In the Matter of C.A.O v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued April 2, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00871-CV
NO. 01-25-00872-CV
———————————
IN THE MATTER OF C.A.O.

On Appeal from the 314th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case Nos. 2025-01689J and 2025-01692J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an accelerated appeal from the Harris County Juvenile Court’s orders

waiving jurisdiction and transferring Appellant—a juvenile respondent—to

criminal district court to stand trial as an adult on charges of murder and

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, Appellant raises a single
issue with respect to the transfers, arguing that the juvenile court abused its

discretion when it admitted a cell phone video that was not properly authenticated.

We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Background1

In July 2025, the State filed two petitions in Harris County Juvenile Court

alleging that Appellant—a juvenile respondent born on October 27, 2007

(“C.A.O.”)—had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing murder and

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.2 The State alleged that on October 14,

2024, C.A.O. had “unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly threatened R.R. with

imminent bodily injury by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon,” and that on the

same day, C.A.O. had “unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly cause[d] the death

of Ivan Gabriel Bernardez . . . by shooting the Complainant with a deadly weapon,

namely a firearm.”

The State filed a motion in each proceeding requesting that the juvenile

court waive its original jurisdiction and transfer C.A.O. to criminal district court to

be tried as an adult pursuant to section 54.02(a) of the Texas Family Code. The

juvenile court held a hearing on the motions and signed an order in October 2025

1
To protect the identity of minor children, we refer to them by pseudonyms. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(c)(2).
2
The offenses allegedly were committed twelve days before C.A.O.’s seventeenth
birthday.
2
waiving its jurisdiction and transferring C.A.O. to criminal district court for trial on

both charges.

Two witnesses testified during the certification hearing.

Detective Jordan Meister

Detective Meister of the Houston Police Department’s homicide division

testified that police were dispatched to a shooting on October 14, 2024, at

approximately 8:15 p.m.3 When the detectives arrived, they found a deceased

young Hispanic male lying on the ground with multiple gunshot wounds. The

complainant, Ivan Bernardez, was in a “defensive position.” According to

Detective Meister, seven 5.56 caliber rifle casings and one 9-millimeter casing

were recovered from the scene, indicating there were two shooters. No firearms

were found at the scene.

The police interviewed witnesses who initially identified four possible

suspects. Bernardez was a member of the “Federal Road” or “Fed Block” gang.

His gang “had beef” with another gang called 18th Street. The four suspects were

members of the 18th Street gang. Detective Meister testified that “multiple

witnesses made it seem like [C.A.O.] was the . . . leader of their 18th Street gang.”

3
Detective Meister testified that he was not originally involved in the investigation
but “inherit[ed]” the case from two other detectives. He became lead detective on
the case because he was working on another homicide involving the same
witnesses and gangs.
3
The investigating officers recovered surveillance video from the apartment

complex where the shooting occurred, surveillance video from an apartment

complex across the street, and a cell phone video related to the assault allegedly

committed by C.A.O. earlier in the day involving R.R. The video from the

neighboring apartment complex showed two males in dark clothing approaching

Bernardez with their arms pointed at him. Detective Meister identified C.A.O. as

one of the males depicted and showed him holding a 5.56 rifle. The other male was

holding a 9-millimeter pistol. Detective Meister testified, “It appeared like the two

suspects were certainly looking for somebody.”

The court admitted the surveillance video from the neighboring apartment

complex and screen shots taken of the suspects from that video. Detective Meister

stated that the clothing in the screen shots matched the clothing seen in the

apartment surveillance videos during the murder. According to Detective Meister,

“multiple witnesses” identified the males in the screen shots as C.A.O. and E.R.C.,

a second suspect in the shooting.4 Detective Meister interviewed several witnesses

who corroborated that C.A.O. and E.R.C. were involved in Bernardez’s murder.

Detective Meister testified that during his investigation of an unrelated

murder involving another member of the Fed Block gang, he interviewed witnesses

involved in the present case. In working on the present case, he also re-interviewed

4
E.R.C. has been charged as an adult co-defendant in Bernardez’s murder.
4
some witnesses who had been interviewed by the original detectives who

investigated Bernardez’s murder.

