Trayvone Wheatly-Porter v. DLP Capital Dba the Proper

Opinion issued March 10, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00354-CV
———————————
TRAYVONE WHEATLY-PORTER, Appellant
V.
DLP CAPITAL D/B/A THE PROPER, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1224829

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Trayvone Wheatly-Porter appeals the county court’s judgment in a forcible

detainer action granting DLP Capital d/b/a The Proper (“DLP Capital”) possession

of a unit in 4971 Martin Luther King Boulevard, Houston, Texas, and finding that
DLP Capital was entitled to $2,235.48 for unpaid rent. See TEX. PROP. CODE

§ 24.002. We affirm.

Background

On August 18, 2023, Wheatly-Porter entered into a student housing lease

agreement with DLA Capital. The lease contemplated that Wheatly-Porter would

pay $550 on the first of each month, and the lease would terminate July 31, 2024.

When Wheatly-Porter did not pay rent in January, DLA Capital gave him a “Final

3-Day Notice” that his $550 January rent payment and various fees were past due,

warning that failure to pay would result in a suit against him for possession of the

property and unpaid rent. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.005(a) (requiring landlord to

give notice to pay rent or vacate before filing forcible detainer suit for termination

based on nonpayment of rent).

When Wheatly-Porter did not pay, DLA Capital instituted this forcible

detainer action in the justice court. On February 20, 2024, the justice court found

that Wheatly-Porter had failed to pay rent and ordered a writ of possession to issue

if he failed to vacate the premises within five days. The court also issued a

judgment against Wheatly-Porter for $550 as rent owed, plus attorney’s fees, court

costs, and post-judgment interest. The judgment further ordered Wheatly-Porter to

pay $550 for each rental pay period during the pendency of any appeal.

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Wheatly-Porter appealed the judgment to a county civil court at law. The

county court conducted a bench trial, and the court reporter has certified that no

record was made of the proceedings. Following the trial de novo in May 2024, the

county court entered a judgment and order awarding DLA Capital possession of

the property, $2,235.48 as rent owed, and $1,075 in attorney’s fees.

Discussion

On appeal, Wheatly-Porter contests the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the judgment against him. He argues that he paid all outstanding charges

before moving out. DLA Capital responds that Wheatly-Porter provided no

evidence of his alleged rent payments in either the justice court or the county court

at law.

A. Forcible Detainer

A landlord may file a forcible detainer action to reclaim possession of

property when a tenant refuses to surrender possession of the subject property on

demand. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.002(a). A forcible detainer action is dependent

on proof of a landlord-tenant relationship. See Trimble v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,

516 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The sole

issue in a forcible detainer action is “who has the right to immediate possession of

the premises.” Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no

pet.) (emphasis in original). A landlord may seek unpaid rent in a forcible detainer

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case filed in justice court, provided that the claim for unpaid rent is for an amount

within the jurisdiction of the justice court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(d). When, as

in this case, an appeal of the judgment of the justice court is filed in the county

court, the prevailing party may recover damages, if any, “suffered for withholding

or defending possession of the premises during the pendency of the appeal.” TEX.

R. CIV. P. 510.11.

B. Possession and Mootness

Although not raised by the parties, because it concerns our jurisdiction, we

first consider the effect of the writ of possession and expiration of the underlying

lease.

A case becomes moot if, during any stage of the proceedings, a controversy

ceases to exist between the parties. See Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex.

2001). In a forcible detainer case, the issue of possession becomes moot when the

appellant ceases to have actual possession of the property, unless the appellant

asserts a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the

premises. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787–88

(Tex. 2006).

The record reflects that the county court awarded possession of the unit to

DLA Capital on May 2, 2024 and ordered the writ of possession to issue on May

13, 2024. The record also reflects that the lease expired by its own terms on

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July 31, 2024. The lease also states that it does not automatically renew. Wheatly-

Porter makes no argument that, even if meritorious, could form the basis of a claim

to possession after July 31, 2024. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 (explaining that

lease had expired and appellant presented “no basis for claiming a right to

possession after that date”). Because there is no dispute that Wheatly-Porter no

longer has actual possession of the property, and he cannot demonstrate a

potentially meritorious claim of right to current actual possession, this appeal has

become moot to the extent Wheatly-Porter challenges the trial court’s award of

possession in favor of DLA Capital. See Dafatry v. Prestonwood Mkt. Square, Ltd.,

399 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (concluding that while

issue of possession became moot, “the entire case was not moot because

[plaintiff’s] claims for damages and attorney’s fees continued to present live

controversies.”).

We dismiss as moot Wheatly-Porter’s challenge to the county court’s

determination of the right to possession of the property. However, because a live

controversy potentially still exists with respect to Wheatly-Porter’s challenge to the

trial court’s award of damages, we will proceed to address that issue.

C. Damages for Unpaid Rent

We construe Wheatly-Porter’s issue related to the award for unpaid rent to

be a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the county court’s

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judgment. The record does not include findings of facts or conclusions of law. In a

bench trial in which the trial court did not file findings of fact, we imply all

findings of fact necessary to support the judgment. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v.

Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002).

The clerk’s record includes evidence admitted during the trial in county

court. The evidence includes the lease agreement, three-day notice, and a tenant

ledger. The ledger shows all activity on Wheatly-Porter’s account. The record

reflects a payment in December 2023 for charges incurred up to that time. It

reflects charges for rent and utilities in January 2024 and no payments made.

The court reporter has certified that no reporter’s record exists of the county

court bench trial. An appellant has the burden to bring forward a sufficient record

to show the trial court’s alleged error. Nicholson v. Fifth Third Bank, 226 S.W.3d

581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“[An appellant] cannot

prevail in any evidentiary challenge without first meeting his burden of presenting

a sufficient record on appeal.”). When a party raises an issue on appeal relying on

evidence presented to the trial court—as Wheatly-Porter does here in his

evidentiary challenge—we must presume the trial court had before it and

determined all facts necessary in support of the judgment absent any record of

what evidence the trial court considered. Harris v. Masumeh, LLC, No. 01-24-

00196-CV, 2025 WL 626177, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 27,

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2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30

(Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (“The court of appeals was correct in holding that, absent

a complete record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial

court’s judgment.” (internal quotations omitted))); Onwubuche v. Olowolayemo,

No. 01-10-00945-CV, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Mar. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Onwubuche did not file a reporter’s record as

part of his record on appeal. We therefore must presume that the reporter’s record

contains evidence to support the trial court’s rulings on all issues of fact.”).

Accordingly, we presume the trial court found the necessary facts to establish that

DLA Capital was entitled to judgment for unpaid rent. See Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at

229–30; Onwubuche, 2012 WL 1067950, at *3. We therefore hold that the

evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment related to

unpaid rent.

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Conclusion

We dismiss and vacate in part and affirm in part. Because the issue of

possession is moot, we vacate the county court’s judgment of possession and

dismiss that portion of the appeal. We affirm the county court’s judgment in all

other respects.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.

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