The Thagard Mineral Partnership, LP v. Michael L. Cass

Opinion filed August 21, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00207-CV
__________

THE THAGARD MINERAL PARTNERSHIP, LP, Appellant
V.
MICHAEL L. CASS ET AL., Appellees
__________

-- and --
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No. 11-23-00208-CV
__________

MICHAEL L. CASS, Appellant
V.
RIM LLLP (F/K/A RIM LLC AND RIM LLP) ET AL., Appellees
On Appeal from the 238th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV56133

OPINION
The above are permissive appeals1 from the trial court’s grant of two partial
summary judgments in favor of Appellees, Michael L. Cass; RIM LLLP; Richard O.
Williams, individually and as manager/trustee of the WTX Royalty Trust; Mark C.
Solari; TSH I LP; Penwell Company, LLC; Dee Bentley, Inc.; Blackbear Oil and
Gas, LLC; and DAC Interests, LLC. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(d) (West Supp. 2024). The relief requested in Appellees’ motions for
summary judgment stem from a quiet title action concerning the ownership of certain
overriding royalty interests (ORRI). Central to these appeals is our construction of
two assignments that pertain to those ORRI and other property interests, which
various parties dispute.
In its order that permitted the parties to seek interlocutory review of its
summary judgment rulings, with regard to these assignments, the trial court
identified two controlling questions of law for which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and further stated that an immediate appeal from its order
would materially advance the ultimate disposition of the litigation. Id. They are:
• Whether the first assignment (the Thagard Assignment) between Greg
Thagard, the predecessor-in-interest to Appellant, The Thagard Mineral
Partnership, LP,2 and Michael L. Cass, an Appellee in Cause No. 11-23-
00207-CV and the Appellant in Cause No. 11-23-00208-CV, is

1
Although two separate appeals were filed, they arise from the same trial court cause number and
the controlling questions of law are interrelated.
For ease of reference, we will refer to both Greg Thagard and The Thagard Mineral Partnership as
2

“Thagard.”

2
unambiguous and unambiguously transferred to Cass all right, title, and
interest, including ORRI, that Thagard owned in the subject property.
• Whether the second assignment, between Cass and Plains Petroleum
Operating Company—the predecessor-in-interest to Appellees, RIM
LLLP, Richard O. Williams, individually and as manager/trustee of the
WTX Royalty Trust, Mark C. Solari, TSH I LP, Penwell Company, LLC,
Dee Bentley, Inc., Blackbear Oil and Gas, LLC, and DAC Interests,
LLC—unambiguously transferred Cass’s entire mineral fee interest in all
depths in the same property.
In ruling on both questions, the trial court found in the affirmative. Thagard appeals
the trial court’s first ruling and challenges (1) whether the Thagard Assignment is
unambiguous, as the trial court found, and (2) if so, whether it transferred any of
Thagard’s royalty or leasehold interests to Cass. Cass appeals the trial court’s
second ruling and contends that the trial court erred when it determined that the
second assignment unambiguously transferred Cass’s entire mineral fee interest in
all depths in the subject property. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
This ownership dispute originated from a series of assignments made in 1990.
First, Cass assigned ORRI to Thagard in the properties that are the subject of this
dispute, namely, Sections 32 and 41 of Block 38, Township 4 South, Texas & Pacific
Railway Company Survey, in Midland County. Next, on July 5, 1990, but dated
effective “as of first runs of the leases,” Thagard executed an assignment (the
Thagard Assignment) that conveyed to Cass “all of [Thagard’s] right, title, and
interest in and to the lands, tracts, oil and gas and/or mineral leases and leasehold
interests in and to the subject lands, which are listed and to the extent described on
Exhibit ‘A,’ which is attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes (the
‘Oil and Gas Properties’).” The attached Exhibit A is reproduced below:

3
In an affidavit filed in the underlying suit, Thagard asserted that these
transactions were a part of an ongoing, verbal agreement between himself and Cass
wherein Thagard would acquire mineral leases on properties that he would thereafter
assign to Cass in exchange for an ORRI in those properties. To Thagard’s
understanding, the Thagard Assignment was a curative measure that was intended
to facilitate the transaction between Cass and Plains Petroleum, not to convey
Thagard’s ORRI to Cass.
Thagard further stated that, after the Thagard Assignment was executed but
before the closing between Cass and Plains Petroleum, Thagard (1) “enter[ed] into
stipulations of interest regarding the [ORRI] as part of the closing with Cass,” and
(2) “signed division orders” with another oil company, and those “division orders
were never cancelled or changed due to the Assignments the subject of this suit.”
Since that time, Thagard also executed division orders with several other companies,
including XTO, which showed his ownership of the ORRI at issue, and that he
continued to receive ORRI payments from XTO until it decided to suspend these
payments because of the issues that gave rise to this suit.
Shortly after the Thagard Assignment was executed, Cass executed an
assignment that conveyed to Plains Petroleum certain interests that he owned,

4
including those in Sections 32 and 41. In relevant part, the granting clause of this
assignment provided that the interests conveyed were those “owned by Assignors
and listed on Exhibit ‘A.’” Exhibit A, which is attached to this assignment, described
the assigned interests in two parts. First, it provided a table that lists and identifies
“Proved Developed Producing Properties.” Noted above this table is an underlined
and fully capitalized label, which states, “MICHAEL L. CASS’ PERSONAL
INTEREST INCLUDING HIS O.R.R.I. & MINERAL INTEREST.” Sections 32
and 41 are included in this table, which is reproduced below:

Following this table in Exhibit A, is a centered heading entitled “Leases
Covering The Above Producing Properties” that introduces a long list of
properties—here, each property is listed and identified by the same “LEASE
NAME” provided in the table, but under each property there is included an indented
column that lists and identifies multiple leases by lessor, lessee, the date of the lease,