Detective Meister then testified about the cell phone video related to the

assault allegedly committed by C.A.O. earlier in the day. The cell phone video

purportedly was taken from inside the car C.A.O. was traveling in while he

allegedly committed the aggravated assault against R.R. Detective Meister was

told that a woman named Cindy had recorded the video, but he was not able to

locate her. He also could not verify that the video had been recorded on October

14, 2024. However, when Detective Meister interviewed two other people who

were in the car allegedly involved in the assault on the day of the shooting, he

ascertained that “what they were talking about [was] depicted in [the] [cell phone]

video.” Detective Meister testified that in the cell phone video, a woman in the car

yelled what sounded like, “[C.A.O.], hell yeah.”

During the assault, C.A.O. allegedly threatened R.R. by shooting at the car

he was in. Others in R.R.’s car identified C.A.O. as the shooter. They said he was

using a rifle and that he was sitting behind the driver’s seat, both of which were

corroborated by the cell phone video.

According to Detective Meister, R.R. was shown surveillance stills and said

C.A.O. was wearing the same dark clothing during the assault as he apparently

wore during the murder. E.R.C.’s girlfriend, T.A., told Detective Meister that she

5
was in the same car as C.A.O. during the assault. She identified C.A.O. from the

surveillance stills. Detective Meister found her response and identification to be

credible.

Detective Meister also interviewed T.A.’s friend, M.V., who was in the car

during the assault. M.V. also identified C.A.O. from the stills. She said that during

the assault, C.A.O. pulled the rifle out of the backpack he appeared to be wearing

in the screen shots from the apartment surveillance video. Detective Meister also

testified that C.A.O.’s ex-girlfriend and two others identified C.A.O. from the

surveillance stills.

Detective Meister testified that he interviewed four members of the 18th

Street gang. One of them, E.P., provided the car that dropped off C.A.O. and the

other suspect at the apartment complex where Bernardez was killed. The car

belonged to E.P.’s mother. E.P. identified the suspects from the still shots.

Detective Meister also interviewed E.R.C.—C.A.O’s co-defendant in

Bernardez’s murder. E.R.C. told Detective Meister that C.A.O. used a rifle during

the murder, and that while they both raised their guns at Bernardez, only C.A.O.

fired at him. Detective Meister noted that the surveillance video from the

apartment complex across the street showed muzzle fire from only one firearm

during the murder.

6
E.R.C. also said that he was driving the car involved in the alleged assault of

R.R. He stated there had been “prior issues” between the 18th Street and Fed

Block gangs. The car R.R. was traveling in during the assault was a Fed Block

vehicle. E.R.C. told Detective Meister he did not know C.A.O. was going to fire at

the Fed Block car but that C.A.O. “did eventually fire the rifle at [R.R.’s] vehicle.”

Detective Meister testified about “multiple similarities” between

Bernardez’s murder and R.R.’s assault: both involved the same gangs, C.A.O was

involved in both incidents, and the weapon used was the same in both incidents.5

He said C.A.O. was known for using the rifle. Detective Meister testified that he

believes the assault and the murder were the result of “deliberate targeting.”

During the investigation, Detective Meister obtained C.A.O.’s Instagram

records and a forensic extraction of his cell phone. A picture in C.A.O.’s Instagram

account appeared to be C.A.O. holding two rifles and wearing the same clothes as

in the apartment complex surveillance video. A photo from C.A.O.’s cell phone

shows him holding a rifle.

When C.A.O. was arrested, he had a fully-loaded rifle magazine on him. His

rifle was not recovered. According to Detective Meister, authorities recovered 5.56

rifle rounds from Bernardez during his autopsy.

5
The testimony that the same weapon was used in the aggravated assault and the
murder was the result of a finding made by NIBIN, a system that compares the
unique marks a firearm makes when a bullet is fired and a shell casing is
expended.
7
Detective Meister interviewed people from both gangs, as well as people

without gang affiliation, who identified C.A.O. as the shooter. He testified that no

one other than C.A.O. (1) had the motive to kill Bernardez, (2) had a NIBIN

finding lead back to an aggravated assault in which people identified him as the

shooter, (3) was identified by multiple people in a surveillance video as being in

the area before the murder, and (4) was identified by a co-defendant as being the

shooter in this case. He testified that he believes C.A.O. and E.R.C. killed

Bernardez.

