In the Matter of the Marriage of Terry Brent Williams and Tracy Leann Williams and in the Interest of P.R.W., a Child v. the State of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00076-cv
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/11/2025 1:48 PM
No. 15-25-00076-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
9/11/2025 1:48:23 PM
AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS AND TRACY LEANN WILLIAMS AND
IN THE INTEREST OF P.R.W., A CHILD,

On Appeal from the 369th District Court
Leon County, Texas, No. 22-0059CV
The Honorable Michael Davis, Presiding

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

Clouthier Law, PLLC
Susan J. Clouthier
Tex. Bar No. 24062673
Elizabeth M. Steiner
Tex. Bar No. 24057028
9950 Woodloch Forest Dr, Ste 1300
The Woodlands, Texas 7380
Ph: (346) 443-4300
Fax: (346) 443-4343
susan@clouthierlaw.com

Attorneys for Appellant
Terry Brent Williams

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant: Terry Brent Williams

Appellee: Tracy Leeann Williams

Counsel for Appellant: Susan J. Clouthier
Elizabeth Steiner
Clouthier Law, PLLC
9950 Woodloch Forest Drive
Suite 1300
The Woodlands, Texas 77380

Trial Counsel for Appellant: Mr. Jeffrey L. Coe
603 E. Lacy Street
Palestine, Texas 75801

Counsel for Appellee: Mr. John R. Bankhead
P.O.Box 1839
Madisonville, Texas 77864

Trial Court Judge: The Honorable Michael Davis
369th District Court
Leon County, Texas
500 N. Church Street, No. 18
Palestine, TX 75801

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................ii

Index of Authorities................................................................................... v

Statement of the Case ............................................................................... 1

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...................................................... 2

Issues Presented........................................................................................ 3

Statement of Facts .................................................................................... 4

Summary of the Argument ..................................................................... 10

Standard of Review ................................................................................. 14

Argument and Authorities ...................................................................... 16

I. The trial court’s child support order requiring Terry Williams to
pay more per month in child support than his entire net pay was an
abuse of discretion. ............................................................................... 16

II. In the alternative, requiring Terry to pay an amount of child
support exceeding both the statutory guidelines and his actual pay
without any specific factual findings (or evidence) to support that an
excess was needed to meet the child’s needs (or for any other
statutorily enumerated purpose) was an abuse of discretion. ............ 22

III. Terry did not agree that the value of his separate property was
$20,000 as the court’s Findings of Fact indicate. Further, the court
committed reversible error by awarding the majority of the proceeds
from the sale of his separate property to the community. .................. 25

IV. In the alternative to III, the trial court abused its discretion by
valuing Terry’s 10.8 acres of separate property in a 44 acres parcel of
land (that netted $385,935 at sale) at only $20,000 because this
valuation was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unsupported by the record
and evidence. The trial court made this ruling without reference to
any guidelines or principles. Evidence in the record shows this 10.8

iii
acre parcel of land was purchased by Terry in 2009 for $127,645.
Further, it constituted approximately ¼ of a larger parcel of land that
netted $385,9835 at sale. ..................................................................... 34

V. The trial court committed reversible error by awarding Appellee
100 percent of the value of certain personal property rather than
making a just and right division of that property. .............................. 41

VI. The court committed reversible error by divesting Terry of the
value of his separate property welding equipment. ............................ 48

VII. The trial court committed reversible error by requiring Terry to
pay for Appellee’s attorney’s fees. ........................................................ 49

Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................ 52

Certificate of Service ............................................................................... 55

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................ 55

Appendix .................................................................................................. 56

iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
Cases

Banker v. Banker,
517 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, pet.
denied) ................................................................................................... 38

Barnett v. Barnett,
67 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. 2001) .................................................................... 27

Bush v. Yarborough Oil & Gas,
705 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. App—El Paso 2024, pet. denied) ....................... 46

City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneau,
48 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. 2001) .................................................................... 38

E.g., Cade v. Dudney,
279 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ............. 28

Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer,
554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1997) .......................................................... Passim

Finch v. Finch,
825 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) ......... 16

Ganesan v. Vallabhaneni,
96 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet denied) .......................... 28

Gerami v. Gerami,
666 S.W. 2d 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no
writ) ..................................................................................... 35, 36, 37, 40

Gonzalez v. Gonzalez,
704 S.W. 3d 54 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.) ............................... 16

Gupta v. Gupta,
2010 WL 2540487 (Tex. App.—Austin June 24, 2010, no pet.) ........... 16

v
Iliff v. Iliff,
339 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 2011) .............................................................. 14, 22

In re Acceptance Ins. Co.,
33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding) .... 14, 52

In re City of McAllen,
677 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2023) ................................................................. 52

In re J.A.V.,
2022 WL 379316 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 9 2022, no pet.) ........ 24

In re M.A.M.,
346 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. App.—Dallas, pet denied) ................................... 24

In re Marriage of Grisham,
2010 WL 4570266 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 10 2010, pet. denied) ... 28, 33

In re Marriage of Merrikj,
2015 WL 2438770 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 19,
2015, pet. denied) ............................................................................ 14, 22

In re Marriage of Scott,
117 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) ........................... 39

Jacobs v. Jacobs,
687 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985) ...................................................... 34, 48, 53

Kelly v. Kelly,
634 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) .. Passim

Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
458 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1970) ............................................................ 15, 40

Mandell v. Mandell,
310 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet denied) ................. 38

Matter of Marriage of Edwards,
804 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1991, no writ) .......................... 24

Matter of Marriage of Price,
2015 WL 6119457 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 15, 2015, no pet.) ............... 28
vi
McElwee v. McElwee,
911 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ
denied) ........................................................................................... Passim

Mogford v. Mogford,
616 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) . 35, 36

Murff v. Murff,
615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981) .................................................................. 15

Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss,
397 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2012) .................................................................. 38

Phillips v. Phillips,
75 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.) .................... 15, 39

Reid Rd. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd.,
337 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. 2011) .................................................................. 38

Rivera v. Hernandez,
441 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. App—El Paso 2014, pet. denied) ........... 12, 29, 41

Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,
860 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1993) .................................................................. 25

Scott v. Younts,
926 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) ... 24, 25

Shanks v. Treadway,
110 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003) .................................................................. 46

Sharma v. Routh,
302 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) Passim

Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
665 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1985) ............................................................ 15, 40

Texas Parks and Wildlife v. Davis,
988 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) .............................. 52

vii
Turner v. Turner,
385 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1964) .................................................................. 51

Wright v. Wright,
280 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.) .......................... 51

Zagorski v. Zagorski,
116 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet denied) .... 27

Statutes

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.002 ............................................ 14, 52

Tex. Const. Art. XVI, § 15 ................................................................. 29, 30

Tex. Fam. Code § 3.001 ........................................................................... 30

Tex. Fam. Code § 3.002 ........................................................................... 30

Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 ............................................................... 14, 48, 53

Tex. Fam. Code § 154.123 ..................................................... 11, 23, 24, 25

Tex. Fam. Code § 154.125 ..................................................... 19, 20, 21, 23

Tex. Fam. Code § 154.130 ................................................................. 11, 23

Rules

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) ............................................................................... 56

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1) ........................................................................... 56

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(2) ........................................................................... 56

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1, 39.1 and 39.2 ........................................................... 2

Tex. R. App. P. 41.3 ................................................................................. 33

Tex. R. Evid. 701 ..................................................................................... 38

viii
Other Authorities

Ewald Kubota, Equipment for Sale - Ewald Kubota.............................. 45

Kubota, USA, “Build my Kubota,” Kubota Tractor - Build My Kubota -
M60 Series ............................................................................................ 45

Smart Asset, LLC, “Paycheck calculator: Federal, State & Local
Taxes,” https://smartasset.com/taxes/pay-checkcalculator (2025)....... 21

Texas Workforce Commission, “Apply for Unemployment Benefits,”
https://www.twc.texas.gov/services/apply-benefits .............................. 20

ix
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case: This case is an appeal of a Final Decree of
Divorce. C.R. at 110-76.
Course of Proceedings: On March 3, 2022, Terry Brent Williams
filed an Original Petition for Divorce, C.R.
at 5-15. Tracy Leeann Williams filed
Respondent’s Original Answer on April 18,
2022, C.R. at 16-18.

