Drew Ryan Bickerstaff v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00006-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DREW RYAN BICKERSTAFF, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT
OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina

Appellant Drew Ryan Bickerstaff was convicted of assault of a family/household

member, with a previous conviction, a third-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 22.01(b)(2)(A), and sentenced to ten years’ incarceration.1 By six issues appellant

1 To protect the victim’s identity in this case, we will use an alias. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt.,
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction (issue one), the trial

court violated his right to confrontation (issues two through four), recordings of jail phone

calls were inadmissible pursuant to Rule 901 (issue five), and the trial court erroneously

admitted improper extraneous evidence (issue six).2 We affirm.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

By his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the

conviction because (1) “[t]he State never produced [the victim, Anna] . . . [and] prove[d]

its case through a 911 call, photographs . . . medical record[s] . . . and excited

utterances”; and (2) Anna recanted, admitted she lied, and reported she “received her

injuries from a fight with someone else,” which “created a reasonable doubt regarding

[appellant’s] guilt.”

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable

inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).

Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable

based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most

favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The

fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight

9.10(a)(3); McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
2 We have reorganized and renumbered appellant’s issues for purposes of this memorandum
opinion.

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to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d

321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). A person commits the offense of assault by “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

caus[ing] bodily injury to another,” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). Punishment is a third-

degree felony if (1) it was committed against a member of appellant’s household and

(2) appellant had been previously convicted of an offense under Chapter 22 wherein he

was “finally convicted of the offense of assault caus[ing] bodily injury to a family member.”3

Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(A).

B. The Evidence

In a 911 call, Anna reported that she was “severely beaten by her boyfriend.”

Rachel Marie Sanchez, a former paramedic, testified that she treated Anna’s injuries on

January 28, 2018, and Anna said “her husband had beat her.” Sanchez observed that

Anna “had a laceration to her forehead . . . on her forearm and to her shoulder blade.”

Anna’s medical records from the date of the offense state she “was assaulted by her

husband” and it is noted that he had been “beating her for weeks.”

Amanda Cantu, who was a patrol deputy on January 28, 2018, was dispatched to

an apartment complex where she spoke to Anna, who “was visibly upset, crying” and was

“[i]n an emotional state of distress.” Cantu “immediately noticed blood dripping from the

side of [Anna’s] head” and a blood stain on her shirt. Cantu saw that Anna “had popped

3 Appellant does not list which elements he challenges on appeal, and it appears that he merely

challenges evidence supporting a finding that he caused Anna’s injuries.

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blood vessels in one of her eyes, swelling and bruising near her mouth area, her lip,

and . . . scrapes and bruises and scratches, red markings along her arms and her legs

and shins and her back.” The trial court admitted pictures of Anna’s injuries. Cantu

testified Anna “described the assault to have occurred” in the bedroom of her home. Cantu

found a blood stain in the bedroom.

Officer Wesley Wayne Shaw, with the Portland Police Department, testified that

he encountered the couple on December 19, 2018, and he observed Anna “had a large

cut on the left side of her head . . . [W]as bleeding from her head very badly . . . and she

had bloody handprints on her arm.” Appellant “had some blood on his clothing and his

hand from the wrists down were covered in blood.” Officer Shaw stated appellant also

had “some [blood] near his back pocket from trying to wipe the hands off . . . and near his

stomach section above his belt line.”

Sergeant Robert Jacob Delapaz, with the Portland Police Department, testified that

on January 27, 2017, Anna and appellant were “living together.” Sergeant Delapaz noted

that Anna was “in distress” and “had . . . some visible markings [such as bruising,

redness] on her person.” The trial court admitted pictures of Anna’s injuries from that

incident. Sergeant Delapaz testified that on March 3, 2017, he was dispatched to the

couple’s residence, and when he arrived, inside the residence he “heard [appellant]

screaming [at his young daughter]. . . Are you crying? Are you fucking kidding me? If you

keep crying, I’m going to fucking hit you” and “if you don’t quit crying, I’m going to beat

the fuck out of you.” Sergeant Delapaz explained that Anna and the couple’s children

were “distraught and crying.” Sergeant Delapaz observed that Anna had injuries including

“bruising and swelling to her face, her lips and her arm.”

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Sergeant Wayne Renfro with the Portland Police Department testified that on

March 3, 2017, he went to the couple’s residence and saw Anna was “clearly upset, had

been crying,” and three “young” children in the home were also “clearly upset and crying.”

Sergeant Renfro saw that Anna “had injuries to her face and both arms.”

Paul Good, a former Portland City police officer, testified that on August 9, 2017,

he was dispatched to appellant and Anna’s address. Good stated that Anna “was pretty

upset,” and “said she had been hit in the lip by a phone.” The trial court admitted pictures

of Anna’s injuries. Appellant was arrested that day due to “his intoxication level.”