Dr. Alexandra Tellez-Caruso

Dr. Tellez-Caruso, a psychologist for the Harris County Juvenile Probation

Department, testified that she conducted a certification evaluation on C.A.O. She

concluded that (1) he fell in the high end of the middle range for dangerousness

when you include the two charged offenses; (2) his intellectual sophistication is

below average; (3) his criminal sophistication is moderately high when you include

both of the charged offenses; (4) his maturity is moderately high; (5) he shows

moderately low treatment amenability when you include the two charged offenses;

and (6) when you include the charged offenses, he has a moderately high risk for

violently re-offending.

At the conclusion of the certification hearing, the court found probable cause

for the offenses and, “based on the seriousness of the offense and the welfare of the

8
community,” the court waived its jurisdiction and ordered C.A.O. to be tried in the

adult criminal system.

This appeal ensued. In his sole issue, Appellant argues the juvenile court

erred in admitting the cell phone video because it was not properly authenticated.

Transfer to Adult Criminal District Court

Section 54.02 of the Texas Family Code governs transfers by a juvenile

court to a criminal district court for criminal proceedings. Under Section 54.02(a),

a juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child 6

to a criminal district court if:

(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of
felony;

(2) the child was:

(A) 14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have
committed the offense, if the offense is . . . a felony of
the first degree, and no adjudication hearing has been
conducted concerning that offense; [and]

...

(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court
determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child
before the court committed the offense alleged and that because
of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of
the child the welfare of the community requires criminal
proceedings.

6
In this context, “child” is defined as someone is “ten years of age or older and
under 17 years of age.” TEX. FAM. CODE §51.02(2)(A).
9
TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a); see Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 886 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d).

The State has the burden to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance

of the evidence that the community’s welfare requires transfer of jurisdiction over

the child for criminal proceedings, either because of the seriousness of the offense

alleged, the background of the defendant, or both. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886 (citing

In re A.K., No. 02-20-00410-CV, 2021 WL 1803774, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). In considering whether the

preponderance of the evidence supports transfer under Section 54.02(a)(3), the

juvenile court must consider, among other things, the following non-exclusive

factors:

(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property,
with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against
the person;

(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;

(3) the record and previous history of the child; and

(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the
juvenile court.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(f); see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886 (citing In re Z.T., No.

05-21-00138-CV, 2021 WL 3645103, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2021,

pet. denied) (mem. op.)). “Any combination of these factors may suffice to support
10
a waiver of the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction and not every factor

need weigh in favor of transfer[.]” Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886 (citing In re B.M., No.

01-18-00898-CV, 2019 WL 1388561, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “The juvenile court need not consider any other

factors, nor need it find that the evidence establishes each factor.” Bell, 649

S.W.3d at 886-87 (citing In re Z.M., No. 02-21-00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)). The factors are

intended to be “non-exclusive guides” to help the juvenile court determine whether

reason for transfer exists. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887 (citing In re Z.T., 2021 WL

3645103, at *8).

Standard of Review7

We review a juvenile court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence at a waiver

and transfer hearing for an abuse of discretion. In re C.P.C., No. 01-24-00672-CV,

2025 WL 2956226, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 21, 2025, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (citing In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist] 2023, pet. denied)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court’s ruling is “so

clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might

disagree.” Id. (citing In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

7
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s order. He only makes a challenge to the admission of the cell
phone video during the transfer hearing.
11
Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). Even if a trial court errs in admitting evidence, any error

is cured if the same evidence is admitted elsewhere without objection. In re H.Y.,

512 S.W.3d at 473 (citing Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003)). Reversal is warranted only “where the error probably caused the rendition

of an improper judgment.” In re C.P.C., 2025 WL 2956226, at *2 (citing In re

A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 552).

Discussion

A. Application of the Rules of Evidence to Transfer Hearings

C.A.O. argues that the Texas Rules of Evidence apply to transfer hearings.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.17(c). The State disagrees, arguing that evidentiary rules are

not strictly applied in juvenile certification hearings.

We recently noted that “[t]here appears to be no published opinion that

indicates whether the Texas Rules of Evidence . . . appl[y] to juvenile transfer

proceedings pursuant to section 51.17(c) of the Texas Family Code.” In re C.P.C.,

2025 WL 2956226, at *3. We observed, however, that Texas appellate courts

“have characterized transfer proceedings as dispositional and not adjudicational,

allowing for the admission of hearsay statements and testimonial statements from

witnesses who are not present.” Id. (citing cases).8 This Court also has held that “a

8
See, e.g., L.M.C. v. State, 861 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, no pet.) (holding rights to confrontation not violated where evidence is not
used to adjudicate guilt or innocence).

