UNITED STATES v. DENEDO

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904 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. DENEDO
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the armed forces
No. 08–267. Argued March 25, 2009—Decided June 8, 2009
Military authorities charged respondent, a native Nigerian serving in the
U. S. Navy, with violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
With counsel’s assistance, respondent agreed to plead guilty to reduced
charges. The special court-martial accepted the plea and convicted and
sentenced respondent; the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Ap
peals (NMCCA) affirmed; and he was discharged from the Navy in 2000.
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal pro
ceedings against respondent based on the conviction. To avoid deporta
tion, he filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis under the authority of
the All Writs Act, asking the NMCCA to vacate the conviction it had
earlier affirmed on the ground that his guilty plea resulted from ineffec
tive assistance of counsel, who had assured him his plea bargain carried
no risk of deportation. Though rejecting the Government’s contention
that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the writ, the NMCCA denied relief
for lack of merit. Agreeing that the NMCCA has jurisdiction, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) remanded for further
proceedings on the merits.
Held:
1. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1259(4), which permits it to review CAAF decisions in cases “in which
[that court] granted relief.” Respondent’s parsimonious view that the
CAAF did not “ ‘gran[t] relief ’ ” in this case, but simply remanded to the
NMCCA, is rejected. Though § 1259 does not define “relief,” the word’s
familiar meaning encompasses any redress or benefit provided by a
court. The CAAF’s judgment reversing the NMCCA satisfies that
definition. Pp. 909–910.
2. Article I military courts have jurisdiction to entertain coram nobis
petitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction
was flawed in a fundamental respect. Pp. 910–917.
(a) Military courts’ power to issue extraordinary writs under the
All Writs Act, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683, 695, n. 7, does not deter
mine the anterior question whether those courts have jurisdiction to
entertain a coram nobis petition. As recognized by the All Writs
Act—which permits “courts established by Act of Congress” to issue
“all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic

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Syllabus
tions,” 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a)—a court’s power to issue any form of relief,
extraordinary or otherwise, is contingent on its subject-matter jurisdic
tion over the case or controversy. Such jurisdiction is determined by
Congress. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 212. Thus, to issue re
spondent a writ of coram nobis on remand, the NMCCA must have had
statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over respondent’s original judg
ment of conviction. Pp. 910–913.
(b) Pursuant to the UCMJ, the NMCCA and the CAAF have
subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. The NMCCA has jurisdic
tion to entertain respondent’s coram nobis request under UCMJ Article
66, which provides: “For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases,
the [NMCCA] may sit . . . .” 10 U. S. C. § 866(a). Because respondent’s
coram nobis request is simply a further “step in [his] criminal” appeal,
United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 505, n. 4, the NMCCA’s jurisdic
tion to issue the writ derives from the earlier jurisdiction it exercised
under § 866(a) to hear and determine the conviction’s validity on direct
review. Respondent’s coram nobis request is not barred by the re
quirement that the NMCCA “act only with respect to the findings and
sentence as approved by the convening authority.” § 866(c). An al
leged error in the original judgment predicated on ineffective assistance
of counsel challenges the conviction’s validity, see Knowles v. Mirzay
ance, ante, at 115, so respondent’s Sixth Amendment claim is “with re
spect to” the special court-martial’s “findings” of guilty. Because the
NMCCA has jurisdiction, the CAAF has jurisdiction to review the
NMCCA’s denial of respondent’s petition challenging the validity of his
original conviction. That the CAAF’s authority is confined “to matters
of law” connected to “the findings and sentence as approved by the
convening authority and as affirmed or set aside . . . by the Court of
Criminal Appeals,” § 867(c), poses no obstacle to respondent’s requested
review. His Sixth Amendment claim presents a “matte[r] of law” “with
respect to the [guilty] findings . . . as approved by the [special court
martial] and as affirmed . . . by” the NMCCA. Pp. 913–915.
(c) The Government’s argument that UCMJ Article 76 affirma
tively prohibits the type of collateral review respondent seeks errs in
“conflating the jurisdictional question with the merits” of respondent’s
petition, Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, ante, at 628. Article 76
provides for the finality of judgments in military cases. Just as the
finality principle did not jurisdictionally bar the court in Morgan, supra,
from examining its earlier judgment, neither does it bar the NMCCA
from doing so here. The Government’s contention that coram nobis
permits a court to correct its own errors, not those of an inferior court,
is disposed of on similar grounds. Pp. 915–917.
66 M. J. 114, affirmed and remanded.

