AMED Management, Inc., AMED Health, Inc., and AMED Services, Inc. v. Eutiva Thomas

Opinion issued October 30, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-22-00808-CV
———————————
A*MED MANAGEMENT, INC., A*MED HEALTH, INC., D/B/A A*MED
COMMUNITY HOSPICE, AND A*MED SERVICES, INC., D/B/A A*MED
HOME HEALTH, Appellants
V.
EUTIVA THOMAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 56th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 19-CV-1003

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a final judgment in a suit brought by a home

healthcare services company against its former employee. After a jury found that

the former employee breached a non-compete, non-solicitation, and confidentiality
agreement, the jury awarded zero damages. The trial court then denied the home

healthcare services company’s request for a permanent injunction and attorneys’

fees. The home healthcare services company now appeals.

We affirm.

Background

Eutiva Thomas began working for A*Med Management, Inc. in 2010. In

2019, Thomas signed a confidentiality agreement requiring her not to disclose any

confidential information, primarily referral sources,1 both during and after her

employment with A*Med.

When Thomas resigned from A*Med and started working for a competitor,

Providence Home Health Services, Inc., A*Med sued Thomas for over $1,000,000

in damages and equitable relief, including a temporary and permanent injunction.

After A*Med obtained a temporary injunction, Thomas and Providence appealed

to this Court and we affirmed.2

Three years later, a jury heard A*Med’s claims for breach of the

confidentiality agreement and misappropriation of trade secrets. Although it found

1
A*Med paid employees like Thomas to market its hospice services to physicians,
case managers, and social workers, who would then refer patients to A*Med’s
hospice services. The jury agreed with A*Med that these physicians, case
managers, and social workers were confidential referral sources
2
See Thomas v. A*Med Mgm’t., Inc., No. 01-19-00564-CV, 2020 WL 5269412
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op).

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that Thomas failed to comply with the confidentiality agreement and that she

misappropriated trade secrets, the jury awarded A*Med zero dollars in damages.

But the jury awarded A*Med $310,107 in attorney’s fees.

After the verdict, A*Med moved for entry of judgment and a permanent

injunction. A*Med argued that based on the jury’s findings that Thomas violated

the confidentiality agreement, A*Med was entitled to a permanent injunction

restricting Thomas from disclosing confidential information.

Thomas opposed the request for a permanent injunction because the

evidence did not show she committed a wrongful act beyond what was already

addressed at trial. Thomas further argued that the record showed no evidence of

imminent harm or irreparable injury.

At a post-verdict non-evidentiary hearing, A*Med asked the trial court to

convert the 2019 temporary injunction to a permanent injunction and to award

attorney’s fees based on that recovery.

In response, Thomas acknowledged her wrongful act in 2019, but she

disagreed with A*Med’s claim of imminent harm and irreparable injury. She

noted that any harm to A*Med occurred in 2019, that A*Med’s witness testified

that the company’s damages had ceased, and that the jury awarded no damages.

Thereafter, the trial court signed an August 9, 2022 judgment, stating that

A*Med brought suit against Thomas for breach of a noncompete agreement and

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that A*Med would take nothing from Thomas and Thomas would take nothing

from A*Med.3 The trial court denied all further relief not expressly granted in its

August 9 judgment.

A*Med then sought reconsideration of its motion for entry of final judgment

and permanent injunction and alternatively, a motion for new trial. A*Med

contended that the trial court had to grant a permanent injunction in accordance

with the jury’s findings because Thomas’s obligations to protect and preserve

A*Med’s confidential information and trade secrets are ongoing and perpetual

obligations that survive the termination of her employment. A*Med argued that “it

cannot be credibly disputed that Thomas remains in a position to use [A*Med’s]

confidential information and trade secrets, which is the controlling issue before the

Court in its analysis.”

Thomas responded to A*Med’s motion for reconsideration, arguing that

A*Med’s sole purpose in seeking a permanent injunction at this stage of the case

was to obtain an award of attorney’s fees. Thomas stated that at no time during

trial was any reference made to support the need for a permanent injunction and

“[n]o equity argument can be argued in good faith contending such a permanent

injunction order is appropriate.”

3
Thomas had counterclaimed for A*Med’s tortious interference with her contract
with Providence.

4
After a non-evidentiary hearing on its motion to reconsider, the trial court

denied A*Med’s motion for reconsideration of its motion for entry of judgment

and permanent injunction and alternative motion for new trial.

A*Med and Thomas filed timely notices of appeal.4

Permanent Injunction

In its first issue, A*Med argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying its request for a permanent injunction.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

To obtain permanent-injunctive relief, a party must show all of the

following: (1) the existence of a wrongful act, (2) the existence of imminent harm,

(3) the existence of irreparable injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy

at law. Risner v. Harris Cnty. Republican Party, 444 S.W.3d 327, 339 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance

Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2018, no pet.)

(listing four elements of permanent injunction in determining whether trial court

abused its discretion in case brought under Texas Trade Secret Act). When

“determining the appropriateness of a permanent injunction,” a court “should

balance the competing equities, including the public interest.” Risner, 444 S.W.3d

at 339.

4
Thomas subsequently filed a motion to dismiss her appeal, which we carried with
the case. We grant the motion and dismiss her appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f).
5
We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for a permanent injunction

for an abuse of discretion. Indian Beach Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Linden, 222

S.W.3d 682, 690–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing

Operation Rescue–Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 975

S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court

(1) acts arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or

principles or (2) misapplies the law to the established facts of the case. Id. “The

trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision is based on conflicting

evidence and some evidence in the record reasonably supports the trial court’s

decision.” Id.