12
juvenile court is not required to rule on the admissibility of evidence during a

transfer hearing.” In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d at 474 (citing Navarro v. State, Nos. 01–

11–00139–CR & 01–11–00140–CR, 2012 WL 3776372, at *6 (Tex. App.–

Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 17, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication)). In Navarro, we held that:

At a transfer and certification hearing, a juvenile court need only
determine if there is “probable cause” that the juvenile committed the
charged offense. The transfer and certification hearing is a
nonadversary preliminary hearing, in which the juvenile court may
rely upon hearsay as well as written and oral testimony. A transfer
hearing “does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence
that an adjudication of guilt or innocence requires”; the hearing’s only
goal is to determine the proper forum in which to adjudicate the
defendant’s guilt or innocence.

2012 WL 3776372 at *5 (internal citations omitted). See also generally State v.

Lopez, 196 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d) (“The [transfer]

hearing is comparable to a criminal probable cause hearing and the court need not

resolve evidentiary conflicts beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citing In re K.B.H., 913

S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ)).9

9
See State v. Lopez, 196 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d)
(“The United States Supreme Court has recognized that although a juvenile court
hearing to determine whether to waive jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile for trial
as an adult is subject to essentials of due process and fair treatment, it is not
required to conform to all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the
usual administrative hearing.”) (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)).
.
13
Indeed, there are numerous cases that hold that a juvenile court may consider

hearsay in transfer hearings. See, e.g., In re C.P.C., 2025 WL 2956226, at *2

(“Because a juvenile transfer hearing is dispositional rather than adjudicational in

nature, a juvenile court may consider hearsay without violating the juvenile’s right

to confrontation.”); In re B.M., 2019 WL 1388561, at *13 (“[B]ecause the transfer

hearing is a nonadversary preliminary hearing, the juvenile court may rely upon

hearsay as well as written and oral testimony in making its probable-cause

findings.”); In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 554 (“[A] juvenile court in a transfer hearing

is not required to resolve the admissibility of hearsay evidence offered against the

juvenile because of the non-adversarial nature of a transfer hearing.”); Grant v.

State, 313 S.W.3d 443, 444 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.) (“The juvenile court

can determine probable cause in a nonadversary preliminary hearing through the

use of hearsay besides written and oral testimony.”); McKaine v. State, 170 S.W.3d

285, 289 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, no pet.) (holding juvenile

court could consider hearsay evidence because “[s]trict rules of evidence are not

applied in transfer proceedings.”).

We have not found, nor has Appellant cited, any case applying the Rules of

Evidence when, as here, the authentication of a video or some other type of

evidence is at issue. We need not resolve the issue, however, because even if the

14
Rules of Evidence were applicable, they would not affect our disposition of the

appeal.

B. Authentication of the Cell Phone Video

During the transfer hearing, C.A.O. objected to the admission of the cell

phone video, which purportedly was made from inside the car when C.A.O.

allegedly shot at R.R. C.A.O. argued in the trial court that Detective Meister—the

sponsoring witness—had not authenticated the video because there was no time

stamp on it and he did not know definitively who had recorded the video or

whether it had been altered.

On appeal, C.A.O. argues the video was not properly authenticated because

it did not comply with Texas Rule of Evidence 901, which requires the offering

party “to produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the

proponent claims it is.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). C.A.O. notes that while the State

attempted to authenticate the cell phone video through Detective Meister’s

testimony, Detective Meister did not make the video, had no personal knowledge

of when or where the video was taken, and did not speak with “Cindy,” the person

who allegedly recorded the video. Further, the State did not call Cindy or any other

occupant of the car to testify about the circumstances under which the video was

recorded.

15
Detective Meister testified during the hearing that he was told the video was

recorded on October 14, 2024, but he could not verify that information. He

testified, however, that “multiple witnesses—all of whom were inside the” car

when the cell phone video was recorded—told him “that was the date it happened.”

Detective Meister testified that, after interviewing two people who were riding in

the car with C.A.O. when the video was recorded, he was able to determine that

their description of the assault matched what was depicted in the video. According

to Detective Meister, during the video the two witnesses called out C.A.O.’s name

as C.A.O. was shooting at the assault complainant.

