In re Radical Hoops, Ltd., 2026 Tex. Bus. 55 (1st Div.) (mem. op.)

2026 Tex. Bus. 55
The Business Court of Texas,
1st Division
IN RE RADICAL HOOPS, LTD.
and RADICAL MAVERICKS II,
LLC,
Petitioners
§
§
§
Cause No. 26-BC01B-0067
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MEMORANDUM O PINION
AND O RDER DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION TO R EMAND
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[¶ 1] 	Before the court is petitioners’ August 3, 2026, Emergency
Motion to Remand. 	The court considered the documents on file; the parties’
arguments at an August 3, 2026, conference on the emergency motion; and
the applicable law. Based on these items, the court denies that motion.
[¶ 2] 	The issue is whether the business court has authority to consider
a Rule 202 petition to take a deposition before suit where the petitioner filed
that petition in district court and the respondent filed a notice of removal to
the business court. See TEX . R. CIV. P. 202. The petitioner moved to remand
FILED IN
BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS
BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK
ENTERED
8/5/2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 2
the petition to the district court. 	Petitioner’s remand motion argues that a
Rule 202 petition is not an “action” under Government Code § 25A.006(d)’s
removal procedures because “action” means a lawsuit and a Rule 202 petition
is not a lawsuit. Specifically, petitioners argue that
This Court should remand Petitioner’s Rule 202 Petition to the
134th District Court because the Texas Business Court does not
have jurisdiction to hear Rule 202 petitions. 	Under Texas
Government Code 	§ 25A.004(b) this Court’s jurisdiction is
limited to “civil actions.” 	A Rule 202 petition is not an
“action.” 	See Tema Oil & Gas Co. v. ETC Filed Servs., 705
S.W.3d 226, 231 (2024 Tex. Bus. 3) (“A civil action is a
lawsuit.”).1
[¶ 3] 	The court denies the remand motion because the Texas Supreme
Court holds that an “action” includes a proceeding where a party seeks to
enforce a claimed right (such as a Rule 202 petition).
I. 	BACKGROUND
[¶ 4] 	The 	court 	takes 	these 	facts 	from 	the removal 	notice and
petitioners’ Verified Rule 202 Peti tion unless stated otherwise and assumes
they are true for purposes of this motion:
1 Radical Hoops, LTD. and Radical Mavericks II, LLC’s Emergency Motion to Remand
(Remand Mot.) at 1.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 3
[¶ 5] 	This dispute arises from petitioners’ claim that respondent (Arena
Development Intermediate, LLC, (ADI)) is or may be tortiously interfering
with petitioners’ asserted right to participate in a future arena development for
the Dallas Mavericks professional basketball team.2 According to petitioners,
this dispute arises out of the sale by Mark Cuban (petitioner’s principal), of his
majority interest in the Mavericks to respondent’s principals, members of the
Adelson family.3 As part of that deal, Cuban and the Adelsons agreed to a
partnership 	whereby 	Cuban 	could 	participate 	in 	“certain 	business
opportunities” that he anticipated would include a destination casino.4
[¶ 6] 	In 2024, the Adelson family began actively pursuing a new arena
to replace the American Airlines Center, where the Mavericks currently play
their home games.5 Valley View Mall, a defunct shopping center located in
North Dallas, became a leading candidate for the proposed new arena.6
2 See Radical Hoops, LTD. and Radical Mavericks II, LLC’s Verified Rule 202 Petition
(Rule 202 Pet.) at 5.