5
and the recording volume and page number. Sections 32 and 41 are described in this
second part of Exhibit A as follows:
H. Maralo “32” – Covering All of Section 32, Block 38, T-4-S, T&P
Ry. Co. Survey, Midland County, Texas from the surface to 8700
feet subsurface.
[Followed by an indented column listing twenty-four leases]
I. Maralo “41” – Covering All of Section 41, Block 38, T-4-S, T&P
Ry. Co. Survey, Midland County, Texas from the surface to 8700
feet subsurface.
[Followed by an indented column listing twenty-nine leases]
In 2018, XTO suspended ORRI payments to Thagard for Sections 32 and 41.
Thagard alleges that XTO later suspended payments for ORRI for property outside
of these sections as well, in an effort to recoup the alleged overpayments from
Sections 32 and 41. As a result, Thagard filed suit against Cass and XTO and sought
declaratory and equitable relief, including to quiet title to the subject ORRI, damages
from XTO, attorney’s fees from Cass and XTO, and costs.
In response, Cass and XTO answered and each asserted counterclaims against
Thagard for money had and received based on the allegation that Thagard had
wrongly received ORRI payments over the preceding years. Cass also asserted
cross-claims against XTO for breach of contract, conversion, fraud, and trespass
based on the alleged wrongful royalty payments that XTO made to Thagard and its
failure to pay Cass profits that were attributable to certain working interests
associated with depths in these sections below 8,700 feet.
In 2020, several other parties—the remaining Appellees in these appeals,
whom we will refer to as the RIM parties—intervened in the underlying case. The
RIM parties alleged that they were owners of certain mineral and royalty interests in
Sections 32 and 41 that Cass had allegedly conveyed to Plains Petroleum, the

6
predecessor-in-interest to the RIM parties, including interests in depths below 8,700
feet that Cass claimed to still own.
Both title disputes, between (1) Thagard and Cass, and (2) Cass and the RIM
parties, were resolved by the trial court’s grants of partial summary judgment in
favor of Cass (Cause No. 11-23-00207-CV) and the RIM parties (Cause No. 11-23-
00208-CV). As to the first dispute, the trial court determined that the Thagard
Assignment unambiguously conveyed all of Thagard’s property interests in the
subject sections to Cass, including all ORRI. For the second dispute, the trial court
initially determined that the assignment from Cass to Plains Petroleum conveyed all
of Cass’s right, title, and interest in Sections 32 and 41, except as to depths below
8,700 feet, which he purportedly retained. However, after considering the RIM
parties’ motion for reconsideration, the trial court vacated its prior order in part and
determined that the operative assignment conveyed Cass’s entire mineral fee interest
in Sections 32 and 41, including those to all depths below 8,700 feet.
The trial court later signed an amended order, which incorporated its prior
rulings on the two title issues and included the findings necessary to satisfy the
statutory requirements for permitting the parties to seek permissive appeals of those
title issue determinations. 3 See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(d). Thagard thereafter
filed a petition for permissive appeal of the title issue that pertains to its dispute with
Cass and XTO, which we granted. 4 Cass separately filed a petition for permissive

3
Specifically, the trial court found that the two title issues were “controlling questions of law . . . as
to which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion” and that “an immediate appeal . . . as to
[those] issues will materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation because it would
dispositively resolve legal issues concerning the scope, meaning, and what interests, if any, were transferred
as a result of the two assignments central to this matter.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(d).
4
XTO filed a letter brief in this appeal disclaiming any position on either title dispute.

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appeal of the title issue that pertains to his dispute with the RIM parties, which we
also granted.
II. Standard of Review
We review declaratory judgment determinations under the same standards as
other judgments. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 37.010 (West 2020). “We look to the
procedure used to resolve the issue below to determine the standard of review on
appeal.” Tanglewood Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. Feldman, 436 S.W.3d 48, 65–66 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Here, the trial court granted
declaratory relief to Cass and the RIM parties in its orders granting their respective
motions for summary judgment.
“We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Eagle Oil
& Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021); Fort Worth Transp.
Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Tex. 2018). To prevail under the
traditional summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopman, 547 S.W.3d 858,
865 (Tex. 2018). If the movant meets its summary judgment burden, the burden
then shifts to the nonmovant to present to the trial court any issues or evidence that
would preclude the grant of summary judgment. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home
Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014).
To determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable
inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. KMS Retail Rowlett,
LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019). We credit favorable
inference to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could do so, and we disregard
contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S.

8
Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tex. 2017); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). The evidence raises a
genuine issue of material fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in
their conclusions in light of all the summary judgment evidence presented.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007).
III. Applicable Law
A. Principles of Contract Construction
When construing a contract, our objective is to “ascertain the true intentions
of the parties as expressed in the writing itself,” beginning with the instrument’s
express language. Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. BlueStone Nat. Res. II, LLC, 639
S.W.3d 682, 689 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011)); see Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff,
596 S.W.3d 740, 743–44 (Tex. 2020). In doing so, we consider the entire writing
and attempt to harmonize the provisions so that all are given effect, and none are
rendered meaningless. U.S. Polyco, Inc. v. Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp., 681 S.W.3d
383, 390 (Tex. 2023); Frost Nat’l Bank v. L&F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310, 312
(Tex. 2005).
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. URI, Inc. v. Kleberg
Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018). “A contract is a written expression of the
parties’ intent. When that intent is in question, the text must be read ‘as a whole in
light of the circumstances [that existed] when the contract was executed.’” Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., 691 S.W.3d 438, 439
(Tex. 2024) (quoting Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940
S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996)). If a contract has a certain and definite meaning, the
contract is unambiguous, and we will construe it as a matter of law. Barrow-Shaver
Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471, 479 (Tex. 2019). Thus, when

