MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. ELAHI

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN v. ELAHI
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 07–615. Argued January 12, 2009—Decided April 21, 2009
In 1997, the International Court of Arbitration awarded petitioner Iranian
Ministry of Defense (hereinafter Iran) $2.8 million to settle a dispute
with Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., a California company, over a 1977
contract that would have provided Iran with an air combat training
system. When Cubic refused to pay, Iran sued in the Federal District
Court in San Diego, which ordered Cubic to pay the award plus interest
(Cubic Judgment). In 2000, respondent Elahi sued Iran in the D. C.
Federal District Court, claiming that Iranian agents had murdered his
brother. He obtained a default judgment of about $312 million and
sought to collect some of the money by attaching the Cubic Judgment.
Iran opposed the lien under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976. The California District Court denied Iran’s immunity claim, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding an exception to sovereign immunity.
This Court vacated and remanded. Ministry of Defense and Support
for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 546 U. S. 450.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that a different immunity excep
tion applied, citing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which
permitted holders of terrorism-related judgments against Iran to attach
“blocked” Iranian assets. The United States had blocked Iranian assets
following the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, and the court held that the
asset Elahi sought to attach had remained blocked notwithstanding the
unblocking orders issued after the crisis was resolved by the Algiers
Accords in 1981. The court reasoned that those unblocking orders had
omitted military goods such as the training system underlying the Cubic
Judgment. The court further rejected Iran’s argument that Elahi had
waived his right of attachment, and concluded that he could attach the
Cubic Judgment.
Held:
1. The asset in question was not “blocked” at the time of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision. Contrary to that court’s holding, the relevant asset
is not Iran’s interest in the air combat training system, but, rather, a
judgment enforcing an arbitration award based upon Cubic’s failure to
account to Iran for its share of the proceeds of the system’s eventual

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sale to Canada. And neither the Cubic Judgment nor the sale proceeds
it represents were blocked assets at the time of the Court of Appeals’
2007 decision. In a 1981 order, the Treasury Department unblocked
transactions involving property in which Iran’s interest arose after Jan
uary 19, 1981. Iran’s interest in the Cubic Judgment itself arose on
December 7, 1998, when the District Court confirmed the arbitration
award. And Iran’s interest in the property underlying the judgment
arose, as the arbitrators ruled, when Cubic completed its sale of the
air combat system in October 1982. Thus, whether Iran’s “interest in
property” is considered to be its interest in the Cubic Judgment itself
or its underlying interest in the sale proceeds, the interest falls within
the terms of the Treasury Department’s general unblocking order.
Even assuming (as the Ninth Circuit held) that the relevant asset was
Iran’s pre-1981 interest in the training system itself, that asset still was
not “blocked” at the time of the decision below. Such an interest would
fall directly within the scope of Executive Order No. 12281, which re
quired that property owned by Iran be transferred “as directed . . . by
the Government of Iran.” No authority supports the contrary conclu
sion. Pp. 375–379.
2. Elahi cannot attach the Cubic Judgment because he has waived his
right to do so. Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (VPA) offers compensation to individuals holding
terrorism-related judgments against Iran. It requires those receiving
payment to relinquish “all rights to . . . attach property that is at issue
in claims against the United States before an international tribunal.”
§ 2002(a)(2)(D). In 2003, the U. S. Government paid Elahi $2.3 million
under the VPA as partial compensation for his judgment against Iran,
and he signed a waiver form that mirrors the statutory language. A
review of the record in Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal Case No. B61 demon
strates that the Cubic Judgment falls within the terms of Elahi’s waiver.
Iran filed that case in 1982, claiming that between 1979 and 1981 the
United States had wrongly barred the transfer of the Cubic training
system and other military equipment to Iran. Iran asked the Tribunal
to order the United States, among other things, to pay Iran damages.
The United States answered that the Tribunal should set off the $2.8
million represented by the Cubic Judgment against any award. Iran
argued that the Tribunal should not set off the $2.8 million insofar as
third parties have attached the judgment. In the terms of Elahi’s
waiver, therefore, the Cubic Judgment is “property,” and Case No. B61
itself is a “clai[m] against the United States before an international tri
bunal.” And there remains a significant dispute about whether the
Cubic Judgment can be used by the Tribunal as a setoff, placing the

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Judgment “at issue” in Case No. B61. Elahi’s arguments to the con
trary are unavailing. Pp. 379–387.
3. Given Elahi’s waiver, this Court need not decide whether the Cubic
Judgment was blocked by new Executive Branch actions following the
Ninth Circuit’s decision. P. 387.
495 F. 3d 1024, reversed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Ken
nedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. Kennedy,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 387.
David J. Bederman argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Mina Almassi.
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him
on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant
Attorney General Katsas, then-Acting Solicitor General
Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Lewis S. Yelin, John B.
Bellinger III, and Robert F. Hoyt.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Jacqueline G. Cooper, Jonathan R.
Mook, and Philip J. Hirschkop.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Dariush Elahi, the respondent, sued Iran, claiming that
Iran unlawfully participated in the assassination of his
brother, and he obtained a default judgment of about $312
million. Seeking to collect some of the money, he has tried
to attach an asset belonging to Iran, namely, a $2.8 million
judgment that Iran obtained against a California company
called Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. (Cubic Judgment). Iran
has asserted a defense of sovereign immunity in order to
prevent the attachment. See Foreign Sovereign Immuni
ties Act of 1976, 28 U. S. C. § 1610.
Since Iran is a sovereign nation, Elahi cannot attach the
Cubic Judgment unless he finds an exception to the principle

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of sovereign immunity that would allow him to do so. See
Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Is
lamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 546 U. S. 450 (2006) (per
curiam). As the case reaches us, the Terrorism Risk Insur
ance Act of 2002 (TRIA), § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2337, note follow
ing 28 U. S. C. § 1610, provides the sole possible exception.
That Act authorizes holders of terrorism-related judgments
against Iran, such as Elahi, to attach Iranian assets that the
United States has “blocked.” Ibid. (emphasis added). And
we initially decide whether Iran’s Cubic Judgment is a
“blocked asset” within the terms of that Act.
Even if the Cubic Judgment is a blocked asset, however,
Elahi still cannot attach it if he waived his right to do so.
And we next decide whether Elahi waived that right when,
in return for partial compensation from the Government, he
agreed not to attach “property that is at issue in claims
against the United States before an international tribunal.”
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000
(VPA), § 2002(d)(5)(B), as added by TRIA § 201(c)(4), 116
Stat. 2339, note following 28 U. S. C. § 1610 (emphasis added).
We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a
“blocked asset” at the time the Court of Appeals handed
down its decision in this case. We recognize that since that
time new Executive Branch action may have “blocked” that
asset; but, in light of the posture of the case, we do not de
cide whether it has done so. Rather, we determine that
Elahi cannot attach the Cubic Judgment regardless, for the
Judgment is “at issue” in a claim against the United States
before the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal. The Judgment con
sequently falls within the terms of Elahi’s waiver.
I
We initially set forth key background elements, including
in this section the events necessary to understand the
“blocked asset” question, while leaving for Part III, infra,
additional background matters related to Elahi’s waiver.

