In the Matter of I.M. — Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bridges

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 20, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00513-CV
IN THE MATTER OF I.M.
On Appeal from the 314th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2023-01659J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By five issues on appeal, I.M. challenges his capital-murder adjudication,
thirty-year 	sentence, 	and 	transfer 	to 	the 	Institutional 	Division 	of 	the 	Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. I.M. did not raise his objection to the trial court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction at the adjudication hearing, and there is no evidence
in the record that the jury was aware he was shackled for a portion of the adjudication
hearing. There is no evidence proper notice of the transfer hearing was not given to
I.M.’s parents and having been committed to the Texas Department of Juvenile
Justice, I.M. was subject to the transfer hearing. We affirm.

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I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Murder
On 	May 	21, 	2023—about 	one 	month 	before 	appellant’s 	seventeenth
birthday—the complainant, Moses Gama, arranged to purchase a PlayStation 5 he
saw listed on a digital marketplace. Gama communicated with the seller via text and
phone. 	The seller directed Gama to meet at a gated apartment complex on North
Post Oak Lane, in Houston, and Gama drove there with his wife and young son.
After Gama arrived, the seller identified apartment 8203 as the meeting
location and directed Gama to a stairwell leading to the third-floor apartment.
Gama’s wife and son waited in the car while Gama went to meet the seller. Gama
had approximately $400 in cash in his wallet. 	The seller wanted $300 for the
PlayStation, and Gama confirmed he would pay in cash.
In the breezeway outside apartment 8203, Gama was shot multiple times.
Multiple residents reported that immediately beforehand, they heard a male voice
yelling along with a higher‑pitched scream. 	Gama ran back downstairs and
collapsed in the parking lot. Police did not recover Gama’s wallet or cash.
One resident saw a young black male run to leave the apartment complex, and
surveillance cameras showed the male’s travel to and from the scene. 	Evidence
obtained from the seller’s marketplace account, Gama’s cellular phone, surveillance
footage around the scene, pawn-shop records and surveillance footage, social media,
and eventually a search warrant ultimately led police to identify I.M. as the assailant.
I.M.’s mother lived within half a mile of the crime scene.
B. I.M.’s Age and the Adjudication Hearing
Appellant’s seventeenth birthday was in June 2023, approximately one month
after the homicide. The State filed its original petition in July 2023, alleging I.M.

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committed capital murder and, in March 2024, the State filed an amended,
grand‑jury-approved petition rendering I.M. eligible for a determinate sentence.1
Following his eighteenth birthday in June of 2024, I.M. moved to dismiss the case
arguing 	a 	lack 	of 	jurisdiction 	under 	Texas 	Family 	Code 	section 	51.0412.
Specifically, I.M. argued that: (1) his adjudication hearing was required to be
completed before his eighteenth birthday; and (2) the juvenile court could not retain
jurisdiction to hold the proceeding because the State did not use due diligence to try
to complete the adjudication before I.M.’s eighteenth birthday.
At the hearing on I.M.’s amended motion to dismiss, the State argued that: (1)
the court’s jurisdiction ends at age nineteen in cases in which determinate sentencing
has been authorized; and (2) appellant’s complaint was not ripe because he had not
yet reached his nineteenth birthday. The juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to
dismiss, stating “that the State has until the respondent’s nineteenth birthday to
prosecute the case. The issue of due diligence is not ripe at this time.”
The adjudication hearing commenced May 27, 2025, and concluded June 3,
2025. During voir dire and the testimony of the State’s first two witnesses, I.M.’s
legs were shackled under counsel table. The record reflects that prior to voir dire,
the trial court had boxes positioned around the table so that the shackles were not
visible. 	There is no evidence in the record that the shackles made any sound or
restricted I.M.’s ability to interact with counsel.
After the jury returned its verdict that I.M. committed capital murder, the trial
court found I.M. is in need of rehabilitation and sentenced I.M. to thirty years of
confinement. The trial court initially committed I.M. to the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department but announced in open court, with I.M.’s father present, that upon I.M.
1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 53.045(a)(2) (providing determinate-sentence eligibility with a
grand jury’s approval of the petition when a child is alleged to have committed capital murder).