9
a contract is unambiguous, it will be enforced as written—that is, the instrument
alone will be deemed to express the objective intent of the parties, and extrinsic
evidence bearing on the parties’ subjective intent will not be considered. See U.S.
Polyco, 681 S.W.3d at 387; Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. Sheppard, 668 S.W.3d 332,
343 (Tex. 2023). However, if a contract “is subject to two or more reasonable
interpretations after applying the pertinent rules of construction, the contract is
ambiguous, creating a fact issue on the parties’ intent.” Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d
at 479; J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003).
When construing an unambiguous instrument, we may consult facts and
circumstances surrounding its execution to aid our interpretation. See Rustic Nat.
Res. LLC v. DE Midland III LLC, 669 S.W.3d 494, 501 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022,
pet. denied) (citing Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d at 483–84). However, we cannot
employ the surrounding context to make contract language state something it
unambiguously does not or to determine “that the parties probably meant, or could
have meant, something other than what their agreement stated.” URI, 543 S.W.3d
at 757 (quoting Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l, Inc. v. Greenburg Peden, P.C., 352
S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tex. 2011)). Rather, the “facts and circumstances can only
provide context that elucidates the meaning of the words employed, and nothing
else,” and they can only give contract language a meaning to which it is “reasonably
susceptible.” Id. at 765. “In other words, such evidence may not be ‘used to add,
alter, or change the contract’s agreed-to terms.’” Nettye Engler Energy, 639 S.W.3d
at 690 (quoting Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d at 485); see URI, 543 S.W.3d at 758.
“Property ‘excepted’ or ‘reserved’ under an instrument of conveyance is
‘never included in the grant’ and is ‘something to be deducted from the thing granted,
narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the

10
grant.’”5 Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2013, pet. denied) (quoting King v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 192 S.W.2d
260, 262 (Tex. 1946)). Therefore, reservations must be made by clear language, and
courts do not favor reservations by implication. Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153,
154 (Tex. 1952). “Exceptions must identify, with reasonable certainty, the property
to be excepted from the larger conveyance.” Graham, 429 S.W.3d at 655–56
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a]s a general rule, exceptions are strictly
construed against the grantor.” State v. Dunn, 574 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
If an instrument is expressly made “subject to” or “pursuant to” a second
instrument, “the parties intended [them] to be construed together.” Burlington Res.
Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC, 573 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Tex 2019);
Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 840 (Tex. 2000).
B. The Statute of Frauds
The statute of frauds requires that contracts for the sale of real property be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 26.01(a), (b)(4) (West 2023); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.021 (West 2021).
Oil and gas interests constitute real property; therefore, an agreement for the transfer
or assignment of a mineral interest must comply with the statute of frauds. Long
Trusts v. Griffin, 222 S.W.3d 412, 416 (Tex. 2006). “[O]ne of the most essential
elements of a contract for the conveyance of . . . an [ORRI] is a description of the
lease from which it comes; for it is the lease which denotes the life and breadth of
the estate to be assigned.” Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 742 n.2 (quoting

5
Although sometimes used interchangeably, the terms “exception” and “reservation” carry separate
meanings. Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Cap. Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tex. 2018) (“Although
an ‘exception’ can refer to any ‘mere exclusion from the grant,’ a ‘reservation’ must ‘always be in favor of
and for the benefit of the grantor.’” (quoting Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957))).

11
Gruss v. Cummins, 329 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1959, writ ref’d
n.r.e.)).
The sufficiency of a legal description in any instrument that transfers a
property interest is a question of law that we review de novo. Anderson Energy
Corp. v. Dominion Okla. Tex. Expl. & Prod., Inc., 469 S.W.3d 280, 295 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (citing Dixon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 150 S.W.3d
191, 194 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, pet. denied)).
To comply with the statute of frauds, an instrument must provide sufficient
information to reasonably identify the property in question, either directly or “by
reference to some other existing writing” by which the property to be conveyed may
be identified with “reasonable certainty.” Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97, 101
(Tex. 2017) (quoting Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972)). Even
if the record is clear that the parties knew and understood what property was to be
conveyed, the knowledge and intent of the parties will not make the contract valid.
Morrow, 477 S.W.2d at 540. Thus, if the contract does not sufficiently describe the
real property interest to be conveyed, the conveyance is void under the statute of
frauds and will not support an action for specific performance or breach of contract.
Pick v. Bartel, 659 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983); Wilson v. Fisher, 188 S.W.2d 150,
152 (Tex. 1945).
“The purpose of the written description is not to identify the land, but to
provide a means of identification.” Anderson Energy, 469 S.W.3d at 295 (citing
Reiland v. Patrick Thomas Props., Inc., 213 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)). The Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged that
Texas employs a strict application of the statute of frauds for interests in land, but it
nonetheless allows for a liberal construction of the words that describe the land. See
Gates v. Asher, 280 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex. 1955). The property description must

12
furnish enough information to locate the property’s general area “as in identifying it
by tract survey and county,” and to determine the “size, shape, and boundaries” of
the property. Anderson Energy, 469 S.W.3d at 295 (quoting Reiland, 213 S.W.3d
at 437); see Morrow, 477 S.W.2d at 539. The description of real property “must be
reasonably certain so that a party familiar with the locality could identify the
property to the exclusion of other property.” Gary & Theresa Poenisch Fam. Ltd.
P’ship v. TMH Land Servs., Inc., No. 04-20-00300-CV, 2021 WL 4173309, at *3
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 15, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Gaut v.
Daniel, 293 S.W.3d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied)).
“When the language in the contract furnishes a ‘key or nucleus’ description
of the property, extrinsic evidence may then be used merely as an aid to identify the
property with reasonable certainty from the data contained in the contract, not to
supply a missing description.” Anderson Energy, 469 S.W.3d at 295–96 (citing
Long Trusts, 222 S.W.3d at 416). Under this “nucleus description” theory, a
property description may identify the property “with reasonable certainty when:
(1) the contract contains a ‘statement of ownership’ such as ‘my property,’ ‘my
land,’ or ‘owned by me;’ and (2) it is shown by extrinsic evidence that the party to
be charged owns only one tract of land [or only one interest in real property] fitting
the property description in the contract.” Moudy v. Manning, 82 S.W.3d 726, 728
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (quoting Pickett v. Bishop, 223 S.W.2d
222, 223 (Tex. 1949)); see Williams v. Ellison, 493 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1973).
Nevertheless, if the instrument of conveyance “refers to another instrument
which contains a proper description of the property, such [] instrument may be
looked to in aid of the description.” ConocoPhillips Co. v. Hahn, 704 S.W.3d 515,
533 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Maupin v. Chaney, 163 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. 1942)).
“Thus, it is sufficient if the instrument ‘furnish[es] within itself or by reference to