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906 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO
Opinion of the Court
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 918.
Pratik A. Shah argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the briefs were then-Acting Solicitor General
Kneedler, former Solicitor General Garre, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Friedr ich, Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben, John F. De Pue, Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Louis J. Puleo,
Brian K. Keller, and Timothy H. Delgado.
Matthew S. Freedus argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Eugene R. Fidell, Brian L.
Mizer, Kathleen L. Kadlec, and Dillon J. Ambrose.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case before us presents a single issue: whether an Ar
ticle I military appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain
a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge its
earlier, and final, decision affirming a criminal conviction.
The military court which had affirmed the conviction and
where the writ of coram nobis was sought is the Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA). Its
ruling that it had jurisdiction to grant the writ, but then
denying its issuance for lack of merit, was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF). After the CAAF agreed that the NMCCA has ju
risdiction to issue the writ, it remanded for further proceed
ings on the merits. The Government of the United States,
contending that a writ of coram nobis directed to a final
judgment of conviction is beyond the jurisdiction of the mili
tary courts, now brings the case to us.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Former Judge
Advocates General et al. by Ronald W. Meister; and for Law Professors
by William M. Hohengarten, Lindsay C. Harrison, and Judith Resnik,
pro se.

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Opinion of the Court
I
Respondent Jacob Denedo came to the United States in
1984 from his native Nigeria. He enlisted in the Navy in
1989 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In
1998, military authorities charged him with conspiracy, lar
ceny, and forgery—in contravention of Articles 81, 121, and
123 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U. S. C. §§ 881, 921, 923—all for his role in a scheme to de
fraud a community college. With the assistance of both mili
tary and civilian counsel, respondent made a plea bargain to
plead guilty to reduced charges. In exchange for his plea
the convening authority referred respondent’s case to a spe
cial court-martial, § 819, which, at that time, could not impose
a sentence greater than six months’ confinement.
The special court-martial, consisting of a single military
judge, accepted respondent’s guilty plea after determining
that it was both knowing and voluntary. The court con
victed respondent of conspiracy and larceny. It sentenced
him to three months’ confinement, a bad-conduct discharge,
and a reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade. Respond
ent appealed on the ground that his sentence was unduly
severe. The NMCCA affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a–
67a. Respondent did not seek further review in the CAAF,
and he was discharged from the Navy on May 30, 2000.
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security commenced
removal proceedings against respondent based upon his spe
cial court-martial conviction. To avoid deportation, re
spondent decided to challenge his conviction once more,
though at this point it had been final for eight years. He
maintained, in a petition for a writ of coram nobis filed with
the NMCCA, that the conviction it had earlier affirmed must
be deemed void because his guilty plea was the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent alleged that
he informed his civilian attorney during plea negotiations
that “ ‘his primary concern and objective’ ” was to avoid de
portation and that he was willing to “ ‘risk . . . going to jail’ ”

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to avert separation from his family. 66 M. J. 114, 118 (CAAF
2008). On respondent’s account, his attorney—an alcoholic
who was not sober during the course of the special court
martial proceeding—erroneously assured him that “ ‘if he
agreed to plead guilty at a special-court-martial he would
avoid any risk of deportation.’ ” Ibid. Respondent argued
that the NMCCA could set aside its earlier decision by issu
ing a writ of coram nobis under the authority of the All
Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a).
The Government filed a motion to dismiss for want of juris
diction. It contended that the NMCCA had no authority
to conduct postconviction proceedings. In a terse, four
sentence order, the NMCCA summarily denied both the
Government’s motion and respondent’s petition for a writ of
coram nobis. App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. Respondent ap
pealed and the CAAF, dividing 3 to 2, affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The CAAF agreed with the NMCCA that
standing military courts have jurisdiction to conduct “collat
eral review under the All Writs Act.” 66 M. J., at 119. This
is so, the CAAF explained, because “when a petitioner seeks
collateral relief to modify an action that was taken within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the military justice system
. . . a writ that is necessary or appropriate may be issued
under the All Writs Act ‘in aid of ’ the court’s existing juris
diction.” Id., at 120 (citing 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a)).
Satisfied that it had jurisdiction, the CAAF next turned
to whether the writ of coram nobis should issue. It held
that a nondefaulted, ineffective-assistance claim that was yet
to receive a full and fair review “within the military justice
system” could justify issuance of the writ. 66 M. J., at 125.
Finding that respondent’s ineffective-assistance claim satis
fied “the threshold criteria for coram nobis review,” the
CAAF remanded to the NMCCA so it could ascertain in the
first instance “whether the merits of [respondent’s] petition
can be resolved on the basis of the written submissions, or
whether a factfinding hearing is required.” Id., at 126, 130.

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Judge Stucky filed a dissenting opinion. Assuming that
the majority had correctly determined its jurisdiction to
grant the requested relief, he concluded that respondent’s
ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit. Id., at 131.
Judge Ryan also dissented. Reasoning that the majority
had misapplied this Court’s holding in Clinton v. Goldsmith,
526 U. S. 529 (1999), she concluded that the UCMJ does not
confer jurisdiction upon military tribunals to conduct “post
finality collateral review.” 66 M. J., at 136. We granted
certiorari, 555 U. S. 1041 (2008), and now affirm.
II
Before we address another court’s subject-matter jurisdic
tion we must first determine our own. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, ante, at 671 (“Subject-matter jurisdiction . . . should be
considered when fairly in doubt”). The Government, upon
which the burden to demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction
lies, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342
(2006), claims that our power to hear this appeal rests on 28
U. S. C. § 1259(4). That jurisdictional provision permits us
to review CAAF decisions in “[c]ases . . . in which the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted relief.” Respond
ent maintains that we lack jurisdiction because the CAAF
did not “ ‘grant relief ’ ”; “all it did was remand” to the
NMCCA. Brief for Respondent 6–7 (brackets omitted).
Respondent’s parsimonious construction of the word “re
lief ” need not detain us long. Though § 1259 does not define
the term, its familiar meaning encompasses any “redress or
benefit” provided by a court. Black’s Law Dictionary 1317
(8th ed. 2004). The CAAF’s judgment reversing the
NMCCA satisfies that definition. The NMCCA denied re
spondent’s petition for a writ of coram nobis, while the
CAAF’s decision reversed and remanded so that the
NMCCA could determine anew if the writ should issue.
That decision conferred a palpable benefit on respondent; for

