OWL Assetco I v. EOG Resources

FILED IN
BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS
BEVERLY CRUMLEY, CLERK
ENTERED
12/5/2025
2025 Tex. Bus. 47

THE BUSINESS COURT OF TEXAS
ELEVENTH DIVISION

OWL ASSETCO I, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Cause No. 25-BC11A-0052
§
EOG RESOURCES, INC., §
§
Defendant. §

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OPINION AND ORDER
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Syllabus *
The Court addresses whether the Texas Legislature’s amount-in-controversy threshold
reduction gives the Texas Business Court jurisdiction to hear a previously remanded action
and whether the subsequent removal of the action was proper and timely. The Court examines
the statutory construction of House Bill 40 and determines removal was both proper and
timely under Texas Government Code 25.006(f).

*
The syllabus was created by court staff and is provided for the convenience of the reader. It is not
part of the Court’s opinion, does not constitute the Court’s official description or statement, and should not
be relied upon as legal authority.
OPINION

¶1 Before the Court is Plaintiff OWL AssetCo1, LLC (“OWL”)’s Motion to

Remand (“Second Remand Motion”), filed October 3, 2025, challenging the Court’s

authority to hear this case. Defendant EOG Resources, Inc. (“EOG”) filed its Response in

Opposition to OWL AssetCo 1, LLC’s Motion to Remand (“EOG’s Resp. to Second Remand

Motion”) on October 24, 2025. OWL filed its Reply in Support of Motion to Remand on

November 7, 2025. The Court held a hearing on the Second Remand Motion on November

19, 2025. As stated at the hearing and further discussed below, the Court concludes that

removal is proper under Subsection 25A.006(f) of the Texas Government Code, and that it

has jurisdiction to hear this case under the newly reduced jurisdictional threshold.

Accordingly, OWL’s Second Remand Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND 1

A. The Parties

¶2 OWL is a service company that “provides water-related services to oil and

gas producers in New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Wyoming, and Ohio.” OWL Original

Petition (“Orig. Pet.”) at 2. EOG is “an exploration and production company that produces

oil and gas in the Permian and Delaware Basins in New Mexico.” EOG’s Resp. to Present

Remand at 2. In December 2019, EOG and OWL entered into a contract concerning the

transportation and disposal of produced water in and around Eddy County, New Mexico.

Id.; see Orig. Pet. at 14-15. On April 9, 2025, OWL filed a breach of contract action against

1
For a more detailed account of the parties’ relationship, the dispute, and the procedural history of
this case, see this Court’s prior opinion granting OWL’s first motion to remand. OWL AssetCo 1, LLC v. EOG
Res., Inc., 2025 Tex. Bus. 30, ¶¶ 1-9, 2025 WL 2306527, at *1 (Tex. Bus. Ct. [8th Div.] Aug. 11, 2025).

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 2
EOG in the 152nd District Court of Harris County, Texas. OWL claims, inter alia, EOG did

not ensure the produced water met the contract’s specifications and it seeks indemnification

for associated property damages. See Orig. Pet. at 15-17.

B. First Removal and First Remand

¶3 EOG filed its initial Notice of Removal to Business Court (“First Removal

Notice”) on May 12, 2025, claiming the Business Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter

under Section 25A.004(d)(1) and (e) of the Texas Government Code. See First Removal

Notice at 1-3. OWL filed its Motion to Remand (“First Remand Motion”) on June 9, 2025,

arguing OWL could not satisfy the Court’s $10 million amount-in-controversy threshold.

See First Remand Motion at 3, 6-11. OWL argued, specifically and in pertinent part, that

the Court lacked jurisdiction because (1) OWL sought oil-spill remediation damages of

approximately $8.22 million, and (2) the amount in controversy is determined solely by its

claims against EOG. Id. Ultimately, the Court agreed with OWL and granted its First

Remand Motion on July 25, 2025. See OWL AssetCo 1, LLC, 2025 Tex. Bus. 30, ¶¶ 19-

20, 2025 WL 2306527, at *4-5.

C. House Bill 40

¶4 After EOG filed its First Removal Notice, the Texas Legislature enacted

House Bill 40 (“H.B. 40”). The bill lowered the amount in controversy from $10 million

to $5 million for actions arising out of qualified transactions under Government Code

§25.004(d)(1). See Act of June 1, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 912, §45, sec. 25A.004(d)(1),

2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 912 (to be codified as an amendment to Tex. Gov’t Code

25A.004(d)(1)). The change in law took effect on September 1, 2025, and, except for

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 3
circumstances not existing here, applies to all cases filed on or after September 1, 2024. Id.

§§ 56, 72-73.

D. Second Removal and Second Remand

¶5 Two days after H.B. 40’s effective date, on September 3, 2025, EOG filed its

Second Removal Notice. In its second notice, EOG claims the Business Court now has

jurisdiction over the action pursuant to Sections 25A.001(14)(A) and 25A.004(d)(1) of the

Government Code and the action meets H.B. 40’s newly enacted amount-in-controversy

threshold. See Second Removal Notice at 3, 5. On October 3, 2025, OWL filed the currently

pending Second Remand Motion. OWL asserts two reasons for prevailing:

(1) EOG’s removal was improper because a change in the law is not
the discovery of “facts establishing the Business Court’s
jurisdiction,” and

(2) EOG did not discover any new case-related facts within 30 days of
H.B 40’s effective date because EOG has long-known the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.

