New York, Oregon, and
Wyoming have declined to follow a broad reading of Belton under their
state constitutions. See State v. Bauder, 181 Vt. 392, 401, 924 A. 2d 38,
46–47 (2007); State v. Eckel, 185 N. J. 523, 540, 888 A. 2d 1266, 1277 (2006);
Camacho v. State, 119 Nev. 395, 399–400, 75 P. 3d 370, 373–374 (2003);
Vasquez v. State, 990 P. 2d 476, 488–489 (Wyo. 1999); State v. Arredondo,
1997–NMCA–081, 123 N. M. 628, 636 (Ct. App.), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999–NMCA–107, 127 N. M. 752 (Ct. App.);

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V
Our dissenting colleagues argue that the doctrine of stare
decisis requires adherence to a broad reading of Belton even
though the justifications for searching a vehicle incident to
arrest are in most cases absent.9 The doctrine of stare deci
sis is of course “essential to the respect accorded to the judg
ments of the Court and to the stability of the law,” but it
does not compel us to follow a past decision when its ration
ale no longer withstands “careful analysis.” Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 577 (2003).
We have never relied on stare decisis to justify the contin
uance of an unconstitutional police practice. And we would
be particularly loath to uphold an unconstitutional result in
a case that is so easily distinguished from the decisions that
arguably compel it. The safety and evidentiary interests
that supported the search in Belton simply are not present
in this case. Indeed, it is hard to imagine two cases that
are factually more distinct, as Belton involved one officer
confronted by four unsecured arrestees suspected of commit
ting a drug offense, and this case involves several officers
confronted with a securely detained arrestee apprehended
for driving with a suspended license. This case is also dis
tinguishable from Thornton, in which the petitioner was
Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 57, 669 A. 2d 896, 902 (1995); People
v. Blasich, 73 N. Y. 2d 673, 678, 541 N. E. 2d 40, 43 (1989); State v. Fesler, 68
Ore. App. 609, 612, 685 P. 2d 1014, 1016–1017 (1984). And a Massachusetts
statute provides that a search incident to arrest may be made only for the
purposes of seizing weapons or evidence of the offense of arrest. See
Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 161–162, 448 N. E. 2d 1264, 1266–
1267 (1983) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 276, § 1 (West 2006)).
9 Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion also accuses us of “overrul[ing]”
Belton and Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), “even though
respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.” Post, at 355. Contrary to
that claim, the narrow reading of Belton we adopt today is precisely the
result Gant has urged. That Justice Alito has chosen to describe this
decision as overruling our earlier cases does not change the fact that the
resulting rule of law is the one advocated by respondent.

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arrested for a drug offense. It is thus unsurprising that
Members of this Court who concurred in the judgments in
Belton and Thornton also concur in the decision in this
case.10
We do not agree with the contention in Justice Alito’s
dissent (hereinafter dissent) that consideration of police reli
ance interests requires a different result. Although it ap
pears that the State’s reading of Belton has been widely
taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers
have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during
the past 28 years,11 many of these searches were not justified
by the reasons underlying the Chimel exception. Countless
individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic vio
lation have had their constitutional right to the security of
their private effects violated as a result. The fact that the
law enforcement community may view the State’s version of
the Belton rule as an entitlement does not establish the sort
of reliance interest that could outweigh the countervailing
interest that all individuals share in having their constitu
tional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is
unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly
outweighs any law enforcement “entitlement” to its persis
tence. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 393 (1978)
(“[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more
efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment”). The dissent’s reference in this regard to the
reliance interests cited in Dickerson v. United States, 530
U. S. 428 (2000), is misplaced. See post, at 358–359. In ob
10 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in Belton, 453 U. S., at
463, for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Robbins v. Califor
nia, 453 U. S. 420, 444 (1981), Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion
in Thornton, 541 U. S. 615, and Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg
concurred in the judgment in that case, id., at 625.
11 Because a broad reading of Belton has been widely accepted, the doc
trine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for searches
conducted in reasonable reliance on that understanding.