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reaching nineteen years of age, a hearing would be held on whether to transfer I.M.
to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
C. The Transfer Hearing
On June 11, 2025, shortly before I.M.’s nineteenth birthday, the juvenile court
conducted the dispositional‑transfer hearing. I.M. objected to the transfer hearing at
the outset. I.M. objected that he did not know whether his parents received notice
of the transfer hearing, and that because he was never physically transferred to the
custody of Juvenile Justice Department, the transfer procedure did not apply to him.
The juvenile court ordered I.M. transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice to serve his determinate sentence. I.M.’s nineteenth birthday fell later in June
2025, after his transfer to the adult prison was ordered. This appeal followed.
II. I SSUES P RESENTED
I.M. raises the following five issues for review on appeal, which we restate as
follows:
1. 	Did the trial Court lack personal jurisdiction because I.M. was
eighteen years old at the time of his adjudication hearing and the State
failed to establish due diligence under Texas Family Code section
51.0412?
2. Did the shackling of I.M. during his adjudication hearing violate due
process and or the common law causing I.M. reversible harm?
3. Did the transfer-hearing procedure under Texas Family Code section
54.11 apply to I.M. when he never entered the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department (“TJJD”)?
4. 	Does the lack of service of notice of a transfer hearing on I.M.’s
parents require reversal of the transfer order under section 54.11?
5. 	Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion by basing its order
transferring 	I.M. 	to 	the 	Texas 	Department 	of 	Criminal 	Justice
Institutional Division (“TDCJ”) on arbitrary and unreasonable factors
without regard to the statutory factors listed in section 54.11?

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We will address I.M.’s issues in order.
III. 	A NALYSIS
A. Challenge to the Trial Court’s Personal Jurisdiction was not Preserved
By his first issue on appeal, I.M. argues that the juvenile court lacked personal
jurisdiction to adjudicate the charged offense after he reached eighteen years of age,
without a due-diligence finding as described in Texas Family Code section 51.0412.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.0412. As discussed below, because I.M. did not raise this
objection at the adjudication hearing, we conclude the issue was waived in the trial
court and not preserved for appellate review.
Juvenile courts have “exclusive, original jurisdiction over all proceedings
involving a person who has engaged in delinquent conduct as a result of acts
committed before age seventeen.” In re T.A.W., 234 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Fam. Code §§ 51.02, 51.04).
When a juvenile turns eighteen, the juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction over the
juvenile, but its jurisdiction becomes limited. Id. The juvenile court retains limited
jurisdiction to either transfer the case to an appropriate court or dismiss the case. Id.
(citing In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.3d 554, 556 (Tex. 1999)).
Section 	51.0412 	of 	the 	Family 	Code, 	which 	applies 	to 	incomplete
proceedings, provides an exception to this rule of limited jurisdiction. It provides:
The court retains jurisdiction over a person, without regard to the age
of the person, who is a respondent in an adjudication proceeding, a
disposition 	proceeding, 	a 	proceeding 	to 	modify 	disposition, 	a
proceeding for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court
under Section 54.02(a), or a motion for transfer of determinate sentence
probation to an appropriate district court if:
(1) the petition or motion was filed while the respondent was younger
than 18 or 19 years of age, as applicable;

