Jonathan Hobson, Jr. v. Commissioners Court of Palo Pinto County, Texas; County Judge Shane Long; Commissioner Gary Glover; Commissioner Mike Reed; Commissioner Mike Pierce; Commissioner Jeff Fryer; Alfred Ezell; And Kim Ezell

Opinion filed September 18, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00060-CV
__________

JONATHAN HOBSON, JR., Appellant
V.
COMMISSIONERS COURT OF PALO PINTO COUNTY,
TEXAS; COUNTY JUDGE SHANE LONG; COMMISSIONER
GARY GLOVER; COMMISSIONER MIKE REED;
COMMISSIONER MIKE PIERCE; COMMISSIONER JEFF
FRYER; ALFRED EZELL; AND KIM EZELL, Appellees

On Appeal from the 29th District Court
Palo Pinto County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C50323

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is the next chapter in the ongoing dispute between neighboring
landowners, Appellant, Jonathan Hobson, Jr., and Appellees, Alfred Ezell and Kim
Ezell (the Ezells), over Hobson’s use of a certain road (the Road) to access his
landlocked property (the Hobson Tract); the Road traverses the Ezells’ property (the
Ezell Tract).1 Adding to the parties’ dissension is the denial of Hobson’s application
for a neighborhood road by Appellees, the Commissioners Court of Palo Pinto
County, Shane Long, Gary Glover, Mike Reed, Mike Pierce, and Jeff Fryer
(collectively, the Commissioners).
After his application was denied, Hobson filed suit alleging that Palo Pinto
County had abandoned and failed to maintain the Road as a public road, and the
Commissioners had abused their discretion by denying his application. Hobson also
sued the Ezells for declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
(UDJA) and permanent injunctive relief. Hobson and the Ezells filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The trial court ultimately granted the Ezells’ motion, denied
Hobson’s motion, denied all claims that Hobson had asserted against the
Commissioners, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Ezells under the UDJA.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009 (West 2020).
On appeal, Hobson challenges the trial court’s rulings in four issues. In his
first issue, Hobson argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
summary judgment. In his second and third issues, Hobson argues that the trial court
erred when it granted the Ezells’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied
the claims he asserted against the Commissioners. In his fourth issue, Hobson argues
that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees to the Ezells
under the UDJA without requiring segregation. See id. We affirm.

This is the second lawsuit between Hobson and the Ezells concerning his use of the Road to access
1

the Hobson Tract. See Hobson v. Francis, No. 02-18-00180-CV, 2019 WL 2635562, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth June 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2
I. Factual Background
The aerial photograph reproduced below illustrates the spatial relationship of
the Hobson Tract, the Ezell Tract, and the Road; the image depicts the Hobson Tract
as Tract 1, the Ezell Tract as Tract 3, and the Road as a thick red line that runs east-
west along the southern boundary of Tract 3. In addition, U.S. Highway 281 is
depicted as an orange line running north-south along the western boundary of the
Ezell Tract, and the county line between Palo Pinto County and Parker County is a
thin red line that runs north-south through the Ezell Tract. The Road crosses the
county line and connects the Hobson Tract to U.S. Highway 281. While the Hobson
Tract is located exclusively within the extraterritorial boundaries of Parker County,
approximately 60% to 70% of the Road is situated in Palo Pinto County.

In 1978, Hobson’s parents purchased the Hobson Tract. In 1999, Hobson’s
family purchased the Southerland Tract, which is depicted as Tract 4 in the above
photograph. Following the purchase of the Southerland Tract, the Ezells’
predecessor-in-title “pulled the culverts” from the Road and barred the Hobson
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family from using the Road to access their property. In 2003, Hobson’s parents
divorced; in the parties’ property division incident to divorce, Hobson’s father was
awarded the Hobson Tract, and Hobson’s mother was awarded the Southerland
Tract. This allowed Hobson’s father to use a “southern easement” on the
Southerland Tract to access his property. Hobson alleges that, around this time, his
father used approximately ten percent of the eastern portion of the Road to access
the Hobson Tract through the “southern easement.”
In 2006, the Ezells acquired title to the Ezell Tract. After the Ezells took
possession of it, Hobson alleges that they also “blocked and refused to allow [him]
to access the Road.” In 2009, Hobson’s mother sold the Southerland Tract to
Hobson’s sister, who in turn allowed Hobson’s father to continue using the “southern
easement” to access the Hobson Tract. Hobson inherited the Hobson Tract from his
father in 2013, and shortly thereafter, his sister sold the Southerland Tract. Hobson
later obtained title to the Hobson Tract.
On January 12, 2017, Hobson filed suit against the Ezells (as well as other
defendants who are not parties to the Palo Pinto County suit) in Parker County to
establish an easement by prescription across a portion of the Ezell Tract that is in the
same location as the Road. The Ezells later filed a traditional motion for summary
judgment, which the Parker County trial court granted on October 13, 2017. Hobson
appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Second Court of Appeals; however,
Hobson did not challenge the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Ezells. See Hobson, 2019 WL 2635562, at *2 n.4.

4
In 2021, Hobson filed an application for a neighborhood road with the
Commissioners.2 In his application, Hobson claimed that the Road was a public
road that had been abandoned by Palo Pinto County, and he requested that: (1) the
Commissioners “reopen” the Road and declare it to be a public road in Palo Pinto
County; or, (2) alternatively, if the Commissioners determined that the Road was a
private road, the Commissioners should then establish a neighborhood road in the
same location. See TRANSP. §§ 251.003(a) (West 2013) (authority over construction
and maintenance of public roads), .004(a) (commissioners’ court as road
supervisors), .016 (general county authority over roads). After a public hearing, the
Commissioners denied Hobson’s application.
On March 31, 2022, Hobson filed the underlying suit in Palo Pinto County.3
In his pleadings, Hobson asserted two claims against the Commissioners. First,
Hobson alleged that the Commissioners had abandoned and failed to maintain the
Road as a public road, and he sought an order from the trial court requiring that the
Commissioners: (1) acknowledge the Road as a public road in its official records;
(2) enforce Hobson’s and the public’s access to the Road; and (3) “either return to
maintaining [the Road] or formally abandon [the Road].” Second, Hobson alleged
that the Commissioners abused their discretion by denying his alternative request for
relief in his application—to establish a neighborhood road. See id. §§ 251.008(1)
(requirement for county roads to be clear of all obstructions), .053 (application for a

2
Prior to filing his application in Palo Pinto County, Hobson filed two applications for a
neighborhood road with the Parker County Commissioners’ Court, in 2019 and 2020, respectively. See
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 251.053 (West 2013). The Parker County Commissioners’ Court denied
Hobson’s applications. However, after a second hearing in 2021, the county attorney for Parker County
allegedly told Hobson that the Parker County Commissioners’ Court would reconsider his application for
a public or neighborhood road if he sought relief from Palo Pinto County on the issue of whether the Road
was a public road.
3
Hobson later amended his petition on May 1, 2023.

5
neighborhood road). In addition to his claims against the Commissioners, Hobson
sued the Ezells for a declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief to restrain
the Ezells from obstructing his access to the Hobson Tract by using the Road.4
The Ezells filed an answer, which they later amended, and asserted multiple
affirmative defenses based on res judicata, laches, limitations, lack of jurisdiction,
and the “redundant remedies doctrine.” On September 1, 2023, the Ezells filed a
motion for partial summary judgment (the Ezell motion).
On September 6, Hobson filed his traditional motion for summary judgment
(the Hobson motion), seeking judgment on the same grounds as alleged in his
pleadings. The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ motions, and on
November 28, it signed two orders, one that denied Hobson’s motion and one that
granted the Ezells’ motion.
Hobson filed a motion to reconsider and for clarification. The trial court
conducted a hearing on Hobson’s motion to reconsider, and on January 2, 2024, it
signed an amended order that clarified its earlier ruling, denied “all of Hobson’s
claims against all [d]efendants,” and stated that it would consider the Ezells’ claim
for attorney’s fees by submission. Subsequently, the Ezells submitted a request for
attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $62,478.15, which the trial court
awarded to them. Pursuant to Hobson’s request, the trial court timely prepared and
signed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its order awarding
attorney’s fees to the Ezells. This appeal followed.

