Ashley Lynette Salinas A/K/A Ashely Salinas v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00202-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ASHLEY LYNETTE SALINAS
A/K/A ASHELY SALINAS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 51ST DISTRICT COURT
OF TOM GREEN COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

Appellant Ashley Lynette Salinas a/k/a Ashely Salinas was convicted of burglary

of a habitation, with intent to commit another felony, a first-degree felony, and sentenced

to twelve years’ incarceration. TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(d). By one issue appellant

contends that the trial counsel that represented her at a prior plea agreement hearing,
wherein she agreed to new terms of community supervision, rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel by misinforming her of which drug program she would have to

complete. We affirm.1

I. BACKGROUND

On September 13, 2017, appellant was placed on deferred adjudication community

supervision for a period of five years pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. On

February 23, 2023, the State filed a motion to revoke deferred adjudication community

supervision and to proceed to adjudicate guilt—amended on October 23, 2023. On

November 1, 2023, a Status Report was filed in the trial court stating that the State and

appellant requested a non-jury setting in that appellant would offer a plea of true and “will

go to Journey Recovery Center [(JRC)], ADAC, for nine (9) months.” The State and

appellant’s attorney at the time signed the status report. Appellant’s trial counsel at the

time also signed for appellant. The status report has a section titled, “ORDER,” which

states: “Until this Order is signed by the Court, the case remains on the calendar

without the changes requested.” The place for a signature by the “District Judge/Court

Administrator” is blank.

On December 1, 2023, the trial court signed an order amending conditions of

community supervision in lieu of revocation, which extended appellant’s community

supervision for a period of two years and stated, among other things, that appellant

“surrender herself to the Tom Green County Jail on or before December 3, 2023” to be

transported “to the Concho Valley Female Community Corrections Facility.” The order

1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Third Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket-

equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001.

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states that “in lieu of incarceration,” appellant “shall participate in all programs deemed

appropriate, and shall neither voluntarily terminate participation . . . nor voluntarily depart

from the premises of said facility without specific written permission” and that “[w]hile

under custodial supervision,” appellant “will attend and participate in

the . . . Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (SATF) program for a minimum of 9

months and not to exceed 2 years.” Appellant signed under the notice stating:

I have been informed of my right to appear in person and/or by attorney to
contest the inclusion of such conditions and I do waive a hearing thereon
and hereby voluntarily and knowingly give my consent to such modification
of Terms of Community Supervision to include and incorporate the above
mentioned conditions.

The order states, “By approval of this amended order, the District Attorney moves to

dismiss the Motion to Revoke heretofore filed herein, and the Court does hereby dismiss

said Motion to Revoke.” Appellant also signed under the statement that she had received

a copy of the community supervision conditions.

On January 1, 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke deferred adjudication

community supervision and to proceed to adjudicate guilt, alleging that appellant had

violated the terms of community supervision by “failing to surrender herself to the Tom

Green County Jail on or before” December 3, 2023, and failing to attend the SATF

program. The trial court held a revocation hearing on November 14, 2024.

William Monpere, a unit supervisor with the Concho Valley Community Supervision

Corrections Department, testified that the State and appellant entered a plea agreement,

memorialized in the trial court’s December 1, 2023 order, that she would report to the

Tom Green County Jail for placement in the SATF program, and that her community

supervision would be extended for two more years. Monpere stated that appellant failed

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to report to the Tom Green County Jail and therefore had not completed the SATF

program. Monpere stated he had personal knowledge that appellant knew that she was

required to complete the SATF program based on “talking” with her then

“attorney . . . [and] getting all the documents signed.” Monpere said, “I let her know, ‘Hey,

tomorrow you need to make sure you’re at the jail by 2:00 p.m.’; and then she let me know

that she thought she was going to JRC [(‘Journey Recovery Center’)].” Monpere

continued, “I told her, ‘That wasn’t what you had signed for. You had signed for the SATF

program.’” Monpere said he asked appellant whether she had reviewed the conditions

with her trial counsel, and she told him “that she did.” Monpere testified that he asked

appellant if she had read the documents, and “she said she tried to.” After Monpere told

appellant that the first page of the order stated that she had to report for the SATF

program, appellant “hung up on [him].”