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(2) the proceeding is not complete before the respondent becomes 18
or 19 years of age, as applicable; and
(3) the court enters a finding in the proceeding that the prosecuting
attorney 	exercised 	due 	diligence 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	complete 	the
proceeding before the respondent became 18 or 19 years of age, as
applicable.
Tex. Fam. Code § 51.0412.
Thus, under section 51.0412, a juvenile court may bind the juvenile defendant
if his case began in the court prior to the juvenile turning eighteen or nineteen years
old, if it is pending when he turns eighteen or nineteen, and if the State exercised
due diligence in attempting to complete the proceeding before the juvenile’s
eighteenth or nineteenth birthday. 	In re P.A.B., No. 14-18-00290-CV, 2018 WL
4354679, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 13, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.
op.); In re N.G.W., 648 S.W.3d 490, 492 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.).
However, Family Code section 51.042 provides that an objection to the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction over the child because of his age must be raised at the
adjudication hearing or the objection is waived. See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.042; In re
T.A.W., 234 S.W.3d at 705.
In this case, I.M. complained after his eighteenth birthday by written motion
filed in June 2024, and by an amended written motion filed in July 2024, that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over him without a due-diligence finding under section
51.0412. On July 16, 2024, after an oral hearing, the trial court denied I.M.’s motion
and ruled the due-diligence issue was not ripe for review because the State had until
I.M.’s nineteenth birthday to prosecute the case.2
2 We note that during the summer of 2024, the public defender’s office represented I.M.,
and in October 2024, retained counsel appeared in the case to represent I.M. On appeal, retained
counsel continues to represent I.M.

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Nearly a year after the trial court ruled the due-diligence issue was not ripe
for review, at the outset of the adjudication hearing in May 2025, I.M. sought
continuances of the adjudication hearing multiple times. On two of those occasions,
in denying the motion for continuance, the juvenile court explained that the prospect
of a jurisdictional dismissal loomed if the case was not completed before I.M.’s
nineteenth birthday in June 2025. 	Counsel for I.M. did not express disagreement
with the juvenile court on this point that its jurisdiction continued until I.M. reached
age nineteen. The trial court may have concluded defense counsel acquiesced to its
conclusion regarding jurisdiction.
I.M. did not raise his age-based jurisdictional objection “at the adjudication
hearing” as section 51.042 requires. 	See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.042. Therefore, the
complaint was waived in the trial court and I.M.’s first issue presents nothing for our
review. See id. § 51.042(b) (“A child who does not object as provided by Subsection
(a) waives any right to object to the jurisdiction of the court because of the age of
the child at a later hearing or on appeal.”); In re T.A.W., 234 S.W.3d at 705.
B. Shackling I.M. During the Adjudication Hearing
By his second issue, I.M. claims (i) the trial court erred in ordering that he
appear in shackles during the voir-dire proceedings before the jury panel and the
start of the adjudication without providing a particularized reason for doing so; and
(ii) he was denied due process because there is a reasonable probability jurors saw
or heard the shackles. The record shows that after the adjudication hearing
commenced, the State withdrew its request that I.M. be shackled, and the shackles
were removed.
At the outset, we observe that I.M.’s complaints that the jurors might have
heard the shackles and that the juvenile court did not state a particularized reason for
granting the State’s request that I.M. be shackled are not preserved for appellate

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review because the record does not show these complaints were raised in the trial
court. 	See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Ex parte Chavez, 560 S.W.3d 191, 203–04 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018) (distinguishing between defense counsel’s failure object to the
trial court’s failure to make findings to justify shackling and an objection to the
defendant being seen in shackles). On the State’s motion, after a hearing, on May
19, 2025, the trial court signed an order that I.M. be shackled in the courtroom
because 	I.M. 	presented 	“a 	substantial 	risk 	of 	inflicting 	physical 	harm 	to
himself/herself or another person.” 	The order stated the least restrictive type of
restraint necessary to prevent physical harm or flight was to be used. 	Defense
counsel objected only that the shackles on I.M.’s legs might be seen by the jury and
undermine the presumption of innocence.
We will consider I.M.’s argument that there is a reasonable probability the
jurors saw the shackles. 	“[S]hackling error may rise to the level of constitutional
error when the record reflects a reasonable probability that the jury was aware of the
defendant’s shackles.” Bell v. State, 415 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude there was a reasonable probability
the jury was aware of I.M.’s restraints. Instead, the record shows that the trial court
took precautionary measures to conceal the shackles from the jury, including: (1)
arranging with I.M.’s counsel to place boxes and other items in front of counsel’s
table so the shackles could not be seen; (2) moving I.M. out of the courtroom only
when jurors were not present; and (3) conducting a “dry run” with the trial court
attempting to see the shackles and then taking notice on the record that the shackles
could not be seen in order verify that the jury would be unable to view appellant's
shackles. There is no indication in the record that these precautionary measures were
ineffective, or that the jury ever saw or was aware that appellant was shackled at any
time. Additionally, nothing in the record suggests that I.M.’s shackles hindered his