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serving that “Miranda has become embedded in routine po
lice practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture,” 530 U. S., at 443, the Court was
referring not to police reliance on a rule requiring them to
provide warnings but to the broader societal reliance on that
individual right.
The dissent also ignores the checkered history of the
search-incident-to-arrest exception. Police authority to
search the place in which a lawful arrest is made was broadly
asserted in Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927),
and limited a few years later in Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lef
kowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). The limiting views expressed
in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz were in turn abandoned in Harris
v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947), which upheld a search
of a four-room apartment incident to the occupant’s arrest.
Only a year later the Court in Trupiano v. United States,
334 U. S. 699, 708 (1948), retreated from that holding, noting
that the search-incident-to-arrest exception is “a strictly lim
ited” one that must be justified by “something more in the
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest.” And just two
years after that, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56
(1950), the Court again reversed course and upheld the
search of an entire apartment. Finally, our opinion in Chi
mel overruled Rabinowitz and what remained of Harris and
established the present boundaries of the search-incident
to-arrest exception. Notably, none of the dissenters in Chi
mel or the cases that preceded it argued that law enforce
ment reliance interests outweighed the interest in protecting
individual constitutional rights so as to warrant fidelity to an
unjustifiable rule.
The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton
has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad
reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that
articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely “within
‘the area into which an arrestee might reach,’ ” 453 U. S., at

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460, and blind adherence to Belton’s faulty assumption would
authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. The doctrine of
stare decisis does not require us to approve routine constitu
tional violations.
VI
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a
search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless
police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the
warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court
correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search.
Accordingly, the judgment of the State Supreme Court is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, concurring.
To determine what is an “unreasonable” search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to the his
torical practices the Framers sought to preserve; if those
provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional standards
of reasonableness. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164,
168–171 (2008). Since the historical scope of officers’ au
thority to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain, see
Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 629–631 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), traditional standards
of reasonableness govern. It is abundantly clear that those
standards do not justify what I take to be the rule set forth
in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), and Thornton:
that arresting officers may always search an arrestee’s vehi
cle in order to protect themselves from hidden weapons.
When an arrest is made in connection with a roadside stop,
police virtually always have a less intrusive and more effec
tive means of ensuring their safety—and a means that is vir

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352 ARIZONA v. GANT
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tually always employed: ordering the arrestee away from the
vehicle, patting him down in the open, handcuffing him, and
placing him in the squad car.
Law enforcement officers face a risk of being shot when
ever they pull a car over. But that risk is at its height at
the time of the initial confrontation; and it is not at all re
duced by allowing a search of the stopped vehicle after the
driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car.
I observed in Thornton that the Government had failed to
provide a single instance in which a formerly restrained ar
restee escaped to retrieve a weapon from his own vehicle,
541 U. S., at 626; Arizona and its amici have not remedied
that significant deficiency in the present case.
It must be borne in mind that we are speaking here only
of a rule automatically permitting a search when the driver
or an occupant is arrested. Where no arrest is made, we
have held that officers may search the car if they reasonably
believe “the suspect is dangerous and . . . may gain immedi
ate control of weapons.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032,
1049 (1983). In the no-arrest case, the possibility of access
to weapons in the vehicle always exists, since the driver or
passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle when the
interrogation is completed. The rule of Michigan v. Long
is not at issue here.
Justice Stevens acknowledges that an officer-safety ra
tionale cannot justify all vehicle searches incident to arrest,
but asserts that that is not the rule Belton and Thornton
adopted. (As described above, I read those cases differ
ently.) Justice Stevens would therefore retain the appli
cation of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), in the
car-search context but would apply in the future what he
believes our cases held in the past: that officers making a
roadside stop may search the vehicle so long as the “arrestee
is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search.” Ante, at 351. I believe that this