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a chance of success on the merits, however slight, is superior
to no possibility at all.
To be sure, respondent would have preferred the CAAF
to issue a writ of coram nobis or to direct the NMCCA to do
so rather than remanding for the NMCCA to conduct further
proceedings. We have jurisdiction, however, to review any
decision granting “relief,” not just those providing “ultimate
relief ” or “complete relief.” Indeed, appellate courts re
verse and remand lower court judgments—rather than is
suing complete relief—with regularity. See, e. g., FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., ante, at 513. There is no
merit to the view that a decision granting partial relief
should be construed as granting no relief at all.
Because the CAAF “granted relief ” to respondent, the
text of § 1259 is satisfied here. We have jurisdiction to de
termine whether the CAAF was correct in ruling that the
NMCCA had authority to entertain the petition for a writ of
coram nobis.
III
A
The writ of coram nobis is an ancient common-law remedy
designed “to correct errors of fact.” United States v. Mor
gan, 346 U. S. 502, 507 (1954). In American jurisprudence
the precise contours of coram nobis have not been “well de
fined,” Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 416 (1882), but the
writ traces its origins to the King’s Bench and the Court of
Common Pleas. United States v. Plumer, 27 F. Cas. 561,
573 (No. 16,056) (CC Mass. 1859) (opinion for the court by
Clifford, Circuit Justice); see also Morgan, supra, at 507, n. 9
(citing 2 W. Tidd, Practice of Courts of King’s Bench and
Common Pleas 1136 (4th Am. ed. 1856)). In English practice
the office of the writ was to foster respect for judicial rulings
by enabling the same court “where the action was com
menced and where the judgment was rendered” to avoid the
rigid strictures of judgment finality by correcting technical

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errors “such as happened through the fault of the clerk in the
record of the proceedings prior to the judgment.” Plumer,
supra, at 572–573.
Any rationale confining the writ to technical errors, how
ever, has been superseded; for in its modern iteration coram
nobis is broader than its common-law predecessor. This is
confirmed by our opinion in Morgan. In that case we found
that a writ of coram nobis can issue to redress a fundamental
error, there a deprivation of counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, as opposed to mere technical errors. 346 U. S.,
at 513. The potential universe of cases that range from
technical errors to fundamental ones perhaps illustrates, in
the case of coram nobis, the “tendency of a principle to ex
pand itself to the limit of its logic.” B. Cardozo, The Nature
of the Judicial Process 51 (1921). To confine the use of
coram nobis so that finality is not at risk in a great number
of cases, we were careful in Morgan to limit the availability
of the writ to “extraordinary” cases presenting circum
stances compelling its use “to achieve justice.” 346 U. S., at
511. Another limit, of course, is that an extraordinary rem
edy may not issue when alternative remedies, such as habeas
corpus, are available. See id., at 510–511.
In federal courts the authority to grant a writ of coram
nobis is conferred by the All Writs Act, which permits
“courts established by Act of Congress” to issue “all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic
tions.” 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a). Though military courts, like
Article III tribunals, are empowered to issue extraordinary
writs under the All Writs Act, Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683,
695, n. 7 (1969), that authority does not determine the
anterior question whether military courts have jurisdiction
to entertain a petition for coram nobis. As the text of
the All Writs Act recognizes, a court’s power to issue any
form of relief—extraordinary or otherwise—is contingent
on that court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or
controversy.

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Opinion of the Court
Assuming no constraints or limitations grounded in the
Constitution are implicated, it is for Congress to determine
the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 212 (2007) (“Within constitutional
bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have
jurisdiction to consider”). This rule applies with added
force to Article I tribunals, such as the NMCCA and CAAF,
which owe their existence to Congress’ authority to enact
legislation pursuant to Article I, § 8, of the Constitution.
Goldsmith, 526 U. S., at 533–534.
Our decision in Goldsmith demonstrates these teachings.
There an Air Force officer, James Goldsmith, was convicted
of various crimes by general court-martial and sentenced to
six years’ confinement. Id., at 531. Following his convic
tion, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the President
to drop convicted officers from the rolls of the Armed Forces.
When the Air Force notified Goldsmith that he would be
dropped from the rolls, he lodged a petition before the Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) claiming that the
proposed action contravened the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution. Id., at 532–533. Goldsmith sought extraordi
nary relief as authorized by the All Writs Act to enjoin the
President from removing him from the rolls. The AFCCA
denied relief, but the CAAF granted it.
Concluding that the UCMJ does not authorize military
courts to review executive action—including a decision to
drop an officer from the rolls—we held that the AFCCA and
the CAAF lacked jurisdiction over Goldsmith’s case. Id., at
535. This was so, we unequivocally found, irrespective of
the military court’s authority to issue extraordinary relief
pursuant to the All Writs Act and its previous jurisdiction
over Goldsmith’s criminal proceeding. The power to issue
relief depends upon, rather than enlarges, a court’s jurisdic
tion. Id., at 536–537.
That principle does not control the question before us.
Because coram nobis is but an extraordinary tool to correct