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A
The Cubic Judgment arose out of a 1977 contract between
Cubic Defense Systems, a California company, and Iran’s
Ministry of Defense. (We shall refer to the Ministry, for
present purposes an inseparable part of the Iranian state, as
“Iran.” See Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed
Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Sys
tems, Inc., 495 F. 3d 1024, 1035–1036 (CA9 2007).) Cubic
there promised to supply Iran with certain military goods,
namely, an air combat training system, for which Iran prom
ised to pay approximately $18 million dollars. In 1979, after
Iran had paid some of the money but before Cubic had sent
the training system, the Iranian Revolution broke out, mili
tants in Iran seized American hostages, and President Car
ter “blocked all property and interests in property of the
Government of Iran . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.” Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 CFR 457 (1979
Comp.) (emphasis added), promulgated pursuant to the au
thority of International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), 50 U. S. C. §§ 1701–1702 (2000 ed. and Supp. V); 31
CFR § 535.201 (1980).
About a year later, on January 19, 1981, Iran and the
United States settled the crisis, in part with an agreement
called the “Algiers Accords.” 20 I. L. M. 224. Under the
Accords, the United States agreed to “restore the financial
position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed
prior to November 14, 1979,” ibid., and (with some excep
tions) to “arrange, subject to the provisions of U. S. law ap
plicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran
of all Iranian properties,” id., at 227. The President then
lifted the legal prohibitions against transactions involving
Iranian property. See Exec. Orders Nos. 12277–12282, 3
CFR 105–113 (1981 Comp.); 31 CFR §§ 535.211–535.215
(1981). In doing so, he ordered the transfer to Iran of Ira
nian financial assets and most other Iranian property “as
directed . . . by the Government of Iran,” Exec. Order

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No. 12281, 3 CFR 112 (1981 Comp.). Shortly thereafter, the
Treasury Department issued a general license authorizing
“[t]ransactions involving property in which Iran . . . has an
interest” where “[t]he property comes within the jurisdiction
of the United States . . . after January 19, 1981, or . . . [t]he
interest in the property . . . arises after January 19, 1981.”
31 CFR § 535.579(a).
The Algiers Accords also set up an international arbitra
tion tribunal, the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal (or Tribunal), to
resolve disputes between the two nations concerning each
other’s performance under the Algiers Accords. The Tribu
nal would also resolve disputes concerning contracts and
agreements between the two nations that were outstanding
on January 19, 1981. 20 I. L. M., at 230–231. The Tribu
nal’s jurisdiction included claims by nationals of one state
against the other state, but it did not include claims by one
state against nationals of the other state. Id., at 231–232.
B
In January 1982, Iran filed two Cubic-based claims in the
Tribunal. In Case No. B/61, Iran claimed that between 1979
and 1981 the United States had wrongly barred the transfer
of certain military equipment, including the Cubic air combat
training system, to Iran. Iran asked the Tribunal to order
the United States either to issue an export license for the
equipment or to pay Iran damages. App. to Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 22a, 24a, 31a.
In Case No. B66, Iran claimed that Cubic had breached its
contract to deliver the training system partly because the
United States had taken actions contrary to the Algiers Ac
cords. Again Iran asked the Tribunal to order either the
issuance of an export license for the equipment or the pay
ment of damages. Id., at 1a, 2a, 9a–10a. In April 1987 the
Tribunal dismissed this second case (No. B–66) on the
grounds that the Iran-Cubic contract imposed no obligations
on the United States and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdic

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tion to consider a suit by a state (Iran) against a private
party (Cubic). Ministry of Nat. Defence of Islamic Repub
lic of Iran v. United States, 14 Iran-U. S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
276, 277–278.
Iran, believing that Cubic had breached its contract, then
went to arbitration before the arbitration tribunal specified
in the Cubic contract, namely, the International Court of Ar
bitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. Iran
asked that arbitration tribunal to award it restitution and
damages.
In May 1997 the arbitrators issued their decision. The
arbitrators found that prior to the Iranian Revolution, prior
to the hostage crisis, and prior to the blocking of any Iranian
assets, (1) Iran and Cubic had themselves agreed that they
would temporarily discontinue (but not terminate) the con
tract; and (2) Cubic had agreed to try to sell the training
system to another buyer and to settle accounts with Iran
later. The arbitrators further found that after the crisis (in
September 1981) (3) Cubic successfully sold a modified ver
sion of the system to Canada. Ministry of Defense and
Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Cubic Int’l Sales Corp., No. 7365/FMS (Int’l Ct. of Arbitra
tion of Int’l Chamber of Commerce), pp. 32–33, 36–40, 50–51,
reprinted in 13 Mealey’s Int’l Arbitration Report pp. G–4,
G–15 to G–18, G–21 (Oct. 1998) (Arbitration Award). The
arbitrators concluded that Cubic had not lived up to this
modified agreement. And, after taking account of the ad
vance payments that Iran had made to Cubic, the funds that
Cubic had spent, the amount that Canada had paid Cubic,
and various other items, they awarded Iran $2.8 million plus
interest. Id., ¶ C.18.3(a), at G–31.
Cubic refused to pay Iran this money. Iran then sued in
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Cali
fornia to enforce the arbitration award. The District Court
confirmed the award and entered a final judgment ordering
Cubic to pay $2.8 million plus interest to Iran. That judg

