Rachel Conover, Individually and as Trustee and Beneficiary of the Rachel Elizabeth Conover Trust Created by the Last Will & Testament of William Van Conover, III; Katherine Conover, Individually and as Beneficiary of the Katherine Marie Conover Trust v. Ward S. Conover and James E. Tausig, Independent Co-Executors of the Estate of William Van Conover, II, and Connie Conover

Opinion issued February 26, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00471-CV
———————————
RACHEL CONOVER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE AND
BENEFICIARY OF THE RACHEL ELIZABETH CONOVER TRUST
CREATED BY THE LAST WILL & TESTAMENT OF WILLIAM VAN
CONOVER III; KATHERINE CONOVER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS
BENEFICIARY OF THE KATHERINE MARIE CONOVER TRUST; AND
DEBORAH SHAMBAN, TRUSTEE OF THE KATHERINE MARIE
CONOVER TRUST, Appellants/Cross-Appellees
v.
WARD S. CONOVER AND JAMES E. TAUSIG, INDEPENDENT CO-
EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM VAN CONOVER, II,
Appellees
and
CONNIE CONOVER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant

On Appeal from Probate Court No. 1
Harris County, Texas
Cause No. 491,483
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises from a summary judgment granted in favor of the co-

executors of an estate (“co-executors”) involving claims related to the decedent’s

actions when he was executor of his son’s estate and trustee of testamentary trusts

for the benefit of his granddaughters. The granddaughters and successor trustee of

one of the trusts (“the appellants”) asserted the decedent breached his fiduciary duty

and committed fraud by non-disclosure. They also brought claims against the

decedent’s widow (“Connie”) for unjust enrichment and constructive trust. The trial

court granted the co-executors’ traditional summary-judgment motion based on the

statute of limitations and the exculpatory clause contained in his son’s will. The trial

court also denied the co-executors’ and Connie’s no-evidence summary-judgment

motions.

The appellants contend (1) genuine issues of material fact remain as to

whether the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment apply to defeat the co-

executors’ statute of limitations defense; (2) the co-executors waived their

exculpatory clause defense, and genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether

the decedent engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence; and (3) genuine

issues of material fact remain regarding the appellants’ unjust enrichment and

constructive trust claims against Connie. The co-executors respond (1) the

appellants’ claims are barred as a matter of law; (2) the appellants failed to rebut the

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valid exculpatory clause; and (3)the appellants’ claims against Connie fail because

they depend on the barred claims.

Connie cross-appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying her

and the co-executors’ no-evidence summary-judgment motions because the

appellants presented no evidence of (1) damages; (2) benefit received by the

decedent; (3) unjust enrichment; and (4) an identifiable res that can be traced back

to the original property.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

William Van Conover, III (“Van”) died in July 2001. At the time of his death,

he was unmarried and had two daughters, Rachel Conover, and Katie Conover, who

were ten and four, respectively. His will devised his residuary estate to his father,

William Van Conover, II (“Bill”) as trustee, to divide into equal shares and distribute

in trust for the benefit of Rachel and Katie. His will also appointed Bill as

independent executor of his estate.

By April 2002, Bill had filed Van’s inventory, appraisement, and list of

claims. The inventory included certain documents from the estate’s federal tax

return. Such documents showed, among other things, that the value of Van’s estate

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was over $4 million1 and the Lagniappe Farms, Inc. and Lagniappe Interests, Inc.

were valued at $1.

In 2002, Deborah Shamban (“Debbie”), Rachel and Katie’s mother, asked for

information about the trusts, but Bill refused to give her any information. Bill’s

ex-wife and Rachel and Katie’s grandmother, Margarite Kirk, warned Debbie that

Bill mismanaged his sons’ trusts, but Debbie did not think Bill was mismanaging

Rachels’ and Katie’s trusts. When Rachel was in high school, Margarite gave Rachel

the same warning, but Rachel also did not believe her. Bill consistently paid for

everything Rachel and Katie needed, including education and living expenses.

