Curadev Pharma PVT. LTD. and Curadev Pharma Limited v. the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, Dr. Xiaochen Bai, and Dr. Xuewu Zhang

Affirmed and Majority and Concurring and Dissenting Opinions filed August
21, 2025.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00004-CV

CURADEV PHARMA PVT. LTD. AND CURADEV PHARMA LIMITED,
Appellants

V.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER,
DR. XIAOCHEN BAI, AND DR. XUEWU ZHANG, Appellees

On Appeal from the 101st District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-24-03875

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
The Court misreads Texas law to override the Takings Clause in the Bill of
Rights solely because a government unit had a contract with some unrelated third
party. When the government takes money or property belonging to A pursuant to a
contract the government has with A, I agree there is no taking; Chapter 2260 of the
Texas Government Code provides an exclusive administrative remedy for A that
cannot be skipped by pleading a takings claim.1 But things are different when the
government takes money or property belonging to B pursuant to a contract the
government has with A. If the government has “taken, damaged, or destroyed” B’s
property for public use, it is no excuse that “A agreed we could do it.” In the former
case, the government has no intent to exercise eminent domain since it has contract
rights to exercise directly against the owner; but in the latter case, it can only have
exercised eminent domain to take property since it has no contract or contractual
rights with the actual owner.
In this case, there were no contracts or contract rights between UT’s
Southwestern Medical Center and the Curadev parties; each had a contract with
Takeda, but neither was aware of Takeda’s contract with the other. But it does not
matter whether Southwestern thought no one else had a property interest in the
intellectual property here; “perhaps we were mistaken about our contract rights” is
no excuse for failing to pay compensation if in fact it took another’s private property.
Under the plain terms of the Texas Constitution’s ancient and venerable Takings
Clause, if Curadev can prove what it alleges (which remains to be seen), the courts
have jurisdiction to adjudicate its takings claim against the Southwestern parties.
A single case issued by the Texas Supreme Court little more than a year ago
explains in detail where the Court goes wrong here. In Texas Department of
Transportation v. Self, the State held a right-of-way easement (i.e., a contract) across
property owned by the Selfs, but intentionally cut down 20 large trees that were
wholly or partly on the Selfs’ property due to a mistaken belief about the location of
the easement’s boundary line.2 The Court held that despite TxDOT’s good faith but
erroneous belief that it was exercising its own contract rights, the Selfs had alleged

1
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2260.005.
2
690 S.W.3d 12, 17–18 (Tex. 2024).

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a viable takings claim.3 The claim was viable even if TxDOT did not have “any
inkling that it was damaging the Selfs’ trees,” because the elements of a takings
claim do not “demand proof that TxDOT acted in bad faith,” or “subjective
awareness that it had no legal right to cut down” the trees.4
The Court says Self does not support Curadev’s claim here by focusing solely
on a single sentence in that opinion: “no compensation is owed when the government
acts on its rights under a contract to which the parties have consented because it is
not exercising sovereign powers.”5 This misses the forest for a single tree; “to which
the parties have consented” means the parties to the lawsuit, not somebody else.
Self does not say “the State was exercising its eminent domain powers” in that
case; it says just the opposite. The Supreme Court held that a taking occurs “even if
the government mistakenly believes that it has a legal right to do so apart from its
power of eminent domain.”6 Whether Curadev’s claims are true or not, the test here
is not whether “the government had a particular ‘impetus’ or mindset” regarding
whether its intentional taking of property for public use was permissible…. The
point of a constitutional action for inverse condemnation is to allow private property
owners to obtain compensation” for property taken “without any valid legal basis
other than eminent domain.”7 Today’s opinion is unmoored from Texas precedent.
I concur with the Court’s judgment that the trial court did not err in dismissing

3
Id. at 30, 32.
4
Id. at 29–30.
5
Id. at 27.
6
Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
7
Id. at 30 (emphasis added). State v. Holland does not hold that absence of an express
contract between the plaintiff and the government is immaterial. The patentholder there controlled
the plaintiff entities entirely and personally handled all contacts and services required of them, so
the State acted “under color of” its contracts with those affiliates. 221 S.W.3d 639, 644 (Tex.
2007). Southwestern had no colorable contract with Curadev or any of its affiliates.

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Curadev’s tort and statutory claims, as well as its claims against Southwestern’s
employees, Drs. Bai and Zhang. But I dissent from the Court’s failure to follow the
Supreme Court’s detailed analysis in Self. Southwestern may not have intended to
take intellectual property that belonged to Curadev, as it was apparently unaware of
Curadev’s interest. But as this lawsuit demonstrates, Southwestern certainly did and
does intend to use, publish, and profit from discoveries arising from its contract with
Takeda to the exclusion of any rights or claims by Curadev. That Southwestern used
intellectual property it may have believed belonged to Takeda does not bar a takings
claim if that property proves to have belonged to Curadev. To the extent the Court
holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

/s/ Scott A. Brister
Scott A. Brister
Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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