In Re Richard Gonzales v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-26-00231-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE RICHARD GONZALES

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña1

By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Richard Gonzales asserts that the trial

court 2 abused its discretion by granting a motion for discovery under the Texas Citizens

Participation Act (TCPA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(b). We conditionally

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-5167-25-D in the 206th District

Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Rose Guerra Reyna. See id. R. 52.2.
grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

Real parties in interest Melissa Jalomo, Stacy Solis, and Eduardo de la Rosa, who

are precinct chairs for the Hidalgo County Democratic Party, filed suit against Gonzales,

individually and as chair of the Hidalgo County Democratic Party County Executive

Committee (CEC), Kenna Giffin, individually and as treasurer of the CEC, and the Hidalgo

County Democratic Party. Their complaints concerned an alleged “sham meeting” of the

CEC held on August 7, 2025, at which the CEC adopted several actions including the

appointment of precinct chairs and further concerned who possessed control over the

CEC’s bank accounts. In their second amended original petition for writ of mandamus,

the real parties sought “to enforce provisions of the Texas Election Code” and specifically

requested the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding:

1. the CEC and the CEC Chair to vacate the action taken by the CEC
at the August 7, 2025 meeting;

2. the CEC Chair to call a meeting of the CEC, giving CEC members
reasonable notice thereof, as required by party rules, but no less than
5 days from the date of issuance of the writ of mandamus, for
reconsideration by the CEC of the items considered and voted on at
the CEC August 7, 2026 meeting;

3. the CEC [C]hair and the CEC to vacate and to not implement any of
the actions taken by the CEC at its August 7, 2025 CEC meeting;

4. the CEC and the CEC Chair and the CEC Treasurer to produce for
[the real parties’] review, and review by the CEC, no later than five
days from the date a writ of mandamus issue[s], (a) record[s] of all
reportable political contributions and political expenditures and (b)
the records of reportable political activity on which reports to the
Texas Ethics Commission of political contributions and political
expenditures are based, including the following records required [by]
Commission Rule § 20.18 to be preserved by the CEC and the CEC
Treasurer[]: bank statements of all campaign activity, invoices or bills

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for campaign expenditures, copies of checks paid for campaign
activity, receipts for reimbursed campaign expenses, employee
times sheets and payroll records;

5. the CEC Chair and the CEC Treasurer to produce or make
accessible, within no later than 5 days from the date of issuance of
a writ of mandamus, to the CEC and to [the real parties], all records
of reportable activity which document contributions or the receipt of
any reportable item during fiscal years 2024 and 2025 by CEC, the
CEC Treasurer or the CEC Chair from Texas Majority PAC, including,
but not limited to, contributions or receipts of any reportable item
mistakenly delivered to the CEC, the CEC Chair, the CEC Treasurer,
or any one on their behalf[;]

6. the CEC and CEC Chair to withdraw, retract, amend, or correct, as
appropriate, and to resubmit to the Secretary of State within no later
than five days of the issuance of a writ of mandamus of a correct,
duly authorized, roster of precinct chairs which has been confirmed
and ratified by the CEC;[]

7. [the CEC Chair] to call a CEC meeting no later than five days after
the date of issuance of the writ of mandamus after giving sufficient
notice as required by party rules to consider the confirmation and
ratification of precinct chairs to fill current precinct chair vacancies;

8. [the CEC Chair] that henceforth all CEC members be given at least
a 5-day advance notice of any CEC meeting in accordance with party
rule[; and]

9. [the CEC Chair] to call and hold an emergency meeting of the CEC
only on the condition that he reasonably describe the circumstances
which give rise to the need for an emergency meeting, certify in good
faith when he learned of the emergency circumstances and that
under no reasonable circumstances could the emergency CEC
action reasonably be avoided.

Thereafter, Gonzales 3 filed a motion to dismiss the real parties’ suit under the

TCPA on grounds that it constituted a legal action that was based on, relates to, or was

made in response to “the exercise of the right of association in a local political party.” See

3 The motion to dismiss states that the real parties’ amended petition omits the CEC as a party to

the lawsuit; however, “because [Gonzales] is also being sued in his official capacity, in an abundance of
caution the [CEC] joins in this motion as well.”
3
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(2) (defining the exercise of the right of association).