Disposition of the case: After a status hearing on October 31,
2024, 2 R.R. at 1-11, another status
hearing on December 6, 2024, 3 R.R. at 1-
19, and a Final Hearing on February 25,
2025, the trial court rendered judgment,
by its Final Decree of Divorce on March 18,
2025. C.R. at 110-76.
Court of Appeals The trial court entered its Final Decree of
Jurisdiction: Divorce on March 18, 2025. C.R. at 110-76.
The trial court rendered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 21,
2025. C.R. at 198-201. Terry Brent
Williams filed a Notice of Appeal on April
15, 2025. C.R. at 190-91. Therefore, this
case is properly before this Court of
Appeals.

1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1, 39.1 and 39.2,

Appellant, Terry Brent Williams (“Terry”), respectfully requests oral

argument before this Court of Appeals. Although Terry represents that

the facts and legal arguments are thoroughly presented in this brief and

in the record, he also believes the decision process of the Court of Appeals

will be significantly aided by oral argument. This appeal concerns

complex factual and legal issues regarding the proper calculation of child

support, the proper division of an approximately $400,000 piece of mixed

character property, and the appropriateness of a punitive award of both

property and attorney’s fees to Appellee. Thus, Terry and counsel believe

that oral argument will aid this Court in its decision process by

explaining certain facts and legal arguments. Accordingly, Terry

requests oral argument.

2
ISSUES PRESENTED

I. The trial court’s child support order requiring Terry Williams to

pay more per month in child support than his entire net pay was

an abuse of discretion.

II. Requiring Terry to pay an amount of child support exceeding

both the statutory guidelines and his actual pay without any

specific factual findings (or evidence) to support that an excess

was needed to meet the child’s needs (or for any other statutorily

enumerated purpose) was an abuse of discretion.

III. Terry did not agree that the value of his 10.8 acres of separate

property was $20,000 as the court’s Findings of Fact indicate.

The court committed reversible error by awarding the majority

of the proceeds from the sale of his separate property acreage to

the community.

IV. In the alternative to Issue III, the trial court abused its

discretion by valuing Terry’s 10.8 acres separate property in a 44

acres parcel of land (that netted $385,935 at sale) at only $20,000

because this valuation was arbitrary, unreasonable, and

unsupported by the record and evidence. The trial court made

3
this ruling without reference to any guidelines or principles.

Evidence in the record shows this 10.8-acre parcel of land was

purchased by Terry in 2009 for $127,645. Further, it constituted

approximately ¼ of a larger parcel of land that netted $385,9835

at sale.

V. The trial court committed reversible error by awarding Appellee

100 percent of the value of certain personal property rather than

making a just and right division of that property.

VI. The court committed reversible error by divesting Terry of the

value of his separate property welding equipment.

VII. The trial court committed reversible error by requiring Terry to

pay for Appellee’s attorney’s fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Terry Brent Williams and Tracy Leeann Williams had a daughter,

in 2010. The following year, on September 10, 2011, the couple got

married. C.R. at 198. Terry filed for divorce on March 3, 2022. C.R. at 5-

15.

The Buffalo Property

In 2009, before the marriage, Terry purchased 10.8 acres in Buffalo,

4
Texas for about $127,645.00. 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-21. This is the first page

of the Deed to that property showing that it was conveyed in 2009 to

“TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, A SINGLE MAN”:

5 R.R. at pdf p. 17.

Here is the first part of the “legal description” that was attached to

the above 2009 Warranty Deed showing the property description for the

10.8 acres that Terry purchased:

5
5 R.R. at pdf p. 19.