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ment is the Cubic Judgment. Ministry of Defense and Sup
port for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic
Defense Systems, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174 (1998) (final
judgment entered Aug. 10, 1999).
C
In February 2000 Elahi brought a tort action against Iran
in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.
Elahi claimed that Iranian agents had murdered his brother.
See 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000 ed.) (lifting sovereign immu
nity of state sponsors of certain kinds of terrorism) (sub
sequently replaced by National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, § 1083(a)(1), 122 Stat. 338, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1605A (2006 ed., Supp. II)); Foreign Operations, Export Fi
nancing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997,
§ 589, 110 Stat. 3009–172, note following 28 U. S. C. § 1605
(providing tort cause of action). Iran did not answer the
complaint. The District Court found Iran in default, and it
awarded Elahi nearly $12 million in compensatory damages
and $300 million in punitive damages. Elahi v. Islamic Re
public of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97 (DC 2000).
In 2001 Elahi filed a notice of lien against Iran’s Cubic
Judgment. He thereby sought to satisfy from the Cubic
Judgment a portion of what Iran owed him under his own
default judgment against Iran. Iran opposed the lien. It
argued that the Cubic Judgment, as property of the sover
eign state of Iran, was immune from attachment or execu
tion. The District Court denied immunity. Ministry of
Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic
of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1140,
1152 (SD Cal. 2002).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. Ministry of
Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic
of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 385 F. 3d 1206 (CA9
2004). The Court of Appeals thought that the Ministry of
Defense of Iran had lost its immunity from attachment be

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cause of a special statutory exception that permits a creditor
to attach the property of an “agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United
States”—where the creditor seeks the property to satisfy a
terrorism-related judgment. 28 U. S. C. § 1610(b). See 385
F. 3d, at 1219–1222. But, on review here, we pointed out (in
a per curiam opinion) that the sovereign immunity exception
upon which the Ninth Circuit had relied—the exception for
the property of an entity that has “engaged in commercial
activity,” § 1610(b)(2)—applies only to property of an “agency
or instrumentality” of a foreign state. It does not apply to
property of an entity that itself is an inseparable part of the
foreign state. § 1610(a). Elahi, 546 U. S., at 452–453.
We remanded the case, and on remand, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Ministry of Defense fell into the latter category
(an inseparable part of the state of Iran), not the former (an
“agency or instrumentality” of Iran). 495 F. 3d 1024, 1035–
1036 (2007). Hence Elahi could not take advantage of the
“engaged in commercial activity” exception. The Court of
Appeals also found inapplicable a slightly different exception
applicable to “property . . . of a foreign state . . . used for
a commercial activity in the United States,” 28 U. S. C.
§ 1610(a). 495 F. 3d, at 1036–1037.
Nonetheless the Court of Appeals found yet another ex
ception that it believed denied Iran its sovereign immunity
defense. The court pointed out that in 2002 Congress had
enacted the TRIA. That Act permitted a person with a
terrorism-related judgment to attach an asset of the respon
sible “terrorist” state to satisfy the judgment, “[n]otwith
standing any other provision of law,” provided that the asset
was a “blocked asse[t].” § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2337. The Court
of Appeals noted that the Cubic Judgment arose out of a
pre-1981 contract with Iran involving an air combat training
system for Iran, and that President Carter had blocked vir
tually all Iranian assets following the Iranian hostage crisis.
See Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 CFR 457 (1979 Comp.) (“block

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[ing] all property and interests in property of the Govern
ment of Iran . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States”), promulgated pursuant to the authority of the
IEEPA, 50 U. S. C. §§ 1701–1702 (2000 ed. and Supp. V); 31
CFR § 535.201. The Court of Appeals then held that the
President had never unblocked the asset in question. 495
F. 3d, at 1033. In its view, the many unblocking orders
that were issued after the 1981 Algiers Accords, see, e. g.,
Exec. Orders Nos. 12277–12282, 3 CFR 105–113; 31 CFR
§§ 535.211–535.215, 535.579(a), did not apply because those
unblocking orders omitted “military goods such as the [train
ing system that underlay the Cubic Judgment].” 495 F. 3d,
at 1033.
The Court of Appeals also rejected Iran’s argument that
Elahi had waived his right to attach the Cubic Judgment
regardless (a matter to which we shall turn in Part III).
And the court concluded that Elahi was free to attach the
Judgment. Id., at 1037.
Iran, with the support of the Department of State, asked
us to grant certiorari. We did so, and we shall consider both
aspects of the Court of Appeals’ determination.
II
A
We turn first to the question whether the Cubic Judgment
was a “blocked asset.” The Ninth Circuit held that the
asset in question consisted of Iran’s interest in military
goods, namely, an air combat training system, which it be
lieved the Executive Branch had failed to unblock after the
Iranian hostage crisis ended. None of the parties here, how
ever, support the Ninth Circuit’s determination. And nei
ther do we.
The basic reason we cannot accept the Ninth Circuit’s ra
tionale is that we do not believe Cubic’s air combat training
system is the asset here in question. Elahi does not seek to
attach that system. Cubic sent the system itself to Canada,

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where, as far as we know, it remains. Rather, Elahi seeks
to attach a judgment enforcing an arbitration award based
upon Cubic’s failure to account to Iran for Iran’s share of
the proceeds of that system’s sale. And neither the Cubic
Judgment nor the sale proceeds that it represents were
blocked assets at the time the Court of Appeals issued its
decision.
In 1981, the Treasury Department issued an order that
authorized “[t]ransactions involving property in which Iran
. . . has an interest” where “[t]he interest in the property
. . . arises after January 19, 1981.” 31 CFR § 535.579(a)(1)
(emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals itself pointed
out, Iran’s interest in the Cubic Judgment arose “on Decem
ber 7, 1998, when the district court confirmed the [arbitra
tion] award.” 385 F. 3d, at 1224. Since it arose more than
17 years “after January 19, 1981,” the Cubic Judgment falls
within the terms of Treasury’s order. And that fact, in our
view, is sufficient to treat the Judgment as unblocked.
Iran’s interest in the property that underlies the Cubic
Judgment also arose after January 19, 1981. As the Inter
national Court of Arbitration held, Cubic and Iran entered
into their initial contract before 1981. But they later agreed
to discontinue (but not to terminate) the contract. Arbitra
tion Award G–15, G–21. They agreed that Cubic would try
to sell the system elsewhere. Id., ¶ C.9.15, at G–14. And
they further agreed that they would take “final decisions”
about who owed what to whom “only . . . once the result
of Cubic’s attempt to resell the System” was “known.” Id.,
¶ B.10.7, at G–17.
Cubic completed its sale of the system (to Canada) in Octo
ber 1982. Id., ¶ B.12.14, at G–22. And the arbitrators re
ferred to October 1982 as “the date the Parties had in mind
when they agreed to await the outcome of Cubic’s resale at
tempts.” Ibid. Only then was Cubic “in a position to rea
sonably, comprehensively and precisely account for the reuse
of components originally manufactured for Iran and for any