Based on Detective Mesiter’s testimony, the State told the court that it had

“established that this evidence is what it purports to be, a cell phone video of what

happened inside of that car that is corroborated by the witnesses who [were] inside

of that vehicle.” On appeal, the State relies on Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) in support of its argument that the cell phone video was

sufficiently authenticated. In Fowler, the Court of Criminal Appeals observed:

[E]ven though the most common way to authenticate a video is
through the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge who
observed the scene, that is not the only way. Evidence can also be
authenticated by “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together
with all the circumstances.”

Id. at 849 (emphasis in original) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4)). Fowler

stemmed from a dispute regarding the authenticity of a surveillance video from a
16
Family Dollar store where the appellant shopped prior to committing theft of an

ATV. The store’s video could not be copied, so an investigating officer recorded a

copy of the video. Id. at 846. There was no audio on the video. Id.

At trial, defense counsel objected to the video’s admission because it was an

incomplete copy of a recording and the State had not established why the original

was not available. Id. The trial court admitted the video. Id. at 847. The court of

appeals held the trial court erred in admitting the video, but the Court of Criminal

Appeals reversed, holding the video had been properly admitted because it is

possible to prove the authenticity of a video “without the testimony of someone

who either witnessed what the video depicts or is familiar with the functioning of

the recording device.” Id. at 848. The Court held that while the State could have

produced testimony from witnesses who would have further authenticated the

video, the trial court’s determination that the police officer sufficiently

authenticated the video was a decision within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Id. at 850. It further held that “[c]onclusive proof of authenticity before allowing

admission of disputed evidence is not required. Rule 901 ‘merely requires some

evidence sufficient to support a finding that evidence in question is what the

17
proponent claims.’” Id. at 848 (citing Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991)).10

Consistent with Fowler, the El Paso Court of Appeals recently admitted a

cell phone video even though the person who recorded the footage did not

authenticate it. Gonzalez v. State, No. 08-23-00306-CR, 2024 WL 4189237, at *4

(Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 13, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). In Gonzalez, a bystander took cell phone video of an assault on the

complainant at a bus stop. 2024 WL 4189237, at *1. The bystander did not testify.

Id. at *2. During the trial, the defendant objected to the admission of the video,

arguing that only the person who recorded the video could say what he was doing

when he made the video, where he was located when the video was made, whether

his camera was working properly, and whether he deleted any part of the video. Id.

The complainant watched the cell phone footage and testified that the video fairly

and accurately depicted her assault and that she saw herself and the defendant in

the video. Id. She testified she did not believe the video had been altered. Id. The

trial court admitted the video. Id.

On appeal, the defendant argued the cell phone video was inadmissible

because the complainant “could not verify any details about the production of the

10
See generally Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(observing that text messages can be authenticated by witness who observes
author type and/or send message, or by witness who knows text message came
from phone number associated with purported sender).
18
footage, including whether it had any additions or deletions,” and that only the

person who made the video could authenticate it under Rule 901. Id. at *2, 4. In

addition, according to the appellant, the video “move[d] away from the action and

back again.” Id. at *4. The court disagreed, holding that “the trial court need not be

convinced that the item is authentic; it need only determine that a reasonable juror

could find that the item is authentic.” Id. at *3 (citing Watson v. State, 421 S.W.3d

186, 190 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d)). The court held that because

the complainant testified the video accurately showed what happened during the

assault, the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the video. Id. at *4.

The Gonzalez court relied in large part on Hines v. State, 383 S.W.3d 615

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d), where a defendant argued that a police

officer’s dashboard camera video should not have been admitted because it was not

properly authenticated. Id. at 624. The defendant in Hines argued the video footage

could not be authenticated by the police officer who sponsored the video because

he could not verify whether the video had been altered in any way, and because the

sponsoring officer did not make the video, given that it was recorded by another

officer’s camera. Id. Holding that the officer could authenticate the video—which

the court identified as a “jumbled mess” because the camera did not operate

correctly—the court of appeals explained that a witness is not “required to be the

maker of the recording or have otherwise participated in the conversation in order

19
for his testimony that the recording is what it is claimed to be to sufficiently

authenticate it.” Id. at 624–25 (citing Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998)).