However, Bill did not set up Rachel’s and Katie’s trusts until 2010, nine years

after Van’s death, and he funded each trust with only $619,504. Rachel and Katie

did not receive information regarding Van’s estate and relied on Bill to manage their

trusts. In 2014, Rachel’s trust was valued at roughly $1.1 million, and Katie’s trust

was valued at roughly $2 million.

In 2010, Rachel emailed Debbie asking for more allowance after learning

from Bill that her trust might not have enough money for her to get through college.

Debbie’s husband emphasized to Debbie that they needed to know how much was

1
Although the original inventory summary mistakenly listed the value of Van’s
stocks and bonds as $1,550,601.00, resulting in the total gross value of Van’s estate
being listed as $3,217.785, the attached schedules filed in support establish that the
actual value of Van’s stocks and bonds was $2,814,467, resulting in the total gross
value of $4,485,641.

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in the trust to make a thoughtful and fair economic decision regarding Rachel’s

request. Bill would not tell Rachel how much was in her trust and told her that she

was entitled to know everything at age 35.

In 2014, Rachel signed an authorization form so that she could have the wealth

management firm make on-demand fund transfers between her trust and her personal

savings account. By 2016, Rachel had direct conversations with the wealth

management firm managing her trust, and by May 2017, she had received a detailed

portfolio report for her trust and instructed the wealth management firm to transfer

money into her personal account to cover her expenses.

In 2015, Katie turned 18. Bill told Katie she had a trust with $2 million in it

and gave her a credit card to use so that the trust would pay her expenses. She had

ongoing conversations about her trust with Bill and his assistant, Michelle Garza,

particularly when she had to pay tuition, rent, or bills related to her horses. Katie

knew Van’s estate was the source of her trust money but never asked which assets

from Van’s estate funded her trust.

When Bill died in 2021, Rachel became the successor trustee for her own trust,

and Debbie became the successor trustee for Katie’s trust. At that time, Rachel and

Katie discovered the estate tax return showing that Van’s gross estate was over $4

million when he died in 2001 and that the Lagniappe Farms, Inc. and Lagniappe

Interests, Inc. were valued at $1 each.

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They also discovered that Bill filed estate tax returns annually until 2015

which showed the estate was generating income, but they did not know what

happened to the assets or the income generated by the assets.

Despite further investigation, they could not find records showing various

proceeds from estate assets were deposited into their trusts, but they found Bill had

taken out at least one express credit line loan on behalf of Van’s estate in 2007.

The appellants asserted breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by non-disclosure

claims against the co-executors of Bill’s estate and unjust enrichment and resulting

trust claims against Bill’s widow, Connie. Connie moved for summary judgment

based on no evidence, and the co-executors moved for no-evidence and traditional

summary judgment. The trial court granted the co-executors’ traditional summary

judgment motion but denied the two no-evidence summary judgment motions. The

appellants moved for reconsideration and/or a new trial, which the trial court denied.

The trial court entered a final judgment that all parties take nothing by their claims.

Appeal and Cross-Appeal

This appeal involves the trial court’s decision to grant the co-executors’

traditional motion for summary judgment, while the cross-appeal involves the trial

court’s denial of Connie’s and the co-executors’ no-evidence summary-judgment

motions. If we determine the trial court properly granted the co-executors’ traditional

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motion for summary judgment, we do not need to reach the no-evidence grounds for

summary judgment raised in the cross-appeal.

Standard of Review

“We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, taking

as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and indulging every reasonable

inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Community Health

Sys. Prof’l Servs. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. 2017) (cleaned up).

To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, “the movant must

show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Id. at 681 (internal quotations omitted). For a defendant, as

movant, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, he must either disprove at

least one necessary element of the plaintiff’s theory of recovery or plead and

conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense. Richardson-

Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). “An issue is conclusively established if reasonable

minds could not differ about the conclusion to be drawn from the facts in the record.”

Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 681 (internal quotations omitted). Once the movant

establishes his right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the

nonmovant to present evidence raising a fact issue to defeat summary judgment.

Richardson-Eagle, Inc., 213 S.W3d at 473.

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Because the trial court did not specify the grounds on which it granted the

traditional motion for summary judgment, we must affirm if any of the grounds

alleged in the motion are meritorious. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 680.

Limitations

In their first issue, the appellants argue that the co-executors were not entitled

to summary judgment on the ground of limitations because genuine issues of

material fact remain regarding the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellants, we conclude that

their claims are barred as a matter of law.

I. Applicable Law

A defendant moving for summary judgment on the limitations affirmative

defense has the burden to conclusively prove that defense. KPMG Peat Marwick v.

Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.1999). The defendant

must (1) conclusively establish when the cause of action accrued, and (2) negate the

discovery rule, if it applies and has been pleaded or otherwise raised, by establishing

as a matter of law that “there is no genuine issue of material fact about when the

plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

discovered the nature of its injury.” Id. “If the movant establishes that the statute of

limitations bars the action, the nonmovant must then adduce summary judgment

proof raising a fact issue in avoidance of the statute of limitations.” Id.

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Each of the appellants’ causes of action is subject to a limitations period of

two or four years. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 16.003(a); 16.004(a)(5).

“Generally, a claim accrues when the defendant’s wrongful conduct causes the

claimant to suffer a legal injury.” Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Tex. 2022).

A legal injury occurs when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to

seek a judicial remedy. Id. “A cause of action accrues when the injury occurs, even

if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages

have not yet occurred.” Id. at 524 (internal quotations omitted). For purposes of

statutes of limitations for personal actions, a person is under a legal disability if he

or she is younger than 18 years of age. Brown v. Arenson, 571 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). If a person entitled to bring a cause of

action is under legal disability when such cause of action accrues, “the time of the

disability is not included in the limitations period.” Id.

The discovery rule is a rare exception that is only applied in “exceptional

cases.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524. Under the discovery rule, the accrual of a cause

of action is deferred “until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence,

should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. The rule should

be applied narrowly and only when the injury is “inherently undiscoverable.” Id.

“An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be discovered

within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” Id. Whether an injury

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is inherently undiscoverable is determined on a categorical basis rather than case-

specific basis; “the focus is on whether a type of injury rather than a particular injury

was discoverable.” Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2006). Thus,

this inquiry presents a question of law. Estate of Ewers, 695 S.W.3d 603, 620 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).

Fraudulent concealment is an affirmative defense to the statute of limitations.

KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 749. The party asserting fraudulent

concealment has the burden to raise it in response to the summary judgment motion

and to come forward with summary-judgment evidence raising a fact issue on each

element of that defense. Id. When a defendant conceals his wrongdoing, the

fraudulent concealment doctrine may toll statutes of limitations after a cause of

action has accrued. Estate of Ewers, 695 S.W.3d at 620. The elements consist of: (1)

an underlying wrong; (2) the defendant’s actual knowledge of the wrong; and

(3) concealment of the wrong to deceive the plaintiff. Brown, 571 S.W.3d at 334.

When a plaintiff alleges the defendant fraudulently concealed the wrong through

affirmative misrepresentations, the plaintiff must also prove that he relied on such

misrepresentations, and his reliance was reasonable under the circumstances. Estate

of Ewers, 695 S.W.3d at 621–22. “Fraudulent concealment only tolls the running of

limitations until the fraud is discovered or could have been discovered with

reasonable diligence.” BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Tex.

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2011). Unlike the discovery rule, the fraudulent concealment doctrine necessarily

turns on the particular facts of each case. Estate of Ewers, 695 S.W.3d at 621.

