Anthony Schultz v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00515-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ANTHONY SCHULTZ, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 94TH DISTRICT COURT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

On April 17, 2025, appellant Anthony Schultz was re-indicted on two counts of

sexual assault of a child, see TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(2), three counts of improper

relationship between educator and student, see id. § 21.12(a), and one count of

solicitation of prostitution with a person under eighteen years of age, see id.
§ 43.021(b)(2). Each offense is a second-degree felony. Id. §§ 22.011(f), 21.12(b),

43.021(b)(2). Appellant pleaded not guilty to the re-indictment and a jury trial commenced

on September 24, 2025. The jury found appellant guilty on all counts and sentenced him

to twenty years’ imprisonment on each sexual assault count; ten, twenty, and fifteen

years’ imprisonment on the improper relationship counts; and fifteen years’ imprisonment

on the solicitation count. 1 Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief

stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the

record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated.

See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional

evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In

Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel

finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and

set out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,

510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

1 The sentences for all counts were ordered to run concurrently.

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appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that she: (1) notified appellant that she has filed an Anders brief and a motion

to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant

of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response,

and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that

only requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten

days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09. Appellant did not move for access to the record or file

a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

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Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five

days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for

discretionary review. 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of April, 2026.

2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.

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