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a legal or factual error, an application for the writ is properly
viewed as a belated extension of the original proceeding
during which the error allegedly transpired. See Morgan,
supra, at 505, n. 4 (coram nobis is “a step in the criminal
case and not, like habeas corpus where relief is sought in a
separate case and record, the beginning of a separate civil
proceeding”); see also United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S.
38, 46 (1998) (noting that an “independent action”—which,
like coram nobis, is an equitable means to obtain relief from
a judgment—“ ‘may be regarded as ancillary to the [prior]
suit, so that the relief asked may be granted by the court
which made the decree in that suit . . . . The bill, though an
original bill in the chancery sense of the word, is a continua
tion of the former suit, on the question of the jurisdiction of
the [court]’ ” (quoting Pacific R. Co. of Mo. v. Missouri Pa
cific R. Co., 111 U. S. 505, 522 (1884))). It follows that to
issue respondent a writ of coram nobis on remand, the
NMCCA must have had statutory subject-matter jurisdic
tion over respondent’s original judgment of conviction.
B
In the critical part of its opinion discussing the jurisdiction
and authority of the NMCCA to issue a writ of coram nobis
in an appropriate case, the CAAF describes respondent’s re
quest for review as one “under the All Writs Act.” 66 M. J.,
at 119. This is correct, of course, if it simply confirms that
the Act authorizes federal courts to issue writs “in aid of ”
their jurisdiction; but it does not advance the inquiry into
whether jurisdiction exists.
And there are limits to the use of coram nobis to alter or
interpret earlier judgments. As Goldsmith makes plain,
the All Writs Act and the extraordinary relief the statute
authorizes are not a source of subject-matter jurisdiction.
526 U. S., at 534–535. Statutes which address the power of
a court to use certain writs or remedies or to decree certain
forms of relief, for instance to award damages in some speci

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fied measure, in some circumstances might be construed also
as a grant of jurisdiction to hear and determine the underly
ing cause of action. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137
(1803). We have long held, however, that the All Writs Act
should not be interpreted in this way. Goldsmith, supra, at
536; Plumer, 27 F. Cas., at 574 ( jurisdiction cannot be ac
quired “by means of the writ to be issued”). The authority
to issue a writ under the All Writs Act is not a font of juris
diction. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537
U. S. 28, 31 (2002).
Quite apart from the All Writs Act, we conclude that the
NMCCA has jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s request
for a writ of coram nobis. Article 66 of the UCMJ provides:
“For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases, the
[Court of Criminal Appeals] may sit . . . .” 10 U. S. C.
§ 866(a). Because respondent’s request for coram nobis is
simply a further “step in [his] criminal” appeal, Morgan, 346
U. S., at 505, n. 4, the NMCCA’s jurisdiction to issue the writ
derives from the earlier jurisdiction it exercised to hear and
determine the validity of the conviction on direct review.
As even the Government concedes, the textual authority
under the UCMJ to “ ‘revie[w] court-martial cases’ ” pro
vided the NMCCA with jurisdiction to hear an appeal of re
spondent’s judgment of conviction. See Brief for United
States 17–18. That jurisdiction is sufficient to permit the
NMCCA to entertain respondent’s petition for coram nobis.
See also Cts. Crim. App. Rule Prac. & Proc. 2(b), 44 M. J.
LXV (1996) (recognizing NMCCA discretionary authority to
entertain petitions for extraordinary writs).
It is true that when exercising its jurisdiction under
§ 866(a), the NMCCA “may act only with respect to the find
ings and sentence as approved by the convening authority.”
§ 866(c). That limitation does not bar respondent’s request
for a writ of coram nobis. An alleged error in the original
judgment predicated on ineffective assistance of counsel
challenges the validity of a conviction, see Knowles v. Mir