4
Hobson sought seven declarations from the trial court, namely that: (1) the Road “has been the
subject of long and continued use by the public going back many decades . . . and the ownership of the land
at the time that the Public Road originated remains shrouded in obscurity”; (2) the Road is a public road
impliedly dedicated by presumptive donative intent; (3) the Road has not been abandoned by the
Commissioners; (4) he maintains a right and interest in the use of the Road; (5) his right to use the Road is
superior to (or at most equal to) the Ezells; (6) the Ezells are wrongfully interfering with his use of the
Road; and (7) the Ezells have no right to block or interfere with his use of the Road.

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II. Standards of Review and Applicable Law
A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
Ordinarily, an order that denies a request for summary judgment is not final
and appealable; such a denial means that a fact issue exists, or the movant has not
carried its burden to prove the required elements as a matter of law. See Cincinnati
Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996). However, when competing
motions for summary judgment are filed and the trial court grants one motion and
denies the other, the denial is reviewable as part of the appeal from the granted
motion. See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005);
Rustic Nat. Res. LLC v. DE Midland III LLC, 669 S.W.3d 494, 504–05 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2022, pet. denied). Further, and in this circumstance, the parties each must
have moved for summary judgment “on the same issues.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 611 (Tex. 2012). In a summary judgment context, the term
“issues” refers to the grounds asserted by the nonmovant to defeat the movant’s
entitlement to summary judgment. See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.,
858 S.W.2d 337, 339 n.2 (Tex. 1993); Rustic, 669 S.W.3d at 505. Thus, because
Hobson and the Ezells both moved for summary judgment on the same issues in the
underlying suit, we will also review the trial court’s denial of Hobson’s motion. See
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 361 S.W.3d at 611–12 (citing Valence Operating Co., 164
S.W.3d at 661); Rustic, 669 S.W.3d at 505.
We review a trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Eagle
Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021); Fort Worth
Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Tex. 2018). To prevail under the
traditional summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to prove that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858,
7
865 (Tex. 2018); Haynes v. DOH Oil Co., 647 S.W.3d 793, 798 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2022, no pet.).
A defendant who moves for summary judgment relief based on a traditional
motion must either conclusively negate at least one essential element of the cause of
action being asserted by the plaintiff or conclusively establish each element of a
defense or a properly pleaded affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez,
941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589
S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979); Seager v. Fry, 707 S.W.3d 452, 462 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2025, no pet.). If the movant meets its summary judgment burden, the
burden then shifts to the nonmovant to present to the trial court any issues or
evidence that would preclude the grant of summary judgment. Amedisys, Inc. v.
Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014); Seager, 707
S.W.3d at 462. However, when cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, each
party bears the burden to establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). Thus,
when the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we must consider all the
summary judgment evidence, determine all questions presented, and render the
judgment that the trial court should have rendered. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko
E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017) (citing Merriman v. XTO
Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)); City of Stephenville v. Belew, 692
S.W.3d 347, 361 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. denied).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. KMS Retail
Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019); Solaris Oilfield
Site Servs. Oper LLC v. Brown Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 688 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tex.
8
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). We must credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant
if reasonable jurors could do so, and we disregard contrary evidence unless
reasonable jurors could not. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521
S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tex. 2017); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v.
Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A genuine issue of material fact is
raised if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions
considering all the summary judgment evidence presented. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007).
In addition, although a party’s pleadings generally do not qualify as competent
summary judgment evidence, a court may nonetheless grant summary judgment
based on deficiencies in an opposing party’s pleadings, and a movant may rely on
allegations in an opposing party’s pleadings that constitute judicial admissions.
Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 827–28 (Tex. 2022) (citing
Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 818–
20 (Tex. 2021)).
When, as in this case, the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds upon
which it granted summary judgment, “we must affirm the [grant of] summary
judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate
review are meritorious.” Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d
211, 216 (Tex. 2003) (citing Cates, 927 S.W.2d at 626); Tex. Petroleum Land Mgmt.,
LLC v. McMillan, 641 S.W.3d 831, 840 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.). “[I]t
is the appellant’s burden on appeal to show that each of the independent grounds
asserted in support of summary judgment is insufficient to support the judgment.”
Humane Soc’y of Dallas v. Dallas Morning News, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 921, 923 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Further “[i]f summary judgment may have been
rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged [on appeal], the
9
judgment must be affirmed.” Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Just., 95 S.W.3d 676,
682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (quoting Ellis v. Precision
Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston, [1st Dist.] 2002,
no pet.).
B. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
The trial court’s interpretation of applicable statutes is a question of law that
we review de novo. Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 500 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. 2016);
Butler v. City of Big Spring, 652 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet.
denied). When construing a statute, our primary objective is to “ascertain and give
effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Bexar Appraisal Dist. v. Johnson, 691 S.W.3d
844, 847 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Odyssey 2020 Acad. Inc. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal
Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021)); TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs,
340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011).
We begin by examining the plain meaning of the statute’s language. Crosstex
Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014). We
derive legislative intent from the statute as a whole and its plain language, rather
than from isolated portions of it. Odyssey, 624 S.W.3d at 540; City of San Antonio v.
City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003). That is, we read statutes
contextually to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence because every word
and phrase is presumed to have been used intentionally, with a meaning and a
purpose. Fort Worth Transp. Auth., 547 S.W.3d at 838; Belew, 692 S.W.3d at 362.
“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of
grammar and common usage.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011 (West 2013);
Cadena Commercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d
318, 325 (Tex. 2017); see also Johnson, 691 S.W.3d at 847 (Statutory terms that are
not defined by the legislature “usually bear their common, ordinary meaning.”).
10
“If [the language of] the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must read the
language according to its [plain and] common meaning ‘without resort to rules of
construction or extrinsic aids.’” Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 389 (quoting
State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006)); Butler, 652 S.W.3d at 152. In
that regard, we will presume that the legislature intended for each of the statute’s
words to have a purpose. Johnson, 691 S.W.3d at 847. Further, if a statute is
unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation that is supported by the statute’s plain
language unless such an interpretation would yield an absurd result. TGS-NOPEC,
340 S.W.3d at 439 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega
Child Care, 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004)). “A statute is ambiguous if its words
are susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations and we cannot discern
legislative intent from the [statutory] language alone.” Fort Worth Transp. Auth.,
547 S.W.3d at 838.
C. Attorney’s Fees
In Texas, a party may not recover attorney’s fees unless such recovery is
authorized by contract or statute. In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406
S.W.3d 168, 172 (Tex. 2013) (citing Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212
S.W.3d 299, 310–11 (Tex. 2006)). The UDJA generally “affords the trial court a
measure of discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees or not.” Bocquet v.
Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998). In this regard, a trial court “may award
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as are equitable and just” in a declaratory
judgment proceeding. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 37.009; Seager, 707 S.W.3d at 472
(citing MEI Camp Springs, LLC v. Clear Fork, Inc., 623 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2021, no pet.)); see also Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water
Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 637–38 (Tex. 1996).

