PETTIT, JUSTIN v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0186-24

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

JUSTIN HEATH PETTIT, Appellee

ON APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
SMITH COUNTY

NEWELL, J., delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court.

OPINION

Does the passenger of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation have

standing to challenge the search of the vehicle following an allegedly

unreasonably prolonged detention? In this case, yes. Here, the vehicle, the

driver, and Appellee, the passenger, were detained for approximately one
Pettit -- 2

hour following a traffic stop to allow for law enforcement to have a K-9 unit

conduct an open-air sniff. After the K-9 gave a positive alert, the vehicle was

searched. Before trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence seized

from the vehicle and attributed to him. Appellee had a reasonable expectation

of privacy in not being subject to an unreasonably prolonged detention

following the traffic stop. We hold that Appellee had standing to challenge his

detention and the subsequent search of the vehicle because it was the fruit of

the allegedly unreasonably prolonged detention. Thus, we reverse the

judgment of the court of appeals and remand for the court of appeals to

consider the merits of the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to

suppress including whether the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged.

Background

The underlying facts are largely uncontested. Trooper Ryan Wilkinson,

a Department of Public Safety patrol officer in Smith County, initiated a traffic

stop of a vehicle on a rural county road for speeding, 1 having an expired

temporary tag, and an inoperative brake light. Trooper Wilkinson approached

the passenger side of the vehicle and found Appellee seated in the front

passenger seat. Trooper Wilkinson asked both the driver and Appellee for

identification and asked the driver to exit the vehicle. The driver, later

1
The vehicle was not speeding when it approached Trooper Wilkinson, but his rear radar
clocked the vehicle as accelerating to 51 in a 45-mph zone.
Pettit -- 3

identified as Bridgett Tobler, explained almost immediately that she did not

have a driver’s license.

Approximately two minutes into the stop, Trooper Wilkinson advised

Tobler he would give her a warning for the expired tag, speeding, and

inoperative brake light but that he had to write her a citation for driving

without a valid driver’s license. Then, Trooper Wilkinson had Appellee exit the

vehicle. Trooper Wilkinson noted Appellee was shaky, and Appellee advised

that he was on probation for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Trooper

Wilkinson patted Appellee down. 2 Between six and seven minutes into the

stop, Trooper Wilkinson confirmed that both Tobler and Appellee were clear

for state-wide and local warrants. Trooper Wilkinson asked Tobler for consent

to search the vehicle, which she refused.

Trooper Wilkinson returned to his vehicle for several minutes but did not

begin writing the citation or warnings. Speaking to his partner, Trooper

Wilkinson admitted that he “didn’t know if they had enough for a dog” but

noted both Appellee and Tobler had drug history, 3 they did not know each

other, Appellee was not from the area, and Appellee was nervous. Trooper

Wilkinson was looking for available K-9 units in the area, but none were

available close by. Nearly eight minutes after the refusal, Trooper Wilkinson

2
Appellee advised Trooper Wilkinson that he had tools on his person but refused consent to
search or remove items from his pockets.

3
Trooper Wilkinson noted that Appellee had lied when he asked him about his criminal history
after Appellee acknowledged he was on probation.
Pettit -- 4

located an available K-9 unit. Approximately fifty-six minutes after the traffic

stop was initiated, the K-9 unit arrived. The K-9 conducted an open-air

search, he alerted, and the officers subsequently searched the vehicle. Inside

of the vehicle, Trooper Wilkinson found prescription medication, syringes, and

a sawed-off shotgun. Appellee was charged with possession of a prohibited

weapon. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized

from the search of the vehicle.

The trial court held a hearing on Appellee’s motion. After hearing

testimony from Trooper Wilkinson and argument from both parties, the trial

court took the matter under advisement. The trial court ultimately granted

Appellee’s motion to suppress and entered written findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The trial court concluded that Trooper Wilkinson lacked

reasonable suspicion to detain Appellee. The trial court concluded that the

length of detention exceeded constitutional boundaries, pursuant to the

Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez v. United States, 4 because the traffic

stop was prolonged beyond its original purpose to bring a drug-sniffing dog to

the scene. Thus, the trial court held the evidence obtained as a result of the

seizure and prolonged detention must be suppressed. The State appealed.

Appeal

On appeal, the State argued that the trial court erred in suppressing the

evidence. The State argued at the outset that Appellee, as a passenger, failed

4
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
Pettit -- 5

to establish standing to contest the search of a vehicle he did not own.

Appellee argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being

detained beyond the time necessary for law enforcement to complete their

investigation for the traffic stop and any further detention lacked reasonable

suspicion.