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zayance, ante, at 115, so respondent’s Sixth Amendment
claim is “with respect to” the special court-martial’s “findings
of guilty,” 10 U. S. C. § 866(c). Pursuant to the UCMJ, the
NMCCA has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear respondent’s
request for extraordinary relief.
Because the NMCCA had jurisdiction over respondent’s
petition for coram nobis, the CAAF had jurisdiction to en
tertain respondent’s appeal from the NMCCA’s judgment.
When exercising its jurisdiction, the CAAF’s authority is
confined “to matters of law” connected to “the findings and
sentence as approved by the convening authority and as af
firmed or set aside . . . by the Court of Criminal Appeals,”
§ 867(c), but these limitations pose no obstacle to respond
ent’s requested review of the NMCCA’s decision. Respond
ent’s Sixth Amendment claim presents a “matte[r] of law”
“with respect to the [guilty] findings . . . as approved by the
[special court-martial] and as affirmed . . . by the Court of
Criminal Appeals.” Ibid. The CAAF had subject-matter
jurisdiction to review the NMCCA’s denial of respondent’s
petition challenging the validity of his original conviction.
C
The Government counters that Article 76 of the UCMJ, 10
U. S. C. § 876, “affirmatively prohibit[s] the type of collateral
review sought by respondent.” Brief for United States 18.
That is incorrect. The Government’s argument commits the
error of “conflating the jurisdictional question with the mer
its” of respondent’s petition. Arthur Andersen LLP, ante,
at 628. Article 76 states in relevant part:
“The appellate review of records of trial provided by
this chapter, the proceedings, findings, and sentences of
courts-martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed as re
quired by this chapter, and all dismissals and discharges
carried into execution under sentences by courts-martial
following approval, review, or affirmation as required by
this chapter, are final and conclusive. Orders publish

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ing the proceedings of courts-martial and all action
taken pursuant to those proceedings are binding upon
all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the
United States . . . .” 10 U. S. C. § 876.
Article 76 codifies the common-law rule that respects the
finality of judgments. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S.
738, 749 (1975). Just as the rules of finality did not jurisdic
tionally bar the court in Morgan from examining its ear
lier judgment, neither does the principle of finality bar the
NMCCA from doing so here.
The Government may ultimately be correct that the facts
of respondent’s case are insufficient to set aside the final
judgment that Article 76 makes binding. No doubt, judg
ment finality is not to be lightly cast aside; and courts must
be cautious so that the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis
issues only in extreme cases. But the long-recognized au
thority of a court to protect the integrity of its earlier judg
ments impels the conclusion that the finality rule is not so
inflexible that it trumps each and every competing consider
ation. Our holding allows military courts to protect the in
tegrity of their dispositions and processes by granting relief
from final judgments in extraordinary cases when it is shown
that there were fundamental flaws in the proceedings leading
to their issuance. The Government remains free to argue
that respondent’s is a merely ordinary case that is not enti
tled to extraordinary relief. But respondent’s entitlement
to relief is a merits question outside the scope of the jurisdic
tional question presented.
The Government’s contention that coram nobis permits a
court “to correct its own errors, not . . . those of an inferior
court,” Brief for United States 36, can be disposed of on simi
lar grounds. Just as respondent’s request for coram nobis
does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction, the Govern
ment’s argument that the relief should not issue “in light
of the writ’s traditional scope” does not undermine it, ibid.
(emphasis deleted). In sum, the Government’s argument

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speaks to the scope of the writ, not the NMCCA’s jurisdic
tion to issue it. The CAAF rejected the former argument.
Only the latter one is before us.
We hold that Article I military courts have jurisdiction to
entertain coram nobis petitions to consider allegations that
an earlier judgment of conviction was flawed in a fundamen
tal respect. That conclusion is consistent with our holding
that Article III courts have a like authority. Morgan, 346
U. S., at 508. The result we reach today is of central impor
tance for military courts. The military justice system relies
upon courts that must take all appropriate means, consistent
with their statutory jurisdiction, to ensure the neutrality and
integrity of their judgments. Under the premises and stat
utes we have relied upon here, the jurisdiction and the re
sponsibility of military courts to reexamine judgments in
rare cases where a fundamental flaw is alleged and other
judicial processes for correction are unavailable are consist
ent with the powers Congress has granted those courts
under Article I and with the system Congress has designed.
* * *
We do not prejudge the merits of respondent’s petition.
To be sure, the writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary
writ; and “an extraordinary remedy . . . should not be
granted in the ordinary case.” Nken v. Holder, ante, at 437
(Kennedy, J., concurring). The relative strength of re
spondent’s ineffective-assistance claim, his delay in lodging
his petition, when he learned or should have learned of his
counsel’s alleged deficiencies, and the effect of the rule of
judgment finality expressed in Article 76 are all factors the
NMCCA can explore on remand. We hold only that the mil
itary appellate courts had jurisdiction to hear respondent’s
request for a writ of coram nobis. The judgment of the
CAAF is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further pro
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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918 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO
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Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
The Court’s approach is simple: Jurisdiction to issue writs
of coram nobis is a “belated extension” of a court’s original,
statutory jurisdiction. Ante, at 913. The military courts
here had original jurisdiction over Denedo’s case. Those
courts therefore have implicit “extended” jurisdiction to con
sider Denedo’s coram nobis petition.
The flaw in this syllogism is at the first step: The only
arguable authority for the proposition that coram nobis ju
risdiction marches hand in hand with original jurisdiction is
a footnote in United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954),
and that case concerned Article III courts. The military
courts are markedly different. They are Article I courts
whose jurisdiction is precisely limited at every turn. Those
careful limits cannot be overridden by judicial “extension” of
statutory jurisdiction, or the addition of a “further step” to
the ones marked out by Congress. Ante, at 914 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
I agree with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction
to review the decision below, but respectfully dissent from
its holding that military courts have jurisdiction to issue
writs of coram nobis.
I
“Traditionally, military justice has been a rough form of
justice emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions
and stern penalties with a view to maintaining obedience and
fighting fitness in the ranks.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1,
35–36 (1957) (plurality opinion). Courts-martial are com
posed of active service members who sit only to hear the
particular case before them. Once a court-martial reaches
a judgment and imposes a sentence, it is dissolved, and its
members return to their regular duties.
Prior to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
military courts of appeals did not exist. If a service mem