Kenneth Wayne Hodge, a former sergeant with the Portland Police Department,

testified that on August 9, 2017, he responded with Good to a dispatch call where he

encountered Anna outside her residence and observed that she “had a swollen lip.”

Hodge testified that appellant was inside the bedroom.

Julia Silos Gebauer, a former police officer with the Corpus Christi Police

Department, testified that on September 8, 2018, she made contact with appellant after

receiving a dispatch that “there was an assault in progress” at a bar. During her

investigation, appellant referred to Anna as his wife and admitted that he had “punched”

someone, an unnamed individual who is not involved in this case. On October 7, 2018,

Gabauer received a dispatch for “another assault-in-progress. The caller stated that there

was a male running after a female and then” Gabauer “made contact with [appellant and

Anna] at the Valero.” Anna “had a busted lip.”

Jeremy Patterson, a former patrol sergeant with the Aransas County Sheriff’s

Office, testified that appellant had previously been convicted of assaulting Anna who “was

described as somebody of [appellant’s] household or a member of his family.” The trial

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court admitted evidence that appellant had previously pleaded guilty to “assault family

violence by striking [Anna] about her face and arms with his fist.”

C. Discussion

First, appellant asserts that the State did not call Anna to testify at trial; therefore,

the evidence is insufficient. However, appellant cites no authority, and we find none,

supporting a conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for assault

of a family member because the victim fails to testify, and we decline to make such a

determination. Appellant also complains that Anna recanted, and the officer admitted that

her injuries could have been inflicted in another manner.4 However, we defer to the fact

finder as the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility. See

Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trier of fact could

have reasonably found from the evidence and reasonable inferences that appellant

caused Anna’s injuries based on evidence that she told the paramedic that he had done

so. Accordingly, we conclude that any rational fact finder could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166;

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

By his second through fourth issues, appellant contends that his right to

confrontation was violated by the trial court admitting a 911 call, Anna’s medical report,

and jail house phone calls because those statements were testimonial.

4 Anna did not testify at the trial.

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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d

410, 417–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling that is correct

under any applicable legal theory and is reasonably supported by the record. Id. at 418.

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment

confrontation right applies not only to in-court testimony, but also to out-of-court

statements that are testimonial in nature. 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). The Confrontation

Clause forbids the admission of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable

to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine the declarant. Id. at

68. This is so even if the statement “falls under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears

particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006). Whether a particular out-of-court statement is testimonial is a question

of law. De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

The Crawford Court did not define “testimonial,” but it noted three
formulations of “core” testimonial evidence: (1) “ex parte in-court testimony
or its functional equivalent,” such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony not subject to cross-examination, or “similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,”
(2) “extrajudicial statements” of the same nature “contained in formalized
testimonial materials,” and (3) “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”

Kearney v. State, 181 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d) (citation

modified).

B. The 911 Call

In Ruth v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals explained that statements made

in 911 calls were generally non-testimonial because those “statements are not given in

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response to structured police questioning or with an eye to future legal proceedings but

are initiated by a victim or witness to obtain police assistance.” 167 S.W.3d 560, 569 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In Kearney, the Sixth Court of Appeals, relying

on Ruth, held that a 911 call was non-testimonial because the call “was [made] to report

a robbery in progress and to summon emergency police help.” 181 S.W.3d at 443. Both

courts noted the following:

(1) Testimonial statements are official and formal in nature.

(2) Interaction with the police initiated by a witness or the victim is less likely
to result in testimonial statements than if initiated by the police.

(3) Spontaneous statements to the police are not testimonial.

(4) Responses to preliminary questions by police at the scene of a crime
while police are assessing and securing the scene are not testimonial.

Kearney, 181 S.W.3d at 442; Ruth, 167 S.W.3d at 568–69.

Here, Anna called 911 to report that appellant had injured her and that she needed

emergency medical and police help. Her statements were not made in an official and

formal nature. See Kearney, 181 S.W.3d at 442; Ruth, 167 S.W.3d at 568–69. As the

alleged victim, Anna initiated the interaction. See Kearney, 181 S.W.3d at 442; Ruth, 167

S.W.3d at 568–69. The statements to the 911 dispatcher were made after she had been

assaulted and were spontaneous. See Kearney, 181 S.W.3d at 442; Ruth, 167 S.W.3d

at 568–69. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 911 call

as it did not contain testimonial evidence. Kearney, 181 S.W.3d at 442; Ruth, 167 S.W.3d

at 568–69. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

C. Anna’s Medical Records

To preserve error for a Confrontation Clause violation, the defendant must have

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specifically objected on that basis at trial. See Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); Rojas-Antonio v. State, 719 S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2025, no pet.) (““Confrontation Clause claims are subject to this

preservation requirement.”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Cavil v. State, No. 09-08-