Considering whether Appellee had standing to assert a violation of his

Fourth Amendment rights, the court of appeals agreed with the State. 5 The

court of appeals looked to this Court’s determination in Lewis v. State, to

conclude that the relevant inquiry as to standing was “whether the search of

the vehicle ‘was come at by exploitation of [Appellee’s] continued detention

and removal from the vehicle.” 6 The court of appeals concluded Appellee

lacked standing to challenge the search or the admission of evidence obtained

as a result of the search because Trooper Wilkinson’s ability to search would

not have been affected by Appellee’s inability to leave. 7 The court of appeals

thus reversed the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. 8

Discretionary Review

Appellee petitioned this Court for discretionary review. We granted

Appellee’s petition on the following ground:

5
State v. Pettit, No. 12-23-00185-CR, 2024 WL 482254, at * 3 (Tex. App. – Tyler, Feb. 7,
2024, pet. granted) (not designated for publication).

6
Id. (citing Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).

7
Id. (“Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Appellee’s
motion to suppress.”).

8
Id.
Pettit -- 6

[Appellee], as a passenger in the vehicle, had standing to
contest his unconstitutional seizure. The twelfth court of
appeals did not follow this Court’s holding in Kothe v. State,
152 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), fundamentally
misapplied the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, and
erred by holding that [Appellee] lacked standing.

Appellee maintains that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in

not being detained beyond the time necessary for the traffic stop. He argues

the prolonged detention was without articulable suspicion of a crime and that

the resulting search of the vehicle was made by exploiting the illegality of the

prolonged detention. He also argues that the court of appeals failed to follow

this Court’s holding in Kothe that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy

in not being detained beyond the time necessary for the traffic stop

investigation. 9 Appellee argues that the trial court properly suppressed the

evidence because he was detained without reasonable suspicion long after the

reason for the traffic stop had ended and the search was a fruit of the

poisonous tree of that prolonged detention.

The State argues that the search was not the result of Appellee’s

continued detention and removal from the vehicle and, therefore, Appellee

has no standing. According to the State, because Appellee did not have an

expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents, the court of appeals

correctly followed Lewis to find Appellee lacked standing. Further, the State

distinguishes Kothe by arguing that in that case standing was based on the

9
Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 60.
Pettit -- 7

defendant’s personal right to privacy in the vehicle he was driving; and the

fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extended standing to the search of the

vehicle’s passenger.

In this case, the court of appeals held that Appellee lacked standing to

challenge the search at issue. 10 As we will explain in further detail below, we

hold that Appellee had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. The

lower court did not consider the question of reasonable suspicion, so we

remand to the court of appeals to address whether there was reasonable

suspicion for the prolonged detention.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a

bifurcated standard of review that gives almost total deference to the trial

court’s determination of historical facts that the record supports and considers

de novo the application of the law to the facts. 11 We defer to the trial court’s

findings unless they are unsupported by the record and view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. 12 The trial court’s ruling on

a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. 13

10
Pettit, 2024 WL 482254, at * 3.

11
State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

12
State v. Johnson, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

13
Cortez, 548 S.W.3d at 203.
Pettit -- 8

Standing

The rights, protected by the United States and Texas Constitutions, 14 to

be free from unreasonable search and seizures, are personal. 15 A person

seeking to challenge the legality of a search or seizure through a motion to

suppress evidence must first establish standing to complain about the search

or seizure by showing that there was a violation of his rather than another

person’s rights. 16 In other words, he must be the “victim” of the unreasonable

search or seizure. 17 A person has standing to challenge a search or seizure if

(1) he has a subjective expectation of privacy in the place or object searched,

and (2) society recognizes that expectation as reasonable or legitimate. 18 A

defendant has no standing to complain about an invasion of someone else’s

personal rights. 19 Instead, he must show “a legitimate expectation of privacy

14
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV (“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violation”); Tex.
Const. Art. 1, Sec. 9 (“[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions, from all unreasonable seizures and searches”).

15
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969); Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596,
606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

16
Matthews, 431 S.W.3d at 606.

17
Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 59 (“Proof of ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy’ is at the forefront
of all Fourth Amendment claims. Any defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment must first show that he personally had a reasonable
expectation of privacy that the government invaded. He must prove he was a ‘victim’ of the
unlawful search or seizure.”).