Both the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment focus on discovery of the

wrong and reasonable diligence to determine when the exceptions no longer defer

accrual or toll limitations, respectively. Id. at 622. “Unless reasonable minds cannot

differ on issues like discovery of the wrong and reasonable diligence, these issues

are for the factfinder to resolve.” Id. Both exceptions evaluate reasonable diligence

under an objective standard. Id. at 623.

Reasonable diligence requires that “owners of property interests make

themselves aware of relevant information available in the public record.” Shell Oil

Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 2011). In probate proceedings, the

reasonable diligence standard is measured against the publicly available probate

records. See Brown, 571 S.W.3d at 334–36. “Persons interested in an estate admitted

to probate are charged with notice of the contents of probate records.” Id. at 334.

“Constructive notice in law creates an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice.” Id.

II. Analysis

The parties do not dispute that absent the application of either the discovery

rule or fraudulent concealment doctrine, the appellants’ claims are barred by

limitations. Rachel turned 18 years old in 2009, and Katie turned 18 years old in

2015. Four years is the longest statute of limitations applicable to their claims. Thus,

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limitations period on their claims expired no later than 2019 for Katie and 2013 for

Rachel absent the application of the discovery rule or fraudulent concealment

doctrine.

A. Application of the Discovery Rule

The appellants contend the trial court erred by refusing to apply the discovery

rule in their case. Texas courts generally refuse to apply the discovery rule to claims

arising out of probate proceedings even when fraud is alleged because, ordinarily,

claimants are interested persons who have constructive notice of the contents of the

probate record. Brown, 571 S.W.3d at 333–34.

Rachel and Katie assert that they are not interested persons in their father’s

estate. They argue Bill’s actions were inherently undiscoverable and the appellants

did not have actual or constructive knowledge of them until 2021, when Rachel

became the successor trustee of her own trust and Debbie became the successor

trustee of Katie’s trust. The co-executors respond that Rachel and Katie had

constructive notice of the contents of the probate records because they were “persons

interested” in their father’s estate, and as such, the irrebuttable presumption of actual

notice applies.

Rachel and Katie did not take directly under Van’s will. Instead, the will

instructed Bill to form trusts for their benefit. The Estates Code, though, does not

focus on whether the parties have an interest in the decedent’s will. It asks whether

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they have an interest in the decedent’s estate. An “interested person” or “person

interested” includes “an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a

property right in or claim against an estate being administered.” TEX. EST. CODE

§ 22.018(1). This Court has clarified that a “person interested in the estate” is “one

who has legally ascertained pecuniary interest, real or prospective, absolute or

contingent, which will be impaired, benefitted, or in some manner materially

affected” by the proceeding. Evans v. Allen, 358 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

Rachel and Katie are “persons interested” in their father’s estate. See id.

(holding a beneficiary of the first will but not the second will was a “person

interested” in the estate); Fields v. Fields, No. 01-21-00138-CV, 2022 WL 2836808,

at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 21, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(holding daughter who was expressly disinherited by the will was an “interested

person” in her father’s estate). They have a pecuniary interest that was materially

affected by the probate of their father’s will.

Further, Rachel and Katie have beneficial interests that flow directly from the

probated will, and the will’s validity, interpretation, and administration directly

affect the creation and terms of the testamentary trusts. As beneficiaries of

testamentary trusts, they are the owners of the property placed in the trust, and as

such, they have “property rights in or claims against” the estate. See Eagle Oil &

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Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. 2021) (acknowledging that

holders of equitable title to trust property are real owners of such property).

The appellants’ own petition is also consistent with Rachel and Katie’s status

as interested persons in Van’s estate. They pleaded that Bill should have accounted

to them for his handling of Van’s estate assets before Rachel’s and Katie’s trusts

were established and funded. They also pleaded that Bill had a duty to keep them

informed of all material facts regarding Van’s estate.