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modification costs.” Ibid. For those reasons, and in light
of the arbitrators’ findings, we must conclude that October
1982 is the time when Iran’s claim to proceeds arose.
The upshot is that, whether we consider Iran’s “interes[t]
in property” as its interest in the Cubic Judgment itself or
its underlying interest in the proceeds of the Canadian sale,
the interest falls within the terms of the Treasury Depart
ment’s general license authorizing “[t]ransactions involving
property in which Iran . . . has an interest” where “[t]he
interest in the property . . . arises after January 19, 1981.”
31 CFR § 535.579(a). And, as we said, that fact is sufficient
for present purposes to treat the asset as having been un
blocked at the time the Ninth Circuit issued the decision
below.
Finally, even if we were to assume (as the Ninth Circuit
held) that the relevant asset were Iran’s pre-1981 interest in
the air combat training system itself, we should still conclude
that that asset was not “blocked” at the time of the decision
below. As the Government points out, such an interest falls
directly within the scope of Executive Order No. 12281, an
unblocking order that required property owned by Iran to
be transferred “as directed . . . by the Government of Iran.”
See also 31 CFR § 535.215(a). None of the four authorities
upon which the Ninth Circuit relied indicates the contrary
conclusion. First, the Circuit cited the Arms Export Con
trol Act, 82 Stat. 1321, 22 U. S. C. § 2751 et seq., and its im
plementing regulations, a statute and regulations which
regulate arms shipments. It is true that, notwithstanding
Executive Order No. 12281, the export of certain military
equipment remained subject to regulation under other stat
utes, including the Arms Export Control Act. See 31 CFR
§ 535.215(c). But that fact does not show that military
equipment remained blocked under IEEPA. The Court of
Appeals next cited the 1979 Executive Order freezing Ira
nian assets, Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 CFR 457—but it failed
to consider the effect of the subsequent unblocking order just

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discussed. The Court of Appeals also relied on a 2005 Presi
dential notice extending the national emergency with respect
to Iran, 70 Fed. Reg. 69039, but that notice did not impose
any additional restrictions on Iranian assets. Finally, the
Court of Appeals pointed to a Treasury Department guid
ance document, which states that “[c]ertain assets”—consist
ing “mainly of military and dual-use property”—“related to
. . . claims” by “U. S. nationals . . . against Iran or Iranian
entities” still being litigated in the Tribunal “remain blocked
in the United States.” Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Dept. of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Regulations for
Exporters and Importers 23 (2007). But the training sys
tem does not fall into the category of assets identified by the
guidance document. The system neither “remain[s] . . . in
the United States” (having been sent to Canada), nor was it
related to claims by “U. S. nationals . . . against Iran or
Iranian entities” before the Tribunal. In sum, no authority
supports the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that an Iranian inter
est in the training system itself would be a “blocked asset.”
And none of the parties defend the Ninth Circuit’s conclu
sion here.
B
Although the Cubic Judgment was not a blocked asset at
the time the Court of Appeals reached its decision, the Gov
ernment believes that it is a blocked asset now. In 2005 the
President issued a new Executive Order that blocks assets
held by proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. Exec.
Order No. 13382, 3 CFR 170 (2005 Comp.). And in 2007,
after the Court of Appeals issued its decision, the State De
partment designated certain component parts of Iran’s Min
istry of Defense as entities whose property and interests in
property are blocked under Executive Order No. 13382. See
72 Fed. Reg. 71991–71992. If the Iranian entity to which
the Cubic Judgment belongs falls within the terms of the
State Department’s designation, then presumably that asset
is blocked at this time.

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The problem for the Government, however, is that Iran
does not agree that the relevant parts of its Ministry of De
fense fall within the scope of the State Department’s desig
nation. Thus the matter is in dispute. The lower courts
have not considered that dispute. The relevant arguments
have not been set forth in detail here. And in such circum
stances we normally would remand the case, permitting the
lower courts to decide the issue in the first instance. See,
e. g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S.
155, 175 (2004). Consequently, we shall not decide whether
the new Executive Branch actions have blocked the Cubic
Judgment. Instead, we turn to the “waiver” question.
And our answer (that Elahi has waived his right to attach
the Cubic Judgment) makes it unnecessary to remand the
blocking question for further consideration.
III
As we have just said, the second question concerns Elahi’s
waiver of his right to attach the Cubic Judgment. In 2000,
Congress enacted a statute that offers some compensation to
certain individuals, including Elahi, who hold terrorism
related judgments against Iran. VPA § 2002, as amended
by TRIA § 201(c). The Act requires those who receive that
compensation to relinquish “all rights to execute against or
attach property that is at issue in claims against the United
States before an international tribunal, [or] that is the sub
ject of awards rendered by such tribunal.” § 2002(a)(2)(D),
114 Stat. 1542; see also § 2002(d)(5)(B), as added by TRIA
§ 201(c)(4), 116 Stat. 2337 (cross-referencing § 2002(a)(2)(D)).
In 2003 the Government paid Elahi $2.3 million under the
Act as partial compensation for his judgment against Iran.
Brief for Respondent 9. And at that time, Elahi signed a
waiver form that mirrors the statutory language. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 30 (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 8077, 8081 (2003)).
The question is whether the Cubic Judgment “is at issue
in claims” against the United States before an “international