After being married, the couple subsequently purchased additional

acreage until the total acreage owned by them constituted about 44 acres.

C.R. 19; 3 R.R. at 2-3. The couple agreed that this acreage would all be

sold together—both Terry’s 10.8 acres of separate property and the other

approximately 32 acres of community property acreage. See 2 R.R. at 5;

see also C.R. at 164-66. The sale of the 44 acres netted $385,935.33 after

fees and taxes. C.R. at 164-66, 200. Yet, the trial court only awarded

Terry $20,000 for his 10.8 acres of separate property. C.R. at 164, 200.

6
Child Support

With respect to custody of their daughter, P.R.W., the court ordered

that both parents should be joint managing conservators. C.R. 198.

Appellee has the right to designate P.R.W.’s primary residence within

Leon County or contiguous counties. C.R. 199. Conservatorship and

access are governed by a standard possession order. C.R. 199.

The court ordered Terry to pay Appellee $1,758 in child support per

month, $150.17 per month for P.R.W.’s medical insurance, $26.37 for

P.R.W.’s vision/dental insurance, and 50 percent of all of P.R.W.’s non-

reimbursed health care expenses. C.R. 141, 145, 199. The court based this

on a finding that the monthly net resources of Terry Williams were

$8,790.60. C.R. at 199.

A 2023 tax return—which is not in the record—ostensibly showed

Terry making about $140,000 gross running a business wherein he laid

concrete and did welding work. See 4 R.R. at 26. However, this $140,000

was before he paid business expenses including fuel, concrete supplies,

taxes, and before Terry paid his employees. 4 R.R. at 26. Thus, his net

income would have been lower. No testimony or evidence was in the

record showing what his Terry’s net resources were for 2023, 2022, or any

7
preceding years.

Regardless of what his net income was in 2023, that was no longer

his income at the time of trial in February of 2025. 4 R.R. at 22-27. In

about 2023 or 2024, Terry went to work at Harris Rebar as a “prelog

fabricator” to have a more secure source of income. 4 R.R. at 22, 24.

Harris Rebar is a company that does work for Nucor. 4 R.R. at 22. This

job paid him $18.50 per hour, but he was not guaranteed a certain

number of hours. 4 R.R. at 22. After eleven months at this job, Terry went

to work for a company named “TIC” in Defore, TX because it paid more.

4 R.R. at 22-24. He made $30 per hour at this job operating a skid steer.

4 R.R. at 23-24. During the pendency of the litigation, Terry produced

paycheck stubs to Appellee’s counsel to show his income. 3 R.R. at 8.

Terry worked at “TIC” until he was laid off in early February 2025.

See 4 R.R. at i, 24 (stating he was laid off three weeks before the February

25, 2025 hearing). Terry made a claim for unemployment and testified

that he expected to receive $460 per week in unemployment. 4 R.R. at 25.

Terry testified that since his lay-off he has applied at multiple

places trying to find work and has been doing odd jobs (such as cleaning

a fence row for his uncle) to try to earn money. 4 R.R. at 25-26. However,

8
his only source of guaranteed income as of the trial date was the $460 per

week income from unemployment. 4 R.R. at 25-28. Terry stated that he

wants to financially provide for his daughter and that he would report

any changes in income to the attorney general’s office, or the clerk of the

court, or anyone who needed to be made aware so that his child support

would be adjusted when he found a job. 4 R.R. at 27-28.

