Stanley v. Department of Public Safety

#30038-a-SRJ
2023 S.D. 13

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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RUSSELL C. STANLEY, Petitioner and Appellee,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent and Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MEADE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE HONORABLE MICHELLE K. COMER
Judge

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EDWARD S. HRUSKA III
Special Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for respondent
and appellant.

MATTHEW J. KINNEY of
Kinney Law, P.C.
Spearfish, South Dakota Attorneys for petitioner
and appellee.

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CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
JANUARY 9, 2023
OPINION FILED 03/08/23
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JENSEN, Chief Justice

[¶1.] Russell C. Stanley pleaded guilty to unauthorized ingestion of a

controlled drug or substance, having been cited for the offense while operating a

motorcycle. The circuit court granted Stanley a suspended imposition of sentence.

Following the criminal proceedings, the Department of Public Safety (Department)

notified Stanley that his commercial driver’s license (CDL) was subject to

disqualification for a period of one year pursuant to South Dakota law. Stanley

requested an administrative hearing to contest the proposed disqualification. An

administrative law judge upheld the disqualification and the Department entered a

final order disqualifying Stanley’s CDL privileges. Stanley appealed to the circuit

court, which reversed the disqualification of his CDL privileges. The Department

appeals the circuit court’s decision. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] Stanley was stopped in Meade County while driving his motorcycle on

August 21, 2020. Stanley held a CDL at the time of the stop. He was charged with

driving under the influence while intoxicated by a combination of alcohol/drug

substances (DUI) and with felony unauthorized ingestion of a controlled drug or

substance in violation of SDCL 22-42-5.1. A chemical analysis of Stanley’s urine

following the stop tested positive for methamphetamine. Stanley later pleaded

guilty to the ingestion charge. The DUI charge was dismissed. The circuit court

imposed a suspended imposition of sentence for the ingestion charge, pursuant to

SDCL 23A-27-13.

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[¶3.] On February 2, 2021, the Department notified Stanley that his CDL

privileges would be disqualified for a period of one year for the reason of a “felony

committed while operating a motor vehicle.” Stanley contested the proposed

disqualification by making a timely request for an administrative hearing with the

Office of Hearing Examiners.

[¶4.] The hearing examiner received evidence including Stanley’s guilty plea

to ingestion of a controlled substance, the order suspending imposition of sentence,

and Stanley’s driving record. Stanley admitted in his testimony that he was

operating a motor vehicle when he was pulled over and cited for ingestion of a

controlled substance and that he later pleaded guilty to the ingestion charge. The

hearing examiner found that Stanley held a CDL at the time he was cited for

ingestion of a controlled substance. 1 The hearing examiner further found that

Stanley was “sentenced” for felony ingestion of a controlled substance and “[a]ll of

the events that led to the conviction happened while Stanley was in a vehicle.” 2

1. While the hearing examiner’s proposed decision correctly refers to Stanley’s
ingestion of a controlled substance charge, the decision states in the
“reasoning” section that Stanley is “considered guilty of possession of a
schedule I or II controlled substance.” Possession of a controlled substance is
prohibited under SDCL 22-42-5, but Stanley was never charged with that
offense. Instead, he pled guilty to ingestion of a controlled substance in
violation of SDCL 22-42-5.1, but it is not clear under which statutory theory
of criminal liability Stanley was convicted—“knowingly ingest[ing]” a
controlled substance or “hav[ing] a controlled drug or substance in an altered
state in the body[.]” Therefore, the finding that Stanley is “considered guilty
of possession” is not supported by the evidence, but, regardless, the
Department does not rely upon this finding in urging this Court to reverse
the decision of the circuit court.

2. Under the felony suspended imposition statute in SDCL 23A-27-13, an order
for a suspended imposition of sentence, after a guilty plea, is neither a
(continued . . .)
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[¶5.] The hearing examiner also determined that Stanley’s suspended

imposition of sentence had no effect on the mandatory CDL disqualification, citing

the “anti-masking” statute, SDCL 32-12A-64, which provides:

The state may not mask, defer imposition of judgment, or permit
any person to enter into a diversion program that would prevent
a commercial learner’s permit or commercial driver license
holder’s conviction for any violation, in any type of motor
vehicle, of a state or local traffic control law except a parking
violation from appearing on the driver’s record, whether the
driver was convicted for an offense committed in the state, in the
state where the driver is licensed, or in another state.

[¶6.] Based upon its findings, the hearing examiner determined that

disqualification of Stanley’s CDL was required pursuant to SDCL 32-12A-36(4).

The relevant portion of the statute provides, “[a]ny person is disqualified from

driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one year: . . . (4) If

convicted of a first violation of using a commercial or noncommercial motor vehicle

in the commission of any felony[.]” SDCL 32-12A-36. The Department entered a

final administrative decision adopting the hearing examiner’s proposed decision in

full. Stanley appealed the decision to the circuit court.