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tribunal,” namely, the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal. If so,
the Cubic Judgment falls within the terms of Elahi’s
waiver. The Court of Appeals believed the Judgment was
not “at issue.” 495 F. 3d, at 1030–1031. But we find to
the contrary.
A review of the record in Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal Case
No. B/61 leads us to conclude that the Cubic Judgment is “at
issue” before that Tribunal. In Case No. B/61 Iran argued
that, between 1979 and 1981, the United States had wrongly
prevented the transfer of Cubic’s air combat training system
to Iran. Iran asked the Tribunal, among other things, to
order the United States to pay damages. Statement of
Claim, Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States (filed Jan.
19, 1982), App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
22a, 24a, 31a. In its briefing before the Tribunal, Iran ac
knowledged that any amount it recovered from Cubic would
“be recuperated from the remedy sought” against the United
States. App. 76, n. 2. And Iran sent a letter to the United
States in which it said that any amounts it actually received
from Cubic would be “recouped from the remedy sought
against the United States in Case B61.” App. to Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 84a. But Iran added that
the Cubic Judgment could not be used as a setoff insofar as
it had been attached by creditors. Id., at 85a.
Meanwhile, in a rebuttal brief before the Tribunal, the
United States, while arguing that in fact it owed Iran noth
ing, added that at the very least Iran must set off the amount
“already . . . awarded” by the International Court of Arbitra
tion (namely, the $2.8 million awarded to Iran from Cubic)
against any money awarded by the Tribunal. Id., at 52a,
80a–81a, and n. 32. And the United States’ demand for a
setoff applies even if third parties have attached the Cubic
Judgment. See Tr. of Tribunal Hearing, in No. B/61
(Iran-U. S. Cl. Trib., Dec. 7 and 12, 2006), App. to Brief for
Respondent 37, 38–39, 41, 42.

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The upshot is a dispute about the Cubic Judgment. The
United States argues (and argued before the Tribunal) that
the Tribunal should set off the $2.8 million that the Cubic
Judgment represents against any award that the Tribunal
may make against the United States in Case No. B/61. Iran
argues (and argued before the Tribunal) that the Tribunal
should not set off the $2.8 million insofar as third parties
have attached the Judgment.
To put the matter in terms of the language of Elahi’s
waiver, one can say for certain that the Cubic Judgment is
“property.” And Case No. B/61 itself is a “clai[m] against
the United States before an international tribunal.” We can
also be reasonably certain that how the Tribunal should use
that property is also under dispute or in question in that
claim. Moreover, since several parties other than Elahi
have already attached the Cubic Judgment, see Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 20, the question whether
an attached claim can be used as a setoff is potentially
significant, irrespective of Elahi’s own efforts to attach the
judgment.
Are these circumstances sufficient to place the Cubic Judg
ment “at issue” in Case No. B/61? Elahi argues not. He
points out that the Cubic Judgment does not appear on a list
of property contained in Iran’s statement of claim in Case
No. B/61; nor is it the subject of any other claim before the
Tribunal. Indeed, Iran and the United States do not dispute
the Cubic Judgment’s validity; they do not dispute the Cubic
Judgment’s ownership; and they do not dispute the fact that
the United States’ asset freeze had no adverse effect on the
Cubic Judgment or on Iran’s entitlement to the Cubic Judg
ment. As the dissent correctly points out, the Judgment is
not “at issue” in any of these senses. The Judgment will
neither be suspended nor modified by the Tribunal in Case
No. B/61, nor is the Judgment property claimed by Iran
from the United States in that case, see post, at 388–391
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

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But that does not end the matter. The question is
whether, for purposes of the VPA, a judgment can neverthe
less be “at issue” before the Tribunal even when it will not
be suspended or modified by the Tribunal and when it is not
claimed by Iran from the United States. Here, a significant
dispute about the Cubic Judgment still remains, namely, a
dispute about whether it can be used by the Tribunal as a
setoff. And in our view, that dispute is sufficient to put the
Judgment “at issue” in the case.
For one thing, we do not doubt that the setoff matter is
“under dispute” or “in question” in Case No. B/61, and those
words typically define the term “at issue.” Black’s Law Dic
tionary 136 (8th ed. 2004). In the event that the Tribunal
finds the United States liable in Case No. B/61, the total sum
awarded to Iran by the Tribunal will depend on whether the
Judgment is used as a setoff. And whether the Judgment
can be so used depends, in turn, on whether the United
States is right that an attached judgment should be set off
or whether Iran is right that it should not be—a matter in
question before the Tribunal. In that sense, the Judgment
is “under dispute.” We recognize that the dispute is over
the use of the Judgment, not the validity of the Judgment.
But we do not see how that fact matters.
For another thing, ordinary legal disputes can easily en
compass questions of setoff. Suppose Smith sues a carrier
for wrongfully harming a shipment of goods. The question
of liability, the question of damages, and the question of re
ducing damages through setoff may all be at issue in the
case. Which is the more important issue in a particular case
depends not upon the category (liability, damages, or setoff)
but upon the circumstances of that particular case.
Further, the language of the statute suggests that Con
gress meant the words “at issue” to carry the ordinary mean
ing just described. Elahi essentially distinguishes between
property that is the subject of a claim (a claim, for example,
that the United States took or harmed particular property

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belonging to Iran) and property that might otherwise affect
a Tribunal judgment (say, through its use as a setoff). And
he argues that the statutory phrase “at issue” covers only
the first kind of dispute, not the second. But the statute
does not limit the property that is “at issue in a claim” to
property that is the subject of a claim. To the contrary, the
statute says that judgment creditors such as Elahi must
“relinquis[h] all rights to execute against or attach prop
erty [1] that is at issue in claims against the United
States before an international tribunal [or] [2] that is
the subject of awards rendered by such tribunal.” VPA
§ 2002(a)(2)(D), 114 Stat. 1542 (emphasis added); see also
§ 2002(d)(5)(B), as added by TRIA § 201(c)(4), 116 Stat.
2337 (cross-referencing § 2002(a)(2)(D)).
Had Congress wanted to limit the property to which it first
refers (namely, property that is “at issue” in a claim) to prop
erty that is the subject of a claim, it seems likely that Con
gress straightforwardly would have used the words “subject
of ”—words that appear later (in respect to awards rendered)
in the very same sentence.
Finally, the statute’s purpose leans in the direction of a
broader interpretation of the words “at issue” than that pro
posed by Elahi. Pointing to the statute’s legislative history,
Elahi says that the statute seeks to enable victims of terror
ism to collect on judgments they have won against terrorist
parties. See Brief for Respondent 6–7, 31 (citing H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 107–779 (2002); 148 Cong. Rec. 23119, 23121–23123
(2002) (statement of Sen. Harkin)). He is such a victim, and,
he says, Congress would have intended an interpretation
that favors his cause. But Congress had a more complicated
set of purposes in mind. The statute authorizes the attach
ment of blocked assets, and it provides partial compensation
to victims to be paid (in part) from general Treasury funds.
But it does so in exchange for a right of subrogation, VPA
§ 2002(c), and for the victim’s promise not to pursue the bal