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ber wanted to challenge a court-martial conviction, he pur
sued a collateral attack in an Article III court. There, re
view was limited to whether the conviction was void
“because of lack of jurisdiction or some other equally funda
mental defect,” Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738,
747 (1975); beyond that, Article III courts adhered to “the
general rule that the acts of a court martial, within the scope
of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed
in the civil courts,” Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 177
(1886).
The UCMJ established a “complete system of [military]
review,” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality
opinion), including direct review in what are now the Courts
of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) and the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces (CAAF). But in keeping with the historical
backdrop against which these courts were created, Congress
did not grant military courts of appeals “broad responsibility
with respect to administration of military justice”; on the
contrary, their jurisdiction is “narrowly circumscribed” by
the governing statutes. Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U. S.
529, 534, 535 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The CCAs provide direct, record-based review of court
martial judgments, but they may only review cases referred
by the judge advocate general, who in turn refers only those
cases in which specific sentences are imposed. 10 U. S. C.
§§ 866(b), (c). When reviewing that subset of court-martial
judgments, a CCA “may act only with respect to the findings
and sentence as approved by the convening authority.”
§ 866(c). If a case is reviewed by the CCA, the CCA’s deci
sion may then be reviewed by the CAAF. § 867(a). But
that court, too, conducts limited direct review: It “may act
only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved
by the convening authority and as affirmed or set aside as
incorrect in law by the [CCA].” § 867(c). Once direct re
view in the CCA and the CAAF is complete, and review in
this Court is exhausted or waived, a judgment as to the le

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gality of the court-martial proceedings is final, and the sen
tence imposed may be executed. § 871(c)(1).
The UCMJ provides only one avenue for reconsideration
of a final court-martial conviction: a petition for a new trial
under Article 73. See § 873. An Article 73 petition may be
brought “within two years after approval by the convening
authority of a court-martial sentence,” meaning it may be
brought before or after a conviction becomes final. Ibid. If
direct review is still pending before a CCA or the CAAF
when the petition is filed, the judge advocate general (to
whom the petition must be directed) will refer the petition
to that court. Ibid. But once the conviction is final, only
the judge advocate general may act on an Article 73 peti
tion. Ibid.
Article 76 “ ‘describ[es] the terminal point for proceedings
within the court-martial system.’ ” Councilman, supra, at
750 (quoting Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128, 132 (1950)).
Under that provision, final court-martial judgments are
“binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers
of the United States, subject only to action upon a petition
for a new trial [under Article 73],” or to action by the appro
priate Secretary or the President. 10 U. S. C. § 876 (empha
sis added). Once an Article 73 petition is denied, a service
member has no relief left to seek within the court-martial
system. See Gusik, supra, at 133–134.1
Federal courts are authorized to issue extraordinary writs
such as coram nobis only as “necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a). The
All Writs Act “confine[s] the power of the CAAF to issuing
1 A court-martial conviction may still be collaterally attacked in an Arti
cle III court, but that is because those courts possess jurisdiction beyond
that granted by the UCMJ. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241, 1331. We have
repeatedly held that Article 76 “does not expressly effect any change in
the subject-matter jurisdiction of Art. III courts.” Schlesinger v. Coun
cilman, 420 U. S. 738, 749 (1975). Our cases have never questioned that
Article 76 limits the jurisdiction of military courts.

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process ‘in aid of ’ its existing statutory jurisdiction” and
“does not enlarge that jurisdiction.” Goldsmith, supra, at
534–535; see also Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969)
(although military courts can issue extraordinary writs in
aid of their direct review jurisdiction, “[a] different ques
tion would, of course, arise in a case which the [courts are]
not authorized to review under the governing statutes”).
The UCMJ grants military courts of appeals no jurisdiction
over final court-martial judgments, so there is no jurisdiction
for a postconviction extraordinary writ to “aid.” A petition
for coram nobis by its nature seeks postconviction review;
it is therefore beyond the scope of these courts’ “narrowly
circumscribed” statutory jurisdiction. Goldsmith, supra,
at 535.
II
The majority overrides these careful limits on military
court jurisdiction by maintaining that later jurisdiction to
issue coram nobis is a “belated extension” of the statutory
jurisdiction, that “jurisdiction to issue [coram nobis] derives
from the earlier jurisdiction.” Ante, at 913, 914. The au
thority the Court cites for this key jurisdictional analysis
is—a footnote. See ante, at 913 (citing Morgan, 346 U. S.,
at 505, n. 4); ante, at 914 (same). Now, footnotes are part of
an opinion, too, even if not the most likely place to look for
a key jurisdictional ruling. But since footnote 4 plays such
an indispensable role in the majority’s analysis, it must be
read with care.
The first thing you notice in doing so is that the footnote
does not mention the word “jurisdiction” at all. That is be
cause it has nothing to do with jurisdiction. The issue ad
dressed in the paragraph to which the footnote was ap
pended was “choice of remedy.” 346 U. S., at 505. The
Court concluded that coram nobis was the appropriate one.
The footnote simply addressed the concern that the remedy
might not be available because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure had abolished coram nobis as a remedy; the con