[¶7.] The circuit court reversed the Department’s determination. In its

decision, the circuit court found that there “is no evidence Stanley ingested while

________________________
(. . . continued)
sentence nor a conviction of the criminal offense. However, the hearing
examiner correctly determined that Stanley had been convicted of ingestion
of a controlled substance for the purposes of the CDL disqualification
statutes. The Legislature defines a conviction under the CDL disqualification
statutes to include “a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court.”
SDCL 32-12A-1(7). The order suspending the imposition of sentence shows
that the circuit court accepted the guilty plea prior to imposing the suspended
imposition of sentence.

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driving[,] . . . when Stanley ingested[,] . . . [or] where Stanley ingested.” The court

also found there “is no evidence Stanley was under the influence of the controlled

substance and in fact the DUI (alcohol/drugs) charge was dismissed.” The circuit

court analyzed our decision in Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2021 S.D. 17, 956

N.W.2d 799, with respect to the issue of whether Stanley’s offense for felony

ingestion of a controlled substance was subject to mandatory disqualification under

SDCL 32-12A-36(4) as a “violation of using a commercial or noncommercial motor

vehicle in the commission of any felony[.]” The circuit court noted that the instant

offense involved felony ingestion rather than felony possession of marijuana located

in the vehicle, as was the case in Ibrahim. Despite this noted distinction and the

court’s findings, the circuit court did not specifically resolve whether SDCL 32-12A-

36(4) applied to Stanley’s felony ingestion offense.

[¶8.] The court examined the “traffic control law” language in SDCL 32-12A-

64, “to determine if [the] charge for which Stanley received a Suspended Imposition

of Sentence should be unmasked.” The court then considered the plain language in

SDCL 32-12A-64 and noted that no part of the crime of ingestion involved a “traffic

control law.” From our review of the remainder of the circuit court’s conclusions, it

appears the court determined that because the anti-masking statute does not apply

to ingestion offenses, Stanley’s suspended imposition of sentence should not be

deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualifying his CDL privileges.

[¶9.] The Department appeals the circuit court’s decision reversing Stanley’s

CDL disqualification, raising the issues we restate as follows:

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1. Whether Stanley “used” a motor vehicle in committing the
crime of ingestion to fall within the scope of SDCL 32-
12A-36(4).

2. Whether SDCL 32-12A-64 applies to the suspended
imposition of sentence for a violation of SDCL 22-42-5.1.

Analysis

[¶10.] Our standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation is well

established.

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. “[T]he
language expressed in the statute is the paramount
consideration” in statutory construction. Further, “we give
words their plain meaning and effect, and read statutes as a
whole.” “When the language of a statute is clear, certain and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and the
court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as
clearly expressed in the statute.”

Ibrahim, 2021 S.D. 17, ¶¶ 12–13, 956 N.W.2d at 802–03 (citations omitted).

[¶11.] The Department argues that the circuit court erred in failing to affirm

the administrative determination that Stanley’s violation of SDCL 22-42-5.1 while

operating a noncommercial motor vehicle fell within SDCL 32-12A-36(4). In its

view, Stanley’s CDL was subject to mandatory disqualification under SDCL 32-12A-

36(4) based upon his admission that he was operating a motor vehicle when he was

stopped by law enforcement; cited for ingestion of a controlled substance; and

ultimately entered a plea of guilty to ingestion of a controlled substance that was

accepted by the circuit court. 3 Stanley asserts that he did not “use” a motor vehicle

3. The Department did not attempt to establish CDL disqualification under any
other subsection of SDCL 32-12A-36. For instance, SDCL 32-12A-36(1)
requires disqualification of a CDL if a person is convicted of driving or being
in control of a vehicle while under the influence of any controlled drug or
(continued . . .)
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to commit the crime of ingestion and therefore is not subject to CDL disqualification

under the provisions of SDCL 32-12A-36(4).

[¶12.] Stanley pleaded guilty to the crime of ingestion in violation of SDCL

22-42-5.1 which provides:

No person may knowingly ingest a controlled drug or substance
or have a controlled drug or substance in an altered state in the
body unless the substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a
valid prescription or order from a practitioner, while acting in
the course of the practitioner’s professional practice or except as
otherwise authorized by chapter 34-20B.

Mandatory disqualification occurs under SDCL 32-12A-36(4) when a CDL holder is

convicted for “using a commercial or noncommercial motor vehicle in the

commission of any felony other than a felony described in § 32-12A-38[.]” (Emphasis

added.)

[¶13.] This Court recently discussed SDCL 32-12A-36(4) in Ibrahim v.

Department of Public Safety. In that case, the defendant was stopped and charged

with felony possession of marijuana after marijuana was found in his vehicle.