Personal Property

The court ordered the sale of multiple items of personal property

that belonged primarily to Terry. These items included: a John Deere

Skid Steer, a 32 ft Tiger flatbed trailer, a 20 ft lowboy, a black gooseneck

trailer with sides, a 15 ft Batwing Shredder, a TRX yellow four-wheeler,

a Kubota cab tractor, a Dodge 2500 single cab welding truck w/ welder, a

34-foot Keystone Bunkhouse Camper, a 2002 Dodge Ram 3500, a 1998

Dodge, a 2006 Silver Dodge Dually without a motor, a gas shop heater, a

small pressure washer, a timeshare with Holiday Inn, a shop door, a

Connex/shipping container, a lawnmower trailer, a gun safe, and a

second scag mower. C.R. at 74-75. Terry turned over the majority of these

items which netted the community (after paying the receiver ten percent

to sell the items) over $45,000. C.R. 199. However, Terry put new tires

9
on one of the vehicles because one of the tires was defective, did not

remove the shop’s door, did not turn over the attachments to the tractor

and skid steer as they were not in the order, and did not turn over his

welding equipment that he owned prior to marriage. 4 R.R. at 38-39. The

court awarded Appellee the full value of the missing property and ordered

Terry to pay Appellee’s attorney’s fees. 4 R.R. at 44-45, C.R. at 199-200.

These two awards totaled almost $21,000. See C.R. at 199-200.

The divorce was granted on March 18, 2025. C.R. at 110-76. Terry

subsequently appealed on April 15, 2025. C.R. at 190-91.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court’s child support order requiring Terry Williams to pay

$1,934.54 per month (child support, medical, and dental/vision) was an

abuse of discretion because Terry was unemployed and there was no

evidence in the record to support its finding that he made a net of

$8,790.60 per month.

Further, the court’s child support order was in error because a

deviation from the Texas Family Code (“TFC”) child support guidelines

require the court to make specific findings explaining the reasons for the

deviation and including both the obligor’s and obligee’s net resources.

10
TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 154.130, 154.123 (stating reasons a court may deviate

from the child support guidelines). Here, not only did the trial court fail

to make these findings, but there was no evidence in the record that the

child’s needs were greater than 20 percent of Terry’s current net monthly

resources. Instead, the court ordered an amount of child support that was

108 percent of Terry’s monthly net resources. This was an abuse of

discretion.

Additionally, the trial court committed reversible error because it

only awarded Terry $20,000 for 10.8 acres of land that was his separate

property. The land had been purchased by Terry before the marriage in

2009 for $127,645. The court sold the property, only awarded Terry

$20,000 for his interest, and granted the remainder of the proceeds from

the sale of the land to the community. Where a trial court divests a party

of his or her separate property, it is not necessary for that party to show

harm because divestiture of separate property is reversible error as a

matter of law. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1997);

Rivera v. Hernandez, 441 S.W.3d 413, 424 (Tex. App—El Paso 2014, pet.

denied). Thus, the trial court in this case committed reversible error by

divesting Terry of his separate property.

11
In the alternative, the trial court abused its discretion by valuing

Terry’s separate property interest (in a 44-acre parcel of land that netted

$385,935 at sale) was worth only $20,000 even though Terry’s separate

property constituted 10.8 acres of the 44-acre parcel and had originally

been purchased for $127,645. The court’s valuation was arbitrary,

unreasonable, and not supported by the record or evidence. The trial

court made this ruling without reference to any guidelines or principles.

It is not necessary for Terry to show harm because this valuation caused

a divestiture of separate property. Eggemeyer, S.W.2d at 140; Rivera 441

S.W.3d at 424. Thus, a finding that the trial court abused its discretion

in valuing Terry’s separate property at $20,000 would be sufficient to

warrant reversal and remand. See id.

The trial court also committed error by awarding Appellee 100

percent of the value of certain personal property rather than making a

just and right division of that property. The trial court did this to punish

Terry because it believed he did not turn over certain items. The reason

Terry did not turn over those items is that they were not included in the

court’s Order for Sale of Personal Property of the Parties (“Order”). Thus,

the court erred by giving the value of these items to Appellee. The value

12
of these items should have been divided equitably between the parties

rather than given solely to Appellee. This error was more than de

minimus because it constituted more than three percent of the

community estate, and, therefore, remand is warranted. See McElwee v.

McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 188-90 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,

writ denied) (an error that constituted three percent was more than de

minimis and warranted remand).

The court also committed error by awarding Appellee the full value

of Terry’s separate property welding equipment that he owned before the

marriage. This divested Terry of his separate property so remand is

warranted.

