Delwin Ray Jackson v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed May 8, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00288-CR
__________

DELWIN RAY JACKSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 90th District Court
Stephens County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F37243

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Delwin Ray Jackson, was charged by indictment with the third-
degree felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, namely
methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (West Supp. 2025). The State also
sought to enhance Appellant’s punishment based on his two prior final felony
convictions. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2025).
In advance of trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence and
contraband that was seized in connection with the warrantless stop initiated by the
law enforcement officer, and his subsequent detention and arrest for the charged
offense, asserting that: (1) the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate
the traffic stop and detain him based on the officer’s belief that Appellant had
committed a traffic violation; (2) all evidence seized by the officer during the
subsequent search of Appellant’s vehicle incident to the traffic stop was illegally
obtained because the stop was an illegal “pretext” stop; and (3) as a result, his rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 9 of the Texas constitution were violated. The trial court denied
Appellant’s motion and signed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
After Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charged offense and a plea of
“true” to one enhancement allegation, the trial court, pursuant to the parties
negotiated plea agreement, assessed Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for
eleven years in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice and a $5,000 fine. As a condition of the plea agreement, and as
shown by the trial court’s certification, Appellant reserved his right and was granted
permission to appeal and challenge the trial court’s suppression ruling. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).
In a single issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to suppress because the contraband that was
seized from his vehicle was obtained because of an invalid, pretext stop. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Shortly after midnight on June 14, 2023, Deputy Jacob Hernandez with the
Stephens County Sheriff’s Office was on patrol when he observed that a vehicle
failed to stop completely at a stop sign. According to Deputy Hernandez, the vehicle

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that he observed “roll[ed] through” the stop sign without stopping completely at the
intersection. The dashcam in Deputy Hernandez’s patrol unit recorded what he
observed. Based on his observation, Deputy Hernandez initiated a traffic stop.
Prior to observing the traffic violation, Deputy Hernandez was unaware of the
identity of the person who was operating the vehicle that had failed to stop.
Subsequent to the traffic stop, Deputy Hernandez determined that Appellant was the
operator of this vehicle and Appellant was later arrested after a warrant check
revealed that he had two outstanding capias warrants. Although Deputy Hernandez
had followed Appellant’s vehicle for several blocks before he observed the traffic
violation, Deputy Hernandez testified that Appellant’s failure to stop at the stop sign
was the only reason for initiating the traffic stop.
In his motion, and at the suppression hearing, Appellant contended that
Deputy Hernandez initiated a pretext stop, had “targeted” him, and was “looking for
a reason to stop” him. The evidence presented to the trial court at the suppression
hearing consisted of testimony from Deputy Hernandez, Appellant, and an excerpt
from Deputy Hernandez’s dashcam video. Contrary to Deputy Hernandez’s
testimony, Appellant testified that the vehicle he was driving stopped completely at
the stop sign before turning, rather than “rolling through” it as Deputy Hernandez
claimed. Appellant further asserted that Deputy Hernandez was “lying” and that the
dashcam video excerpt did not support Deputy Hernandez’s version of events. At
the hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel also argued that the dashcam video showed
that Deputy Hernandez “[activated] his [overhead] emergency lights before
[Appellant] ever made the turn,” targeted Appellant, and “followed him [for] nine
blocks or more trying to find a reason to stop him.”

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II. Standard of Review
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In
reviewing its ruling, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Arellano,
600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 436
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 922–23. When the trial court
makes express findings of fact, as it did here, we must determine whether the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports its
findings. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v.
Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
We afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court’s factual findings are
based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57;
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Amador v.
State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guzman v. State, 955
S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). We also defer to the trial court’s findings
as to questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact that turn on the weight or
credibility of the evidence. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 436; Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d
661, 666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913.
We review de novo the trial court’s determination of pure questions of law,
the application of the law to established facts, and the legal significance of those
facts. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Wade, 422
S.W.3d at 667; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913; Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54,
62–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We also review de novo mixed questions of law and
fact that are not dependent upon credibility determinations. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at
436; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913 (citing Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673).

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When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court is the exclusive trier of
fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278,
281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As such, the trial court may choose to believe or to
disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853,
855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 287 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990). Therefore, we will sustain the trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, regardless of whether the trial court granted or denied the motion, if it is
supported by the record and it is correct under any applicable theory of law.
Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57–58; Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190; Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–
56.
III. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). These constitutional
protections extend to investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of a
traditional arrest. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). A warrantless
traffic stop by a law enforcement officer to address a traffic violation is a seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is tantamount to a temporary
detention; therefore, the traffic stop must be justified and, at a minimum, supported
by reasonable suspicion. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996);
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
439 (1984); see Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015);
Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914 (citing Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005)).