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ance of the judgment by attaching property “at issue” in a
claim against the United States before the Tribunal. VPA
§§ 2002(a)(2)(D), (d)(5)(B), as added by TRIA § 201(c)(4). The
statute thereby protects property that the United States
might use to satisfy its potential liability to Iran.
The Cubic Judgment falls into this category. It is prop
erty that the United States could use to satisfy its potential
liability to Iran, but which may be unavailable for that pur
pose if successfully attached. With respect to the statute’s
revenue-saving purpose, it is difficult to distinguish between
property that is the subject of a claim before a tribunal and
property that is in dispute before the tribunal in respect to
its use as an offset.
The dissent adds that the “better reading” of the words
“at issue” is one that limits them to the “foster[ing] [of] com
pliance with the Government’s international obligations.”
Post, at 392. We agree with this statement, but we do not
see how it adds anything but new phraseology to the dis
sent’s basic claim, namely, that arguments before the Tribu
nal about “setoffs” do not count as “issues.” To repeat our
own view of the matter, a dispute about whether one country
must pay the other country more money because it cannot
use particular property (because of an attachment) to satisfy
an obligation raises an issue that the Tribunal must resolve,
no less and no more than other issues that might be before
the Tribunal in that case or other cases.
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 394, there is
no unfairness in our holding. Elahi could have chosen to
forgo the Government’s compensation scheme, and he then
could have attached the Cubic Judgment, as have other ter
rorist victims with judgments against Iran. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 20. But that course car
ried risks: Iran had challenged Elahi’s notice of lien and it
was uncertain whether Elahi would prevail. In 2003, while
litigation over his notice of lien was pending, Elahi chose to
participate in the Government’s scheme. He thereby re

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ceived the benefit of immediate, guaranteed partial compen
sation from the Government—in exchange for a promise not
to interfere with property that the United States might need
to satisfy potential liability to Iran. Having received $2.3
million in Government funds, there is nothing unfair about
holding Elahi to the terms of his bargain.
Elahi makes several other arguments. He points to lan
guage in the TRIA (the statute authorizing attachment of
blocked assets) which says: “Notwithstanding any other pro
vision of law” the “blocked assets” of a state “shall be sub
ject to . . . attachment in aid of execution” of a terrorism
related judgment. § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2337 (emphasis added).
He also points to VPA § 2002(d)(4), as added by TRIA
§ 201(c)(4), 116 Stat. 2339, which reads: “Nothing in this sub
section [which contains the relinquishment provision] shall
bar . . . enforcement of any” terrorism-related “judgment . . .
against assets otherwise available under this section or
under any other provision of law.” (Emphasis added.)
The first provision, Elahi argues, permits him to attach
blocked assets notwithstanding the VPA’s requirement that
he relinquish his right to attach property “at issue” before
an international tribunal; and that conclusion, he says, is re
inforced by VPA § 2002(d)(4). Our interpretation, he adds,
would “bar . . . enforcement” of a terrorism-related judgment
“otherwise available” under TRIA § 201(a)—contrary to the
statutory language just quoted.
But VPA § 2002(d)(5) requires Elahi, in exchange for hav
ing received partial compensation, to relinquish “all rights”
to attach property “at issue” in an international tribunal.
VPA § 2002(a)(2)(D), 114 Stat. 1542 (cross-referenced by
§ 2002(d)(5)(B); emphasis added). And, as several Courts of
Appeals have apparently assumed, the relinquishment of “all
rights” includes the right given by TRIA § 201(a) to attach
blocked assets. See Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 376
F. 3d 226, 232 (CA4 2004); Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

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380 F. 3d 1000, 1009 (CA7 2004); Hegna v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 402 F. 3d 97, 99 (CA2 2005) (per curiam).
Moreover, the relinquishment provision that applies to
Elahi was added to the VPA by the very same statute, the
TRIA, that permitted the attachment of blocked assets, and
which contains the “notwithstanding” clause upon which
Elahi relies. § 201(a) (blocked assets); § 201(c) (amending
VPA). Congress could not have intended the words to
which Elahi refers to narrow so dramatically an important
provision that it inserted in the same statute. And for those
who, like Elahi, argue that the legislative history supports
his reading of the statute, we point out that the history sug
gests that Congress placed the “notwithstanding” clause in
§ 201(a) for totally different reasons, namely, to eliminate the
effect of any Presidential waiver issued under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1610(f) prior to the date of the TRIA’s enactment. H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 107–779, at 27.
Elahi makes three final arguments, first that setoff is not
“at issue” because the United States has argued in Case
No. B/61 that it has no liability at all, second that setoff is
not “at issue” because the United States has not formally
asserted a setoff before the Tribunal, and third that the Gov
ernment violated his due process rights by inadequately in
forming that his waiver would deprive him of his right to
attach the Cubic Judgment. We find none of these argu
ments convincing and shall briefly indicate our reasons in
summary form.
As to the first, the United States argued setoff in the alter
native, thereby placing it, in the alternative, “at issue” before
the Tribunal. As to the second, Elahi at most points to a
ground for disputing the propriety, under Tribunal rules, for
granting a setoff; he does not deny that the Tribunal some
times can do so, see, e. g., Futura Trading Inc. v. National
Iranian Oil Co., 13 Iran-U. S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 99, 115–116, ¶ 62
(1986) (preventing collection on a claim because the claimant
had already collected the sum at issue from a different

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party). Hence whether the Tribunal can provide for a setoff
here is a matter for the Tribunal to decide, and until it does
decide, one way or the other, the matter is “at issue.” As to
the third, we can find nothing that shows Elahi was unfairly
surprised by the scope of his waiver—certainly not to the
point of violating any due process rights. See, e. g., 14
Iran-U. S. Cl. Trib. Rep., at 278, ¶ 10 (dismissal of Iran’s claim
against Cubic was “without prejudice to any findings it may
make concerning [the Cubic contract] in Case No. B61”).
IV
We conclude: The Cubic Judgment was not blocked at the
time the Court of Appeals reached its decision. We do not
decide whether more recent Executive Branch actions would
block the Judgment at present. Regardless, Elahi has
waived his right to attach the Judgment. We reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Souter and Jus
tice Ginsburg join, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion but, with all
respect, dissent from Parts III and IV. As to Parts I and
II, the Court is correct, in my view, to hold that the Cubic
Judgment was not a “blocked asset” when the Court of Ap
peals reached its decision. As to Parts III and IV, however,
respondent Dariush Elahi has not relinquished his right to
attach the Cubic Judgment. By holding otherwise, the
Court departs from the plain meaning and the purpose of the
statutes Congress enacted to compensate Elahi and other
victims of terrorism.
I
A
The statutory phrase to be interpreted is “property that
is at issue in claims against the United States before an in