While all of these cases are illustrative, we find that Fowler is the most

persuasive. The juvenile court’s admission of the cell phone video in the present

case was a decision within the zone of reasonable disagreement. As the Court of

Criminal Appeals stated in Fowler, “Rule 901 ‘merely requires some evidence

sufficient to support a finding that evidence in question is what the proponent

claims.’” 544 S.W.3d at 848 (citation omitted). Detective Meister provided “some

evidence” to authenticate the cell phone video. He testified that others traveling in

the car when the video was recorded told him that the video depicted the

circumstances of the assault. He also testified that after he interviewed several

witnesses, he “was able to ascertain that what was on this cell phone video [was] a

fair and accurate depiction of what actually happened in this aggravated assault.”

The State was not required to produce those witnesses. As we previously

explained, a juvenile court may rely on hearsay during a transfer hearing, and

Detective Mesiter’s testimony, while based on hearsay, sufficiently authenticated

the video. We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the cell phone video.

C. Harm

Even if the juvenile court erred in admitting the cell phone video, we

20
conclude the error was harmless. We can only reverse a juvenile court’s order

waiving jurisdiction if the error “probably caused the rendition of an improper

judgment.” In re C.P.C., 2025 WL 2956226, at *3 (citing TEX. R. APP. P.

44.1(a)(1)); see In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 554 (holding no harm demonstrated

when there was “an abundance of evidence to support the trial court’s finding”).

C.A.O. argues that the admission of the cell phone video was harmful

because the State’s case “relied heavily on Detective Meister’s testimony regarding

statements made by people who did not testify and were not subject to cross-

examination to test their veracity or bias.” He argues that the only physical

evidence that connected the assault to the murder was the presence of 5.56 shell

casings that may have come from the same gun, which was not found. He avers

that “[i]n the absence of live witnesses that could testify that they saw C.A.O. fire

that gun, the cell phone video was the State’s best evidence of a connection

between C.A.O. and the gun that was necessary to support a finding of probable

cause.”

The State responds that there was an “abundance of evidence” in addition to

the cell phone video to support the trial court’s finding that C.A.O. should be tried

as an adult. We agree.

First, the State proffered surveillance video from the apartment complex

across the street from where the shooting occurred. The State argues that the

21
apartment video and still shots from the video placed C.A.O. at the scene of the

homicide. Further, Detective Meister testified that “multiple witnesses”—including

members of the 18th Street gang, members of the Fed Block gang, and people who

did not belong to either gang—identified C.A.O. as the person who approached

Bernardez while holding a rifle.

Second, the State presented testimony identifying C.A.O. as the person who

held the rifle that killed Bernardez. Witnesses from the assault that occurred hours

before the murder identified C.A.O. from the surveillance video and confirmed that

he wore the same clothing during the assault and the murder. Further, E.P. told

police that on the day of the murder, he gave C.A.O. and E.R.C. a ride to the

apartment complex where Bernardez was killed and picked them up there later.

Third, the State argues that there was evidence that the rifle C.A.O. held in

the photos was the rifle used to kill Bernardez. The State presented evidence that

NIBIN indicated the same rifle was used in the assault and the murder. And the

surveillance video that captured the murder showed muzzle fire only from the gun

that one of the shooters was holding when the murder occurred. E.R.C. also told

Detective Meister that he and C.A.O. were armed when they confronted Bernardez,

that both raised their weapons, but that only C.A.O fired his rifle at Bernardez.

Fourth, Dr. Tellez-Caruso testified that, among other things, C.A.O. was in

the high end of the middle range for dangerousness, he showed moderately low

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treatment amenability, he had a moderately high criminal sophistication and

maturity, and he had a moderately high risk for violently re-offending.

Finally, the State argues that any evidence from the cell phone video was

cumulative, as it did not contain any information that was not elicited during

Detective Meister’s testimony. Detective Meister testified that during his witness

interviews, he learned that C.A.O. was wearing all black and sitting behind the

driver’s seat when he fired his rifle during the assault. The video from the

neighboring apartment complex, which was admitted without objection, showed

what C.A.O. wore the night the assault and murder were committed, which

matched the description of what Detective Meister learned about the murder

suspect during his witness interviews. And C.A.O. did not object to the admission

of an Instagram photo that showed him holding a rifle and wearing the same jacket

he apparently wore in the surveillance video.

We conclude the admission of the cell phone video did not lead to the

rendition of an improper judgment. We overrule C.A.O.’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the juvenile court’s orders transferring C.A.O.’s cases to criminal

district court.

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Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

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