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Reasonable suspicion exists if a law enforcement officer has specific,
articulable facts, based on his knowledge and experience, combined with rational
inferences from those facts, that would lead the officer to reasonably suspect or
conclude that a particular person has engaged in, is presently engaging in, or soon
will engage in criminal activity. Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247; Derichsweiler,
348 S.W.3d at 914 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21–22 (1968); Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This
is an objective standard that disregards the actual subjective intent of the detaining
officer and focuses, instead, on whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for
the officer to stop and detain the person. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; York v. State,
342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914;
State v. Clark, 315 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex. App—Eastland 2010, no pet.) (“There
need only be an objective basis for the stop; the subjective intent of the officer
conducting the stop is irrelevant.”).
The likelihood of criminal activity that is required to support the “reasonable
suspicion” standard need not rise to the level that is required for probable cause.
State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Instead, when
evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, we consider the totality of the
circumstances and whether the totality of the objective information available to the
detaining officer when the stop is made indicates that some minimal level of
objective justification for the stop existed. Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36;
Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Derichsweiler, 348
S.W.3d at 914–916 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981));
Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Thus, “[i]f an officer
has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a traffic violation, the officer

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may conduct a traffic stop.” State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. Crim. App.
2022).
In his sole issue on appeal, as it is framed, Appellant argues that contraband
was illegally seized from his vehicle because the traffic stop initiated by Deputy
Hernandez was an unlawful, pretext stop. However, Appellant neither advances any
argument in his brief nor does he cite to any authority to support his contention that
contraband was illegally seized. Rather, the focus of Appellant’s argument on
appeal is two-fold: (1) the traffic stop was unlawful because Deputy Hernandez did
not observe a circumstance that would be tantamount to an “objectively valid traffic
stop”; and (2) the evidence presented to the trial court at the suppression hearing
“could not have [been] reasonably believed,” does not support the trial court’s
findings, and instead supports a finding of an unlawful pretext stop.
A. Pretext Stop
A pretext stop is one that is effectuated by the detaining officer based on the
officer’s ulterior motive. Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). Such a stop occurs when the detaining officer validly stops a person for a
traffic violation for the sole purpose of investigating whether the person has
committed a different offense for which the officer would otherwise not have a legal
basis to stop or arrest the person. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 939–40 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992). However, an objectively valid traffic stop is not unlawful simply
because the detaining officer had an ulterior motive for making it. Crittenden, 899
S.W.2d at 671, 674. In other words, even a stop that is found to constitute a pretext
stop is permissible if the underlying traffic stop is a valid one. Id. at 674.
B. Reasonable Suspicion – Traffic Stop
As relevant here, the operator of a motor vehicle that is approaching an
intersection that is controlled by a stop sign must stop in a manner prescribed by

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Section 544.010(c) of the Transportation Code before turning into or proceeding
through the intersection. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.010(a), (c) (West Supp.
2025).
It is well settled that a traffic violation committed in an officer’s presence
constitutes probable cause, authorizes the officer to initiate a stop, and justifies the
initial detention. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d at 872; Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 543
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982). Nevertheless, to justify the stop, the State is only required to show that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation occurred. See
Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190; Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 369, 376 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d). Thus, an officer’s observation and reasonable belief
that a traffic violation occurred—here, the failure to stop completely at a stop sign—
satisfies the reasonable suspicion standard for conducting a traffic stop. Yoda v.
State, 630 S.W.3d 470, 479 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d); Maysonet v.
State, 91 S.W.3d 365, 372 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d).
Here, the legality of the traffic stop initiated by Deputy Hernandez does not
rely on proof that a traffic violation had in fact been committed; rather, it is sufficient
to show that Deputy Hernandez reasonably believed that Appellant either committed
a traffic violation or that a violation was in progress. Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at
247; Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 377–78 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977). As such, and despite Appellant’s contentions, the relevant
inquiry is not whether Deputy Hernandez knew the person that he eventually
stopped—Appellant—because such knowledge, even if it existed, is irrelevant and
of no consequence to our analysis; instead, it is based on Deputy Hernandez’s
observation—whether he had a reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic

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violation had been committed or was in progress. Simply put, the focus is on Deputy
Hernandez’s reasonable perception and belief. Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247–48.
Based on the evidence presented and the totality of circumstances, we
conclude that Deputy Hernandez provided sufficient, specific facts to support his
reasonable belief that Appellant’s vehicle failed to stop completely at the stop sign.
See id. at 247. What Deputy Hernandez perceived and believed based on his
observation and his experience as a law enforcement officer cannot be discounted or
disregarded only because Appellant contends that the evidence presented to the trial
court by the State at the suppression hearing is not worthy of belief. The trial court,
as the trier of fact, made its credibility determinations, impliedly finding that Deputy
Hernandez’s testimony was credible when it denied Appellant’s motion, and we
defer to its findings, as we must.1 Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57; Jaganathan, 479
S.W.3d. at 247–48; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913; Maxwell, 73 S.W.3d at 281;
Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855. Therefore, because the trial court found that Deputy
Hernandez had an objectively justifiable basis to stop and detain Appellant and
investigate the circumstances of the traffic violation, we cannot conclude that the
traffic stop of which Appellant challenges violated his constitutional rights, as he
suggests. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914.

1
Although Appellant contends that the dashcam video excerpt does not support
Deputy Hernandez’s visual observations, testimony, and version of the relevant events, we note
that studies, research, and analysis have shown that, because of its sophistication, a person’s “naked
eye” will more accurately assess and perceive an occurrence when compared to what may
be reproduced and displayed on a video recording. This is because the “naked eye” and its
accompanying cerebral interpretation is significantly superior to a video recording because of its real-
time processing and binocular cues which allows a person to more accurately judge distances. Nicholas
P. Murray, William Lewinski, Craig Allen, Gustavo Sandri Heidner, Michael W. Albin & Robert Horn, The
eyes have it! Functional field of view of differences between visual search behavior and body-worn
camera during a use of force response in active-duty police officers, 25 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 490–497
(2024),https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/15614263.2024.2328664?needAccess=true [https:
//doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2024.2328664].
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Because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, supports its findings, see Arellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57; Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at
190; Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

May 8, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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