See Second Remand Notice at 6-8, 9.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶6 Subject-matter jurisdiction “[i]nvolves a court’s power to hear a case.” Tellez

v. City of Socorro, 226 S.W. 3d 413 (Tex. 2007). It exists “when the nature of the case falls

within the general category of cases the court is empowered, under applicable statutory and

constitutional provisions, to adjudicate.” Diocese of Galveston-Hous. v. Stone, 892 S.W.2d

169, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (citing City of El Paso v. Madero

Development, 803 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied)). When

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 4
interpreting a statute, courts generally “ʻrely on the plain meaning of the statute’s words’

to discern legislative intent.” Aleman v. Tex. Med. Bd., 573 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex.

2019) (citing Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d

318, 325 (Tex. 2017)). It is a bedrock principle that if a case can be “decided according to

the statute itself, it must be decided by the statute itself.” Bank Direct Cap. Fin. LLC v.

Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W. 3d 76, 78 (Tex. 2017). The truest manifestation of what

lawmakers intended is what they enacted because the Legislature “expresses its intent by

the words it enacts and declares to be the law.” Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v.

Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006); Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414

(Tex. 2011).

B. Removal and Remand

¶7 Section 25A.006 of the Government Code establishes the procedure and

grounds for removal to the Business Court. Specifically, Section 25A.006(d) permits a

party to an action filed in a district court or county court at law to remove the action to the

Business Court if the action is within the Court’s jurisdiction. TEX. GOV’T CODE. §

25A.006(d). If removal is opposed, a party must file its removal notice within 30 days after

the party discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, facts establishing the Business

Court’s jurisdiction. Id. § 25A.006(f)(1). After removal, if the Business Court decides it

does not have jurisdiction of the action, the statute commands the Court to remand the

action to its originating court. Id. 25A.006(d).

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 5
¶8 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 355 is the statute’s counterpart and addresses

both removal and remand. In pertinent part, Rule 355 provides a contested notice of

removal must be filed “within 30 days after the date the party requesting removal of the

action discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, facts establishing the business

court’s authority to hear the action.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 355(c)(2)(A). Paralleling the

Government Code, Rule 355 requires the Court to remand an action if it determines, on

motion or its own initiative, that removal was improper. TEX. R. CIV. P. 355 (f)(2). It also

permits a party to move for remand based on an improper removal. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

¶9 EOG is sound in its plain-meaning interpretation of H.B. 40’s jurisdictional

establishment and it properly removed the action to this Court. As stated above, removal

is proper when done not later than 30 days after a party discovered or reasonably should

have discovered, facts establishing the Business Court’s jurisdiction over the action. See

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25A.006(f). In construing a statute, a court’s “primary objective” is

to determine legislative intent which, when possible, is discerned from the plain meaning

of the words chosen by the legislature. In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex.

2007). Courts interpret statutes by following the rules of grammar and common usage.

Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE §

311.011(a)); see also In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. 2007). 2

In determining a statute’s plain meaning, courts often consider the term’s dictionary

2
Grammar rules are crucial to the proper construction of statutory language. Malouf v. State ex rels.
Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 725 (Tex. 2024) (citing Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d
126, 132 (Tex. 2018)).

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 6
definition and usage in other statutes, court decisions, and other authorities. See Tex. State

Bd. of Exam’r of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex.

2017) (citing Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex. 2011)); see also Fort Worth Transp.

Auth v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018). If the statutory language is

ambiguous or leads to absurd results, a court can consider extratextual factors such as the

object sought to be attained, the legislative history, and the consequences of a particular

construction. See Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 311.023.

¶ 10 In the instant matter, the Court adheres to the plain meaning of Section

25.006(f)(1)(B) and finds the legislative intent of H.B. 40 unambiguous. At issue here are

the parties’ varied interpretation of the words “discover” and “facts” in Section

25.006(f)(1)(B). While OWL argues the “statutory requirement that ʻfacts’ must be

ʻdiscovered’ [] confirms that changes in law do not trigger a right to remove,” the Court

disagrees. Second Remand Motion at 7 (emphasis omitted). The Court first considers the

context of the “facts” requirement.