18
State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

19
Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 59.
Pettit -- 9

in the place invaded.” 20 “Absent a legitimate expectation of privacy, a

defendant lacks standing to raise [challenge the constitutionality of a search]

and we may not consider the substance of his complaint.” 21 Standing is a

legal issue that we review de novo. 22

Analysis

“The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop entails

a seizure of the driver ‘even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the

resulting detention is quite brief.’” 23 In Brendlin v. California, the United

States Supreme Court held that a passenger is likewise seized during a traffic

stop reasoning that “a traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger

has chosen just as much as it halts the driver.” 24 The Supreme Court

recognized that a traffic stop “normally amounts to intrusion on ‘privacy and

personal security’ [and] does not normally . . . distinguish between passenger

and driver.” 25 Rather, a traffic stop seizes everyone in the vehicle not just the

driver. 26 The Court recognized, as anyone who has ever been involved in a

20
King v. State, 670 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Villarreal v. State, 935
S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

21
Id. (citing Kothe, 152 S.W.2d at 59).

22
Id.

23
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007).

24
Id. at 257.

25
Id.

26
Id.
Pettit -- 10

traffic stop would, that a passenger will reasonably expect that any “attempt

to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from

the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.” 27 The

State concedes Appellee has standing to challenge the stop of the vehicle but

contends that he did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of

the search. But if a passenger can challenge a traffic stop, it follows that he

can challenge his continued detention thereafter. 28

We recognized in Kothe v. State that both drivers and passengers have

a reasonable expectation of privacy in not being detained pursuant to a traffic

stop for longer than is necessary for the officer to complete his investigation. 29

Kothe, the driver, was the subject of a traffic stop following a call about a

possibly intoxicated driver. 30 After determining that he was not intoxicated

and had no warrants, the investigating officer received notice that he may be

in possession of a stolen item. After searching Kothe’s vehicle with consent,

and finding drug paraphernalia, the officer questioned the vehicle’s passenger

27
Id. at 257.

28
See id. at 259 (citing 6 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(e), pp. 194, 195, and n. 277
(4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2007).

29
Kothe, 152 S.W.3d. at 61 (recognizing both the driver and the passenger had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the right to be free from an illegal detention). This Court also
recognized Professor LaFave’s explanation that “[i]f either the stopping of the car of the
passenger’s removal from it are unreasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense, then surely the
passenger has standing to object to those constitutional violations and to have suppressed
any evidence found in the car which is their fruit.” Id. (citing 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizures § 11.3(3), at 173-74 (3d ed. 1996)).

30
Id. at 58.
Pettit -- 11

who said she had two bags of heroin on her person, which Kothe asked her to

hold. He was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance

and drug paraphernalia.

Kothe filed a motion to suppress the heroin seized arguing the officer

unreasonably prolonged his detention and that the search of the passenger

was made by exploiting that initial illegality. 31 In other words, he argued that

the search of the passenger was the fruit of the poisonous tree of the allegedly

unduly prolonged stop. 32 We held that if the officer’s conduct in prolonging

the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the driver would

have standing to complain about the subsequent search of the passenger

because that search constituted an exploitation of the illegal detention. 33

We agree with Appellee that Kothe controls. Here, the search of the

vehicle was the fruit of the poisonous tree of the unreasonably prolonged

detention. Both the driver and passenger had a reasonable expectation in

being free from the intrusion of an unreasonably prolonged detention following

the traffic stop. Trooper Wilkinson prolonged his detention of Appellee and

Tobler to have a K-9 unit conduct an open-air sniff and, upon the dog’s alert,

conducted a search of the vehicle. Absent reasonable suspicion, an officer

31
Id. at 60.

32
Id.

33
Id. at 57 (“We hold that, because [the driver] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
not being subjected to an unduly prolonged detention, he has standing to challenge the
seizure of evidence obtained by exploiting that detention.”).
Pettit -- 12

may not extend a traffic stop in order to conduct a K-9 dog sniff. 34 It follows

that if Appellee had standing to contest the legality of the stop based on the

intrusion into his reasonable expectation of privacy during a traffic stop, he

has standing to challenge his prolonged detention following that stop.

The question then becomes whether standing extends to the search of

the vehicle in this case, which turns on whether the search of the vehicle was

the result of the exploitation of Appellee’s continued detention. The answer

to that question is yes. As we recognized in Kothe, if a search constituted an

exploitation of an illegal detention that search would be a “fruit of the

poisonous tree.” 35 We recognized the same principle in Lewis, a much earlier

case, stating “if the search resulted from an infringement (such as an illegal

detention) of the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights,” a passenger can

challenge the search of a vehicle. 36 But the court of appeals relied on Lewis

to conclude that Appellee lacked standing.

In Lewis, a vehicle was stopped for the failure to have a license plate

light. The investigating officer issued the driver a citation and determined that

neither the driver nor either of the two passengers had outstanding warrants.

But the officer ordered the occupants out of the car, frisked the driver and

front passenger, and searched the vehicle. The search revealed marijuana

34
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356-57.

35
Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 62.