13
other identified writings then in existence, the means or data by which the particular
land [or interest in land] to be conveyed may be identified with specific certainty.’”
Id. (quoting Pick, 659 S.W.2d at 637).
IV. Analysis
A. Cause No. 11-23-00207-CV – The Thagard Assignment Is Unambiguous
and Unambiguously Conveyed the Subject Interests
Thagard contends that the Thagard Assignment is facially incomplete for two
reasons: (1) it repeatedly refers to leases listed on Exhibit A, but no leases are listed
in Exhibit A, which is a material omission because (a) the effective date of the
assignment is tied to the leases, (b) the Thagard Assignment discusses appurtenant
rights in reference to the leases in Exhibit A, and (c) the interests conveyed are those
interests “to the extent described” in Exhibit A; and (2) the Thagard Assignment
purports to be “subject to” a missing instrument. Thagard argues that either of these
flaws renders the Thagard Assignment ambiguous and incapable of interpretation as
a matter of law; therefore, the use of extrinsic evidence to complete the contract
terms is justified.
Thagard further contends that even if the assignment is both complete and
effective, it nevertheless failed to convey any ORRI because the statute of frauds
requires a conveyance of such interests to identify the associated leases, which the
Thagard Assignment fails to do.
Cass responds that the Thagard Assignment is unambiguous because the only
reasonable interpretation of it is that Thagard conveyed to Cass all his interests in
Sections 32 and 41. Cass contends that Thagard’s ambiguity arguments fail for the
same reasons his statute-of-frauds argument fails: the scope of the conveyance and
its effective date can be determined as a matter of law by reviewing and considering
the four corners of the Thagard Assignment and readily available public data. Cass

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also responds that no missing instrument exists because the “subject to” phrase in
Exhibit A of the Thagard Assignment refers to the Thagard Assignment itself.
The parties’ arguments primarily concern whether the leases associated with
the contested royalty interests must have been attached to the Thagard Assignment
for it to be unambiguous. In this regard, we will first address Thagard’s argument
that the scope of this Assignment is limited by a missing instrument.
Thagard bases this argument on the following sentence in Exhibit A: “Subject
to that certain Assignment, Bill of Sale and Conveyance dated July 5th, 1990, by and
between Greg Thagard, Assignor, and Michael L. Cass, Assignee.” Thagard urges
that this sentence refers to an additional assignment between Thagard and Cass,
which serves to limit the description in Exhibit A of the Thagard Assignment.
Thagard contends that this additional assignment is a necessary part of the Thagard
Assignment’s interpretation, it is not in the summary judgment record, and, as such,
it is missing; therefore, the Thagard Assignment cannot be given a matter-of-law
interpretation.
Importantly, the Thagard Assignment—between Thagard as Assignor and
Cass as Assignee—is entitled “Assignment, Bill of Sale and Conveyance,” and dated
July 5, 1990. Thagard acknowledges this, but reasons that it is nonsensical for a
property description (Exhibit A) to describe itself as “subject to” the operative
conveyance—rather, properly, it is the conveyance that is subject to the property
description, which defines the scope of the conveyance. This is true enough.
However, Thagard concedes in an affidavit that he has “looked for but been
unable to locate the missing assignment.” In his affidavit, Cass states that (1) he is
unaware of the existence of the alleged additional assignment, (2) only one
assignment matching the description in Exhibit A was executed between he and
Thagard, and (3) the allegation that an additional assignment that limited the grant

15
in the Thagard Assignment is not an accurate representation. Cass also states in his
affidavit that, “After I executed and sent the Thagard Assignment to Mr. Thagard
for recording, he recorded the Thagard Assignment in the Deed Records of Midland
County, Texas. . . . The Alleged Assignment, which was alleged of having been
executed on or about the same date, was not recorded, for the simple reason that it
does not exist.”
Thagard asserts that it is as reasonable to conclude from these circumstances
that there is a missing document here, as it is to conclude that the parties used
language that was both circular and backwards. We disagree; there is no evidence
that another assignment exists. Thus, lacking another reasonable explanation, the
inartful “[s]ubject to” language in Exhibit A appears to refer to the Thagard
Assignment itself.
Next, we address Thagard’s remaining arguments regarding the property
description in Exhibit A and the text of the assignment that refers to the “leases
listed” there. Because this analysis requires an examination of the scope of the
property description in Exhibit A, with it we also address Thagard’s statute-of-frauds
argument.
Thagard argues that the language that refers to the “leases listed” in Exhibit A
renders the Thagard Assignment incomplete and ambiguous because no leases are
listed in Exhibit A. But the granting language of the Assignment does not use this
language. Instead, the grant in the Thagard Assignment conveys “all of [Thagard’s]
right, title, and interest in and to the lands, tracts, oil and gas and/or mineral leases
and leasehold interests in and to the subject lands, which are listed and to the extent
described on Exhibit ‘A.’” Thagard contends that this language is narrowed by the
property description in Exhibit A because the granting clause limits the grant to the
property “listed and to the extent described” in Exhibit A. According to Thagard,