We therefore conclude that Rachel and Katie, as persons interested in Van’s

estate, are “charged with constructive notice of the contents of the public probate

records.” Evans, 358 S.W.3d at 365. They are also charged with constructive notice

of the actual knowledge that could have been acquired by examining them. Mooney

v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981). An examination of the probate records

would have disclosed the trust’s distribution schedule as described in Van’s will; the

gross value of Van’s estate; the valuation of Lagniappe Farms and Lagniappe

Interests at $1 each; the value of Van’s life insurance; and the value of Van’s real

estate. Accordingly, the appellants were charged with notice that: (1) the value of

Van’s estate was more than $4 million, including stocks and bonds worth $2.8

million;2 (2) Lagniappe Farms and Lagniappe Interests were valued at $1 each; (3)

2
We noted earlier that the inventory summary has an error in the stocks and bonds
amount, which reduces the estate total on the first page. Because the attached
schedules include the correct amounts, this error does not affect our analysis.

14
Van’s life insurance was $1 million; (4) Van’s real estate was valued at $399,000;

and (5) certain amounts from the trusts would be distributed to them at certain ages,

all by the time they reached age 35. Their constructive notice of the probate records

creates an irrebuttable presumption they had actual notice of them when they reached

eighteen. See Brown, 571 S.W.3d at 334.

The appellants contend that even if they were charged with constructive

notice, they had no reason to look into the probate records based on their positive

relationship with Bill and his misleading them into believing they were not entitled

to information regarding their trusts. In support of their argument, they cite a non-

probate case regarding right of first refusal where the plaintiff had no reason to

monitor property records. See Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 291–92 (Tex.

2018). Archer is inapplicable because, in probate cases, persons interested in an

estate are charged with notice of the contents of probate records. Mooney, 622

S.W.2d at 85. Because constructive notice creates an irrebuttable presumption of

actual notice, such presumption cannot be contradicted by evidence. See Brown, 571

S.W.3d at 334.

Once charged with such notice, the appellants had knowledge of facts that

would cause a reasonably prudent person to make inquiry of Bill’s actions as

executor and trustee. See Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd. P’ship, 457 S.W.3d 52,

58–59 (Tex. 2015) (holding that if plaintiffs had exercised reasonable diligence,

15
readily accessible and publicly available information would have revealed injury,

and thus, they did not exercise reasonable diligence as a matter of law). The

appellants did not need to know they had a cause of action; they only needed to know

the facts giving rise to the cause of action. Fields, 2022 WL 2836808, at *9.

Although the standard is objective, the appellants’ pleading confirms that the

very information that caused them to discover their injury was the same information

that was originally filed in the probate records. Their live petition explains that they

learned from the 2002 estate tax return that Van’s estate had a gross value of $4.6

million, including stocks and bonds worth $2.8 million, and Lagniappe Farms and

Lagniappe Interests were “curiously” valued at only $1 each. These $1 valuations

prompted the appellants to inquire. The summary-judgment evidence also

demonstrates that the 2002 estate tax return is what prompted the appellants to

become concerned that the balance of the estate proceeds was never accounted for

and never made it to their trusts.

The appellants rely heavily on their status as trust beneficiaries owed fiduciary

duties by Bill as trustee. They are correct that the discovery rule can be invoked

when “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed is either unable to inquire into the

fiduciary’s actions or unaware of the need to do so.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 526. But

those owed a fiduciary duty are not entirely absolved of the standard obligation to

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use reasonable diligence to discover an injury. Id. “[A] person owed a fiduciary duty

has some responsibility to ascertain when an injury occurs.” Id.

The question here is whether the appellants were unable to inquire into Bill’s

actions or unaware of the need to do so. Rachel and Katie presented evidence Bill

did not inform them of their trust information. The summary judgment evidence

showed red flags that would have alerted a reasonable person of the need to inquire

about Bill’s actions.