Finally, the court committed error by requiring Terry to pay for

Appellee’s attorney’s fees. The court did this to punish Terry for not

settling the case. Punishing a party because he would not settle a case

goes against the voluntary nature of alternative dispute

resolution/mediation. See In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 452-

54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding); see also TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.002. Division in divorce proceedings must be

based on what is “just and right” rather than arbitrary and pecuniary.

13
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001. Harm occurred because the trial court’s

punitive awards to Appellee of what should have otherwise been

community property was more than “de minimus.” See McElwee, 911

S.W.2d at 188-90.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s child support order will not be disturbed on appeal

unless the complaining party can show a clear abuse of discretion. Iliff v.

Iliff, 339 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011). A trial court abuses its discretion

when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding

rules or principles, or by failing to analyze or apply the law correctly. Id.

The trial court does not abuse its discretion if the record contains some

evidence of substantive and probative character to support its decision.

In re Marriage of Merrikj, No. 14-14-00024-CV, 2015 WL 2438770, at *2

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 19, 2015, pet. denied).

When a trial court mischaracterizes separate property as

community property and awards it to the other spouse, this constitutes

an abuse of discretion and is reversible error. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at

140. In such an instance, it is not necessary to show harm or demonstrate

that the overall property division constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.

14
Such errors require the appellate court to remand the case for a proper

division of property. Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.2d 335, 346-47 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.).

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s valuation of property in a

divorce under an abuse of discretion standard. See Phillips v. Phillips, 75

S.W.3d 564, 574 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.). The test for abuse

of discretion is “whether the court acted without reference to any guiding

rules and principles.” Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., S.W.2d 238,

241-42 (Tex. 1985). Another way of stating the test is to ask whether the

act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 242; Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft

Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex. 1985); Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458

S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1970).

The appellate court reviews the trial court’s division of community

property under an abuse of discretion standard. Murff v. Murff, 615

S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). Further, a party who complains of the way

the trial court divided the community property must show from the

evidence that the error made the overall division so unjust and unfair as

to constitute an abuse of discretion. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 704 S.W. 3d

54, 82 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.); Gupta v. Gupta, No. 03-09-

15
00018-CV, 2010 WL 2540487, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin June 24, 2010, no

pet.) (mem. op.); Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. The trial court’s child support order requiring Terry
Williams to pay more per month in child support than his
entire net pay was an abuse of discretion.

In the trial court’s Finding’s of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the

trial court held:

10. The monthly net resources of Terry Brent Williams are
$8,790.60.

11. Application of the Child Support Guidelines of the Texas
Family Code of 20 percent supports the Court's award of child
support in the amount of $1,758.00 per month beginning
October 1, 2024.

12. Health insurance is available for [P.R.W.] through the
employment of Tracy Leeann Williams.

13. It is in the best interest of [P.R.W.] that Tracy Leeann
Williams provide health insurance through her employment
and that Terry Brent Williams pay medical support in the
amount of $150.17 per month beginning October 1, 2024.

C.R. at 199.

Additionally, the trial court also ordered Terry to pay $26.37 for

P.R.W.’s vision and dental insurance as well as 50 percent of all of

16
P.R.W.’s non-reimbursed health care expenses. C.R. 141, 145.

There was no evidence in the record to support Finding of Fact No.

10 that “[t]he monthly net resources of Terry Brent Williams are

$8,790.60.” C.R. at 199. The trial court set child support based on the

assumption that Terry’s gross income was $140,000 with the $8,790.60

figure being the monthly net proceeds after applicable taxes. 4 R.R. at 44,

C.R. at 199. This was error as there was no evidence in the record to

support that Terry’s current income or resources were this much.

The only evidence in the record supports that Terry’s income was

substantially lower. Appellant supplied his paycheck stubs prior to his

lay off to opposing counsel. 3 R.R. at 8, 10. He also testified that he had

been laid off and would be receiving $460 per week from unemployment.