16
Exhibit A describes only the surface estate because although the granting language
described various interests, it was limited by the “listed and to the extent described
on Exhibit A” language. Thus, such a description of the sections of land only is
tantamount to a limitation of the grant because a specific description of leases or
other interests was not included.
It is true, as Thagard argues, that “where an exhibit is referenced to describe
the property being conveyed, it is the description of the interest in the exhibit which
controls the scope of the grant, regardless of the breadth of the granting language.”
Posse Energy, Ltd. v. Parsley Energy, LP, 632 S.W.3d 677, 693 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2021, pet. denied) (citing Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 747–48). However,
it is also true that an instrument of conveyance of real property passes whatever
interest the grantor has in the land, unless it contains language expressing the
intention to grant a lesser estate. Rahlek, Ltd. v. Wells, 587 S.W.3d 57, 64 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied). As the Texas Supreme Court has said, “[a]ll
means all.” Davis, 528 S.W.3d at 102.
Thus, in proper context, the description of the interest in the exhibit (here
Exhibit A) is controlling, regardless of the breadth of the granting language. Posse
Energy, 632 S.W.3d at 693 (citing Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 747–48). But
this only begins the inquiry because an exhibit that does not expressly state whether
the interest listed in it identifies the scope of the interest that was conveyed presents
further interpretive questions. See Vaughn v. Vaughan, 710 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (citing Occidental Permian, Ltd. v. Citation 2002
Inv. LLC, 689 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex. 2024)). In Occidental Permian, the final
granting clause included a broad statement that it was the intent of the parties to the
assignment to convey “all rights and interests . . . regardless of whether same may
be incorrectly described or omitted from Exhibit A,” however, more specific or

17
limiting descriptions in the Exhibit A do not act to limit the grant. Id. at 419–20
(quoting Occidental Permian, 689 S.W.3d at 902–03, 906); see also Piranha
Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 746.
We addressed a similar question to the one now before us in Vaughn. See
Vaughn, 710 S.W.3d at 415. In Vaughn, a deed of trust over certain real property
referenced an exhibit to describe the property being conveyed. Id. The exhibit
described the property as:
SURFACE ESTATE ONLY:
Being all of the Southeast One-fourth (SE/4) of Section Eight (8), Block
Thirty-two (32), Township G North, T&P Ry. Co. Surveys, Borden
County, Texas.
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS AND/OR
RESERVATIONS:
(a) All outstanding ownership in the oil, gas[,] and other minerals in,
on[,] and under that may be produced from the described
premises, as such outstanding interest are shown by the records
of the County Clerk of Borden County, Texas;
(b) Any outstanding oil, gas[,] and mineral lease or leases upon the
premises, which lease or leases appear of record in the office of
the County Clerk of Borden County, Texas; and
(c) Any and all easements and/or rights-of-way which appear of
record in the office of the County Clerk of Borden County,
Texas, or which are visible and apparent upon the ground.
Id. at 415–16. In Vaughn, we considered whether the deed of trust secured a lien on
mineral interests as well as the surface estate of the property. Id. at 415. We
concluded that it did not because the exhibit attached to the deed of trust expressly
and unambiguously limited the conveyance to the surface estate only and excepted
all mineral interests. Id. at 420–21.

18
Here, Exhibit A contains no language that limits the grant to the surface estate
only, nor does it contain any exceptions from the grant whatsoever. As such, it does
not at all narrow or limit the broad granting language contained in the Thagard
Assignment. See Rahlek, 587 S.W.3d at 64 (“[A] deed will pass whatever interest
the grantor has in the land, unless it contains language showing a clear intention to
grant a lesser estate.”); Graham, 429 S.W.3d at 655–56 (“Exceptions ‘must identify,
with reasonable certainty, the property to be excepted from the larger conveyance.’”
(quoting Angell v. Bailey, 225 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.));
see also Davis, 528 S.W.3d at 102 (“All means all.”).
Thagard contends that any conveyance of an ORRI requires a description of
the lease that it burdens. See Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 742 n.2; Gruss, 329
S.W.2d at 501. But as Cass points out, both Piranha Partners and Gruss involved
conveyances of an ORRI only, whereas the Thagard Assignment involves a grant of
“all” the assignor’s right, title, and interest in the lands, tracts, leases, and leasehold
interests in and to the subject lands as described on Exhibit A, which simply
describes three sections of land. Nevertheless, a broad grant such as this need not
be so specific to be effective. See Rahlek, 587 S.W.3d at 64; see also Davis, 528
S.W.3d at 102.
With this understanding of the scope of the property description, we turn to
the “leases listed” language that Thagard points out in other provisions of the
Assignment. The first reference appears in the following language:
This Assignment includes, to the extent Assignor may lawfully
assign same, corresponding undivided interests in and to all of such
Assignor’s right, title, interest and estate in and to the property and
rights incident, not limited to the leases listed on Exhibit “A” (emphasis
added).