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standard fails to provide the needed guidance to arresting
officers and also leaves much room for manipulation, inviting
officers to leave the scene unsecured (at least where danger
ous suspects are not involved) in order to conduct a vehicle
search. In my view we should simply abandon the Belton-
Thornton charade of officer safety and overrule those cases.
I would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso
facto “reasonable” only when the object of the search is evi
dence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of an
other crime that the officer has probable cause to believe
occurred. Because respondent was arrested for driving
without a license (a crime for which no evidence could be
expected to be found in the vehicle), I would hold in the
present case that the search was unlawful.
Justice Alito insists that the Court must demand a good
reason for abandoning prior precedent. That is true
enough, but it seems to me ample reason that the precedent
was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in this case un
constitutional) results. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S.
808, 827 (1991). We should recognize Belton’s fanciful reli
ance upon officer safety for what it was: “a return to the
broader sort of [evidence-gathering] search incident to arrest
that we allowed before Chimel.” Thornton, supra, at 631
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Justice Alito argues that there is no reason to adopt
a rule limiting automobile-arrest searches to those cases
where the search’s object is evidence of the crime of arrest.
Post, at 364 (dissenting opinion). I disagree. This formula
tion of officers’ authority both preserves the outcomes of our
prior cases and tethers the scope and rationale of the doc
trine to the triggering event. Belton, by contrast, allowed
searches precisely when its exigency-based rationale was
least applicable: The fact of the arrest in the automobile con
text makes searches on exigency grounds less reasonable,
not more. I also disagree with Justice Alito’s conclusory

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Breyer, J., dissenting
assertion that this standard will be difficult to administer in
practice, post, at 360–361; the ease of its application in this
case would suggest otherwise.
No other Justice, however, shares my view that application
of Chimel in this context should be entirely abandoned. It
seems to me unacceptable for the Court to come forth with a
4-to-1-to-4 opinion that leaves the governing rule uncertain.
I am therefore confronted with the choice of either leaving
the current understanding of Belton and Thornton in effect,
or acceding to what seems to me the artificial narrowing of
those cases adopted by Justice Stevens. The latter, as I
have said, does not provide the degree of certainty I think
desirable in this field; but the former opens the field to what
I think are plainly unconstitutional searches—which is the
greater evil. I therefore join the opinion of the Court.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
I agree with Justice Alito that New York v. Belton, 453
U. S. 454 (1981), is best read as setting forth a bright-line
rule that permits a warrantless search of the passenger com
partment of an automobile incident to the lawful arrest of an
occupant—regardless of the danger the arrested individual
in fact poses. I also agree with Justice Stevens, however,
that the rule can produce results divorced from its underly
ing Fourth Amendment rationale. Compare Belton, supra,
with Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 764 (1969) (explain
ing that the rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justi
fied by the need to prevent harm to a police officer or de
struction of evidence of the crime). For that reason I would
look for a better rule—were the question before us one of
first impression.
The matter, however, is not one of first impression, and
that fact makes a substantial difference. The Belton rule
has been followed not only by this Court in Thornton v.
United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), but also by numerous
other courts. Principles of stare decisis must apply, and

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Alito, J., dissenting
those who wish this Court to change a well-established legal
precedent—where, as here, there has been considerable reli
ance on the legal rule in question—bear a heavy burden.
Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U. S. 877, 918–926 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
I have not found that burden met. Nor do I believe that the
other considerations ordinarily relevant when determining
whether to overrule a case are satisfied. I consequently join
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion with the exception of
Part II–E.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice and Jus
tice Kennedy join, and with whom Justice Breyer joins
except as to Part II–E, dissenting.
Twenty-eight years ago, in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S.
454, 460 (1981), this Court held that “when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automo
bile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”
(Footnote omitted.) Five years ago, in Thornton v. United
States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004)—a case involving a situation
not materially distinguishable from the situation here—the
Court not only reaffirmed but extended the holding of Bel
ton, making it applicable to recent occupants. Today’s deci
sion effectively overrules those important decisions, even
though respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.
To take the place of the overruled precedents, the Court
adopts a new two-part rule under which a police officer who
arrests a vehicle occupant or recent occupant may search the
passenger compartment if (1) the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the vehicle at the time of the search or (2) the
officer has reason to believe that the vehicle contains evi
dence of the offense of arrest. Ante, at 351. The first part
of this new rule may endanger arresting officers and is truly
endorsed by only four Justices; Justice Scalia joins solely
for the purpose of avoiding a “4-to-1-to-4 opinion.” Ante, at