4 R.R. at 25. As of the time of trial, he had only been unemployed for

three weeks so unemployment benefits had not yet started. 4 R.R. at 25.

This testimony was as follows:

Q. So, as far as your actual income as of today, and as of the
last three weeks, and you haven't even received a check yet,
but you anticipate receiving $460 per week?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. If the Judge were to order you to pay child support
at $140,000 a year, are you making $140,000 a year?

17
A. No, sir.

Q. Would you be able to -- as you sit here today, would you
even be able to think about paying child support at $140,000
per year?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is that going to put you in arrears immediately, based on
your income coming in right now?

A. Well, on my income coming in right now, yes, sir, it would.

Q. Because you don't -- you don't have anything right now.

A. Correct.

Q. And you haven't had anything for the last -- When did you
get your last check from your employer?

A. Like I said, about three weeks ago.

Q. Okay. Do you have any other sources of income, or
resources available to you?

A. No, sir. I just go -- right now, just going to work for whoever
needs some help.

Q. And you're willing to do whatever it takes to come back to
the Court, to report to the Court, to give whoever needs access
to determine when you do get employed, you're going to report
that to the Attorney General's office, to the clerk's office, to
whoever needs to know, so that can be re-evaluated; is that
correct?

A. Yes, sir.

18
Q. You didn't ask to be laid off work, did you?

A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't do this as an intentional act to cause your child
support to be less than what it would have been otherwise?

A. No, sir.

Q. You want to take care of your daughter?

A. Correct. Yes, sir.

4 R.R. at 26-28.

Pursuant to the Family Code Section 154.125(b), Appellee would be

required to pay 20 percent of his net resources as child support since he

is responsible for only one child. Using the paycheck calculator at smart

asset.com to estimate income after federal taxes and withholdings, based

on an income of $460 per week, this would leave Terry a “net” pay of $407

per week, $1763.67 per month, or $21,164 per year. Thus, his current

total child support liability of $1934.54 (child support plus insurance,

dental, and vision) is currently more than his net monthly resources of

$1,763.67 by $170.87. Pursuant to the Family Code Section 154.125(b),

he should be paying $352.73 per month based on his current net

resources.

Even if one were to assume arguendo that the court felt as though

19
Terry’s unemployment was purposeful—which there is no evidence in the

record to support this finding and, furthermore, Terry would not be

receiving unemployment benefits if he had quit or been fired for cause 1—

using the amounts Terry made in his last two jobs would not equate to

anywhere near the amount the court ordered Terry to pay.

In the job that Terry had before he was laid off, he made $30 per

hour. 4 R.R. at 23-24. His net take home pay working full-time would be

about $1,0001 per week or $4,337.67 per month.2 Pursuant to TFC

Section 154.125, Terry’s child support would be $867.53 per month

assuming an income of $30 per hour working full-time.

At the job Terry had before his last job, he made $18.50 per hour. 4

R.R. at 23. After taxes, this would equate to a take home pay of $633 per

week, $2,743 per month, or $32,916 per year. 3 Thus, his child support

using this amount would be $548.60. TFC § 154.125.

1 The Texas Workforce Commission website states: “Unemployment Benefits is an

employer-paid program that provides temporary, partial income replacement to
eligible workers who, through no fault of their own: Lost their job or are working
reduced hours.” Texas Workforce Commission, “Apply for Unemployment Benefits,”
https://www.twc.texas.gov/services/apply-benefits, retrieved Sept. 4, 2025 (emphasis
added).
2 Smart Asset, LLC, “Paycheck calculator: Federal, State & Local Taxes,”

https://smartasset.com/taxes/pay-checkcalculator (2025), last retrieved September 4,
2025.
3 See id.

20
Terry’s testimony is the only evidence in the record that establishes

his income. The court instructed Appellee’s attorney to subpoena

Appellee and Appellant’s tax records either from the couple’s CPA or the

IRS:

THE COURT: You subpoena the CPA, contact the I-R --
whatever you need to do to get –

MR. BANKHEAD: I will.