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ternational tribunal.” Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA), § 2002(d)(5)(B), as added by
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), § 201(c)(4), 116
Stat. 2339, note following 28 U. S. C. § 1610. The context, of
course, is Case No. B/61—a suit by Iran against the United
States that is pending before the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal.
The word “property,” as used in the statutory phrase, surely
can refer both to tangible property, such as real estate or
valuables in a safe-deposit box, and to intangible property
interests, such as a claim, a cause of action or, as in this
case, a judgment rendered by a United States district court.
Still, it must be acknowledged that the term “at issue” is
neither precise nor much illuminated by its operation in
cases or other statutes. The absence of any clear authority
on this point makes it imperative to adopt an interpretation
that accords with familiar and well-settled principles of law.
In this case those principles are the rules designed to give
full and proper respect to final judgments rendered by courts
of competent jurisdiction.
To determine whether the Cubic Judgment is “at issue” in
Case No. B/61, the primary consideration must be whether
the Claims Tribunal, in the exercise of its own authority and
jurisdiction, can affect the ownership, disposition, or control
of the property the judgment comprises. Here the property
in question is a judgment rendered by the United States Dis
trict Court for the Southern District of California. As all
acknowledge, that court had jurisdiction over the subject and
the persons then before it. And, as is further conceded, that
court’s judgment is valid and has binding force on Cubic De
fense Systems, Inc., the nongovernmental party before that
court. See Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed
Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Sys
tems, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170 (1998). Neither party
to Case No. B/61 questions the judgment or requests the
Claims Tribunal to interpret it—much less to alter, enforce,
or invalidate it.

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Even if one of the parties were to ask the Claims Tribunal
to modify the Cubic Judgment, the Tribunal would simply
lack power to do so. The judgment arises out of Iran’s con
tractual dispute with Cubic, an American company, and the
Tribunal has no “jurisdiction over claims by Iran against
United States nationals.” Ministry of Nat. Defence of Is
lamic Republic of Iran v. United States, 14 Iran-U. S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 276, 278 (1987) (Case No. B-66). Iran tried to sue
Cubic in the Claims Tribunal 20 years ago, but the Tribunal
dismissed that suit for lack of jurisdiction. Ibid. In these
circumstances the Cubic Judgment is simply an extrinsic fact
beyond the Claims Tribunal’s power to affect. True, the
Tribunal, when it enters its own orders, might or might not
give credit to the United States for a payment, or a right to
payment, arising out of the Cubic Judgment; but that does
not put the judgment itself at issue.
B
Even if the Court’s broad reading of the phrase “at issue”
were correct, the Court’s conclusion would still be wrong be
cause the relinquishment provision is limited to property
that is at issue “in claims against the United States.” And
the Cubic Judgment is not part of the claims Iran makes in
Case No. B/61, as both Iran and the United States have made
clear in their submissions to the Claims Tribunal. To put
the countries’ filings in context, a brief review of both the
Cubic Judgment and Case No. B/61 is necessary.
The Cubic Judgment is the result of a contract dispute
between Iran and Cubic. In the late 1970’s, Iran hired Cubic
to build an air combat training system, and advanced some
$12 million for the project. But Iran failed to make all the
payments due. App. 43–44. Thus rebuffed, Cubic sold the
system to Canada and refused to refund any of Iran’s ad
vance payments. Iran brought an arbitration against Cubic.
The panel of arbitrators, after ascertaining Cubic’s costs of
building the system, and after allowing the company a rea

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sonable profit of $3.5 million, ordered Cubic to return to Iran
$2.8 million of the $12 million advance. Iran brought this
arbitration award to the U. S. District Court for the South
ern District of California, which issued the judgment at issue
here. The judgment orders Cubic to pay Iran $2.8 million.
Cubic Defense Systems, supra, at 1171, 1174.
Case No. B/61 is in essence a contract dispute between
Iran and the United States. Iran accuses the United States
of breaking its promise, made in the Algiers Accords, to “ar
range . . . for the transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties”
located in the United States on January 19, 1981. 20 I. L. M.
224, 227, ¶ 9 (1981). One of the properties Iran claims is
Cubic’s air combat training system. See Statement of Claim
in No. B/61, (Iran-U. S. Cl. Trib.), App. to Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 22a, 24a, 31a. Both parties have
confirmed, in their joint report describing all the “property
claimed by Iran,” that Cubic’s system is “at issue” in Iran’s
claims. Cover Letter to Final Joint Report Re: Case
No. B/61 (July 14, 1989), App. to Brief for Respondent 14.
But the Cubic Judgment, in contrast to Cubic’s training
system, is not part of Iran’s claims in Case No. B/61. Both
countries made this clear in their submissions to the Tribu
nal. Their joint report does not list the Cubic Judgment
among the properties “at issue.” Final Joint Report (July
14, 1989), id., at 15–23. And, in a statement altogether con
sistent with that omission, Iran told the Tribunal that “[t]he
subject-matter of [Case No. B/61], at variance with the [arbi
tration] action [against Cubic], is the losses suffered by Iran
as a result of the United States’ non-export of Iranian prop
erties.” Iran’s Statement No. 16, App. 73, 76. The United
States agreed, stating that the “only ‘property that’ . . . is
properly at issue” in Case No. B/61 is property that “ ‘has
already been made the subject of a claim’ ” by Iran against
the United States. U. S. Rebuttal (Sept. 1, 2003), 1 Lodging
p. L419 (emphasis deleted) (Sealed). The United States re
affirmed this position in oral argument before the Tribunal:

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“Any losses in relation to [the Iran-Cubic] contract are not
recoverable against the United States and issues regarding
losses under that contract do not belong before this Tribu
nal.” Tribunal Hearing 124 (Dec. 12, 2006), App. to Brief
for Respondent 41, 42.
Because the Claims Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the
Cubic Judgment, and because that judgment is not part of
Iran’s claims against the United States in Case No. B/61, the
judgment is not “property that is at issue in claims against
the United States” under the plain meaning of the TRIA’s
relinquishment provision. TRIA § 201(c)(4), 116 Stat. 2339
(amending VTVPA § 2002(d)).
II
Even if the text of the relinquishment provision were
somehow ambiguous—and it is not—then the purpose of the
VTVPA and TRIA would tip the scales in Elahi’s favor.
The text and the evident purpose of those statutes demon
strate that Congress’ primary purpose was to compensate
the victims of terrorism, not to secure from those victims a
relinquishment of their claims to property owned by entities
found to have sponsored terrorism.
The text of the VTVPA, and of the amendments made to
it by the TRIA, shows that Congress’ primary purpose was
to enable the victims of terrorism to execute on the assets
of a state found to have sponsored or assisted in a terrorist
act. In the first subsection of the TRIA concerning the at
tachment of state assets by victims of terrorism, Congress
provided that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law
. . . in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment
against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of
terrorism . . . the blocked assets of that terrorist party . . .
shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execu
tion in order to satisfy such judgment . . . .” § 201(a), id., at
2337. The effect of this subsection is to ensure that other
laws do not bar victims’ efforts to enforce judgments against

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terrorist states. To like effect is another paragraph of the
VTVPA concerning victims of Iranian terrorism. Entitled
“Statutory Construction,” this paragraph reads: “Nothing in
this subsection shall bar, or require delay in, enforcement
of any judgment to which this subsection applies under any
procedure . . . .” § 2002(d)(4), as added by TRIA § 201(c)(4),
id., at 2339. Though neither provision refers in direct terms
to the relinquishment provision, both provisions show Con
gress’ intent to broaden, rather than limit, the rights of vic
tims like Elahi to execute on property owned by state spon
sors of terrorism. Yet the opinion issued by the Court today
does just the opposite.
To contravene the statute’s clear design, the Court sur
mises that Congress also had a “more complicated” purpose,
namely, to “protec[t] property that the United States might
use to satisfy its potential liability to Iran.” Ante, at 383,
384. This imagined purpose, the Court says, requires us to
read the relinquishment provision as broadly as possible so
as to prevent victims of terrorism from attaching property.
But the Court does not point to evidence of this putative
purpose, aside from the text of the relinquishment provision
itself—a text which, as submitted above, the Court reads
the wrong way.
The better reading of the relinquishment provision—and
one much more consistent with Congress’ protective pur
pose—is not as a “revenue-saving” device, ante, at 384, but
as a way to foster compliance with the Government’s interna
tional obligations. If Iran has asked the Claims Tribunal
to resolve the status of certain property, then Iran and the
Tribunal may well take the position that the United States
has a responsibility under the Algiers Accords to prevent
U. S. nationals from executing against that property. That
concern is not present in this case. The ownership of the
Cubic Judgment is not disputed, and allowing Elahi to attach
it will not affect Iran’s right to obtain full recovery from the
United States in Case No. B/61. At most, the attachment

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might affect the right of the United States to use the judg
ment to offset its liability.
The Court purports to agree with this reading of the stat
ute’s purpose. Ibid. But that agreement is hard to square
with the Court’s insistence upon fulfilling what it sees as the
statute’s “revenue-saving purpose.” Ibid. If the Court did
in fact believe that the “ ‘better reading’ ” of the statute’s
purpose, ibid., is to foster compliance with the United States’
international obligations, then the Court would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Elahi’s attachment of
the Cubic Judgment does not hinder the U. S. Government’s
efforts to comply with its obligations under the Algiers Ac
cords. At Algiers, the United States agreed to “arrange . . .
for the transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties” located in
the United States. 20 I. L. M., at 227, ¶ 9. That is not an
obligation to pay Iran money, as the Court seems to believe.
See ante, at 384. It is instead an obligation to take specific
action in regard to specific properties. These specific prop
erties do not include the Cubic Judgment—as the Court con
cedes. See ante, at 376 (holding that the Cubic Judgment
was not blocked). Therefore, Elahi’s attachment of the
Cubic Judgment does not impede the United States’ efforts
to make good on its obligations under the Algiers Accords.
To be sure, a judicial lien on one of the specific properties
referenced by the Algiers Accords might make it difficult for
the U. S. Government to comply with its obligations, under
those Accords, to arrange for that property’s transfer to Iran.
By encouraging creditors such as Elahi to give up their liens
on these specific properties that are subject to the Algiers
Accords, the TRIA makes it easier for the Government to
comply with its obligation to “arrange . . . for the transfer”
of these properties to Iran. This purpose (fostering compli
ance with the United States’ obligation under the Algiers
Accords) is more in keeping with the statute’s text than is
the Court’s “revenue-saving” purpose. And this purpose—
that is, the purpose of enabling the United States to meet its

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394 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED
FORCES OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN v. ELAHI
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
obligations under the Algiers Accords—is not in the least
frustrated by permitting Elahi to attach the Cubic Judg
ment, a property that, as the Court concedes, is not subject
to the Algiers Accords.
III
The facts of this case show the injustice of the Court’s
interpretation. The Court today puts an end to Elahi’s
decade-long quest to hold Iran to account for murdering his
brother Cyrus. In 2000, Elahi won a wrongful-death law
suit against Iran and was awarded some $6 million in com
pensatory damages. See Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
124 F. Supp. 2d 97 (DC). In April 2003, Elahi took what he
must have considered a further step toward his goal when
he accepted $2.3 million from the U. S. Government under
the VTVPA.
After today’s ruling, what once appeared Elahi’s gain of
$2.3 million now seems to be a loss of $500,000. By taking
the VTVPA’s $2.3 million, the Court holds, Elahi relin
quished his right to the $2.8 million Cubic Judgment he had
already attached. The practical effect of the Court’s ruling
is to turn the purpose of the VTVPA on its head. Rather
than further Elahi’s effort to obtain compensation for the
murder of his brother, the Act has instead set him back half
a million dollars. For the reasons given above, this result
was not what Congress intended when it passed the VTVPA.
IV
Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act to com
pensate victims of terrorism. Congress expressed this pur
pose both in the text of the principal provision interpreted
here and in accompanying sections of the statute. By strip
ping Elahi of his right to attach the valid judgment against
Cubic rendered by the District Court—a judgment not be

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fore the Claims Tribunal in any sense—the Court fails to
give the statute its intended effect. These reasons explain
my respectful dissent.