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354 (concurring opinion). The second part of the new rule is
taken from Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Thornton
without any independent explanation of its origin or justifi
cation and is virtually certain to confuse law enforcement
officers and judges for some time to come. The Court’s deci
sion will cause the suppression of evidence gathered in many
searches carried out in good-faith reliance on well-settled
case law, and although the Court purports to base its analy
sis on the landmark decision in Chimel v. California, 395
U. S. 752 (1969), the Court’s reasoning undermines Chimel.
I would follow Belton, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
Although the Court refuses to acknowledge that it is over
ruling Belton and Thornton, there can be no doubt that it
does so.
In Belton, an officer on the New York Thruway removed
the occupants from a car and placed them under arrest but
did not handcuff them. See 453 U. S., at 456; Brief for Peti
tioner in New York v. Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80–328, p. 3.
The officer then searched a jacket on the car’s back seat and
found drugs. 453 U. S., at 455. By a divided vote, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the search of the jacket
violated Chimel, in which this Court held that an arresting
officer may search the area within an arrestee’s immediate
control. See State v. Belton, 50 N. Y. 2d 447, 407 N. E. 2d
420 (1980). The judges of the New York Court of Appeals
disagreed on the factual question whether the Belton arrest
ees could have gained access to the car. The majority
thought that they could not have done so, id., at 452, n. 2,
407 N. E. 2d, at 423, n. 2, but the dissent thought that this
was a real possibility, id., at 453, 407 N. E. 2d, at 424 (opinion
of Gabrielli, J.).
Viewing this disagreement about the application of the
Chimel rule as illustrative of a persistent and important
problem, the Belton Court concluded that “ ‘[a] single famil

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iar standard’ ” was “ ‘essential to guide police officers’ ” who
make roadside arrests. 453 U. S., at 458 (quoting Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213–214 (1979)). The Court ac
knowledged that articles in the passenger compartment of a
car are not always within an arrestee’s reach, but “[i]n order
to establish the workable rule this category of cases re
quires,” the Court adopted a rule that categorically permits
the search of a car’s passenger compartment incident to the
lawful arrest of an occupant. 453 U. S., at 460.
The precise holding in Belton could not be clearer. The
Court stated unequivocally: “[W]e hold that when a police
man has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automo
bile.” Ibid. (footnote omitted).
Despite this explicit statement, the opinion of the Court in
the present case curiously suggests that Belton may rea
sonably be read as adopting a holding that is narrower than
the one explicitly set out in the Belton opinion, namely, that
an officer arresting a vehicle occupant may search the pas
senger compartment “when the passenger compartment is
within an arrestee’s reaching distance.” Ante, at 341 (em
phasis in original). According to the Court, the broader
reading of Belton that has gained wide acceptance “may be
attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent.” Ante, at 341.
Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, however, Justice Bren
nan’s Belton dissent did not mischaracterize the Court’s
holding in that case or cause that holding to be misinter
preted. As noted, the Belton Court explicitly stated pre
cisely what it held. In Thornton, the Court recognized the
scope of Belton’s holding. See 541 U. S., at 620. So did
Justice Scalia’s separate opinion. See id., at 625 (opinion
concurring in judgment) (“In [Belton] we set forth a bright
line rule for arrests of automobile occupants, holding that . . .
a search of the whole [passenger] compartment is justified in
every case”). So does Justice Scalia’s opinion in the pres