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cern was dismissed because the Court concluded the criminal
rules, not the civil rules, applied. Id., at 505, n. 4; see also
United States v. Keogh, 391 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1968)
(Friendly, J.) (“The problem to which the footnote was ad
dressed was that F. R. Civ. P. 60(b) had abolished writs of
error coram nobis”).
The point is further confirmed by the text in the body of
the opinion: The Court’s conclusion in the paragraph in which
the footnote appears is that since the remedy sought was “in
the nature of . . . coram nobis,” the trial court could “prop
erly exercise its jurisdiction.” 346 U. S., at 505 (emphasis
added). The issue was not the existence of jurisdiction, but
whether the court had the authority to exercise it. The
Court in the present case recognizes the distinction. See
ante, at 915 (“When exercising its jurisdiction, the CAAF’s
authority is confined to matters of law” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); ante, at 914 (“The authority to issue a writ
under the All Writs Act is not a font of jurisdiction”).
Even accepting the majority’s reading of Morgan’s hith
erto obscure footnote, that reading would only establish the
“belated jurisdiction” theory for Article III courts. The
military courts are Article I courts. The distinction has di
rect pertinence to the point at issue in this case.
Legal doctrines “must be placed in their historical setting.
They cannot be wrenched from it and mechanically trans
planted into an alien, unrelated context without suffering
mutilation or distortion.” Reid, 354 U. S., at 50 (Frank
furter, J., concurring in result). The Article III courts have
been given broad jurisdiction. I can understand, if not nec
essarily agree with, the notion that they might enjoy some
implicit “long-recognized authority” to correct their earlier
judgments. See ante, at 916. But not so for Article I
courts. The principle that Congress defines the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts “applies with added force to Arti
cle I tribunals.” Ante, at 912. That is especially true with
respect to military courts. The military justice system is

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the last place courts should go about finding “extensions” of
jurisdiction beyond that conferred by statute.
As we expressly recognized in Goldsmith, “there is no
source of continuing jurisdiction for the CAAF over all ac
tions administering sentences that the CAAF at one time
had the power to review.” 526 U. S., at 536 (emphasis
added). Since the UCMJ grants military courts no postcon
viction jurisdiction, conferring on them perpetual authority
to entertain coram nobis petitions plainly contravenes that
basic principle.2
III
Even if the majority’s reading of Morgan’s footnote could
be transplanted to the military context, the majority’s con
clusion would still not follow. “ ‘[T]he All Writs Act is a
residual source of authority to issue writs that are not oth
erwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically
addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority,
and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.’ ” Carlisle v.
United States, 517 U. S. 416, 429 (1996) (quoting Pennsylva
nia Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service,
474 U. S. 34, 43 (1985)).
The UCMJ contains not one, but two provisions specifi
cally limiting the circumstances under which postconviction
relief (other than action by the appropriate Secretary or the
President) may be obtained within the court-martial system.
First, Article 73 provides that, “within two years after ap
2 Once you get into the business of extending jurisdiction, it can be hard
to stop. Denedo is no longer in the military. Ante, at 907. Military
courts lack jurisdiction over “civilian ex-soldiers who ha[ve] severed all
relationship with the military and its institutions.” United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 14 (1955). In the event coram nobis does
issue with respect to a former service member, the Government maintains
it would lack jurisdiction to retry. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56–57; see 10 U. S. C.
§§ 802–803. Avoiding that extraordinary result would require another
“belated extension” of the original court-martial proceeding, expanding
the jurisdiction of military courts to try individuals who have long since
severed their ties to the military.

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proval by the convening authority of a court-martial sen
tence, the accused may petition the Judge Advocate General
for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
or fraud on the court.” 10 U. S. C. § 873. The only relief
available under this “special post-conviction remedy” is a
new trial, Burns, 346 U. S., at 141 (plurality opinion), and
even that may be granted only in an expressly circumscribed
timeframe (two years) and set of circumstances (newly dis
covered evidence or fraud on the court). Article 73 stands
in stark contrast to coram nobis, which the majority char
acterizes as a writ infinitely available “to redress a[ny]
fundamental error.” Ante, at 911; see Morgan, supra, at
512 (“fundamental error” not limited to jurisdictional defects
or errors on the face of the record).
To be sure, the limited nature of relief available under Ar
ticle 73 might lead one to question whether that is truly the
only postconviction relief the UCMJ permits. “You’re in
the Army now” is a sufficient answer to such concerns; the
relief available looks positively extravagant in light of the
prior history and tradition of military justice. In any event,
as the majority recognizes, see ante, at 915–916, Article
76 makes clear that all court-martial judgments “carried
into execution” after completion of direct review are “final
and conclusive,” 10 U. S. C. § 876. Contrary to the major
ity’s assertion, that language does not simply “codif[y] the
common-law rule that respects the finality of judgments.”
Ante, at 916. In fact, Article 76 does not stop there. It
goes on to instruct that final court-martial judgments are
binding “subject only to action upon a petition for a new trial
[under Article 73],” or action by the appropriate Secretary
or the President. 10 U. S. C. § 876 (emphasis added).
In light of these provisions, only Article 73 provides any
authority to the CCAs or the CAAF, and even that narrow
authority is limited to pending cases. Once a conviction is
final, only the judge advocate general can provide relief.
See supra, at 920; 10 U. S. C. § 873. To the extent the CCAs