11
When analyzing the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees on appeal, we note
that “the UDJA does not require an award of attorney’s fees to anyone; rather, it
‘entrusts attorney fee awards to the trial court’s sound discretion.’” Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Irwin, 627 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21);
see Dipprey v. Double Diamond, Inc., 637 S.W.3d 784, 800 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2021, no pet.). A party may request attorney’s fees under the UDJA in an action
which seeks a declaration that a disputed roadway has been impliedly dedicated to
the public. See Shelton v. Kalbow, 489 S.W.3d 32, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Moreover, “[a] trial court may, in its discretion, award
attorneys’ fees to the nonprevailing party in a declaratory judgment action.”
Hartsell v. Town of Talty, 130 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet.
denied).
We review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under the UDJA for an
abuse of discretion. El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2012);
see Seager, 707 S.W.3d at 471. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily,
unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles in reaching its ruling, or
if its ruling is not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. Transcor
Astra Grp. S.A. v. Petrobras Am. Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462, 482 (Tex. 2022) (citing
Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21). “The grant or denial of attorneys’ fees in a declaratory
judgment action lies within the discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not
be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” Hartsell, 130
S.W.3d at 329. In conducting an abuse of discretion review, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and we indulge every
presumption in its favor. Aquaduct, L.L.C. v. McElhenie, 116 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see Glass v. Frank Glass Family P’ship,

12
Ltd., No. 11-16-00047-CV, 2018 WL 4137625, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 30,
2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
“When a claimant wishes to obtain attorney’s fees from the opposing party,
the claimant must prove that the requested fees are both reasonable and necessary.”
Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tex.
2019). Whether the fees requested by a prevailing party are reasonable and
necessary are questions of fact. Id. at 498. In this regard, the lodestar method sets
forth a two-step standard for the factfinder to utilize so that it may ascertain what
constitutes reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. Id.
First, the factfinder must determine the number of reasonable hours that
counsel worked on the case; those hours are then multiplied by the reasonable hourly
rate for counsel’s services. Id.; El Apple I, 370 S.W.3d at 760. At a minimum, the
fee claimant’s proof of reasonable hours should include “evidence of (1) particular
services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the
services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the
services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such
services.” Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 498. This lodestar calculation approximates
“the reasonable value of legal services provided” and, when supported by sufficient
evidence, is presumed to indicate “the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that
can be shifted to the non-prevailing party.” Id. at 498–99.
Second, because other considerations may justify either an enhancement or a
reduction to the lodestar figure, the factfinder must determine “whether evidence of
those considerations overcomes the presumption and necessitates an adjustment to
reach a reasonable fee.” Id. at 501. This determination allows for the enhancement
or the reduction of the lodestar figure “when considerations not already accounted
for in the first step” establish that the lodestar figure represents either an
13
unreasonably low or an unreasonably high fee award. Id. at 502. “[C]onsiderations
already incorporated into the base calculation may not be applied to rebut the
presumption that the base calculation reflects reasonable and necessary attorney’s
fees.” Id. at 501 (noting that Arthur Andersen lists the factors “that may justify an
adjustment” provided they are noncumulative of the base-lodestar considerations)
(citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.
1997)).
“General, conclusory testimony [that is] devoid of any real substance will not
support a fee award.” Id. Generalities about tasks that were performed provide
insufficient information for the factfinder to meaningfully review whether the tasks
performed by counsel and the hours incurred were reasonable and necessary. El
Apple I, 370 S.W.3d at 764. While contemporaneous billing records are not
required, there must be some evidence to inform the factfinder of the amount of time
that counsel dedicated to specific tasks so that it may meaningfully review the
amount of fees requested. Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 502; Long v. Griffin, 442
S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d
731, 736–37 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam).
The issue of fee segregation and whether the claims in dispute are so
intertwined that they cannot be separated, is a mixed question of law and fact that
we review de novo. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 312–14. The party seeking attorney’s
fees has the burden to prove that the requested fees have been properly segregated
or that segregation is not required. Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt., L.L.C. v.
Hannah Reef, Inc., 623 S.W.3d 851, 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet.
denied). A claimant seeking attorney’s fees must segregate the fees that (1) are
recoverable from those that are not, and (2) are owed by different parties. See
Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017) (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at
14
314); see also Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Tex. 1991).
However, an exception to the duty to segregate exists “when the services for which
the fees are incurred ‘advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim,’ such
that the ‘fees are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.’” Transcor Astra
Grp. S.A., 650 S.W.3d at 482 (quoting Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14); see Kinsel,
526 S.W.3d at 427.
III. Analysis
While Hobson’s brief raises multiple sub-issues regarding the trial court’s
rulings and judgment, he presents four issues for our review: (1) did the trial court
err when it denied the Hobson motion; (2) did the trial court err when it granted the
Ezell motion; (3) did the trial court err when it denied Hobson’s claims against the
Commissioners; and (4) did the trial court abuse its discretion when it awarded
attorney’s fees to the Ezells.
Because our resolution of the Ezell motion is dispositive of Hobson’s second
and third issues, we begin by addressing the summary judgment grounds raised in
the Ezell motion.
The Ezells sought summary judgment on the claims that Hobson had asserted
against the Commissioners and the Ezells. First, the Ezells contended that summary
judgment should be granted in their favor because: (1) limitations barred Hobson’s
claims under Section 16.051 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code; (2) res
judicata barred Hobson’s claims; (3) Hobson could not show a probable right of
recovery to obtain permanent injunctive relief; and (4) there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the Road was a private road, or, alternatively, that Palo Pinto
County abandoned the Road as a public one. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.051 (West
2015) (the residual four-year limitations statute); TRANSP. § 251.057 (West Supp.
2024).
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Second, the Ezell motion sought summary judgment for the Commissioners
contending that: (1) limitations barred Hobson’s claims under Section 16.005 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code; 5 (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the
relief that Hobson requested—i.e., the trial court cannot order the Commissioners to
establish either a public road or neighborhood road beyond the extraterritorial
boundaries of Palo Pinto County; and (3) the Commissioner’s did not abuse their
discretion when they denied Hobson’s application, including his request that the
Road be declared a public road for the purposes of county maintenance. See CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 16.005 (West 2025).
In a summary judgment context, the appealing party must negate all possible
grounds upon which the trial court’s summary judgment order could have been
based. See Star–Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995); see also
FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000) (The
reviewing court must affirm summary judgment if any summary judgment ground
is meritorious.). It is not sufficient to merely raise an issue generally—the appellant
must challenge each summary judgment ground with supporting arguments and
authorities. Ramirez v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 458 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2014, no pet.) (citing Rangel v. Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 333 S.W.3d
265, 269–70 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied)). Thus, if the appellant fails to
challenge each ground on which summary judgment could have been granted, we

5
We note that both parties refer to Section 16.005 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code as a
statute of limitations; however, Section 16.005 is a statute of repose. See Crockett Cnty. v. Klassen Energy,
Inc., 463 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.); Hanks v. Sabine Cnty., No. 06-10-00099-
CV, 2011 WL 1260211, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 5, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (stating that
the statute of repose runs from a specific date without regard to the accrual of a cause of action and operates
as an affirmative defense which must be pled and proven by the defendant).

16
must uphold the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the unchallenged
ground(s). Star–Telegram, 915 S.W.2d at 473; Ramirez, 458 S.W.3d at 572.
A. Section 16.051 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code
In his second issue, Hobson argues that the trial court erred when it granted
summary judgment in favor of the Ezells on his claims for declaratory and permanent
injunctive relief based on the defense of the residual four-year statute of limitations.
Specifically, Hobson argues that Section 16.051 is inapplicable to these claims
because the residual limitations statute “do[es] not bar claims for interference with
public roads.” Additionally, Hobson contends that the Ezells were required to
establish that the Road was not public property before the residual statute of
limitations would apply to his suit. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.051. However,
Hobson is incorrect as to each party’s burden of proof regarding the affirmative
defense of limitations.
A defendant that moves for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of
limitations bears the burden to conclusively establish that defense. See Gill v. Hill,
688 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 274 (2024); see also
TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. To meet this burden, the defendant-movant must conclusively
prove when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and, if the discovery rule has been
pleaded or otherwise raised, conclusively negate the application of the discovery rule
and any tolling doctrines that have been pled as an exception to limitations. Gill,
688 S.W.3d at 868. A defendant-movant negates the discovery rule’s application by
proving as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
when the plaintiff-nonmovant discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered his injury. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous.
Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999).