3 See Rule 202 Pet. at 3.
4 See Rule 202 Pet. at 3-4.
5 Rule 202 Pet. at 6.
6 Rule 202 Pet. at 6.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 4
[¶ 7] 	In June 2026, respondent entered into an option agreement with
the mall’s owner to buy a portion of the property intended to be the Mavericks’
future home (Valley View Option).7
[¶ 8] 	The 	Adelsons 	did 	not 	tell 	Cuban 	about 	that 	arrangement.8
Instead, they formed a Delaware entity (ADI) to complete the deal.9 Because
Delaware law does not require respondent to disclose its members, Cuban and
petitioners do not know respondent’s membership, corporate structure, or the
scope of its involvement in the new arena and business opportunities related
to it.10
[¶ 9] 	So, petitioners seek Rule 202 discovery to explore anticipated
tortious interference with existing and prospective contracts claims related to
these transactions.11
II. 	D ISCUSSION
[¶ 10] 	Petitioners ask the court to remand the Rule 202 Petition to the
district court, arguing that a Rule 202 proceeding is not a removable “action”
7 Rule 202 Pet. at 6.
8 Rule 202 Pet. at 6.
9 Rule 202 Pet. at 6.
10 Rule 202 Pet. at 6-7.
11 Rule 202 Pet. at 7-8.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 5
under Government Code § 25A.006(d).12 That request requires the court to
analyze the interplay between Rule 202 and Government Code § 25A.006(d),
the court’s removal statute.
[¶ 11] 	To begin, Rule 202 permits a person to petition a court for an
order authorizing the taking of a deposition on oral examination or written
questions to either (i) perpetuate or obtain testimony for use in an anticipated
suit or (ii) investigate a potential claim or suit. TEX . R. CIV. P. 202.1.
[¶ 12] 	Next, “A party to an action filed in a district or county court at
law that is within the jurisdiction of the business court may remove the action
to the business court.” T EX . GOV’ T CODE . § 25A.006(d) (emphasis added).
[¶ 13] 	Thus, the statute presents two questions: 	First, is a Rule 202
proceeding an “action” under Government Code § 25A.006(d); and second, if
so, is that action within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally,
respondent suggested during the August 3rd conference this controversy was
included within a binding arbitration clause and so planned to file a motion to
compel to that effect.
12 Remand Mot. at 2.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 6
[¶ 14] 	Accordingly, assuming respondent files its motion to compel, the
following flow chart shows the proper analysis for this controversy:
A. 	A Rule 202 petition is an “action.”
1. Petitioners’ Authorities
[¶ 15] 	Petitioners cite Yadav v. Agrawal, 2025 Tex. Bus. 7, 708 S.W.3d
246 (3d Div.); Osmose Util. Servs., Inc. v. Navarro Cnty. Elec. Coop., 2025 Tex.
Bus. 3, 707 S.W.3d 117 (1st Div.); and Tema Oil & Gas Co., 2024 Tex. Bus. 3,
705 S.W.3d 226 (8th Div.) for the premise that an “action” for business court
jurisdiction purposes means a “lawsuit,” and a Rule 202 proceeding is not a
lawsuit.13 The argument rests on the premise that “action” means only a
lawsuit rather than a broader meaning where a party pursues a claimed right.
13 Radical Hoops, LTD. and Radical Mavericks II, LLC’s Emergency Motion to Remand
(Remand Mot.) at 1-3.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 7
[¶ 16] 	Petitioner’s argument is misplaced for several reasons. To begin,
none of petitioners’ cited cases involved the removal of a Rule 202 proceeding
and so did not address the precise question before the court.
[¶ 17] 	For example, Yadav and Tema Oil & Gas Co. concerned whether
the business court has jurisdiction over “actions” that commenced prior to
September 1, 2024. See Yadav, 2025 Tex. Bus. 7 ¶ 14; Tema Oil & Gas Co.,
Tex. Bus. 3 ¶ 8. 	Yadav and Tema Oil & Gas Co. thus defined “action” as
“lawsuit” because the court was simply determining if it had jurisdiction to
hear the underlying lawsuit. 	Yadav, 2025 Tex. Bus 7 ¶s 28-31; Tema Oil &
Gas Co., 2025 Tex Bus. 3 ¶s 15-18.
[¶ 18] 	Similarly, in Osmose, the court addressed whether Chapter 25A
permitted removing parts of a pending lawsuit i.e., causes of action, or if a
removal notice removed the entire “action.” See 2025 Tex. Bus. 3 ¶ 15.