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ability to communicate with defense counsel or the trial court, or to participate at
trial.
Having concluded there is not a reasonable probability that the jury was aware
of I.M.’s shackles, any alleged harm I.M. suffered is nonconstitutional in nature, and
this Court may only reverse the juvenile court’s judgment if the juvenile court made
an error of law that “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment . . . .”
See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); In re D.I.B., 988 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. 1999) (applying
civil standard for reversible error in a juvenile case); In re G.M.P., 909 S.W.2d 198,
210–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.) (holding the civil standard
for harmless error applies in juvenile-delinquency appeals). 	As stated above,
nothing in the record indicates the jury was even aware that I.M. was shackled;
precautionary measures were taken so that the jury would not see his shackles and
nobody at the adjudication hearing mentioned in the jury’s presence that I.M. was
wearing shackles. Also, there is no evidence that the shackles affected I.M.’s ability
to participate in the trial or communicate with his counsel. 	Accordingly, we
conclude that any error was harmless. We overrule I.M.’s second issue to the extent
it was preserved for appellate review.
C. Validity of the Transfer Hearing
By his third and fourth issues on appeal, I.M. challenges the transfer hearing
by which he was transferred from TJJD to TDCJ to finish serving his thirty-year
sentence. 	We address these issues together because they are related and both
concern adherence to Texas Family Code section 54.11. 	See Tex. Family Code §
54.11. We generally review a juvenile court’s decision to transfer someone to TDCJ
for an abuse of discretion, but we review questions of law such as statutory
construction do novo. See In re C.B., No. 14-25-00465-CV, 2026 WL 2239084, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 4, 2026, no pet.) (“We review a juvenile

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court’s decision to transfer someone to the TDCJ for an abuse of discretion.”); In re
K.L.W., 726 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.)
(reviewing issue of statutory construction of Texas Family Code section 54.11 de
novo).
By his third issue, I.M. argues that because he was never physically present in
a TJJD facility, the transfer-hearing procedure in Texas Family Code section 54.11
did not apply to him. 	We disagree. 	I.M. bases his argument entirely on the plain
language of section 54.11. 	Section 54.11 provides a procedure for a person
“committed” to TJJD to be transferred to TDCJ. 	See Tex. Family Code § 54.11.
I.M. argues that even though the determinate-sentence order committed him to TJJD,
he was never physically moved to a TJJD facility prior to the hearing to transfer him
to TDCJ.
In In re C.B., this Court held that a transfer under section 54.11 does not
necessarily require the TJJD to have physical custody or movement of the person for
the juvenile court to order transfer to the TDCJ. 	In re C.B., 2026 WL 2239084, at
*5. The Court wrote:
Section 54.11 authorizes a juvenile court to transfer a person to TDCJ
to serve the remainder of their juvenile sentence when the court receives
a request from TJJD and certain criteria are met. Nothing in the
statutory scheme mandates that the person be in the physical custody of
TJJD at the time of the transfer order.
Id.; see also In re J.H.M., , No. 01-24-00386-CV, 2026 WL 1338090, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2026, pet. filed) (holding the lack of physical transfer to
TJJD did not mean J.H.M. had not been “committed” to TJJD). 	Here, the trial
court’s determinate-sentence judgment specifically “committed” I.M. to TJJD even
if he was not physically moved to a TJJD facility prior to the hearing to transfer I.M.
to TDCJ. Therefore, the “committed to the TJJD” requirement in section 54.11 was