17
Conversely, a plaintiff-nonmovant bears the burden to raise a fact issue to
support his assertion that the statute of limitations cannot bar his suit even if the
limitations period has expired, as Hobson argues here. See Gill, 688 S.W.3d at 868.
Thus, once the Ezells presented sufficient evidence to show that Hobson’s claims
were barred by limitations based on the date of his claimed injury, the burden shifted
to Hobson to raise a fact issue that his claims were not barred by the expiration of
the four-year residual limitations period. Id.
1. The Ezells’ Burden
The question of when a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues is a question of law.
Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 221. Generally, a cause of action accrues when facts come
into existence that authorize one to seek a judicial remedy, when a wrongful act
causes a legal injury, or whenever one person may sue another. Am. Star Energy &
Minerals Corp. v. Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. 2015).
In their motion, the Ezells contended that Hobson’s requests for declaratory
and permanent injunctive relief are barred by Section 16.051, which states that
“[e]very action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for
the recovery of real property, must be brought not later than four years after the day
the cause of action accrues.”6 CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.051; see Futrell v. Lopez,
No. 04-02-00894-CV, 2003 WL 21269591, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 4,
2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing the applicability of a four-year limitations
period to an injury caused by a locked gate that obstructed access to a public road)
(citing Lubbock Cnty., Tex. v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585

6
Neither party contends that Hobson’s claim for injunctive relief was an action for the recovery of
real property.

18
(Tex. 2002)). In his response, Hobson primarily argues that the residual limitations
statute cannot bar his suit even if that limitations period has expired.
As the party seeking summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of
limitations, the Ezells had the burden to prove as a matter of law that no genuine
issue of material fact existed as to when Hobson discovered or should have
discovered the nature of his claimed legal injury. See B. Mahler Interests, L.P. v.
DMAC Constr., Inc., 503 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no
pet.) (citing KPMG Peat Marwick, 988 S.W.2d at 748). To this point, the Ezells
argue that Section 16.051 bars Hobson’s claims because: (1) Hobson filed this suit
more than four years after he filed the Parker County lawsuit in 2017 in which he
sought the same or similar relief; (2) for purposes of limitations, Hobson was aware
of his alleged legal injury no later than 2017 because it had accrued prior to him
filing suit in Parker County; and (3) the claims in both cases encompass the same
underlying facts and legal injury—that the Ezells blocked and interfered with
Hobson’s access to the Road.7 See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.051. We agree with the
Ezells.
Here, the Ezells cited to allegations in Hobson’s pleadings in support of their
contention that the accrual date for his claims was between 2006 and 2013. See
Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d at 827–28 (holding that judicial admissions in an opposing
party’s pleadings may be competent summary judgment evidence to support the
affirmative defense of limitations). According to Hobson’s pleadings, he inherited
the Hobson Tract in 2013, and he acquired title to that property. Moreover, in
Hobson’s original petition in the Parker County suit, he alleged that the previous
owner of the Ezell Tract “fenced the road out” and “pulled out the culverts” on the

7
Hobson filed his suit in Parker County against the Ezells on January 12, 2017.
19
Road prior to the time that the Ezells had acquired the tract. This conduct then
caused Hobson to seek alternative easements to access the Hobson Tract.
Further, Hobson acknowledged that the Ezells continued to block his access
to the Hobson Tract by using a gate on the Road after they acquired possession of
the Ezell Tract. In his Parker County pleadings and answers to interrogatories,
Hobson also alleged that he used a portion of the Road to access his property from
sometime in 2003 until sometime in 2015. Moreover, the allegations in Hobson’s
Parker County pleadings are corroborated by his sworn applications for a
neighborhood road that he filed in Parker County in 2019 and 2020, and in Palo
Pinto County in 2022.
The evidence conclusively shows that Hobson failed to file the underlying suit
within four years from the date he discovered that an alleged actionable legal injury
could be asserted. Therefore, we conclude that Hobson was aware of his
complained-of injury at the time he first filed suit in Parker County in 2017, if not
sooner. Thus, because Hobson’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were
asserted more than four years after the accrual of those causes of action, the Ezells
met their evidentiary burden to show that these claims are barred by the residual
statute of limitations. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.051; Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 221.
As such, the burden shifted to Hobson to raise a fact issue that his claims are not
barred by the expiration of this limitations period, as he suggests. See Gill, 688
S.W.3d at 868.
2. Hobson’s Burden
In his response to the Ezell motion, Hobson argued that he was not seeking
damages for an injury that occurred in the past; rather, he contended that his claim
for permanent injunctive relief constitutes a continuing tort, which negated the
accrual date of his injury under the residual statute of limitations. A cause of action
20
for a continuing tort accrues when the tortious conduct ceases. Upjohn Co. v.
Freeman, 885 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (citing
Tectonic Realty Inv. Co. v. CNA Lloyd’s of Tex. Ins. Co., 812 S.W.2d 647, 654 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied)). “The doctrine of continuing tort, with its
extension of [the] accrual date, is rooted in a plaintiff’s inability to know that the
ongoing conduct is causing him injury.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520
S.W.3d 572, 592 (Tex. 2017).
We note that the Texas Supreme Court has “neither endorsed nor addressed”
the continuing-tort doctrine. See Regency Field Services, LLC v. Swift Energy
Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 817 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Rincones, 520 S.W.3d
at 592). If a plaintiff discovers his injury and its cause, the rationale for the
continuing-tort doctrine no longer applies, and the statute of limitations commences
at that point. Upjohn, 885 S.W.2d at 544 (citing Atha v. Polsky, 667 S.W.2d 307,
310 n.10 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); Beltway Park Baptist Church,
Inc. v. Bolton, No. 11-18-00049-CV, 2020 WL 868069, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Feb. 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Further, and as noted in Rincones, “[w]e follow
our rule that ‘a cause of action generally accrues at the time when facts come into
existence which authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy’ and the ‘fact that
damage may continue to occur for an extended period after accrual does not prevent
limitations from starting to run.’” 520 S.W.3d at 593 (quoting Murray v. San Jacinto
Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990)). Nevertheless, until such time as
the supreme court has expressly addressed this doctrine and its application, we
decline to apply the continuing-tort doctrine to the circumstances before us.
Hobson relies on Section 16.061 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code to
support his argument that his claims against the Ezells are not barred by limitations
because title to public property cannot be taken from the state through adverse
21
possession. CIV. PRAC. & REM § 16.061(a) (West 2015) (“[a] right of action of this
state or a political subdivision of the state . . . is not barred by [Section 16.051]”).
However, Section 16.061 is inapplicable to Hobson’s claims because, while the
legislature has expressly exempted counties and other entities from its application,
this exemption does not apply to private individuals like Hobson. See Monsanto
Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 938–40 (Tex. 1993)
(discussing the statutory amendment history of Section 16.061 and applying the
ordinary meaning to the term “state” as it is used in the statute); Weaver v. City of
Sunset Valley, 535 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. App.—Austin 1976, no writ) (addressing
the applicability of Article 5517—the predecessor statute to Section 16.061—to an
action seeking to acquire title by limitation to a public street) (“[W]e have not
discovered in this body of case law any holding that would extend to private
individuals the same exemption from the statutes of limitations that Article 5517
extends to municipalities, regardless of what right the individual sought to
enforce.”); see generally Johnson v. City of Ft. Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex.
1989) (stating that Section 16.061 was intended as a non-substantive revision of
Article 5517).
Hobson also cites to several cases to support his contention, each of which is
distinguishable. See Adams v. Rowles, 228 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. 1950) (a trespass
to try title to land suit filed by an individual against Pecos County concerning the
sale of lots which included a public dedication of a road by reference to a recorded
plat); Richardson v. Lone Star Salt Co., 49 S.W. 647, 648 (Tex. 1899); Cowan v.
Worrell, 638 S.W.3d 244, 264 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.) (stating that the
statute of limitations for adverse possession does not apply to the State when an
action seeks to acquire public land owned by the State, such as an action for adverse
possession of title for real property) (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.061(a));
22
Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Reese, 163 S.W.2d 249, 249–51 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1942,
no writ) (holding that a private entity could not use adverse possession to acquire
title to land because the title included an express dedication of the streets and alleys
to public use); Eidelbach v. Davis, 99 S.W.2d 1067, 1073 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
1936, writ dism’d) (holding that intervening petitioners who purchased lots by
reference to a recorded plat that dedicated a street and parkway to the public were
entitled to enjoin the erection of a store in the parkway in violation of their private
rights to the public land because the store was erected less than four years prior to
filing suit, but the petitioners were not entitled to abate or remove obstructions
caused by the erection of camp houses after four years had passed); City of Dallas v.
Early, 281 S.W. 883, 885 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1926, writ dism’d) (discussing the
abatement of a nuisance caused by the overflow of a city drainage system);
Spencer v. Levy, 173 S.W. 550, 557 (Tex. App.—Austin 1914, writ ref’d)
(discussing an attempt to acquire title by limitation to a portion of a public street).
We do not disagree with the general propositions of law espoused in each of
the cases cited above by Hobson; however, none address the issue that is before us:
whether an individual landowner may avail himself of the limitations exemption in
Section 16.061(a). Nor has Hobson cited or directed us to any authority that
addresses the applicability of Section 16.061(a) to either an action for declaratory
judgment or for permanent injunctive relief against a neighboring landowner based
on the disputed status of a public road. See Weaver, 535 S.W.2d at 14.
We conclude that Hobson failed to meet his burden to establish that his claims
are not barred by the expiration of the four-year residual limitations period. See CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 16.051; Gill, 688 S.W.3d at 868. As such, the trial court did not err