A. Owl’s focus on “facts” in the abstract overlooks “establishing the business
court’s jurisdiction over an action.”

¶ 11 H.B. 40’s reduction of the amount-in-controversy threshold from $10 million

to $5 million is a “fact” sufficient to establish this Court’s jurisdiction. In promulgating

the removal timelines in Section 25A.006(f), the Texas Legislature used a present-

participial phrase that restricts “facts” to those capable of performing the described act—

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 7
“establishing the business court’s jurisdiction over an action.” See D.A. v. Tex. Health

Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton, 514 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017), rev’d

on other grounds, 569 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2018) (“Participial phrases are those which

combine the characteristics of a verb with those of an adjective by taking the base form of

a verb, such as ʻarise,’ and adding -ing to the end. These phrases function exactly like

adjectives—describing, or limiting, a noun or pronoun and often answering which, what

kind, or how many.”). The participle “establishing” is the present participle of the

transitive verb “establish,” meaning “to bring into existence.” 3 In Section

25A.006(f)(1)(B), it functions adjectivally; in effect, the statute requires “facts that

establish the business court’s jurisdiction over an action.” See Ex parte Flores, 483 S.W.3d

632, 644 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (entire present participial

phrase “having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership” served

to limit the noun “persons” like an adjective). “Establishing” does not take “jurisdiction”

or “an action” in the abstract; it takes “the business court’s jurisdiction over an action”

unitarily, as its restrictive relative clause. See A.S. Horner, Inc. v. Navarrette, 656 S.W.3d

717, 722–23 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (phrase “who constructs or repairs . . . for

the Texas Department of Transportation” serving to limit “contractor”). Thus, if any

3
In a statutory context, transitive verbs do not act without a direct object. See O’Brien v. State, 544
S.W.3d 376, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“commit(s)” in TEX. PEN. CODE § 71.02 is a transitive verb that
requires a direct object to function); see also Halferty v. Flextronics Am., LLC, 545 S.W.3d 708, 713-14 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2018, pet. denied) (holding that the verb “provide” in TEX. LAB. CODE §
406.123 means “supply or make available” and thus presupposes a direct object—something to be supplied
or made available). Thus, “establish” likewise requires a direct object. See Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d
305, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring) (essential statutory elements include the subject
(defendant); the main verb (“causes”); and for transitive verbs, their direct objects (“serious bodily injury”)).
The same rule applies to present-participial and gerund forms of transitive verbs. See Dunham v. State, 554
S.W.3d 222, 232-33 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019), aff’d, 666 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 8
portion of that restricting unit drops out—if the Court lacks jurisdiction or there is no

action—then the 30-day removal period cannot begin running. 4

¶ 12 The Business Court outlined this principle when it addressed a similar

interpretation issue in Safelease Ins. Services LLC v. Storable, Inc., 2025 Tex. Bus. 6, 707

S.W.3d 130 (3rd Div. 2025). There, the Court held that the removal period is not triggered

solely by the removing party’s knowledge of facts that may satisfy the Business Court’s

jurisdictional threshold. Id. at ¶ 8-10, 132-33. Rather, the 30-day removal deadline in

Section 25A.006 “pivot[s] on the discovery of facts ʻestablishing the business court’s

jurisdiction to hear the action.’” Id. And because there was no “action” for the court to

exercise jurisdiction over, the clock never started. Id. at ¶ 10-11, 133-34. In this case, Owl

argues that swapping one missing piece for another—jurisdiction out, action in—should

still start the clock. It does not.

¶ 13 The Court follows SafeLease’s logic and will not impose an undue burden on

the parties that they must learn novel information prior to filing a notice of removal to the

Business Court. In this matter, no set of facts could establish this Court’s jurisdiction over

this action before the implementation of H.B. 40’s lower amount-in-controversy threshold.

4
See Malouf, 694 S.W.3d at 722-23 (Tex. 2024) (reading a word out of a restrictive clause renders
it impermissibly superfluous).

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 9
B. Legislative intent is evident by H.B. 40’s retroactive application to all cases filed
in the Business Court

¶ 14 The Court examines “discovery” through the lens of legislative intent and

finds the legislature’s intent of H.B. 40 is evident by its retroactive application to all cases

filed in the Business Court since the Business Court’s inception. Courts cannot establish

jurisdiction over matters absent statutory or constitutional grant. See In re Doe (Trooper),

444 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2014) (state district court cannot order discovery for copyright

claim, as such matters fall exclusively within federal jurisdiction). EOG could not discover

facts establishing this Court’s jurisdiction over the action until H.B. 40 lowered the

amount-in-controversy threshold and brought the action back into the Court’s purview.

Black Mountain SWD, LP v. NGL Water Sols. Permian, LLC, 2025 Tex. Bus. 24, ¶¶18-20,

30-31, 718 S.W.3d 281, 288-89, 291–92 (8th Div. 2025) (allegations falling below the

Business Court’s required amount in controversy preclude its jurisdiction).

¶ 15 EOG sufficiently “discovered” this information upon H.B. 40’s enactment

and it promptly filed its Second Removal Notice two days after H.B. 40’s effective date.

Said differently, EOG timely removed this action once the lowered amount in controversy

established the Court’s authority to hear it. To conclude otherwise would contradict the

Legislature’s intent and effectively dissuade parties from removing cases with less than $10

million in controversy to the Business Court.

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 10
IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 16 For these reasons, the Court finds that EOG’s removal was both proper and

timely. OWL’s Second Remand Motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
__________________________
JERRY D. BULLARD
Judge of the Texas Business Court,
Sitting by Assignment
SIGNED: December 5, 2025.

OPINION AND ORDER, PAGE 11