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satisfied. See In re C.B., 2026 WL 2239084, at *5; In re J.H.M., 2026 WL 1338090,
at *4. Accordingly, we overrule I.M.’s third issue.
Under his fourth issue, I.M. argues the lack of service and notice of the post-
adjudication transfer hearing on I.M.’s mother under Texas Family Code section
54.11 deprived the juvenile court of jurisdiction to hold the transfer hearing, and
requires reversal.3 I.M.’s argument assumes based on his mother’s absence from the
transfer hearing that she did not receive notice of the hearing. We disagree.
Texas Family Code section 54.11 requires the juvenile court to give notice of
the time and place of the transfer hearing to, among others, the parents of the person
to be transferred. Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(b)(2). If the court’s transfer order recites
the transfer hearing was held after due notice was issued to all parties as required by
the statute, the reviewing court may presume the regularity of this recitation in the
record absent controverting evidence. In re E.V., 225 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2006, pet. denied) (citing Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 450–51 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985)(Op. on reh’g); In re B.D., 16 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)).
Facing a similar issue to the one at bar, in In re E.V., our sister court found
that the record sufficiently supported the recitation in the court’s order that notice
was served on the defendant’s mother as required by the statute. Id. (applying Tex.
Fam. Code § 54.11(b)(2)). In the E.V. case, although the defendant’s parents were
absent from the transfer hearing, his uncle attended, which the court interpreted as
sufficient evidence that notice was served, especially because defense counsel
3 We note that in his list of issues presented, I.M. complains by issue four that his “parents”
did not receive notice of the transfer hearing, but in discussing this issue in the argument section
of his brief, I.M. complains that his “mother” did not receive notice of the transfer hearing. This
Court’s analysis of issue four is the same regardless of whether issue four is construed to concern
both parents or just I.M.’s mother.

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informed the court that he knew the defendant’s mother, aunt, and uncle. Id. at 235.
The court of appeals applied the rule that the appellate court presumes the regularity
of recitations in judgments, provided the record does not contain any controverting
material. Id. The court held that the evidence supported the finding that due notice
of the transfer hearing was served on the parties as required by Texas Family Code
section 54.11. Id. at 235.
In this case, the transfer order recites that “[p]ursuant to and in full accordance
with Section 54.11, Texas Family Code, after due notice had been issued on all
parties as required,” the transfer hearing was held. The record does not controvert
the trial court’s due-notice recitation in the transfer order. 	I.M.’s parents were
present for parts of the adjudication hearing including the jury verdict, and his father
was present when disposition was pronounced. 	With I.M.’s father present, after
rendering a thirty-year determinate sentence, the juvenile court told appellant that a
transfer hearing would occur upon his nineteenth birthday to decide release on parole
or transfer to TDCJ.
At the transfer hearing on June 11, 2025, shortly before I.M.’s nineteenth
birthday, defense counsel announced that he and I.M. were present via Zoom.
Defense counsel stated that the mother and father were not present and that he did
not know if they received any notice. No evidence or representation was made that
I.M.’s parents were not notified of the hearing. On this record, as in In re E.V., this
Court cannot conclude from I.M.’s parents’ absence from the transfer hearing that
they did not receive notice of the hearing. 	The record reflects that I.M.’s parents
attended parts of the adjudication hearing, but not others. It was announced in open
court with I.M.’s father present that the transfer hearing would occur. 	Nothing
contradicts the recitation in the transfer order that notice of the hearing was issued
in accordance with Family Code section 54.11. 	See In re E.V., 225 S.W.3d at 235.