Ibrahim, 2021 S.D. 17, ¶ 5, 956 N.W.2d at 801. In the criminal proceedings, the

defendant was convicted of felony possession of marijuana and the Department

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(. . . continued)
substance. A “conviction” as defined in SDCL 32-12A-1(7) includes “a
determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a
court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal . . .
regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated.”
(emphasis added). The DUI charge was dismissed at the time Stanley
pleaded guilty to ingestion of a controlled substance. The administrative
tribunal made a determination that Stanley was pulled over in a motor
vehicle and cited for DUI and ingestion, but as noted by the circuit court, the
hearing examiner made no finding that Stanley was driving while under the
influence of a controlled substance and/or alcohol in violation of the
applicable criminal statute.

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sought to disqualify his CDL. Id. ¶ 2, 956 N.W.2d at 800–01. On appeal, Ibrahim

considered “whether possession of a felony quantity of marijuana while using a

motor vehicle is ‘using a . . . vehicle in the commission of any felony’ under SDCL

32-12A-36(4).” Id. ¶ 12, 956 N.W.2d at 802. In answering this question in the

affirmative, we discussed the definition of “using” a motor vehicle in the commission

of a crime. Id. ¶ 17, 956 N.W.2d at 803–04. We explained that “use” means “to put

into action or service . . . employ” or “to carry out a purpose or action by means of.”

Id. (quoting Use, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/use (last visited Mar. 2, 2021)). Based on a plain reading of

the language, we held that SDCL 32-12A-36(4) “applies upon proof that the vehicle

was used as a means to commit felony possession of marijuana.” Ibrahim, 2021 S.D.

17, ¶ 16, 956 N.W.2d at 803 (emphasis added). Because the marijuana was found in

the vehicle at the time of the stop, we determined the defendant was “using” a

vehicle to possess the marijuana. Id. ¶ 21, 956 N.W.2d at 804.

[¶14.] The Department asserts that Ibrahim precludes Stanley’s arguments

that the vehicle must be used as an “instrumentality” of the crime and that SDCL

32-12A-36(4) would apply only when the use of a vehicle is an actual element of the

offense. The Department claims the “any felony” language is intended to apply to

every felony charged when a person is using a vehicle. In Ibrahim we articulated

that SDCL 32-12A-36(4) is not limited to crimes that require the use of a vehicle as

an element of the offense. “[T]he Legislature’s inclusion of the ‘any felony’ language

suggests that subsection (4) is a catch-all provision that requires the

disqualification of CDL privileges whenever a vehicle is used in the commission of a

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felony.” Ibrahim, 2021 S.D. 17, ¶ 19, 956 N.W.2d at 804 (emphasis added). Thus,

SDCL 32-12A-36(4) may apply to any felony offense that can be committed with or

without the use of a vehicle, but we must look at how the offense was committed to

determine whether SDCL 32-12A-36(4) requires CDL disqualification. If the vehicle

is used to commit the offense, the statute applies. In Ibrahim, we determined that

the vehicle the defendant was operating was used as a means to possess the

marijuana. Here, we must consider whether Stanley used his motorcycle to commit

the offense of ingestion of a controlled substance.

[¶15.] The felony ingestion statute in SDCL 22-42-5.1 prohibits a person from

“knowingly ingest[ing] a controlled drug or substance or hav[ing] a controlled drug

or substance in an altered state in the body . . . .” There is no evidence or showing

that Stanley utilized the motorcycle to commit the crime of ingestion of a controlled

substance. The offense as committed by Stanley in this case is therefore not subject

to mandatory CDL disqualification within SDCL 32-12A-36(4). 4

[¶16.] The circuit court’s decision reversing the Department’s disqualification

of Stanley’s CDL is affirmed. 5

4. Because we determine that Stanley did not use a motor vehicle to commit the
crime of ingestion, it is unnecessary to decide, and we make no determination
whether a “conviction” for ingestion of a controlled substance under SDCL 22-
42-5.1 is an offense that, under different facts, may involve the use of “a . . .
vehicle in the commission of any felony” under SDCL 32-12A-36(4).

5. As to the Department’s second issue, the circuit court’s reliance upon the
inapplicability of the anti-masking statute, in SDCL 32-12A-64, to reverse
the decision of the Department was misplaced. SDCL 32-12A-64 is designed
to prevent any state action to mask a conviction for a CDL disqualifying
offense of a “state or local traffic control law[.]” Stanley’s suspended
imposition of sentence did not mask his offense for the purpose of CDL
(continued . . .)
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[¶17.] KERN, SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, concur.

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(. . . continued)
disqualification because the Legislature has defined a conviction to include “a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court . . . regardless of
whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended or probated[.]” SDCL 32-
12A-1(7). After the court accepted Stanley’s guilty plea to ingestion and
imposed a suspended imposition of sentence, it stood as a “conviction” as
defined by SDCL 32-12A-1(7), but it was not a disqualifying conviction under
SDCL 32-12A-36(4). The fact that the circuit court reached its conclusion for
the wrong reason “does not prevent this court from affirming based upon the
correct reason.” Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 1997 S.D. 97, ¶ 11, 567 N.W.2d
220, 222 (quoting Anderson v. Somers, 455 N.W.2d 219, 222 (S.D. 1990)).

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