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358 ARIZONA v. GANT
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ent case. See ante, at 351 (Belton and Thornton held that
“arresting officers may always search an arrestee’s vehicle
in order to protect themselves from hidden weapons”). This
“bright-line rule” has now been interred.
II
Because the Court has substantially overruled Belton and
Thornton, the Court must explain why its departure from
the usual rule of stare decisis is justified. I recognize that
stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,” Payne v. Ten
nessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991), and applies less rigidly in
constitutional cases, Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530,
543 (1962) (plurality opinion). But the Court has said that
a constitutional precedent should be followed unless there is
a “ ‘special justification’ ” for its abandonment. Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000). Relevant factors
identified in prior cases include whether the precedent has
engendered reliance, id., at 442, whether there has been an
important change in circumstances in the outside world,
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 244 (2006) (plurality opin
ion); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 412
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), whether the precedent has
proved to be unworkable, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267,
306 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Payne, supra, at 827),
whether the precedent has been undermined by later deci
sions, see, e. g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S.
164, 173–174 (1989), and whether the decision was badly
reasoned, Vieth, supra, at 306 (plurality opinion). These
factors weigh in favor of retaining the rule established in
Belton.
A
Reliance. While reliance is most important in “cases in
volving property and contract rights,” Payne, supra, at 828,
the Court has recognized that reliance by law enforcement
officers is also entitled to weight. In Dickerson, the Court
held that principles of stare decisis “weigh[ed]” heavily

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against overruling Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
because the Miranda rule had become “embedded in routine
police practice.” 530 U. S., at 443.
If there was reliance in Dickerson, there certainly is sub
stantial reliance here. The Belton rule has been taught to
police officers for more than a quarter century. Many
searches—almost certainly including more than a few that
figure in cases now on appeal—were conducted in scrupulous
reliance on that precedent. It is likely that, on the very day
when this opinion is announced, numerous vehicle searches
will be conducted in good faith by police officers who were
taught the Belton rule.
The opinion of the Court recognizes that “Belton has been
widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement
officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches
during the past 28 years.” Ante, at 349. But for the Court,
this seemingly counts for nothing. The Court states that
“[w]e have never relied on stare decisis to justify the continu
ance of an unconstitutional police practice,” ante, at 348, but
of course the Court routinely relies on decisions sustaining
the constitutionality of police practices without doing what
the Court has done here—sua sponte considering whether
those decisions should be overruled. And the Court cites
no authority for the proposition that stare decisis may be
disregarded or provides only lesser protection when the
precedent that is challenged is one that sustained the consti
tutionality of a law enforcement practice.
The Court also errs in arguing that the reliance interest
that was given heavy weight in Dickerson was not “police
reliance on a rule requiring them to provide warnings but
to the broader societal reliance on that individual right.”
Ante, at 350. The Dickerson opinion makes no reference to
“societal reliance,” and petitioner in that case contended that
there had been reliance on Miranda because, among other
things, “[f]or nearly thirty-five years, Miranda’s require
ments ha[d] shaped law enforcement training [and] police