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Accordingly, we overrule I.M.’s fourth issue on appeal.
D. The Transfer Order
By his fifth issue on appeal I.M. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion
by transferring him to TDCJ without “thoughtful consideration” of the factors listed
in Texas Family Code section 54.11 and without “reasonable evidence.” I.M. argues
the juvenile court only considered the nature of the offense and the State’s
recommendation in deciding to transfer I.M. to TDCJ. 	We disagree because
sufficient record evidence supports the trial court’s decision, in light of the statutory
factors.
As mentioned above, we review a juvenile court’s decision to transfer a child
to TDCJ for an abuse of discretion. J.A.F. v. State, No. 14-23-00922-CV, 2025 WL
793579, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 13, 2025, no pet.). Generally,
a court abuses its discretion if ‘it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as
to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.’ 	Id. (quoting Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992)). “In deciding whether the juvenile court abused
its discretion, we review the entire record to determine if the court acted without
reference to any guiding rules or principles. If some evidence exists to support the
juvenile court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion. 	Id. (citing Sherman v.
Sherman, 650 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.) (noting no
abuse of discretion if some substantive and probative evidence supports a trial
court’s decision or if reasonable minds could differ as to the result)). 	Stated
conversely, a trial court abuses its discretion when it “acts arbitrarily or unreasonably
or when it rules based upon factual assertions not supported by the record.” 	Id.
(quoting Cook v. Mayfield, 886 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, no writ)).
After a child with a determinate sentence reaches the age of sixteen, but before
reaching the age of nineteen, TJJD may request an order approving the transfer of

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the child to TDCJ if the sentence has not been completed and the child poses a
continuing risk to the community’s welfare. 	Id. (citing Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann.
§ 244.014). TJJD will notify the juvenile court to set a hearing to determine whether
the child should be transferred to TDCJ or released under supervision. 	Id. (citing
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(a)).
Texas Family Code section 54.11(k) lists non-exclusive factors the trial court
may consider in making its transfer decision:
In making a determination under this section, the court may consider
the 	experiences 	and 	character 	of 	the 	person 	before 	and 	after
commitment 	to 	the 	Texas 	Juvenile 	Justice 	Department 	or 	post-
adjudication secure correctional facility, the nature of the penal offense
that the person was found to have committed and the manner in which
the offense was committed, the abilities of the person to contribute to
society, the protection of the victim of the offense or any member of
the victim’s family, the recommendations of the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department, 	county 	juvenile 	board, 	local 	juvenile 	probation
department, and prosecuting attorney, the best interests of the person,
and 	any 	other 	factor 	relevant 	to 	the 	issue 	to 	be 	decided.
Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11 (k). The juvenile court is not required to consider all the
listed factors, the State is not required to present evidence of each factor, and the
court may assign different weights to the factors. 	J.A.F., 2025 WL 793579, at *6
(citing In re J.J., 276 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied)). The
appellate court’s review of whether the transfer decision was made with reference to
guiding rules is not limited to the face of the order but rather, the entire record. Id.
at *7 (citing In re C.D.T., 98 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
pet. denied)).
At the transfer hearing, the State’s evidence consisted of the judgment of
adjudication and commitment order, TJJD’s hearing‑referral letter, and a May 2025
probation report. 	A TJJD liaison confirmed appellant had not been transferred to

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TJJD, had been adjudicated and sentenced for capital murder the prior week, and
TJJD had no records pertaining to I.M. for the juvenile court. 	The transfer order
states the juvenile court considered the parties’ pleadings, evidence and arguments,
TJJD’s recommendations, and other section 54.11 factors. In its transfer order, the
court found appellant displayed a deadly weapon, namely a firearm. The court also
found appellant had been detained 220 days for the offense. 	The court found
appellant still needed rehabilitation and the community’s welfare required transfer
to TDCJ. The court found transfer to TDCJ was in the best interest of I.M. and the
public.
The juvenile court’s decision to transfer I.M. was supported by some evidence
in the record and, therefore, it was not abuse of discretion. The juvenile court found
that I.M. had been detained only 220 days and still needed rehabilitation, and the
welfare of the community required that he complete his sentence in TDCJ. This was
a reasonable conclusion in light of the evidence that I.M. committed capital murder
using a firearm at an apartment complex. 	Under section 54.11(k) of the Family
Code, the juvenile court could consider TJJD’s recommendation. It was also within
the court’s discretion to apply varying amounts of weight to the evidence. 	See
J.A.F., 2025 WL 793579, at *6 	(citing In re N.K.M., 387 S.W.3d 859, 865 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). We overrule I.M.’s fifth issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled I.M.’s preserved appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s
disposition order and its transfer order.
/s/ 	Chad Bridges
Justice
Panel Consists of Justices Jewell, Hart, and Bridges.