23
when it granted the Ezell motion based on limitations and denied the Hobson motion
on the same basis.8
Accordingly, we overrule Hobson’s second issue.
B. Section 16.005 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code

Within his third issue, Hobson asserts that Section 16.005 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code is inapplicable to his claims against the Commissioners for their
alleged abandonment and failure to maintain a public road because: (1) he does not
challenge any order passed by the Commissioners that closed the Road; and (2) the
record does not include a formal order or ordinance enacted by the Commissioners
to close or abandon the Road. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.005; see also Kennedy
Con., Inc. v. Forman, 502 S.W.3d 486, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,
pet. denied).
In their motion, the Ezells argued that Hobson’s claims against the
Commissioners are barred by Section 16.005, which is titled “Action for Closing
Street or Road,” because his suit was filed more than two years after either: (1) the
date that the Road was first “closed” in 1999; (2) the date he inherited the Hobson
Tract from his father in 2013; or (3) the date he filed suit in Parker County in 2017
to obtain access to his property. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.005.
The plain language of Section 16.005 states that suit must be filed no later
than two years after a cause of action accrues “[for] the adoption by a commissioners
court of an order closing and abandoning, or attempting to close and abandon, all
or any part of a public road or thoroughfare in the county, other than a state
highway.” Id. § 16.005(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the two-year statute of repose

8
Because of our disposition of Hobson’s issue on this point, it is not necessary to address the
applicability of the other affirmative defenses raised by the Ezells in their motion—although some, such as
res judicata, may also support the trial court’s judgment—or the corresponding arguments raised by Hobson
in his brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
24
in Section 16.005 commences on the date of the passage or adoption by a
commissioners court of (1) a procedurally valid order to close and abandon all or
any part of a public road, or (2) any order that attempts to do the same. See id.;
Crockett Cnty., 463 S.W.3d at 913.
Here, there is no evidence that the Commissioners ever passed, or attempted
to pass an order to close and abandon all or any part of the Road. Consequently,
there is no date upon which a claim under Section 16.005 could have accrued. As
such, because the Ezells failed to meet their evidentiary burden to support a grant of
summary judgment based on their affirmative defense under Section 16.005 for
Hobson’s remaining claims against the Commissioners, we agree with Hobson that
Section 16.005 would not bar his claims. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.005; Crosstex
Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 389–90; see also Kennedy Con., Inc., 502 S.W.3d at
501 (discussing the application of Section 16.005(a)(1) to a trespass-to-try-title
action for ownership of a right-of-way). However, this determination does not
require that we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
C. Lack of Jurisdiction

Hobson also argues in his third issue that the trial court erred when it denied
his claims against the Commissioners because the Ezells’ motion failed to establish
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so.9 Hobson argues that the trial court
had jurisdiction over the claims that he asserted against the Commissioners because:
(1) the Commissioners had the jurisdiction and authority to determine the public
status of the Road pursuant to their general powers; and (2) the trial court could in

9
Neither party disputes that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear and decide Hobson’s declaratory
judgment claims under the UDJA, which he solely asserted against the Ezells. See Haven Chapel United
Methodist Church v. Leebron, 496 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Wise
Cnty. v. Mastropiero, No. 02-18-00378-CV, 2019 WL 3755766, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

25
turn review the Commissioners’ denial of his application, and enter an order for his
requested relief, because district courts may exercise supervisory control over
commissioners’ courts. 10 See TRANSP. §§ 251.003(a) (construction and maintenance
of public roads), .004(a) (commissioners as road supervisors), .008(1) (general
requirements for county roads to be clear of obstructions), .016 (general county
authority over roads); GOV’T § 24.020 (West 2023) (a district court’s jurisdiction
over a commissioners’ court); Henry v . Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. 2017); Henryv.
Sullivan, 499 S.W.3d 545, 553 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)
(op. on reh’g). For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant Hobson’s requested relief for his claims against the
Commissioners.
Before a court may hear and decide a case, it is essential that the court possess
subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–
54 (Tex. 2000); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443
(Tex. 1993). To invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court, the claimant must
allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226; Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at
446. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Johnson, 572 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Tex. 2019).