B. Elements of Permanent Injunction

1. Imminent Harm and Irreparable Injury

Because they are dispositive, we limit our analysis to the elements of

imminent harm and irreparable injury. A*Med argues that it established that

Thomas’s unauthorized use and disclosure of its confidential information caused it

imminent harm and irreparable injury due to the jury’s findings to Questions 3, 5,

and 6. The trial court had vast discretion in determining whether to issue the

injunction, and we conclude it did not abuse its discretion, on this record, in

denying the request.

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In response to Question 3, the jury found that Thomas failed to comply with

the confidentiality clause in the confidentiality agreement. In response to Question

5, the jury found that A*Med owned trade secrets. And in response to Question 6,

the jury found that Thomas misappropriated A*Med’s trade secrets. Based on

these affirmative answers, A*Med contends that it “cannot be credibly disputed

that Thomas remains in a position to use A*Med’s confidential information and

trade secrets.” Further, A*Med maintains that “[f]or these reasons alone, A*Med

established imminent and irreparable harm as a matter of law.”

While these findings establish that Thomas violated the confidentiality

clause and that she misappropriated trade secrets in 2019, they do not allow us to

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the forward-looking

permanent injunction—a decision that turns on the elements set forth above. See

Huynh v. Blanchard, 694 S.W.3d 648, 673, 677 (Tex. 2024); see also Luminant

Energy Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Tex., 665 S.W.3d 166, 181 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2023) (“An injunction is inherently forward-looking, intended to prohibit

present or future conduct.”), rev’d on other grounds, 691 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. 2024).

To be entitled to a permanent injunction, A*Med had to present evidence to

the trial court in support of its request. See Operation Rescue-Nat’l, 975 S.W.2d at

560; TMRJ Holdings, 540 S.W.3d at 208. Other than relying on the jury’s findings

to Questions 3, 5, and 6, A*Med does not direct us to any evidence in the record

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that supports the existence of imminent harm or irreparable injury after the events

that formed the basis of the suit. See, e.g., Tanglewood Homes Assoc. Inc. v.

Feldman, 436 S.W.3d 48, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)

(noting that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected plaintiffs’

request for permanent injunction because plaintiffs did not point to any record

evidence that defendant intended to violate declaratory judgment’s requirement

once appellate process is complete).

Instead, A*Med’s brief merely cites various authorities in support of its

request for a permanent injunction.5 But merely citing cases—without pointing to

evidence in the record that supports each of the required elements—does not

demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a permanent

injunction. We are thus left to scour the record for evidence supporting A*Med’s

position. But in doing so we would be abandoning our role as impartial judges and

5
A*Med cites cases such as IAC Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d
191 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) for the propositions that “[t]he
threatened disclosure of trade secrets constitutes irreparable injury as a matter of
law[,]” and that “when a defendant possesses trade secrets and is in a position to
use them, harm to the trade secret owner may be presumed.” A*Med does not
direct us to evidence that Thomas is threatening to disclose trade secrets or that
Thomas is currently in a position to use trade secret information. Further, IAC is
distinguishable because the appellate court was concerned with whether the
applicant had a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim before
trial, as opposed to whether applicant was entitled to a permanent injunction after
trial. See Tesoro Corp. v. Tesoro Corp., No. 13-14-00511-CV, 2016 WL 872647,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 18, 2016, pet. denied) (noting that in
temporary injunction cases, plaintiff only has to show probable irreparable injury).

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becoming an advocate for a party. And that we may not do. See Walker v.

Eubanks, 667 S.W.3d 402, 407–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.)

(“We are not responsible for identifying possible trial court error, searching the

record for facts favorable to a party’s position, or conducting legal research to

support a party’s contentions.”).

We note, however, that the record does show that Walt Crowder, A*Med’s

owner, testified repeatedly that Thomas’s actions caused harm for only a distinct

six-month period in 2019 and that he was seeking lost profit damages only from

this time period. And A*Med did not present any evidence that Thomas had been

disclosing trade secrets in 2022 or that she was threating to disclose trade secrets.

Indeed, although the trial court conducted two post-trial hearings on

A*Med’s request for a permanent injunction, A*Med presented no evidence

supporting that request. And, again, a trial court has vast discretion over whether

to issue an injunction. See Pike v. Texas EMC Mgmt., 610 S.W.3d 763, 792 (Tex.

2020); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.003 (“Actual or threatened

misappropriation may be enjoined. . . .”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016(1) (“May”

as used in statute creates discretionary authority). Accordingly, because A*Med

has not pointed us to any evidence of Thomas causing imminent harm and

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irreparable injury in 2022, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying A*Med’s request for a permanent injunction.6

We overrule A*Med’s first issue.

Because A*Med’s second issue, the recovery of attorney’s fees, is solely

dependent on the success of its first issue, we must overrule A*Med’s second

issue.

Conclusion

For all of the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all

things.

Terry Adams
Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.

6
Although the jury found that Thomas breached the confidentiality agreement—
which contemplated injunctive relief for a violation—such actions do not bind the
trial court to grant a permanent injunction. See Malone v. PLH Grp., Inc., No. 01-
19-00016-CV, 2020 WL 1680058, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7,
2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[A] contracting party’s acknowledgement that the
other contracting party has a right to equitable relief does not bind judicial actors
or require a court to grant the equitable relief ultimately requested. Trial courts
are afforded discretion in granting equitable relief.”).
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