On cross-examination, Monpere stated that the JRC program is very different from

SATF program and is shorter than nine months. Appellant’s trial counsel asked, “And the

amendments that were in fact filed that she signed were for SATF and not [JRC]; is that

correct?” Monpere replied, “That is correct.” On redirect examination, Monpere testified

that it was recommended that appellant attend the SATF program because there is

“a line of progression,” which appellant had already completed, which included the JRC

program. Monpere said that appellant had still been “struggling” with methamphetamine

abuse, and short-term programs such as at JRC do not “really work.” Therefore,

according to Monpere, after completing the JRC program and still having abuse issues,

the department “referred her to the CRTC program,” which she completed and then she

“relapsed again”; thus, “the next step in progressive sanctions would be the SAFT

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program.” Monpere recommended revocation.

Appellant testified that Defense Exhibit No. 4, which is the Status Report, shows

that she would have to report for treatment at “Journey.” Appellant faulted her previous

trial counsel for misinforming her that she was agreeing to attend the JRC program. Her

revocation trial counsel asked, “How long did he tell you the program was,” and appellant

replied, “He didn’t say . . . Well, he said it was thirty days, as a matter of fact.” Appellant’s

revocation trial counsel asked, “Now, on [the Status Report] it does say that it’s a nine-

month program. Did he tell you that part of it?” Appellant responded, “No, sir.” Appellant

claimed that JRC has a nine-month program. Appellant acknowledged that she signed

the December 1, 2023 order, which explicitly states she must complete the SAFT program

but insisted that her trial counsel at that time “just told” her that she “needed to sign the

amendment and that [she] was going to [JRC].” Appellant claimed that she had not read

the December 1, 2023 order and just signed it anyway. Appellant said, “But I did tell them

that if it said anything other than [JRC] that I was not agreeing to it, because I had proof

of what I had completed and they were saying I didn’t complete.”

The trial court revoked community supervision, adjudicated appellant guilty, and

sentenced her to twelve years’ incarceration. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

We will sustain an ineffective assistance claim if the preponderance of the

evidence shows that trial counsel’s (1) performance was deficient by falling below an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficiency caused such prejudice that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88,

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694 (1984); Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 892–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “A claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel must be affirmatively supported by the record.” Tabora

v. State, 14 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

III. DISCUSSION

By her sole issue, appellant contends her previous trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by telling her that in lieu of revocation, she could report to JRC.

Monpere testified that appellant knew that she was required to attend the SATF

program, and she signed the December 1, 2023 order that clearly indicates that she was

required to attend the SAFT program and that she will attend and participate in the

“[SATF] program for a minimum of 9 months and not to exceed 2 years.” Appellant

signed the December 1, 2023 order acknowledging that she received a copy of the

community supervision conditions, she was informed of her right to contest the

modifications of community supervision, and she gave her consent to the modifications.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court could have reasonably disbelieved

appellant’s testimony that her trial counsel misinformed her and believed that she knew

about the program she agreed to attend. See Milum v. State, 482 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“That he signed a written copy of the conditions,

which detail exactly what Milum is and is not allowed to do, further indicates that he knew

and accepted these restrictions without objection.”); see also Armstrong v. State, No. 10-

02-077-CR, 2003 WL 22023575, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 27, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (explaining that the appellant signed documents that

listed the conditions of community supervision reflecting that he knew about the

objectionable conditions of community supervision); Garcia v. State, No. 2-01-397-CR,

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2003 WL 21197409, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 22, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (explaining that “the judge who presided at the new trial

hearing was able to evaluate [the a]ppellant’s credibility,” concerning whether her trial

counsel misinformed her and stating, “we are not in a position to disturb his ruling absent

an abuse of discretion”). Therefore, we cannot conclude that appellant’s claim that she

was misinformed by her previous trial counsel is adequately supported in the record and

conclude that appellant has not overcome the presumption that counsel provided

reasonable assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694; Perez, 310 S.W.3d at

892–93. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of April, 2026.

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