Rachel had conversations, as early as high school, which would cause a

reasonable person to investigate whether Bill was mismanaging her trust. Bill

refused to give her information on her trust, and Margarite told Rachel that Bill

mismanaged his sons’ trusts, resulting in a lawsuit and her becoming trustee of their

trusts. Rachel was concerned she would exhaust her trust in 2010.

Debbie also had conversations that would call a reasonable person to

investigate whether Bill was mismanaging her daughters’ trusts. Bill refused to give

her any information as early as 2002; Margarite gave Debbie the same warning as

Rachel in 2006; and in 2010, Debbie was aware that Rachel was concerned she

would exhaust her trust, and Debbie’s husband emphasized the importance of

finding out how much was in the trust.

Between 2010 and 2015, Katie knew she would inherit money from Van that

he had left her when he died. Beginning in 2015, Katie had conversations with Bill

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regarding her trust and knew that the trust grew to $2 million. She was also in

communication with Michelle Garza, Bill’s assistant, and knew that Jay Brown was

the person looking after her trust. She understood the trust was from Van’s estate

and had the trust pay for various expenses, including education, rent, and her horses.

Despite the trust paying for all of her living expenses, she did not investigate the

probate records or ask for more information about her trust or how it was managed.

That Bill, as fiduciary, purportedly misled the appellants by not giving them

certain information regarding their trusts and Van’s estate does not absolve them of

their obligation to exercise reasonable diligence by looking at the probate records

and inquiring further. To the extent these facts establish a possible injury, a person

exercising reasonable diligence could have discovered it based on known

information, supplemented by the probate records.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, and

indulging every inference in their favor, the information furnished from the probate

records combined with the appellants’ own knowledge of the facts from their

interactions is sufficient as a matter of law to require the appellants to begin an

inquiry, and the record shows that a diligent inquiry would have led to the discovery

of their alleged injury. Thus, the appellants’ alleged injury was not inherently

undiscoverable, and the discovery rule does not apply.

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B. Application of fraudulent concealment

The appellants also contend the trial court erred because genuine issues of fact

remain regarding the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. The

appellants complain that a fact issue remains regarding what the appellants knew or

should have known because of Bill’s fiduciary duty to Rachel and Katie and his

concealment of his actions. They further assert that they presented more than a

scintilla of evidence proving the elements of fraudulent concealment.

Assuming without deciding they met their burden to raise an issue of fact

regarding the elements of fraudulent concealment, fraudulent concealment does not

toll the running of limitations indefinitely. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv.

Servs. of Nev., Inc. v. Triex Tex. Holdings, LLC, 659 S.W.3d 456, 464 (Tex. 2023).

The tolling effect of fraudulent concealment ceases when one learns of facts,

conditions, or circumstances that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to make

an inquiry that, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of

action. Id.

For the same reasons we concluded the claims in this case were not inherently

undiscoverable, we conclude that the exercise of reasonable diligence would have

led the appellants to discover any alleged concealed cause of action within the

applicable limitations periods. The irrebuttable presumption of actual notice of the

probate records compels the conclusion that the appellants were charged at the time

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of their majority (in 2009 and 2015) with knowledge of the facts giving rise to their

claims. Combined with their own knowledge of the facts relating to their trusts and

interactions with Bill and Margarite, the appellants had sufficient information to put

them on inquiry notice of their causes of action by 2015 at the latest.

Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the appellants, and indulging every

inference in their favor, appellees conclusively established that the discovery rule

did not delay the accrual of their claims and that any tolling under the fraudulent

concealment doctrine would have ceased by 2015. Thus, the four-year statute of

limitations expired in 2019. Because the appellants did not file their claims until

2021, their claims were barred. For these reasons, the trial court properly granted

summary judgment against the appellants on the statute of limitations.

We overrule the appellants’ first issue. Because our holding on the statute of

limitations is dispositive, we need not address the appellants’ remaining issues or

the cross-appeal in this case.

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Conclusion

We hold that the trial court did not err in granting the co-executors’ summary

judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Clint Morgan
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guiney, and Morgan.

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