[¶ 19] 	Accordingly, none of these prior decisions bear on whether pre-
suit discovery controversies are included within the definition of “action.” As
such, they do not inform the court’s decision in this case. See Mitchell v. Town
of Refugio, 265 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. App.—4th Dist. 1954, writ refused)
(“[T]he bindingness of a precedent or the ratio decidendi 	of a case cannot be
determined independently of the facts upon which the decision is based.”);

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 8
Ratio Decidendi, B LACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“The principle or
rule of law on which a court’s decision is founded.”); see also 21 C.J.S. Courts
§ 186 (April 2026 Update) (“The principle of precedent requires that, when
the facts are the same, the law should be applied the same.” (emphasis added)).
[¶ 20] 	Additionally, 	petitioners’ 	reliance 	on 	Montaya 	Frazier 	v.
Maxwell, 734 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App.—2d Dist. 2025, pet. denied) is
misplaced because that case concerned whether a Rule 202 proceeding is a
“legal action” as defined by the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). See
TEX . CIV. PRAC . & REM. CODE §§ 27.001-.011. 	However, Montoya turns on a
2019 TCPA amendment that limited the scope of actions subject to the TCPA
by expressly excluding from that statute’s scope “a procedural step taken (or
[] a motion made in an action) that does not amend or add a claim for legal,
equitable, or declaratory relief.” 	See id. at 21 (quotation omitted). 	So, by
relying on the 2019 TCPA amendments to exclude a Rule 202 proceeding from
the meaning of “legal action” for TCPA purposes, Montoya implicitly holds
that a Rule 202 proceeding would otherwise be a legal action.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 9
2. 	The Texas Supreme Court
[¶ 21] 	The 	supreme 	court 	in 	Jaster 	v. 	Comet 	II 	Const., 	Inc.,
distinguished between the broader term “action” and its component “suit”
thusly:
The common meaning of the term “action” refers to an entire
lawsuit or cause or proceeding, not to discrete “claims” or
“causes of action” asserted within a suit, cause, or proceeding.
B LACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY at 28 (defining “action” as “[a] civil
or 	criminal 	judicial 	proceeding”). 	“The 	term 	ʻaction’ 	is
generally synonymous with ʻsuit,’ which is a demand of one’s
rights in court.” Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex.
1995); see also In re Marriage of Combs, 958 S.W.2d 848, 850
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no pet.) (holding that an “action”
is “a demand for one’s legal right and has been held synonymous
with ʻsuit’ ”). 	A suit, in turn, is “any proceeding in a court of
justice by which an individual pursues that remedy in a court of
justice which the law affords him.” 	H.H. Watson Co. v. Cobb
Grain Co., 292 S.W. 174, 176 (Tex. 1927) (citing Weston v. City
Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. 449, 464, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L.Ed. 481
(1829)). Although the word “suit” can be “more general in its
comprehension than the word ʻaction,’” both terms refer to a
judicial proceeding in which parties assert claims for relief. Id.
Thus, under the common definition, “[a]n action is a judicial
proceeding, either in law or in equity, to obtain certain relief at
the hands of the court.” Elmo v. James, 282 S.W. 835, 839 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1926, writ dism’d w.o.j.). 	Historically,
“action” referred to a judicial proceeding in a court of law, while
“suit” referred to a proceeding in a court of equity. 	B LACK ’S
LAW DICTIONARY at 29.
438 S.W.3d 556, 563-64 (Tex. 2014).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 10
[¶ 22] 	It follows that a Rule 202 proceeding is an “action” because
petitioners are seeking to enforce their claimed right to conduct pre-suit
discovery. See TEX . R. CIV. P. 202.1; see also Action, B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(12 ed. 2024) (“A civil or criminal proceeding”); Id. (quoting 1 Morris M.