00049-CR, 2009 WL 2617780, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 26, 2009, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that appellant waived his

Confrontation Clause issue because he did not object at trial on that basis). At trial, when

Sanchez said Anna told her that “her husband had beat her and that she had a cut to her

head,” appellant only objected on the basis that the statement was hearsay. Appellant did

not object on the basis that the statement was testimonial or violated the Confrontation

Clause. “[A] general hearsay objection does not preserve error on Confrontation Clause

grounds.” See Rojas-Antonio, 719 S.W.3d at 431–32 (citation modified). Therefore, he

did not preserve this complaint. See id.; Craven v. State, 579 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (determining that appellant did not preserve a

Confrontation Clause complaint to a lab report because appellant only lodged a hearsay

objection and “[n]othing about appellant’s objection would have alerted the trial judge to

his complaint on appeal that admitting the report violates appellant’s rights under the

Confrontation Clause”); Mitchell v. State, 238 S.W.3d 405, 409 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Appellant’s hearsay objection did not preserve error on his

confrontation clause and due process claims.”); see also Odeku v. State, 722 S.W.3d 76,

85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025) (concluding that the statements made to a

medical professional were non-testimonial); Murray v. State, 597 S.W.3d 964, 974 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2020, pet. ref’d) (explaining that “[m]edical reports created for treatment

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purposes generally are non-testimonial” and “statements to individuals who are not law

enforcement officers . . . are much less likely to be testimonial”) (citation modified).

Appellant had “no objection” when the State offered Anna’s medical records. Therefore,

we conclude appellant did not preserve his complaint that the statements in Anna’s

medical records were testimonial. See Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a);

see also Cavil, 2009 WL 2617780, at *3. We overrule appellant’s third issue.

D. Jail Calls

Next, appellant states, “clearly the jail phone calls were out-of-court statements

and were procured by law enforcement, albeit by recording, for later prosecution. The

callers were forced to use this communication system at the Jail, and the calls were kept

in the system at the Sheriff’s Office ‘forever.’” Appellant argues “[b]ecause [he] was in

custody and the phone calls were recorded and gathered for law enforcement purposes

by government officials, they were testimonial in nature.” Appellant has not cited authority

to support his suggestion that statements made in jail phone calls are per se testimonial,

and we find none. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Taylor v. State, 555 S.W.3d 765, 781 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d) (finding the appellant’s brief inadequate because he

failed to include citations to the record or case law to support his argument that a transcript

of a phone conversation was testimonial).

Nonetheless, we disagree with appellant’s implication that jail phone calls are per

se testimonial. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) (noting that “the most

important instances in which [the Confrontation Clause] restricts the introduction of out-

of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court

interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial”); Williams v. State, 606 S.W.3d 48,

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58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (rejecting the appellant’s argument

that a coconspirator’s statement was testimonial “based on a generalized idea that all

statements one inmate makes to another about a case are made with the knowledge that

the statement could be available for potential use at a later criminal prosecution” and

explaining that “the primary purpose of the . . . statements . . . was not to create an out-

of-court substitute for trial testimony” and not per se testimonial); see also Espinoza v.

Thaler, No. 2:11-CV-00146, 2012 WL 774989, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (agreeing that recorded telephone conversations were not

testimonial because they were initiated by appellant’s co-defendant, “not law

enforcement, and they constituted spontaneous statements she made to private

persons”); Vargas v. State, No. 06-02-00075-CR, 2003 WL 1338682, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Mar. 20, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining

that the appellant’s brief was inadequate and presented nothing for appellate review

because he failed “to argue or cite authority supporting the proposition that his

constitutional right to confrontation was violated under either the United States or Texas

Constitutions by the trial court simply admitting the 9-1-1 tape”). “An out-of-court

statement may be testimonial when the surrounding circumstances objectively indicate

that the primary reason the statement was made was to establish or prove past events

that would be potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” Nicholls v. State, 630

S.W.3d 443, 448 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547

U.S. 813, 822–23 (2006)). Here, the statements appellant made in the jail phone calls

were not formal, solemn declarations, and none of the statements in the recordings were

elicited by or made to any law enforcement officer or court official. See id. Therefore, we

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conclude that the statements were not testimonial, and the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting them. See id. at 449–50 (holding that appellant’s statements to a

co-defendant were not testimonial even though they were recorded by law enforcement

while appellant was in custody in the officer’s vehicle); see also Townsend v. State, No.

03-17-00495-CR, 2018 WL 3978489, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 21, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining recorded statements appellant

made to his co-defendant and another inmate were not testimonial as the statements

“were not made to law enforcement, but between acquaintances” and “[t]he primary

purpose of the recording was not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”).