He characterized the real parties’ lawsuit as “an effort to have the Court manage and

compel the internal governance of the [CEC], including meeting procedure, notice

requirements, signatory authority over party accounts, precinct-chair confirmations, and

party records.” Gonzales asserted that the CEC “is a political association organized to

collectively pursue common interests relating to governmental proceedings and matters

of public concern, including the administration of primary elections and political

participation,” and that the real parties’ requested relief “seeks to influence and control

how that public purpose political association operates.” He contended, in short, that

“Texas courts do not adjudicate intra-party governance disputes absent clear statutory

authorization, and [real parties’] requested relief confirms they seek judicial supervision

of party operations.” Gonzales supported the motion to dismiss with his January 29, 2026

affidavit. In the affidavit, Gonzales averred, in part:

3. During the time period referenced in [the real parties’] Second
Amended Original Petition for Writ of Mandamus, I served as Chair
of the [CEC]. I am familiar with the CEC’s customary meeting
practices, the Party’s internal governance procedures, and the
administration of CEC business.

4. The CEC is a political association composed of members who join
together to collectively express, promote, pursue, and defend shared
political interests, including interests related to primary elections,
precinct conventions, and party governance of the Democratic Party.
The CEC’s work includes organizing and conducting internal party
activities and coordinating actions related to election-cycle
operations and political participation.

5. I have reviewed [the real parties’] Second Amended Original Petition
for Writ of Mandamus in this cause. [The real parties’] requested
relief seeks to have the Court direct and control CEC governance
and operations, including meeting procedures, meeting notice
requirements, committee assignments, signatory authority on

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accounts, the submission or withdrawal of precinct chair rosters, and
access to internal party records.

6. CEC meetings are held to conduct CEC business, including
discussion and votes by members on internal party matters. CEC
meetings routinely involve member communications, deliberations,
and collective decision-making regarding party operations and
political activity.

7. A meeting of the CEC was scheduled for August 7, 2025. Notice of
the meeting was provided by the Party through customary channels
used by the CEC for meeting notice, including electronic
communications and distribution methods routinely used for CEC
matters. The notice stated the date, time, and location of the meeting,
and it was intended to provide members a meaningful opportunity to
attend.

8. On August 7, 2025, members attended the meeting in person and or
remotely. Based on the attendance and sign-in information
maintained for that meeting, the meeting proceeded with the
participation of members sufficient to conduct the business that was
conducted. [T]he meeting involved internal governance matters of
the CEC, including committee assignments, organizational functions,
and the administration of party operations. Any actions taken were
taken in the context of internal party governance and the collective
decision-making of CEC participants.

9. Committee assignments and signatory authority are internal
administrative functions of the Party and the CEC. Changes to
committee assignments are made to organize work and
responsibilities. Signatory authority is maintained to protect the
integrity of accounts and to ensure that authorized persons can
execute banking tasks required for Party operations.

10. The Party maintains and updates precinct chair rosters as part of its
internal administration. A roster may be transmitted to third parties,
including governmental offices, to reflect the Party’s understanding
of current precinct chair status at the time of submission based on
records and information available to the Party.

11. The Party maintains financial records and reporting information in the
ordinary course of its operations. Records include information related
to contributions, expenditures, bank account statements, invoices,
and communications with vendors or committees. Records are
maintained in formats used by the Party for compliance and internal

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administration. To the extent [the real parties] request court-ordered
disclosure or production of records in a particular form or timeframe,
that request concerns internal administration and governance,
including how the CEC manages its records and approvals.

12. From my review of [the real parties’] Petition, [the real parties] are
attempting to use this lawsuit to change who controls CEC
operations and how the CEC must conduct its internal business. The
dispute is fundamentally about internal party governance and the
management of a political association.

13. The actions described in [the real parties’] Petition, including calling
meeting, communicating with members, conducting votes, assigning
committees, managing signatory authority, and administering
precinct chair status and internal records, are part of how CEC
members join together to pursue shared political goals and common
interests.

14. My actions as Chair were undertaken in good faith and for legitimate
party purposes, including ensuring orderly governance, continuity of
operations, and the effective administration of Party business.

15. I am also currently running for 2026 Hidalgo County Democratic
Chair and believe that the lawsuit is intended to interfere with my
election and influence my race for the position. The petition makes
allegations attacking my character and accusing me of abusing my
legal authority which is furthest from the truth.