36
Lewis, 664 S.W.2d at 348 (emphasis in the original).
Pettit -- 13

under the front passenger seat and what appeared to be marijuana seeds on

the backseat. Lewis, the backseat passenger, was charged with possession

of marijuana. In a motion to suppress the evidence, Lewis challenged the

search arguing that it was the result of an illegal detention. The trial court

declined to suppress the evidence.

On appeal, this Court considered the relevant question to be, “whether

the search of the vehicle was come at by the exploitation of [Lewis’s]

continued detention and removal from the vehicle.” 37 The Court held that

Lewis’s removal from the vehicle was “not even a ‘but-for’ cause of the

subsequent search” because “[a] fair reading of the record indicate[d] that

[the officer] could have performed his search without removing the car’s

occupants, but that he did remove them for the sake of his convenience and

safety.” 38 We explained that Lewis’s “presence was irrelevant to the officer’s

decision to search. Put another way, [the officer] could have let [Lewis] leave

without hampering his ability to search the car. Thus, in no way was her

detention necessary to perform the search.” 39 We held that the exploitation

of the passenger’s continued detention did not give rise to the search. 40

37
Id. at 348.

38
Id. at 348-49.

39
Id. at 349.

40
Id.
Pettit -- 14

Citing Lewis, the court of appeals reasoned Appellee lacked standing

because “had he been allowed to leave, the DPS Troopers’ ability to search

the vehicle would not have been affected.” 41 But the insertion of this

theoretical consideration into the question of standing is unsupported and

unnecessary to the resolution of the case. First, it is at odds with the Supreme

Court’s recognition in Brendlin that a traffic stop “necessarily curtails the travel

a passenger has chosen just as much as it halts the driver” and “no passenger

would feel free to leave in the first place.” 42 If a passenger has standing to

challenge a traffic stop because the stop “seizes everyone in the vehicle, not

just the driver,” it follows that the passenger has standing to challenge the

prolonged nature of the stop because, the passenger is in fact detained and

not free to leave. 43 As both Lewis and Kothe recognized, if a search

constituted an exploitation of an illegal detention, standing extends to the

search. 44 It would be inappropriate to deny relief on the basis that a

passenger lacks standing simply because the driver’s rights may have

simultaneously been injured. 45 To the extent that Lewis imposed a new

41
Pettit, 2024 WL 482254, at *3.

42
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257 (holding that a passenger was seized in a traffic stop and thus
entitled to challenge the stop).

43
Id. at 255-57.

44
Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 62 (a “search is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ if it constituted an
exploitation of the illegal detention”); Lewis, 664 S.W.2d at 348 (“the relevant question
becomes whether the search of the [the driver’s] vehicle was come at by exploitation of [the
passenger’s] continued detention”).

45
Lewis, 664 S.W.2d at 355 (Miller, J., dissenting).
Pettit -- 15

theoretical test, we now expressly disavow that language. 46 If a passenger is

detained during a traffic stop that he alleges was unreasonably prolonged, he

has standing to challenge the prolonged nature of that detention as well as

any fruits that flowed from that detention.

Here, the search occurred precisely because the Trooper detained

Appellee and the driver for nearly an hour to await a K-9 unit. Both Appellee

and the driver were subject to the traffic stop and its attendant detention,

which Appellee alleges was unreasonably prolonged in order to call for a K-9

unit. The search occurred because the Trooper detained Appellee to call for

the K-9 unit, which gave an alert authorizing the search. The search was the

fruit of the detention. Also, the record reveals that Appellee was anything but

irrelevant to the Trooper’s decision to prolong the detention. Trooper

Wilkinson testified at the suppression hearing that his decision to prolong the

traffic stop was based on Appellee’s nervousness; that Appellee and the driver

admitted to drug use; that Appellee and the driver offered unsolicited

information; and that Appellee lied about his criminal history. 47 Unlike the

defendant in Lewis, Appellee’s presence was not irrelevant to the detention or

the search that resulted from that detention. Because the facts gleaned during

46
See Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“If a prior decision was
poorly reasoned or unworkable, we do not achieve the goals sought through reliance upon
stare decisis by continuing to follow that precent.”).

47
The determination of reasonable suspicion is based on objective standard, but the Trooper’s
testimony makes clear that Appellee’s presence was not irrelevant to his determination to
prolong the traffic stop for the dog-sniff, which preceded the search.
Pettit -- 16

the prolonged detention gave rise to the justification for the search, Appellee

has standing to challenge the search as a product of the prolonged detention.

Conclusion

Having determined Appellee had standing to challenge the search, we

remand to the court of appeals for it to consider whether the prolonged

detention was reasonable.

Delivered: May 28, 2025

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