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conduct.” See Brief for Petitioner in Dickerson v. United
States, O. T. 1999, No. 99–5525, p. 33.
B
Changed circumstances. Abandonment of the Belton
rule cannot be justified on the ground that the dangers sur
rounding the arrest of a vehicle occupant are different today
than they were 28 years ago. The Court claims that “[w]e
now know that articles inside the passenger compartment
are rarely ‘within “the area into which an arrestee might
reach,” ’ ” ante, at 350, but surely it was well known in 1981
that a person who is taken from a vehicle, handcuffed, and
placed in the back of a patrol car is unlikely to make it back
into his own car to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence.
C
Workability. The Belton rule has not proved to be un
workable. On the contrary, the rule was adopted for the
express purpose of providing a test that would be relatively
easy for police officers and judges to apply. The Court cor
rectly notes that even the Belton rule is not perfectly clear
in all situations. Specifically, it is sometimes debatable
whether a search is or is not contemporaneous with an ar
rest, ante, at 345–346, and n. 6, but that problem is small in
comparison with the problems that the Court’s new two-part
rule will produce.
The first part of the Court’s new rule—which permits the
search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment if it is within
an arrestee’s reach at the time of the search—reintroduces
the same sort of case-by-case, fact-specific decisionmaking
that the Belton rule was adopted to avoid. As the situation
in Belton illustrated, there are cases in which it is unclear
whether an arrestee could retrieve a weapon or evidence in
the passenger compartment of a car.
Even more serious problems will also result from the sec
ond part of the Court’s new rule, which requires officers

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making roadside arrests to determine whether there is rea
son to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the crime
of arrest. What this rule permits in a variety of situations
is entirely unclear.
D
Consistency with later cases. The Belton bright-line rule
has not been undermined by subsequent cases. On the con
trary, that rule was reaffirmed and extended just five years
ago in Thornton.
E
Bad reasoning. The Court is harshly critical of Belton’s
reasoning, but the problem that the Court perceives cannot
be remedied simply by overruling Belton. Belton repre
sented only a modest—and quite defensible—extension of
Chimel, as I understand that decision.
Prior to Chimel, the Court’s precedents permitted an ar
resting officer to search the area within an arrestee’s “pos
session” and “control” for the purpose of gathering evidence.
See 395 U. S., at 759–760. Based on this “abstract doctrine,”
id., at 760, n. 4, the Court had sustained searches that ex
tended far beyond an arrestee’s grabbing area. See United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) (search of entire
office); Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947) (search
of entire apartment).
The Chimel Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stew
art, overruled these cases. Concluding that there are only
two justifications for a warrantless search incident to ar
rest—officer safety and the preservation of evidence—the
Court stated that such a search must be confined to “the
arrestee’s person” and “the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 395
U. S., at 762–763.
Unfortunately, Chimel did not say whether “the area from
within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence” is to be measured at the time of

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the arrest or at the time of the search, but unless the Chimel
rule was meant to be a specialty rule, applicable to only a
few unusual cases, the Court must have intended for this
area to be measured at the time of arrest.
This is so because the Court can hardly have failed to ap
preciate the following two facts. First, in the great major
ity of cases, an officer making an arrest is able to handcuff
the arrestee and remove him to a secure place before con
ducting a search incident to the arrest. See ante, at 343,
n. 4 (stating that it is “the rare case” in which an arresting
officer cannot secure an arrestee before conducting a search).
Second, because it is safer for an arresting officer to secure
an arrestee before searching, it is likely that this is what
arresting officers do in the great majority of cases. (And it
appears, not surprisingly, that this is in fact the prevailing
practice.1) Thus, if the area within an arrestee’s reach were
assessed, not at the time of arrest, but at the time of the
search, the Chimel rule would rarely come into play.
Moreover, if the applicability of the Chimel rule turned on
whether an arresting officer chooses to secure an arrestee
prior to conducting a search, rather than searching first and
securing the arrestee later, the rule would “create a perverse
incentive for an arresting officer to prolong the period during
which the arrestee is kept in an area where he could pose a
danger to the officer.” United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85
F. 3d 664, 669 (CADC 1996). If this is the law, the D. C.
Circuit observed, “the law would truly be, as Mr. Bumble
said, ‘a ass.’ ” Ibid. See also United States v. Tejada, 524
F. 3d 809, 812 (CA7 2008) (“[I]f the police could lawfully have
searched the defendant’s grabbing radius at the moment of
arrest, he has no legitimate complaint if, the better to protect
themselves from him, they first put him outside that radius”).
I do not think that this is what the Chimel Court intended.
Handcuffs were in use in 1969. The ability of arresting of
1 See Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexami
nation of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 665.