10
Additionally, Hobson argues that the Commissioners had the jurisdiction to create a neighborhood
road outside the extraterritorial boundaries of Palo Pinto County in accordance with an interlocal agreement
that existed between counties. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 64(b); GOV’T § 791.001–.037 (authorizing local
governments to contract with one another and with agencies of the state); TRANSP. § 251.059 (mutual
agreement between commissioners courts for the costs of maintenance of a road). However, despite his
bare assertion that the Commissioners had the authority to enter into an agreement for the maintenance of
a road, Hobson provides no evidence of any such agreement between Parker and Palo Pinto Counties that
would permit the extension of their jurisdictions beyond their respective county boundaries, nor does he
provide any authority in support of this argument.
26
At the outset, we note that neither the Ezells nor the Commissioners filed a
plea to the jurisdiction; nevertheless, matters concerning subject-matter jurisdiction
may be raised in a motion for summary judgment or for the first time on appeal. See
Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554; Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; Stephens v. Three
Finger Black Shale P’ship, 580 S.W.3d 687, 704 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet.
denied). In this case, the Ezells challenged the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction through their traditional motion for partial summary judgment.
The Ezells’ jurisdictional argument is two-fold. First, they argue that
Hobson’s requested relief to order the Commissioners to “acknowledge the public
nature” of the Road and “enforce access to” the Road is not a viable claim because
the Commissioners do not have the constitutional or statutory authority to declare
that a road is a public road. Second, they contend that the Commissioners lacked
the authority to grant Hobson’s application because: (1) a portion of the Road is not
located in Palo Pinto County and the Hobson Tract is located solely in Parker
County; and (2) a district court has no authority to direct a commissioners’ court to
perform a discretionary act. See TRANSP. § 251.016. Thus, the Ezells contend that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief that Hobson requested.
1. The Authority of the Commissioners
The Texas constitution established a commissioners’ court as a county’s
principal governing body; it may exercise legislative, executive, administrative,
and judicial functions. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18; Cox, 520 S.W.3d at 36 (citing
Ector Cnty. v. Stringer, 843 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex. 1992)). Additionally, a
commissioners’ court “shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county
business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be
hereafter prescribed.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 18(b). Commissioners’ courts have the
power to design, open, discontinue, or alter any public road. Smith Cnty. v.
27
Thornton, 726 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. 1986) (citing Morris v. Cassidy, 15 S.W. 102, 103
(Tex. 1890); Robison v. Whaley Farm Corp., 37 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Tex. 1931));
Cowan, 638 S.W.3d at 255. However, as we have said, the power of a
commissioners’ court over public roads is not absolute; rather, “any authority that a
county has to declare that a road is a public road must be based on the Texas
Constitution and [applicable] statutes.” Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Newton Cnty., 149
S.W.3d 262, 263–64 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2004, no pet.) (citing Guynes v.
Galveston Cnty., 861 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. 1993)); see also Canales v. Laughlin,
214 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. 1948); Anderson v. Wood, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (Tex.
1941); White v. Eastland Cnty., 12 S.W.3d 97, 100 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no
pet.).
The Ezells emphasize that we previously addressed the scope of authority
granted to a county commissioners’ court to use its implied powers to declare that
a road is a public road in Newton County. See Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 263–64
(“Commissioners courts may exercise broad discretion through implied powers in
conducting county business.”). In Newton County, we considered whether the
Newton County Commissioners’ Court had the jurisdiction and authority to establish
a public road based on a request filed by a group of the county’s residents. Id. The
commissioners’ court declared that the road at issue had been used by the public for
more than fifty years and had become a public road by prescription, and it adopted
an order to that effect. See id. We concluded that no constitutional provision or
statute expressly authorizes a county to declare that a road is a public road, and that
counties do not have the statutory authority to construct and maintain private roads.
See id. at 264; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM-334 (1985). Moreover, we noted that
“[i]f a commissioners court spends money on a road without knowing whether the

28
road is a public road or a private road, it risks violating the prohibition against county
maintenance of private roads.” Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 264.
However, circumstances may arise where a commissioners’ court may desire
to maintain a road that has not been officially established as a public road but has
nonetheless been accessible to and regularly used by the public. Newton Cnty., 149
S.W.3d at 264; see generally Matthews v. Colorado Cnty., No. 01-16-00092-CV,
2016 WL 4033391, at *2–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 26, 2016, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (citing TRANSP. §§ 258.002.–.007) (discussing the procedure to
allow a county to preserve the existence of a public interest in a road under
Chapter 258 of the Transportation Code). In these instances, a commissioners’ court
may exercise their implied authority to administratively determine the public status
of a road for the purpose of permitting county action with respect to the road, such
as spending public funds for the maintenance or improvement of a public road.
Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 263–64 (citing City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d at 28); see
Canales, 214 S.W.2d at 453; see also TRANSP. §§ 251.001–257.026. However, in
further explaining the limited scope of authority that a commissioners’ court
possesses to determine whether a road has become a public road, we cited to a Texas
attorney general’s opinion which states that:
[An administrative] determination would not, however,
finally resolve the rights of private parties with respect to
the road. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. M-534 (1969).
Private landowners and others affected by a
commissioners court’s determination that a road is a
public road may seek to have their rights adjudicated by a
court.
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0503 (2002). Thus, a county’s administrative
determination of a road’s status serves only as a foundation upon which the
commissioners’ court may base its action or inaction. Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at
29
264; see Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. M–534 (1969). Ultimately, we concluded that the
Newton County commissioners’ court did not have the constitutional or statutory
authority, and thus lacked the jurisdiction, to adopt an order declaring that the road
at issue was a public road because its order was adopted solely in response to the
citizens’ request, and not as a foundation to support an authorized county action.
Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 264–65. Therefore, its order was void. Id. at 265.
While the facts of the case before us are distinguishable from Newton County,
the underlying legal principles to be derived from it are instructive. In his application
to the Commissioners, Hobson requested that the Commissioners: (1) investigate
and issue a finding as to the history and status of the Road; (2) evaluate the necessity
and logistics of obtaining an interlocal agreement; (3) make a finding and
determination that Hobson does not have access to his home; and (4) enter an order
declaring that the Road is a public road and that any adjacent property owners must
cease interfering with the public’s use of the Road. However, any administrative
determination as to the status of a road by the commissioners can only be used as the
foundation for commissioners’ court’s action or inaction, and their determination
does not resolve the rights of private parties. Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 264.
Instead, the proper vehicle for determining an individual’s right to use a public road,
and to change its character, is through adjudication in a suit under the UDJA. See
Rutledge v. Staner, 9 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pet. denied)
(citing Lindner v. Hill, 691 S.W.2d 590–91 (Tex. 1985); Steel v. Wheeler, 993
S.W.2d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, writ denied)). As such, we conclude that
the Commissioners lacked the jurisdiction and authority to determine whether the
Road was a public road based on the relief sought in Hobson’s application. See
Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 263–64.

30
Furthermore, the Ezells contend that the Commissioners lacked the
jurisdiction and authority to establish a public or neighborhood road—as requested
by Hobson in his petition—because a portion of the Road is situated in Parker
County. See TRANSP. § 251.016 (“The commissioners court of a county may
exercise general control over all roads, highways, and bridges in [its] county.”)
(emphasis added); City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d at 30 (discussing the general authority
of commissioners’ courts and remanding the issue of extraterritorial boundaries and
jurisdiction for annexing property to the trial court). Although Hobson concedes
that the Commissioners’ authority over roads is limited to those which are only
situated in Palo Pinto County, he does not identify any authority, nor have we found
any, to refute the Ezells assertion that the Commissioners lacked the jurisdiction and
authority to create a neighborhood road in the same location as the Road, as
requested in his application. See TRANSP. § 251.016.
Instead, Hobson alternatively argues that the Commissioners had the authority
to execute an interlocal agreement with Parker County to establish a neighborhood
road. See TRANSP. § 251.059 (authorizing agreements between commissioner courts
for costs and maintenance of a public road that is situated in more than one county);
GOV’T § 791.001–.038 (authorizing local governments to contract with one another).
However, Hobson’s application to the Commissioners does not contain any
acknowledgement or other writing from Parker County that shows that the
Commissioners intended or were authorized to create a public or neighborhood road
beyond the extraterritorial boundaries of Palo Pinto County pursuant to an
“interlocal agreement.” Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the
Commissioners had the authority to grant Hobson’s requested relief because, as we
explain below, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to order the Commissioners to
create a neighborhood road. See Cox, 520 S.W.3d at 37.
31
2. The Jurisdiction of a District Court
Under the Texas constitution, a district court has “appellate jurisdiction and
general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with
such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.” TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 8. The enabling legislation incorporates this constitutional
provision. GOV’T § 24.020; Comm’rs Court of Titus Cnty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77,
79 (Tex. 1997); Grant v. Comm’rs Court of Navarro Cnty., No. 11-10-00309-CV,
2012 WL 1259295, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Here, in his original petition, Hobson alleged that the district court in Palo Pinto
County had the jurisdiction over the Commissioners under Article V, Section 8 of
the Texas constitution to order the performance of a ministerial or nondiscretionary
statutory duty.
The legislature has not specified how such jurisdiction may be exercised or
invoked by a district court; therefore, “the scope of [a] district court’s supervisory
jurisdiction generally has been defined by case law.” Sullivan, 499 S.W.3d at 551;
see also Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 80. In this regard, a party may only invoke a district
court’s constitutional supervisory control over a commissioners’ court’s judgment
when that body acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses its discretion. Agan,
940 S.W.2d at 80; Hobbs v. Gattis, No. 01-19-00025-CV, 2020 WL 6065439, at *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). When
reviewing the reasonableness of a commissioner’s court’s order or decision, we
afford the same deference and respect that is shown to all other courts as provided
for in our Constitution. See Cox, 520 S.W.3d at 37 (citing Yoakum Cnty. v. Gaines
Cnty., 163 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tex. 1942)). As such, our review of the Commissioners
decision here is limited to discerning whether the Commissioners acted illegally,