16. I submit this affidavit in support of [the] Motion to Dismiss under the
[TCPA] and related requests for relief, including the request for a
discovery stay and the request for attorneys’ fees, costs, and
sanctions.

The real parties thereafter filed a “Motion for Specified and Limited Discovery.”

They asserted that “the specific and limited depositions” of Gonzales and Giffin “will assist

the court in its consideration of” the TCPA motion to dismiss. They informed the trial court

that it was allowed to order specified and limited discovery relevant to the motion to

dismiss upon a showing of good cause, see id. § 27.006(b), and they alleged that:

The purpose of the specified and limited discovery sought by [the real
parties] will relate to the following issues: (a) [Gonzales’s] alleged

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communication(s) at issue and the extent, if any, to which those
communications occurred within the [TCPA’s] definition of the exercise of
the right of association, and (b) that the relevant communication(s) were
made to an individual with whom [Gonzales] “had joined together to
collectively express, promote, pursue of defend common interests relating
to a governmental proceeding or a matter of public concern.”

[Gonzales] has not identified with any specificity what factual
circumstances constitute the “communication(s)” he claims were part of his
right of association, when these communication(s) took place, and the
identity of the person(s) that made up the “association.”

(Internal footnote omitted). The real parties asserted that the depositions “will assist the

court in its review and determination of the pending motion.”

Gonzales and Giffin filed a response and objection to the real parties’ motion for

discovery. They asserted that the real parties failed to meet their burden to obtain

discovery under the TCPA because they had not shown good cause for the discovery and

the requested discovery was not relevant to their motion to dismiss. They argued that the

real parties’ requested discovery regarding “communications” was irrelevant to their

motion to dismiss because the current version of the TCPA did not require a showing of

“communications” as part of the right of association. They further asserted that

depositions were “not necessary to determine whether a lawsuit seeking judicial control

of internal party governance ‘relates to’ the exercise of the right of association under

[section] 27.003(a).”

The trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on the real parties’ motion at which

the real parties argued that:

The discovery that we are asking for, Your Honor, relates specifically to
[Gonzales’s] affidavit. We believe that the affidavit is bogus. It’s not factually
based and does not show the elements of a preponderance of the evidence
which they have a burden to show before this case moves forward with
respect to that motion.

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At the hearing, the trial court orally granted the real parties’ motion in part by allowing the

deposition of Gonzales but not Giffin. On March 17, 2026, the trial court issued an order

allowing the real parties to depose Gonzales “on the matters contained in his affidavit

dated January 29, 2026.”

This original proceeding ensued. Gonzales filed a petition for writ of mandamus

and an emergency motion for stay. We granted the emergency motion, ordered his

deposition to be stayed, and ordered the real parties to file a response to the petition for

writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8, 52.10. The real parties filed a response

asserting generally that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering the discovery.

Gonzales has filed a reply in support of his request for relief. See id. R. 52.5.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the trial court

clearly abused its discretion and the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy on

appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re

Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential

Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer,

827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A court abuses its discretion if

no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests and if the court could reasonably

have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223

(Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We conduct a “benefits-and-detriments

analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn

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Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see

In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136–37.

We review a trial court’s ruling on discovery under the TCPA for abuse of

discretion. Bauta v. Mulvey, 646 S.W.3d 347, 358 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2022, pet. denied); Walker v. Schion, 420 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.). An order that allows discovery beyond the permissible scope

constitutes an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy. In re State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 712 S.W.3d 53, 70 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding) (discussing

discovery under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure); In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d

464, 470 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, orig. proceeding) (applying this tenet to discovery

under the TCPA).

III. THE TCPA AND DISCOVERY

The purpose of the TCPA “is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights

of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in

government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the

rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 27.002; see Walgreens v. McKenzie, 713 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. 2025)

(explaining that this “dual purpose” is served by authorizing a motion to dismiss early in

the proceedings and expedited review of the ruling on that motion); D Mag. Partners, L.P.

v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 433–35 (Tex. 2017) (discussing the TCPA’s balance

between the need for freedom of press and the right to seek redress for injury). When a

motion to dismiss is filed under the TCPA, “all discovery in the legal action is suspended

until the court has ruled on the motion to dismiss.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

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§ 27.003(c). Instead, the trial court determines the motion based on “the pleadings,

evidence a court could consider under Rule 166a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and

supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is

based.” Id. § 27.006(a).

