Phillip Lloyd Trahan v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed December 7, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00240-CR

PHILLIP LLOYD TRAHAN, Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 1584999

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The sole issue in this appeal is whether appellant Phillip Lloyd Trahan
received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial for intoxication manslaughter
with a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle. Appellant hit and killed a cyclist while he
was driving in a public park, did not stop and render aid, fled the scene, and ran
into the woods, where he was later apprehended by law enforcement.

In this appeal from trial-court cause number 1584999, the jury found
appellant guilty of the second-degree felony and found that appellant used a deadly
weapon during the commission of the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 1.07(a)(17) (deadly weapon), 49.08 (intoxication manslaughter). The jury
assessed punishment at imprisonment for 18 years. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 12.33. Appellant was also charged and convicted of failure to stop and render aid
in trial-court cause number 1584710, in which the jury assessed punishment at
imprisonment for 10 years with a recommendation for probation, which the trial
court accepted. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.021(c). No motion for new trial
was filed.

On appeal, appellant contends his counsel was ineffective because:
(1) counsel filed no pretrial motions outside of motions to continue; (2) counsel did
not adduce evidence of appellant’s mental-health history and develop this issue for
the jury; (3) counsel did not exclude evidence of extraneous misdemeanor
offenses; (4) counsel did not request a jury instruction on the lesser-included
offense of driving while intoxicated; and (5) counsel did not object to prejudicial
social-media evidence presented by the State at the punishment phase.

Evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment involves a two-pronged test: (1) whether counsel was deficient, and
(2) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error. U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

To establish that counsel’s actions were deficient, the appellant must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel’s actions fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; Hernandez v. State,
726 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). There is “a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
(1955)). Courts should consider the reasonableness of counsel’s actions at the time,
rather than viewing such actions through the benefit of hindsight. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689. The court should make this determination in light of all the
circumstances in order to determine if the actions fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance. Id. at 690.

“Under most circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient
to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or
strategic decision-making as to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct was reasonable and professional.” Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503,
510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Given this fact, trial counsel should ordinarily be
afforded an opportunity to explain his conduct before being denounced as
ineffective. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In
the absence of such an opportunity, when faced with an undeveloped record on
direct appeal, “[c]ourts ‘commonly assume a strategic motive if any can be
imagined and find counsel’s performance deficient only if the conduct was so
outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Okonkwo v.
State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Andrews v. State, 159
S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Counsel’s actions are considered
deficient only if the court finds, as a matter of law, that “no reasonable trial
strategy could justify trial counsel’s acts or omissions, regardless of his or her
subjective reasoning.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011).

We have reviewed entire trial record, and without an evidentiary motion for
new trial at which trial counsel was afforded an opportunity to explain his conduct,

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we cannot conclude as a matter of law counsel had no reasonable trial strategy.1
Further discussion of the alleged ineffective assistance would not serve any
purpose and could possibly prejudice any future habeas-corpus proceeding on
ineffective assistance of counsel.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment as
challenged on appeal.

/s Charles A. Spain
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Bourliot, and Spain.
Do Not Publish —Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

1
We note that although there were oral discussions at trial that the jury would assess
punishment, trial counsel did not timely submit a written election for the jury. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 2(b). When the trial court initially balked at the jury determining
punishment, trial counsel stated, “I will be filing an affidavit of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Appellant and the State agreed that the jury should assess punishment, and the trial
court agreed.

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