William Lewis Arnett v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed July 31, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
___________

No. 11-25-00163-CR
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WILLIAM LEWIS ARNETT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 244th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C240559CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, William Lewis Arnett, pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony
offense of arson of a building. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a), (d) (West
2019). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement between Appellant and the State, the
trial court sentenced Appellant to confinement for eight years in the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed a pro se notice
of appeal from the trial court’s judgment. We dismiss the appeal.
When this appeal was docketed, we notified Appellant that the trial court had
certified that (1) this is a plea bargain case in which Appellant has no right of appeal,
and (2) Appellant had waived his right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2),
(d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West 2018). In our letter, we
requested that Appellant’s counsel respond and show grounds to continue the appeal.
The trial court subsequently permitted Appellant’s trial counsel to withdraw and
appointed new counsel to represent him in this appeal. We notified Appellant’s new
counsel that a response was due and extended the deadline for him to file a response.
Appellant’s counsel has not filed a response.
Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a plea bargain case in which the punishment
imposed does not exceed the punishment agreed to by the parties, “a defendant may
appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on
before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the
specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); see
also CRIM. PROC. art. 44.02. Subsections (B) and (C) are not applicable here.
To the extent that Appellant attempts to appeal matters that were raised by pro
se pretrial motions, and to the extent Appellant had any right to appeal such motions,
Appellant specifically waived his right to appeal. The waiver is signed by Appellant,
his trial counsel, and the presiding judge. In the signed document, the trial court
stated that Appellant’s appellate rights were explained to him by both Appellant’s
trial counsel and the trial court, and the trial court specifically found that Appellant
understood the consequences of waiving his rights, and voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived such rights.
We further note that Rule 25.2 does not permit a plea-bargaining defendant to
appeal matters related to the voluntariness of his plea unless the defendant has
obtained the trial court’s permission to appeal. See Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77,
83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Carender v. State, 155 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2005, no pet.).

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The documents on file show that Appellant entered into a plea bargain
agreement, his punishment was assessed by the trial court in accordance with the
parties’ agreement, and he waived his right of appeal. Further, the trial court
certified that Appellant has no right of appeal and that he waived this right. The trial
court’s certification was signed by Appellant, Appellant’s trial counsel, and the
presiding judge. The documents on file in this court support the trial court’s
certification. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal without further action. TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
This appeal is dismissed.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

July 31, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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