Estee, Estee’s Pleadings, Practice, and Forms § 3, at 1 (Carter P. Pomeroy ed.,
3d ed. 1885)) (“An action has been defined to be an ordinary proceeding in a
court of 	justice, 	by 	which one 	party 	prosecutes 	another 	party for 	the
enforcement or protection of a right[.]”); 	Action, 	https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/action (last visited Aug. 3, 2026) (“The initiating of
a proceeding in a court of justice by which one demands or enforces one’s
right.”). 	Thus, an action is a proceeding that may include, but is not limited
to, a lawsuit.
B. 	The Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[¶ 23] 	Because subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s
power to decide a case, the court cannot render judgment on matters over
which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d 71,
73 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). 	Also, a party is unable to obtain by Rule 202
what it would be denied in the anticipated action. Id.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 11
[¶ 24] 	Since a Rule 202 petition is an “action” for Government Code
§ 25A.006(d)’s purposes, the court must decide whether this action is “within
the jurisdiction of the business court.” That issue has two parts (i) statutory
subject matter jurisdiction and (ii) constitutional subject matter jurisdiction.
1. This 	petition 	concerns 	an 	anticipated 	lawsuit 	within 	the 	court’s
statutory subject matter jurisdiction.
[¶ 25] 	Here, 	the subject matter jurisdiction question begins with
whether the anticipated action/lawsuit would be in this court’s statutory
subject matter jurisdiction. See In re DePinho, 505 S.W.3d 621, 623-25 (Tex.
2016) (Rule 202 discovery improper where court would lack subject matter
jurisdiction over the anticipated action).
[¶ 26] 	Respondent’s 	Notice 	of 	Removal 	pleads 	two 	qualified
transactions give rise to petitioners’ claims (i) the multi-billion-dollar sale of
the majority ownership of the Dallas Mavericks and (ii) the Valley View
Option valued at over $50 million and that the amounts in controversy exceed
$5 million.14 Accordingly, this Rule 202 proceeding is alleged to be “an action
arising out of a qualified transaction” with an ultimate amount in controversy
14 See Respondent’s Notice of Removal at 2-4, 6.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 12
meeting the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 	See TEX GOV’ T CODE §§
25A.001(14), .004(d)(1).
[¶ 27] 	Finally, 	related 	to 	statutory 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	is
whether the business court has the authority to decide a Rule 202 petition.
The legislature established that authority by providing that the business court
may “grant any relief that may be granted by a district court.” 	T EX . GOV’ T
CODE § 25A.004(a)(2). 	Thus, because a district court may grant the relief
requested by the Rule 202 petition, so can the business court if it otherwise
has subject matter jurisdiction.
2. The Court’s Constitutional Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Ripeness
[¶ 28] 	Whether 	this 	controversy 	meets 	the 	court’s 	constitutional
jurisdiction is not necessary for the court to decide the emergency motion to
remand, so the court will address that issue during the Rule 202 petition
hearing.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER D ENYING EMERGENCY M OTION TO REMAND , Page 13
III. 	C ONCLUSION
[¶ 29] 	Accordingly, the court denies petitioners’ emergency motion to
remand.
It is so ORDERED.
BILL WHITEHILL
Judge of the Texas Business Court,
First Division
SIGNED: August 5, 2026

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Case Contacts
Name
Lynette Peter
Joshua Upthegrove
Michelle Duong
James Bookhout
Megan McKennon
William Corbin
John Zavitsanos
Jason McManis
Warren McCarty
Justin Kenney
Emily Adler
Collin Kennedy
Matthew Micik
Anders Huizenga
Business Court 1B
BarNumber Email
lpeter@azalaw.com
joshua.upthegrove@katten.com
mduong@azalaw.com
james.bookhout@katten.com
megan.mckennon@katten.com
reid.corbin@katten.com
jzavitsanos@azalaw.com
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jkenney@azalaw.com
eadler@azalaw.com
cdk@hanshawkennedy.com
mmicik@azalaw.com
ahuizenga@azalaw.com
BCDivision1B@txcourts.gov
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