19
This boilerplate provision can be harmonized with the broader language in the grant
and the broad property description. Occidental Permian, 689 S.W.3d at 905–09;
U.S. Polyco, 681 S.W.3d at 390; Frost Nat’l Bank, 165 S.W.3d at 312. It
contemplates that leases may be listed in Exhibit A, but as we have explained, the
granting language and corresponding property description broadly encompass all of
Thagard’s interests, including any leases. Contrary to Thagard’s assertion, the above
passage does not conflict with this reading or create any ambiguity.
Next, the effective date of the Thagard Assignment is tied to the “first runs”
of the “leases listed” in Exhibit A. The term “first runs” is not defined and the
effective date appears to be a condition precedent, for which an exception to the
parol evidence rule exists. Rincones v. Windberg, 705 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1986, no pet.) (“It is settled that parol evidence of a condition
precedent to a contract is admissible. The effect of such a condition ‘is not to vary
the terms of a binding instrument, but merely, as a condition precedent, to postpone
the effective date of the instrument until the happening of a contingency.” (quoting
Baker v. Baker, 183 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1944))).
Cass cites to three Texas cases in which the term “first runs” is used in
reference to oil and gas leases; 6 however, none of these cases offer more than an
implied definition of the term, nor does Cass cite to any other authority to support
his contention that it is a common term in the oil and gas industry. Thagard does not
challenge the meaning of this term; instead, he asserts that because leases are not

6
Tex. Gas Corp. v. Hankamer, 326 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App.—Houston 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(“A test run shall be made at the time such well is put on stream and first runs are made into the pipe line.”);
Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1957, no writ) (“This well is now, and has
continuously since the date of first runs in 1952, produced gas in commercial quantities.”); Rainwater v.
Mason, 283 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1955, no writ) (deed conveying “royalties due or to
become due from the day of first runs” entitled the appellee to royalties “from the accrued oil runs”).

20
explicitly listed in Exhibit A, this omission renders the Assignment incomplete or
the effectiveness date impossible. We disagree. Even if the leases were included in
Exhibit A, they could not furnish the timing of the “first runs” from the four corners
of the assignment. It is necessarily a future contingency. See id.
Therefore, we return to the question of whether the property description that
is contained in Exhibit A is sufficient because it provides the information needed to
locate the land—we conclude that it is. Moreover, this information subsequently
would allow one to locate the interests that are associated with the grant of this
assignment, including the leases and pertinent Railroad Commission information,
which would furnish the first production dates of the leases.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the Thagard Assignment is
unambiguous and unambiguously transferred to Cass all right, title, and interest,
including ORRI, 7 that Thagard had in the subject property. As such, the trial court
did not err when it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Cass on this issue.
Accordingly, we overrule Thagard’s issues on appeal.
B. Cause No. 11-23-00208-CV – The Assignment from Cass to the RIM
Parties Unambiguously Conveyed Cass’s Entire Mineral Fee Interest in
Sections 32 and 41
We turn now to the second dispute, between Cass, as Appellant,8 and the RIM
parties. The controlling question of law is whether the second assignment, between

7
The RIM parties filed a brief in Cause No. 11-23-00207-CV and adopted Cass’s arguments, but
additionally argued that the Thagard Assignment conveyed the royalty interests in Section 41 granted by
Cass to Thagard through a “royalty deed” dated January 4, 1990, which Cass then conveyed to the RIM
parties in the assignment between them that is the subject of Cause No. 11-23-00208-CV, which we discuss
below. The trial court’s order—which we affirm in this opinion—broadly declared that the Thagard
Assignment conveyed “all” of Thagard’s right, title, and interest to Cass. Similarly, our construction of the
Thagard Assignment includes “all” right, title, and interest that Thagard held in Sections 32 and 41.
The Assignors to this assignment included Cass, his wife, and “MLC Co., Inc., and Michael L.
8

Cass Companys, Inc. dba MLC Co., Inc.” We refer to this group as “Cass” unless otherwise specified, but

21
Cass and Plains Petroleum, unambiguously transferred Cass’s entire mineral fee
interest in all depths in the subject property.
Cass contends that the assignment and the descriptions listed in Exhibit A to
this assignment are unambiguous and clearly limit the conveyance to only the depths
described. The RIM parties argue that the assignment conveyed “all” of Cass’s
personal right, title, and interest in the mineral fee interest—including the attendant
royalty interests—in Sections 32 and 41 without any limitation as to depths.
Shortly after the Thagard Assignment was executed, Cass executed an
assignment that conveyed certain interests to Plains Petroleum. As relevant to the
disputed mineral interests, the assignment’s granting clause provided the following:

That is, it recited that Cass conveyed “all” of his right, title, and interest in “the
following described estates or interests, to-wit:” all of the oil, gas, and mineral leases,
properties, rights, and undivided interests owned by Cass and listed in Exhibit A.
Exhibit A begins with a statement that it is attached to and made a part of the
assignment dated July 24, 1990, “by and between Michael L. Cass, et al and Plains

importantly, the mineral interest at issue is or was Michael L. Cass’s personal interest in the subject lands,
as discussed in detail below.

22
Petroleum.” It then states that “All Properties are located in Midland County,
Texas.” After these preliminaries, there is a table of “Proved Developed Producing
Properties.” Above the table, capitalized and underlined, is the label “MICHAEL
L. CASS’ PERSONAL INTEREST INCLUDING HIS O.R.R.I. & MINERAL
INTEREST.” Sections 32 and 41 are included in this table, which is reproduced
below:

Following this table in Exhibit A, a centered heading entitled “Leases
Covering The Above Producing Properties” introduces a long list of properties—
each producing property is listed again, but under each producing property is
included an indented column that lists and identifies the leases by lessor, lessee, the
date of the lease, and the recording volume and page number. Sections 32 and 41
are described in this part of Exhibit A as follows:

23
H. Maralo “32” – Covering All of Section 32, Block 38, T-4-S, T&P
Ry. Co. Survey, Midland County, Texas from the surface to 8700
feet subsurface.
[Followed by an indented column listing twenty-four leases]
I. Maralo “41” – Covering All of Section 41, Block 38, T-4-S, T&P
Ry. Co. Survey, Midland County, Texas from the surface to 8700
feet subsurface.
[Followed by an indented column listing twenty-nine leases]
The grant concludes in the body of the assignment with a habendum clause, which
reads: “TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the Properties, to the extent herein conveyed.”
Cass argues that, when read together, the table of “Producing Properties” and
the following list of leases that covers them provide the full description of the
properties identified in Exhibit A and conveyed in Section I (a) of the assignment.
Conversely, the RIM parties argue that the depth limitations in the “Leases
Covering” section apply only to the leases listed and identified there, and not to the
mineral interests included in the table of “Producing Properties.” We agree with the
RIM parties.
As we stated earlier, because the granting language references and
incorporates Exhibit A to describe the property being conveyed in Section I (a), the
description of the property in the exhibit controls the scope of the grant over the
breadth of the granting language. Posse Energy, 632 S.W.3d at 693 (citing Piranha
Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 747–48). But when such an exhibit contains ambiguities,
we will read all the provisions of the instrument together to ascertain its meaning.
See Occidental Permian, 689 S.W.3d at 905–06 (holding that all provisions should
be read and construed together to determine whether any ambiguity exists) (citing
Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 752–53).