However, section 27.006(b) provides that “[o]n a motion by a party or on the court’s

own motion and on a showing of good cause, the court may allow specified and limited

discovery relevant to the motion.” Id. § 27.006(b); see In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d

at 470; see also In re SPEX Grp. US LLC, No. 05-18-00208-CV, 2018 WL 1312407, at *4

(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 14, 2018, orig. proceeding [mand. dism’d]) (mem. op.). We note

that, in general, “good cause” requires “a legally sufficient reason.” Good Cause, BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). “Discovery is relevant to a motion to dismiss if it seeks

information related to the allegations asserted in the motion” or if “it seeks information to

assist the non-movant to meet its burden to present a prima facie case for each element

of its claims to defeat the motion to dismiss.” In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d at 471–

72; Norwich v. Jack N. Mousa, Ltd., No. 11-19-00339-CV, 2020 WL 2836789, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Eastland May 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Mazaheri v. Tola, No. 05-18-

01367-CV, 2019 WL 3451188, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). However, “[t]he [TCPA] does not contemplate extensive discovery.” USA Lending

Grp., Inc. v. Winstead PC, 669 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. 2023).

IV. ANALYSIS

Gonzales asserts that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by granting the

real parties’ motion for discovery. He argues that the real parties failed to show good

cause for the discovery, and they did not specify why the discovery was needed or how

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it was limited to the TCPA motion. The real parties contend otherwise and broadly assert

that discovery is necessary because the motion to dismiss is deficient. They assert that

the motion to dismiss “fail[s] to demonstrate with any clarity how [the real parties’] lawsuit

allegedly impinges on Gonzales’[s] constitutional right of association.” They further argue

that, “No facts are articulated to support the bare pleadings in the motion to dismiss or to

connect them to [the real parties’] alleged interference with [Gonzales’s] alleged

constitutional right of association,” and their “motion for discovery expressly noted this

deficiency and their good cause for limited and specified discovery.”

In examining whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing discovery

under the TCPA, we bear in mind that the TCPA’s purpose is to balance protections for

a defendant’s constitutional rights of speech, petition, and association with a claimant’s

rights to pursue valid legal claims for demonstrable injuries. See Ferchichi v. Whataburger

Rests. LLC, 713 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. 2025) (discussing section 27.002 of the TCPA).

Thus, “[t]he provisions staying discovery are tempered by provisions permitting discovery

upon a showing of good cause.” Combined L. Enf’t Ass’n of Tex. v. Sheffield, No. 03-13-

00105-CV, 2014 WL 411672, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 31, 2014, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). “These provisions can curtail potentially costly discovery in a possibly meritless

case, thus serving the TCPA’s goal of keeping litigation from being used to chill the

exercise of constitutional rights, but can permit discovery upon a showing of good cause.”

Id. 4

4 “As a general rule, a party may obtain discovery regarding any unprivileged matter that is relevant

to the subject matter of the pending action.” In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 712 S.W.3d 53, 67 (Tex. 2025)
(orig. proceeding). However, like the TCPA, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require a heightened “good
cause” standard to obtain discovery when competing interests are involved. For instance, Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 204.1 requires “good cause” to obtain a physical or mental examination of another party.

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We conclude that the real parties failed to meet their statutory burden to show good

cause for the requested discovery. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(b). The

real parties’ motion did not state that there was good cause for allowing discovery but

instead merely asserted that the discovery would “assist the court” in its “consideration”

or “review and determination” of the motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the real parties did

not argue that there was good cause for discovery; rather, they argued that they should

be allowed to conduct discovery because they “believe[d] that [Gonzales’s] affidavit is

bogus,” “not factually based[,] and does not show the elements . . . which [relators] have

a burden to show before this case moves forward with respect to that motion.” These

arguments do not meet the statutory requirement for the movant to show “good cause”

for allowing the discovery. See id.; Mazaheri, 2019 WL 3451188, at *5 (concluding good

cause for discovery was not shown where the movant “did not explain in his motion, or to

the trial court at the hearing on his motion, how particularly the information he sought was

relevant to defending against [the] motion to dismiss”); In re D.C., No. 05-13-00944-CV,

