In the Interest of J.A.S. A/K/A J.S., H.G.S. A/K/A H.G.S., N.J.S., Children v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00631-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.S. A/K/A J.S.,
H.G.S. A/K/A H.G.S, AND N.J.S., CHILDREN

ON APPEAL FROM THE 206TH DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

Appellant J.C.S. appeals the trial court’s judgment involuntarily terminating his

parental rights with respect to minor children J.A.S. a/k/a J.S., H.G.S. a/k/a H.G.S., and

N.J.S.1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001. We affirm.

1 We refer to appellant and the children by initials in accordance with the rules of appellate

procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
I. ANDERS BRIEF

J.C.S.’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief stating that he has diligently

reviewed the entire record but has concluded that there are no “arguable grounds” to

advance an appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); Porter v. Tex.

Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a

parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for

appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief.”). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements

of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically

advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record

references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”).

Counsel has informed this Court in writing that he: (1) notified J.C.S. that he has

filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided J.C.S. with a copy of the

Anders brief; and (3) informed J.C.S. of his right to review the record and file a pro se

response, and (4) provided J.C.S. with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate

record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An adequate amount of time has passed, and J.C.S.

has not filed a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at *1 (Tex.

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App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have reviewed

the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no reversible error. See Bledsoe

v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders

briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and

reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). We have specifically

reviewed the trial court’s findings under parts (D) and (E) of family code § 161.001(b)(1),

and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to

those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (holding

that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court

detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D)

or (E) of the Family Code”).

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

J.C.S.’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see

also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. However, when an Anders brief is filed in

a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed counsel extends to “all

proceedings in [the Supreme Court of Texas], including the filing of a petition for review.”

In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, a motion to

withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id. Counsel is permitted to

withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek

further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not constitute good cause. Id.

Here, counsel’s motion does not show “good cause” for withdrawal other than his

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inability to identify any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion to

withdraw is denied.2 See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
18th day of June, 2025.

2 The Texas Supreme Court has noted that, in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations

[in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders
brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

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