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Alito, J., dissenting
ficers to secure arrestees before conducting a search—and
their incentive to do so—are facts that can hardly have
escaped the Court’s attention. I therefore believe that the
Chimel Court intended that its new rule apply in cases
in which the arrestee is handcuffed before the search is
conducted.
The Belton Court, in my view, proceeded on the basis of
this interpretation of Chimel. Again speaking through Jus
tice Stewart, the Belton Court reasoned that articles in
the passenger compartment of a car are “generally, even
if not inevitably,” within an arrestee’s reach. 453 U. S., at
460. This is undoubtedly true at the time of the arrest of a
person who is seated in a car but plainly not true when the
person has been removed from the car and placed in hand
cuffs. Accordingly, the Belton Court must have proceeded
on the assumption that the Chimel rule was to be applied at
the time of arrest. And that is why the Belton Court was
able to say that its decision “in no way alter[ed] the funda
mental principles established in the Chimel case regarding
the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial ar
rests.” 453 U. S., at 460, n. 3. Viewing Chimel as having
focused on the time of arrest, Belton’s only new step was to
eliminate the need to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
a particular person seated in a car actually could have
reached the part of the passenger compartment where a
weapon or evidence was hidden. For this reason, if we are
going to reexamine Belton, we should also reexamine the
reasoning in Chimel on which Belton rests.
F
The Court, however, does not reexamine Chimel and thus
leaves the law relating to searches incident to arrest in a
confused and unstable state. The first part of the Court’s
new two-part rule—which permits an arresting officer to
search the area within an arrestee’s reach at the time of the
search—applies, at least for now, only to vehicle occupants

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and recent occupants, but there is no logical reason why the
same rule should not apply to all arrestees.
The second part of the Court’s new rule, which the Court
takes uncritically from Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in
Thornton, raises doctrinal and practical problems that the
Court makes no effort to address. Why, for example, is the
standard for this type of evidence-gathering search “reason
to believe” rather than probable cause? And why is this
type of search restricted to evidence of the offense of arrest?
It is true that an arrestee’s vehicle is probably more likely
to contain evidence of the crime of arrest than of some other
crime, but if reason-to-believe is the governing standard for
an evidence-gathering search incident to arrest, it is not easy
to see why an officer should not be able to search when the
officer has reason to believe that the vehicle in question pos
sesses evidence of a crime other than the crime of arrest.
Nor is it easy to see why an evidence-gathering search
incident to arrest should be restricted to the passenger com
partment. The Belton rule was limited in this way because
the passenger compartment was considered to be the area
that vehicle occupants can generally reach, 453 U. S., at 460,
but since the second part of the new rule is not based on
officer safety or the preservation of evidence, the ground for
this limitation is obscure.2
2 I do not understand the Court’s decision to reach the following situa
tions. First, it is not uncommon for an officer to arrest some but not all
of the occupants of a vehicle. The Court’s decision in this case does not
address the question whether in such a situation a search of the passenger
compartment may be justified on the ground that the occupants who are
not arrested could gain access to the car and retrieve a weapon or destroy
evidence. Second, there may be situations in which an arresting officer
has cause to fear that persons who were not passengers in the car might
attempt to retrieve a weapon or evidence from the car while the officer is
still on the scene. The decision in this case, as I understand it, does not
address that situation either.

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Alito, J., dissenting
Respondent in this
III
case has not asked us to overrule
Belton, much less Chimel. Respondent’s argument rests
entirely on an interpretation of Belton that is plainly incor
rect, an interpretation that disregards Belton’s explicit
delineation of its holding. I would therefore leave any re
examination of our prior precedents for another day, if such
a reexamination is to be undertaken at all. In this case,
I would simply apply Belton and reverse the judgment
below.