24
Here, the six-column table of “Proved Developed Producing Properties” is
preceded by the underlined and all-capitalized label: “MICHAEL L. CASS’
PERSONAL INTEREST INCLUDING HIS O.R.R.I. & MINERAL INTEREST.”
The table shows various interest percentages, each associated with a “LEASE
NAME” and a corresponding section number, block number, and township. The
column showing each section number also specifies whether the table covers “all”
of the section number or only a fractional part. For example, the “Maralo 41” covers
“all” of Section 41, whereas the “A.M. Cowden” covers only the East half of the
Northeast quarter of Section 14. The table does not contain any notations regarding
depth limitations. This is significant.
The next section is introduced by the header “Leases Covering The Above
Producing Properties.” This list again lays out the same properties listed in the
“LEASE NAME” column of the “Producing Properties” table but here, rather than
in tabular form, the property information is simply spelled out. For example, the
“LEASE NAME” for the first property listed the “Producing Properties” table is
“Babb ‘30’,” the section number is “30 – All,” and the block number is “38.” In the
“Leases Covering” section, the first property is identified as “Babb – Covering All
of Section 30, Block 38, T-4-S, T&P Ry. Co. Survey, Midland County, Texas
containing 664.3 acres of land, more or less.” The descriptions of the two properties
that are the subject of this dispute are set out above.
The parties do not dispute that the properties identified in both parts of
Exhibit A are the same; however, they disagree as to the meaning of this designation.
Although the same properties are listed in both parts of Exhibit A, only one part—
the “Leases Covering” section—at times mentions or refers to depth limitations. The
RIM parties contend that the depth limitations noted in the “Leases Covering”
section do not apply to the descriptions in the “Producing Properties” table because

25
that table compiles Michael L. Cass’s personal interests in those properties that are
to be conveyed, including mineral and royalty interests, rather than the specific
leases that cover the same property.
Cass contends that the “Leases Covering” section more clearly and
specifically identifies the property. According to Cass, everything that is used to
identify the property in the “Leases Covering” section—including the depth
limitations that are present in the descriptions of Section 32, Section 41, and others—
applies equally to all the property that is described in the “Producing Properties”
table. Cass essentially asserts that because the “Producing Properties” are listed in
their table by “LEASE NAME(s)” that correspond(s) to the properties listed in the
“Leases Covering” section, the “LEASE NAME” column simply incorporates all
the following section’s information, including depth limitations, into the “Producing
Properties” table.
But the headers and labels included in the two sections of Exhibit A indicate
that they address different aspects of the conveyance. The “Producing Properties”
table unambiguously labels and identifies Cass’s personal interests, including his
mineral interests. The “Leases Covering” section does not mention or refer to Cass’s
personal interests, whether it be working interests, royalty interests, overriding
royalty interests, or mineral interests. Instead, it only addresses the leases that cover
the “Producing Properties.” The two sections of Exhibit A are segregated by headers
and labels that indicate different subjects, but each use the “Lease Name(s)” of the
properties—“Babb [Section Number]” or “Maralo [Section Number],” for example.
However, one section contains and refers to depth limitations; the other does not.
Because there is no express guidance in the exhibit that directs us to read the two
sections one way or the other, we must turn to the provisions of the assignment. See

26
Occidental Permian, 689 S.W.3d at 905–06 (citing Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d
at 752–53).
Because of the minor ambiguities in Exhibit A, the breadth of the granting
language in Section I weighs in favor of a broader reading of the assignment. The
pertinent language indicates an intent to convey everything that the Assignors—
Cass, his wife, and his companies—own in the “Properties,” and that this would
be better effectuated by refusing to construe the depth limitations in one part of
Exhibit A into another part that does not expressly contain such limitations.
Greater support for this view is contained in Section IV of the assignment,
which sheds further light on the meaning of Exhibit A:

This section further supports our reading that (1) Exhibit A is designed to contain
two separate parts which address two separate topics, and (2) the “Producing
Properties” table should not be associated with the depth limitations contained in the
“Leases Covering” section. Section IV expressly disclaims that the decimals set
forth in Exhibit A—regarding certain identified properties that describe various
working interests, net revenue interests, ORRI, “or other words of like import”—are
limitations on the scope of the grant, and it states that they are for informational
purposes only. Immediately following this, Section IV also states that it is the
parties’ intent that “the entire right, title and interest in and to the Properties owned
by Assignors and described on Exhibit ‘A’ as of the Effective Date hereof shall be