2013 WL 4041507, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 9, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)

(concluding the movant failed to show good cause when he “stated no good cause for the

TEX. R. CIV. P. 204.1(c). “The purpose of Rule 204.1’s good-cause requirement is to balance the movant’s
right to a fair trial and the other party’s right to privacy.” In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 303
(Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To establish good cause to obtain an examination under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 204.1(c), “the movant must show that (1) the examination is relevant to the issue in
controversy and is likely to lead to relevant evidence, (2) there is a ‘reasonable nexus between the
examination and the condition in controversy,’ and (3) the desired information ‘cannot be obtained by less
intrusive means.’” In re Sherwin-Williams Co., 668 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam). Similarly, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.7 requires good cause to obtain an order for entry on
a nonparty’s property, and “the trial court must balance the degree to which the proposed inspection will
aid in the search for truth against the burdens and dangers created by the inspection.” In re Sun City Gun
Exch., Inc., 545 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding). In these circumstances, “good
cause” is shown if the movant’s defense will be compromised by the denial of discovery. In re SWEPI L.P.,
103 S.W.3d 578, 587 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).

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discovery” in his motion and merely argued at the hearing “he needed to have limited

depositions of the defendants in order to defend the motion to dismiss”).

Moreover, the real parties sought discovery regarding Gonzales’s “alleged

communication(s)” and “the extent, if any, to which those communications occurred within

the [TCPA’s] definition of the exercise of the right of association,” because Gonzales “has

not identified with any specificity what factual circumstances constitute the

‘communication(s)’ he claims were part of his right of association, when these

communication(s) took place, and the identity of the person(s) that made up the

‘association.’” Gonzales and Giffin asserted that the real parties’ discovery request was

legally misplaced because it relied on the 2011 version of the TCPA rather than the

amended 2019 version. The 2011 version of the TCPA defined “exercise of the right of

association” as “a communication between individuals who join together to collectively

express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests.” See Act of May 24, 2011, 82d

Leg., R.S., ch. 341 (H.B. 2973), § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961, 961–62. However, the

Legislature amended this definition in 2019, and the applicable version of the TCPA now

defines the right of association as “to join together to collectively express, promote,

pursue, or defend common interests relating to a governmental proceeding or a matter of

public concern.” Act of May 20, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 1, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws

684, 684 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(2)); see McLane Champions,

LLC v. Hous. Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907, 919 (Tex. 2023) (discussing the

amendment). Thus, the 2019 version of the TCPA does not require Gonzales and Giffin

to identify a discrete “communication” in order to invoke the right of association. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(2); Perales v. Newman, No. 02-23-00095-CV, 2023 WL

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5615893, at *18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, the real parties’ request for discovery regarding Gonzales’s

“communications” was not apt under the current version of the TCPA.

Finally, we note that the trial court’s order allows the real parties to depose

Gonzales “on the matters contained in his affidavit.” As shown herein, Gonzales’s affidavit

is lengthy and encompasses numerous topics regarding the CEC, its practices and

procedures, factual matters regarding the August 7, 2025 meeting, the CEC’s financial

records, and the election for 2026 Hidalgo County Democratic Chair, including Gonzales’s

belief that the real parties’ lawsuit was intended to interfere with that election. As such,

the trial court’s order fails to meet the TCPA’s requirement for allowable discovery to be

“specified and limited.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(b); In re SPEX Grp.

US LLC, 2018 WL 1312407, at *5 (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering discovery under the TCPA where the scope of discovery was not properly

limited).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by

ordering discovery that is not authorized by the TCPA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 27.006(b); In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d at 470; In re SPEX Grp. US LLC, 2018

WL 1312407, at *4. Further, Gonzales lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to address

this error. See In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d at 470; In re SPEX Grp. US LLC,

2018 WL 1312407, at *4. We sustain the sole issue presented in this original proceeding.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

the real parties’ response, the reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that

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Gonzales has met his burden to obtain mandamus relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay

previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10. We conditionally grant the

petition for writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to vacate its March 17, 2026 order

regarding discovery and to proceed in accordance with our memorandum opinion. Our

writ will issue only if the trial court fails to promptly comply.

L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
19th day of May, 2026.

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