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or the CAAF could be deemed to have some inherent contin
uing authority to issue writs of coram nobis, Articles 73 and
76 extinguish it.
IV
The Government goes on to argue that even if military
courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis, and
even if Articles 73 and 76 do not bar such relief, the courts
still lack authority to issue coram nobis, because the writ is
neither “necessary” nor “appropriate” to the court-martial
system of justice. See 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a) (federal courts
“may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions”). Coram nobis allows the court
that issued a judgment to correct its own errors of fact. See
Morgan, 346 U. S., at 507, n. 9 (“ ‘If a judgment in the King’s
Bench be erroneous in matter of fact only, . . . it may be
reversed in the same court, by writ of error coram nobis’ ”
(quoting 2 W. Tidd, Practice of the Courts of King’s Bench,
and Common Pleas 1136 (4th Am. ed. 1856); some emphasis
added)); see also ante, at 916 (referring to “authority of a
court to protect the integrity of its earlier judgments” (em
phasis added)). But a court-martial is not a standing court.
On a case-by-case basis, “[i]t is called into existence for a
special purpose and to perform a particular duty. When the
object of its creation has been accomplished it is dissolved.”
Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 555–556 (1887); see
also 66 M. J. 114, 124 (CAAF 2008) (a court-martial “does not
have independent jurisdiction over a case after the military
judge authenticates the record and the convening authority
forwards the record after taking action”). Because the
court-martial that issues the conviction no longer exists once
the conviction is final, there is no court to which a postconvic
tion petition for coram nobis could be directed.
The absence of standing courts-martial is no mere techni
cality, but rather an integral and intentional part of the mili
tary justice system. “Court-martial jurisdiction sprang
from the belief that within the military ranks there is need

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for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience
and order.” United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S.
11, 22 (1955). But meeting that need requires expending
significant military resources, and “[t]o the extent that those
responsible for performance of [the military’s] primary func
tion are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the
basic fighting purpose of armies is not served.” Id., at 17.
Accordingly, courts-martial, composed of active duty military
personnel, have always been called into existence for a lim
ited purpose and duration.
It is no answer that the CCAs and the CAAF are stand
ing courts that could act as substitutes for coram nobis
purposes. As this case illustrates, those courts are not
equipped to handle the kind of factfinding necessary to re
solve claims that might be brought on coram nobis. In
stead, the CCAs will have to resort to the procedures in
vented by United States v. DuBay, 17 U. S. C. M. A. 147, 37
C. M. R. 411 (1967) (per curiam), under which a new conven
ing authority will refer a case to a new court-martial, and
task various military personnel who have no prior familiarity
with the case to conduct an out-of-court evidentiary hearing
on the merits of the petitioner’s claim. Id., at 149, 37
C. M. R., at 413. This “unwieldy and imperfect system” will
undoubtedly divert valuable military resources, 66 M. J., at
136 (Ryan, J., dissenting), all in aid of postconviction relief
Congress specifically withheld.
The Court expressly declines to consider the Government’s
“necessary or appropriate” argument: “[T]he Government’s
argument speaks to the scope of the writ, not the [CCA’s]
jurisdiction to issue it. The CAAF rejected the former
argument. Only the latter one is before us. ” Ante, at
916–917. The Court may well be correct in dividing the
questions into separate pigeonholes. But the Government’s
argument, even if an argument about authority rather than
jurisdiction, applies to every coram nobis case, given the na
ture of the military justice system. It is curious to conclude

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that military courts have jurisdiction, while not considering
a raised and briefed argument that they may never exer
cise it.
* * *
Since the adoption of the UCMJ, “Congress has gradually
changed the system of military justice so that it has come to
more closely resemble the civilian system.” Weiss v. United
States, 510 U. S. 163, 174 (1994). “But the military in impor
tant respects remains a specialized society separate from ci
vilian society.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Neither the jurisdiction nor the powers of Article III courts
are necessarily appropriate for military courts, and Con
gress’s contrary determinations in this area are entitled to
“the highest deference.” Loving v. United States, 517 U. S.
748, 768 (1996). Rather than respect the rule that military
courts have no jurisdiction to revisit final convictions, the
majority creates an exception that swallows it. Because I
would hold the military courts to the statutory restraints
that govern them, I respectfully dissent.