27
subject to the terms of this Assignment.” Section IV specifically addresses the only
express limitation that is contained in the “Producing Properties” table—the decimal
percentages of various interests as described in the second and third columns.
Moreover, it does so to specifically disclaim them as limitations. Significantly,
Section IV does not address depth limitations at all.
The leases “described on Exhibit A” are only mentioned once in the body of
the assignment in Section V. There, the assignment is expressly made subject to
“the terms and provisions of the oil and gas leases described on Exhibit ‘A’ and all
assignments and/or agreements which affect said leases, whether or not the same
appear of record.” Nowhere does the assignment address the depth limitations
contained in the “Leases Covering” section of Exhibit A. 9
This silence is telling. Although the assignment takes care to prohibit the
construction of the percentages that are expressed as decimals in Exhibit A as being
limitations on the grant—because the intent is to assign the “entire right, title and
interest” owned by Assignors and described in Exhibit A—it does not prohibit such
a construction of the depth limitations. And yet the depth limitations are not included
in the “Producing Properties” table—which is clearly labeled as addressing a
different subject than what is contained in the “Leases Covering” section, and in
which the only potential limitation that is included is expressly disclaimed as “for
informational purposes only.”
Cass cites to several cases in support of his primary contention that a plain
reading of Exhibit A shows an intent to limit the grant in accordance with the depth

9
As a practical observation, the inclusion of a list of existing leases within the four corners of a
property conveyance that includes mineral interests advises the purchaser of the property of the existing
burdens than run with and are associated with that property. In that scenario, chosen language that the
property acquired is “subject to” existing leases would indicate that the acquired property shall be assumed
with any existing lease that burdens the property.

28
limitations contained in the “Leases Covering” portion of Exhibit A. We find each
case to be distinguishable.
In Posse Energy, the instrument limited that grant to a lease “INSOFAR AND
ONLY INSOFAR AS” the lease covered certain depths. Posse Energy, 632 S.W.3d
at 681, 685. But Posse Energy concerned a single lease with a specific depth
limitation, and the Eighth Court of Appeals noted that the Texas Supreme Court held
in Piranha Partners that the phrase “INSOFAR AND ONLY INSOFAR” serves as
a limitation on the conveyance itself. Id. at 694 (citing Piranha Partners, 596
S.W.3d at 753). The court in Posse Energy also distinguished the conveyance
instruments it was construing from those in Piranha Partners and similar cases
because, unlike those cases, the instruments and exhibits in Posse Energy contained
sufficient specificity to dictate the scope of the grant. Id. at 694–95. Here, the
assignment did not contain any specific limitation, and the Assignors conveyed a
variety of property interests, including some labeled in Exhibit A’s “Producing
Properties” table as “MICHAEL CASS’ PERSONAL INTEREST INCLUDING
HIS O.R.R.I. & MINERAL INTEREST.”
Cass next cites to our decision in Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc. because there the
granting clause described the grant as: “Being all the Surface Rights, and everything
thereon,” which we construed to be a limitation of the grant to only the surface rights.
646 S.W.2d 292, 293–94 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In the case
now before us, however, the grant in Section I (a) simply references Exhibit A for
property-description purposes only—there is no limitation in the granting language
that is similar to that which we construed in Large.
Next, Cass cites to Ridgefield Permian, in which a Sherrif’s Deed was limited
by reference to the interests foreclosed in a tax suit and that were described in an
order of sale and in an exhibit. Ridgefield Permian, LLC v. Diamondback E & P

29
LLC, 626 S.W.3d 357, 369 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied). There, the
Eighth Court of Appeals reasoned that despite the broad language in the granting
clause, the language was limited by references to “as foreclosed” in the tax suit and
“as described in the Order of Sale,” and to an exhibit attached to the “Sheriff’s
Deed.” Id. Because only a certain specific interest fit those limitations, despite the
broad granting language, the scope of the grant was significantly limited. Id. We
do not disagree with the court’s analysis in that case. Nevertheless, it differs from
the case now before us because here, the question is not whether the reference in the
granting clause to Exhibit A limited the scope—it does—but rather how the
descriptions contained in Exhibit A did so. As we have explained, the structure of
Exhibit A and the emphatic labeling of the “Producing Properties” table that pertains
specifically to the certain interests in dispute dictates our interpretation of its effect.
Cass also cites to other cases, including Piranha Partners, which he claims
each stand for the same proposition as those cited above. See Piranha Partners, 596
S.W.3d at 744, 753; Hansaker v. Brown Distrib. Co., Ltd., 373 S.W.3d 153, 158
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (grantor conveyed one-half of what he
owned, rather than one-half of the listed mineral interests because the attached
exhibit described only property “now owned by” grantor); Dupnik v. Hermis,
No. 04-12-00417-CV, 2013 WL 979199, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13,
2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“surface only” language included in the property
description in the attached exhibit was a limitation on the grant); Elder v. Anadarko
E & P Co., No. 12-10-00250-CV, 2011 WL 2713817, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler
July 13, 2011, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (legal descriptions in attached exhibit controlled
over language in the granting clause). We give the same explanation for each—
although we have followed the interpretive principles espoused in the cases cited
and relied on by Cass, none of them present analogous circumstances. As we have

30
said, because of the minor ambiguities contained in this attached exhibit, we have
consulted both the language of the controlling exhibit (Exhibit A) and the provisions
in the body of the assignment, and our reading of this assignment and this exhibit,
when taken together as a whole, supports the conclusion that we reach today. See
Occidental Permian, 689 S.W.3d at 905–09.
We conclude that because (1) Exhibit A contains minor ambiguities, (2) the
granting language throughout the assignment is very broad, (3) Exhibit A is
segregated into two parts and labeled for different purposes, and (4) the first part of
Exhibit A does not contain express depth limitations but does include decimal
percentages that are disclaimed as for “informational purposes only,” the depth
limitations in the second part of Exhibit A cannot be read to apply to the properties
that are described in the table in the first part of Exhibit A, as Cass suggests.
Therefore, by its terms, the assignment conveyed all of Cass’s personal interests in
the mineral fee—including the attendant royalty interests—in Sections 32 and 41, to
all depths. As such, the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in
favor of the RIM parties on this issue. Accordingly, we overrule Cass’s sole issue.
V. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the orders of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

August 21, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

31