32
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or otherwise clearly abused their discretion. Agan, 940
S.W.2d at 79–80; Stringer, 843 S.W.2d at 479.
A district court may exercise general supervisory control over a
commissioners’ court in three circumstances. Sullivan, 499 S.W.3d at 553. First, if
the commissioners’ court fails to perform a clear statutory duty, a district court may
order that it do so. Id.; see Vondy v. Comm’rs Ct. of Uvalde Cnty., 620 S.W.2d 104,
108–09 (Tex. 1981) (Vondy I). Second, a district court has jurisdiction over claims
in which it is alleged that the commissioners’ court acted illegally or exceeded its
authority, or when the challenged act is otherwise invalid. Sullivan, 499 S.W.3d at
553; see Wichita Cnty. v. Bonnin, 182 S.W.3d 415, 421–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2005, pet. denied). Third, when the commissioners’ court performs an act that is
entrusted to its discretion, “jurisdiction can be invoked by allegations that the
commissioners court’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by
substantial evidence.” Sullivan, 499 S.W.3d at 553 (citing Vondy I, 620 S.W.2d at
108–09).
Relying on Wise County v. Mastropiero, Hobson argues that the trial court
had the jurisdiction to: (1) review the Commissioners decision to deny his
application based on its failure to perform its statutory duty to maintain the Road;
(2) determine the public status of the Road; and (3) order the Commissioners to
comply with its statutory duty to maintain the Road for public use. See No. 02-18-
00378-CV, 2019 WL 3755766, at *1–7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2019, no
pet.) (mem. op.). However, Mastropiero is distinguishable based on the means that
Hobson utilized to seek relief.
In Mastropiero, a housing developer presented its “Phase Two Final Plat” for
a subdivision development to the county commissioners’ court; the plat described
several roads and stated that the roads were “dedicate[d] to the public.” Id. at *1.
33
The county instructed an engineer to conduct an inspection of the roads, and the
engineer later submitted a letter of compliance to the commissioners’ court
certifying that the developer had completed all “infrastructure improvements”—
including the roads—according to county specifications. Id. The commissioners’
court at a public meeting unanimously approved the final plat for Phase Two based
on the “letter of compliance” issued by the engineer. Id. The final plat was then
endorsed and filed in the county’s records, and the county’s procedures showed that
filing the plat was the next step in the process after the county “accepts
improvements.” Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff, a resident of the Phase Two
subdivision, filed suit against the county alleging that the county failed to repair and
maintain the Phase Two roads because the county had accepted the roads as county
roads and had a statutory duty to maintain them. Id. at *5–6; see TRANSP.
§ 251.003(a). Importantly, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief including
declarations from the trial court that the roads should be maintained by the county.
Id. at *1. The county filed a plea to jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. Id. at
*5. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order and held
that a fact issue remained as to whether the county had accepted the dedication of
the plats for public use. Id. at *5–7.
In the case before us, the Ezells contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to grant Hobson’s requested relief because the Commissioners did not have the
authority to order such relief. We agree. Because of the type of relief requested by
Hobson in his pleadings, the proper method for which to adjudicate Hobson’s claims
against the Commissioners, and to obtain a determination of the Road’s status, would

34
be through an action for declaratory judgment.11 Unlike the plaintiff in Mastropiero,
Hobson did not seek or request any declaratory relief under the UDJA against the
Commissioners; instead, the claims that he asserted against them were limited to
whether the Commissioners abused their discretion by denying his application,
including his request to declare the Road as a public road. See Mastropiero, 2019
WL 3755766, at *1–7. As we have said, a district court’s supervisory control over
the conduct of a commissioners’ court is only invoked when the commissioners’
court acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses its discretion. Agan, 940 S.W.2d
at 80. In this instance, we cannot say that they did either.
We conclude that the Commissioners did not have the authority to declare the
Road as a public road; therefore, the Commissioners could not have abused their
discretion by their inaction or refusal to grant Hobson’s application or his request to
maintain the Road. Moreover, because Hobson only sought declaratory relief for
the claims that he asserted against the Ezells—and not the Commissioners—the trial
court was limited to determining whether Hobson’s pleadings were sufficient to
invoke its supervisory jurisdiction over his abandonment claim. They were not.
Therefore, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Hobson’s requested relief,
and because the Commissioners did not have the authority to determine the rights of
private landowners, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Hobson’s claim that
the Commissioners had abandoned and failed to maintain the Road as a public road.
See Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 80; Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 263–64.

11
Additionally, a county or commissioners’ court may elect to file suit to determine whether a
private road has become a public road by prescriptive easement. See Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d at 264;
Chambers Cnty. v. Frost, 356 S.W.2d 470, 485 (Tex. App.—Waco 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (discussing an
action by a county to establish a public easement over land which the county claimed were public roads);
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0503 (2002).
35
Nevertheless, even if the trial court determined that the Commissioners had
abused their discretion in denying Hobson’s application, the trial court lacked the
jurisdiction to compel an act that rests within the Commissioners discretion—the
denial of his application for a neighborhood road. See Cox, 520 S.W.3d at 37 (“In
short, the district court may order the commissioners court to exercise its discretion,
but [a district court] cannot tell the commissioners what decision to make.”) (quoting
Stringer, 843 S.W.2d at 479); see generally Bastrop Cnty. v. Samples, 286 S.W.3d
102, 106 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (discussing the procedure for a
commissioners’ court to create a neighborhood road, including the condemnation of
land through eminent domain).
Accordingly, we overrule Hobson’s third issue. Furthermore, because the
Ezells conclusively established the applicability of certain affirmative defenses
raised by them, which we have specifically discussed in this opinion, we also
conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Hobson’s cross-motion for
summary judgment on the same claims. As such, we also overrule Hobson’s first
issue.
D. Attorney’s Fees
In his fourth issue, Hobson argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it awarded attorney’s fees to the Ezells under the UDJA.12 See CIV. PRAC. &
REM. § 37.009. As relevant to this appeal, after the trial court signed its amended
summary judgment order, the Ezells and Hobson each submitted additional briefing
to the trial court on the Ezells’ request for attorney’s fees and costs; attached to the
Ezells’ brief was an affidavit by their trial counsel and billing invoices for legal

12
We note that Hobson does not challenge the trial court’s award of contingent appellate attorney’s
fees.
36
services rendered. After considering the parties’ submissions, the trial court signed
an order awarding the Ezells $62,478.15 in attorney’s fees.
The trial court also signed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
included in relevant part, the following regarding its attorney’s fee award: (1) the
attorneys’ fees awarded to the Ezells were reasonable and necessary; (2) the
evidence submitted by the Ezells satisfied the evidentiary factors outlined in
Rohrmoos; (3) the total hours and rates included in the Ezells’ billing statements
were reasonable and necessary to defend against Hobson’s UDJA claims; (4) the
elements of Hobson’s injunctive relief claim overlapped with Hobson’s declaratory
judgment claims; (5) the non-declaratory judgment claims were intertwined with
Hobson’s declaratory judgment claims, segregation was not workable, and a
discount may be applied; and (6) a discount of thirty-three percent to the total
attorneys’ fees incurred by the Ezells was reasonable to account for the attorneys’
fees necessary for the Ezells to defend against Hobson’s declaratory judgment
claims as opposed to the non-declaratory judgment claims.
In his challenge to the trial court’s attorney’s fee award, Hobson argues that
the trial court abused its discretion because: (1) the evidence presented by the Ezells
failed to show that the trial court’s award was reasonable, necessary, or equitable;
and (2) the Ezells failed to properly segregate their fees.13 Conversely, the Ezells
argue that the evidence submitted to the trial court in their sworn declaration
constituted sufficient evidence of the fees requested under the Rohrmoos standard,
they were not required to segregate their fees because Hobson’s non-declaratory
judgment claims were ultimately the same as his declaratory judgment claims