Moreover, appellant does not contend he was harmed by admission of this

evidence. See Chaves v. State, 630 S.W.3d 541, 558 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2021, no pet.) (determining that appellant waived appellate argument that the trial court

committed error by admitting two exhibits, because “in his brief, appellant provide[d] only

two conclusory sentences, without citation to authority, asserting that he ‘suffered harm

as a result of the trial court’s admission of’” the exhibits); see also Adell v. State, No. 01-

21-00439-CR, 2023 WL 4938111, at *54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2023,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding the appellant waived his

Confrontation Clause issue even though he had argued error in admission of “certain

complained-of testimony and text-message evidence,” because “his briefing contain[ed]

no argument, explanation, substantive analysis, or citation to authorities to show that he

was harmed by the trial court’s purported erroneous admission”). Therefore, we cannot

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the complained-of

evidence. See Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting that

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the United States Supreme Court concluded that “[a]fter finding a violation of the

Confrontation Clause,” the appellate court must then determine whether the error is

harmless (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986))); see also Davis v.

State, 581 S.W.3d 885, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. ref’d) (explaining that even

assuming the trial court erred by admitting testimonial evidence, the court was

“convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the erroneous admission of [the] testimonial

statements would probably not have had a significant impact on the mind of an average

juror”). We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

III. Rule 901

By his fifth issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the recordings of the jail phone calls because the voices in the recordings were

not properly authenticated under Rule 901. See TEX. R. EVID. 901 (requiring sufficient

evidence to show that an item offered is what the proponent claims it to be). Again,

appellant does not argue in his brief that he was harmed; thus, he does not present any

discussion, analysis and does not present authoritative citations to support a conclusion

that he was harmed. Therefore, we may not reverse the judgment on this basis. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Arevalo v. State, 675 S.W.3d 833, 847 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no

pet.) (“Therefore, irrespective of having raised the issue, the omission of any substantive

analysis of the harm that Appellant allegedly suffered renders the issue of harm waived.”);

Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 554 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (concluding

error pursuant to 901 was harmless because the inadmissible evidence “did not have a

substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict”). We overrule appellant’s fifth issue.

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IV. EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE

By his sixth issue, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously admitted

extraneous evidence that was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403.5 Appellant complains

that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the following:

A March 3, 2017 alleged assault in Portland at a residence where officers
heard a male voice yelling aggressively and [Anna] was observed with
injuries.

An April 9, 2017 alleged assault in Portland at a residence where
[Anna] met officers outside with a swollen lip and they found [appellant] in a
bedroom.

An August 9, 2017 alleged assault in Portland in which [appellant] was
arrested for intoxication.

An October 7, 2018 alleged assault in Corpus Christi where [appellant]
ran after [Anna].

A December 19, 2018 alleged assault in Portland during a traffic stop
where [Anna] was “bleeding very badly” from her head area.

A. Applicable Law

“To preserve error for appellate review, an appellant must present a timely

complaint to the trial court stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling ‘with sufficient

specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint’ if it is not apparent from the

context of the complaint.” Rodriguez v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, No. 01-23-00721-

CR, 2025 WL 1373693, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 13, 2025, no pet.)

(quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A)). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

“consistently held that the failure to object in a timely and specific manner during trial

5 “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a

danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403.

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forfeits complaints about the admissibility of evidence.” Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584,

603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002)). “This is true even though the evidence might implicate the defendant’s

constitutional rights.” Id. To preserve a complaint that the evidence violated Rule 403, the

appellant must have made a specific rule 403 objection in the trial court. Lopez v. State,

200 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d).

B. Discussion

Gebauer testified that she went to a bar to investigate “an assault in progress,” and

appellant admitted that “he punched” someone. Delapaz testified that on March 3, 2017,

he heard appellant aggressively screaming at his daughter and threatening to “hit” her if

she continued crying and that he observed Anna had injuries. Sergeant Hodge testified

that on April 9, 2017, he encountered Anna outside her residence, she had a swollen lip,

and appellant was in the bedroom. Good testified that appellant had been arrested due

to his “intoxication level.” Gebauer testified that she was dispatched on October 7, 2018,

due to “an assault in progress” and a report “that there was a male running after a female.”

Officer Shaw testified that on December 19, 2018, he saw that Anna “had a large cut on

the left side of her head. She was bleeding from her head very badly as pooling on her

shirt and she had bloody handprints on her arms.”

Appellant did not object to any of the complained-of testimony on any basis.

Therefore, he did not preserve this issue for appellate review. See Rodriguez, ___ S.W.3d

at ___, 2025 WL 1373693, at *14 (holding that the appellant failed to preserve his

complaint that the State’s questions it asked the complainant’s mother during her

testimony were inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403 by failing to object on that basis at

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trial); Lopez, 200 S.W.3d at 251 (explaining that because the appellant only raised a Rule

403 objection concerning complaint six, he did not preserve his other complaints that the

evidence was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). We overrule

appellant’s sixth issue.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
2nd day of April, 2026.

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