13
In his brief, Hobson prays that if we reverse the trial court’s judgment, we should also reverse
and render the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. In the alternative, Hobson prays that the issue of
attorney’s fees be reversed and rendered “to the proper amount of fees and expenses and supported by the
evidence in the record.”
37
against the Ezells, and the relief that Hobson sought was the same for all the claims
he had asserted in the case—that the Road is a public road.
We note that Hobson does not raise a specific issue as to an insufficient entry
in the billing statements or entries that could have been segregated from the services
that were related to the unrecoverable fees that he incurred from his non-declaratory
judgment claims. Instead, Hobson argues that the trial court did not properly
consider the affidavit of his attorney, Paul J. Vitanza, in its findings of fact or its
ultimate decision to award fees to the Ezells, and that the one-third fee reduction
does not comport with the requirements and standards for segregation. Moreover,
the parties do not dispute that the fees incurred for Hobson’s non-declaratory
judgment claims are not recoverable, or that the fees for those claims should have
been segregated from the fees for the UDJA claims; rather, the segregation dispute
raised by Hobson is whether the Ezells adequately segregated the attorney’s fees in
their request, and whether the trial court’s award constituted an abuse of discretion
by not requiring further segregation. See Hannah Reef, Inc., 623 S.W.3d at 872 (“If
any attorney’s fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a
claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees.”) (citing Chapa, 212
S.W.3d at 313).
In his affidavit, Vitanza stated that “twenty-five (25) percent of the services
underlying the $92,550.90 in attorney’s fees [requested by the Ezells] . . . were
reasonable and necessary based upon the allegations in the case.” Vitanza also stated
that the evidence presented by the Ezells was insufficient to show that segregation
was not required because “[they] do not offer any explanation of the differences
between the causes of action and requested relief . . . what fees are allocated to that
defense, or why segregation is ‘unworkable.’” Additionally, Vitanza concluded that

38
sixty-five percent of the Ezells’ billing statements were solely related to
nonrecoverable claims.
Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
when it determined that the attorney’s fees requested by the Ezells were reasonable
and necessary. There is evidence of the specific services performed, who performed
those services, and the reasonable hourly rate for each person who performed such
services. See Rohrmoos, 578 S.W.3d at 498. As to the amount of the attorney’s
fees, the Ezells’ brief, upon which the trial court relied when it rendered its attorney’s
fee award, was supported by the affidavit of the Ezells’ trial attorney, Mary H.
Barkley, along with attached, itemized billing statements. Moreover, even though
Vitanza submitted a controverting affidavit to the trial court to rebut the
reasonableness of the Ezells’ requested fee award, a trial court does not abuse its
discretion when it bases its decision to award attorney’s fees on conflicting evidence.
Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 372 S.W.3d 244, 252 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2012, no pet.); see also Aquaduct, L.L.C., 116 S.W.3d at 444 (holding that
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling).
In her affidavit, Barkley stated that: (1) she began providing legal services for
the Ezells for this case in June 2022; (2) her rate was $415 per hour; (3) the hourly
rate for comparable partner-level attorneys in the area ranges from $415 to $850 per
hour; (4) the hourly rate for associate-level attorneys in the area ranges from $150
to $550 per hour; and (5) the attached billing invoices show the legal services that
were rendered. Additionally, Barkley stated that the invoices also included billing
statements for legal services rendered by other attorneys at her law firm who worked
on this case, including her law partner, S.G. Johndroe, III, who’s hourly rate was
$430 per hour, and associates, who charged between $150 and $280 per hour.

39
Barkley further averred that the number of hours that she spent working on
this case, as listed within her attached invoice for legal services rendered, were
reasonable based on multiple factors such as the complexity of the issues involved
and her experience as an attorney. Barkley stated that the total fees and costs
incurred by the Ezells were $92,550.90, and the total expenses incurred were
$1,166.32. The attached billing statements include itemized entries for legal services
provided by Barkley, Johndroe, and associate attorneys at her firm. Each entry
details the specific legal services performed, the attorney who performed the
services, the hourly rate of the attorney who performed the services, and the total
billable hours for each task, as required by Rohrmoos. See 578 S.W.3d at 498.
Barkley’s affidavit also explained that the tasks related to the Ezells’ defense
against Hobson’s declaratory judgment claims were “in many respects the same”
when compared to his other, unrecoverable, non-declaratory judgment claims—
permanent injunctive relief, abandonment, and his appeal of the Commissioners’
decision to deny his application. Barkley stated that because segregation was not
workable, she discounted her requested attorney’s fees by one-third and only
requested a fee award of $62,478.15. According to Barkley, this fee amount shows
the reasonable and necessary costs to defend the declaratory judgment claims
asserted by Hobson. See Hannah Reef, Inc., 623 S.W.3d at 872.
Here, the attached billing statements and invoices for legal services rendered
by Barkley and her law firm in this case were sufficient to inform the trial court of
the time spent on specific tasks and enabled it to meaningfully review the fees
requested by the Ezells. See Long, 442 S.W.3d at 255–56. The record also shows
that, consistent with its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court:
(1) considered the lodestar method with regard to determining the amount of
reasonable and necessary fees; (2) accepted the one-third discount proposed by
40
Barkley; and (3) found that “the award of $62,478.15 in attorneys’ fees reflects the
reasonable and necessary fees incurred by the Ezells in defending against [Hobson’s]
declaratory judgment claims under the UDJA.” See El Apple I, 370 S.W.3d at 763–
64 (“We generally accord considerable deference to a trial court’s findings regarding
whether prevailing counsel’s claimed hours are excessive, redundant, or
unreasonable.”); 4922 Holdings, LLC v. Rivera, 625 S.W.3d 316, 334 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied).
Additionally, because it was necessary for the Ezells to defend against
Hobson’s declaratory judgment claims regarding the public nature of the Road, they
were required to also prove these same claims in their motion for partial summary
judgment to defend against the other, unrecoverable claims asserted by Hobson. The
trial court’s findings state that it considered Hobson’s concerns about awarding fees
for unrecoverable claims, and that “segregation is not workable and a discount may
be applied.” In this regard, in circumstances where segregation is not workable, a
“discount” may be applied to a party’s request for attorney’s fees to compensate for
unrecoverable fees incurred which cannot otherwise be segregated from recoverable
fees. See Transcor Astra Grp., 650 S.W.3d at 482–83; RSL Funding, LLC v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., No. 01-23-00190-CV, 2025 WL 920767, at *23 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 27, 2025, no pet.) (stating that a party establishing a percentage
discount for unrecoverable fees must demonstrate that they “considered the actual
work performed and the specific claims in the case”). Thus, Barkley’s affidavit and
the attached billing statements and invoices are sufficient evidence of properly
segregated attorney’s fees. See Transcor Astra Grp., 650 S.W.3d at 482–83.
Because there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s award of
attorney’s fees to the Ezells, we cannot say that its fee award was unnecessary,
unreasonable, or that it constituted an abuse of discretion. Long, 442 S.W.3d at 255–
41
56. Further, based on the trial court’s application of a discount in its fee award, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by not requiring further
segregation, or that its fee award was inequitable and unjust. See Transcor Astra
Grp., 650 S.W.3d at 482–83; Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21; see also Chapa, 212
S.W.3d at 311–12. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

September 18, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

42