3 R.R. 11.

Mr. Bankhead was Appellee’s attorney, not Appellant’s attorney. 4

R.R. at ii. There are no tax returns in the record.

On appeal, the complaining party must show that the trial court’s

child support order was an abuse of discretion. Iliff, 339 S.W.2d at 78. A

trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably,

without reference to guiding rules or principles, or by failing to analyze

or apply the law correctly. Id. Here, the trial court did exactly that as it

disregarded the guidelines laid out in the Family Code and the evidence.

The only evidence in the record supported that Terry was unemployed

and only receiving $460 per week from unemployment. 4 R.R. at 26-28.

The trial court does not abuse its discretion if the record contains

some evidence of substantive and probative character to support its

21
decision. In re Marriage of Merrikj, 2015 WL 2438770 at *2. Here, there

is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s order that child

support should be based on an income of $140,000. Thus, the trial court

abused its discretion, and its ruling should be reversed.

II. In the alternative, requiring Terry to pay an amount of child
support exceeding both the statutory guidelines and his
actual pay without any specific factual findings (or
evidence) to support that an excess was needed to meet the
child’s needs (or for any other statutorily enumerated
purpose) was an abuse of discretion.

If a court is going to deviate from the child support guidelines in the

Texas Family Code Sec. 154.125, the court must provide specific findings

explaining the reasons for the deviation, including the obligor’s and

obligee’s net resources and the specific reasons for the variance. TEX.

FAM. CODE § 154.130; see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.123 (specifically

enumerated reasons the court may deviate from the child support

guidelines laid out in Texas Family Code § 154.125). The trial court in

this case did not do that.

Instead, the trial court ignored the guidelines and ordered Terry to

pay an amount of child support that was 108 percent of his monthly net

income. Cf C.R. at 199 with 4 R.R. at 23-28. The record suggests that the

trial court did this to punish Terry for what the court perceived as his

22
wrongdoing in his failing to turn over certain personal property, even

though said property was not named in an order. Specifically, the trial

court stated:

In addition to the conduct, and misleading the Court, not
following directions, making this case a lot harder than it had
to be, I'm assessing the attorney's fees -- his child support is
going to be set in the amount of $140,000.00 self-employed
rate…Mr. Williams, you made this a lot harder, and I told you,
I've been warning you from day one, when you think you're
smarter than everybody, that this is what happens. I could
have done you a lot worse than this, just off of what I heard
on the witness stand. Do you understand me?

4 R.R. at 44-45.

Deviations from the child support guidelines must be tied to the

child’s needs and not to extraneous factors such as punishing a parent.

See Scott v. Younts, 926 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi

1996, writ denied) (holding that the trial court improperly considered

factors outside of those set forth in the predecessor to the Family Code

Sec. 154.123 for an obligor earning over the presumptive obligation); see

also Matter of Marriage of Edwards, 804 S.W.2d 653, 656-57 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 1991, no writ). “To impose child support beyond the guidelines,

the record must contain evidence of the ‘proven needs’ of the child.’” In re

M.A.M., 346 S.W.3d 10, 17 (Tex. App.—Dallas, pet denied); see also In re

23
J.A.V., No. 03-21-00084-CV, 2022 WL 379316, at *3 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Feb. 9 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). “By law, an award in

excess of the presumptive award must be based on the unmet needs of

the child...” Scott, 926 S.W.2d at 420 citing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860

S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. 1993).

Texas Family Code Sec. 154.123 also lays out specific reasons why

a court may deviate from the recommended guidelines. None of these

enumerated reasons are punitive in nature but instead focus on the best

interest and needs of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.123.

Here, requiring Terry to pay an amount of child support exceeding

both the statutory guidelines and his net pay without any specific factual

findings to support that an excess was needed for the child or for any

other reason enumerated in Texas Family Code Sec. 154.123 was an

abuse of discretion. See C.R. 198-201. To impose child support beyond the

guidelines, the record must contain evidence of the child's “proven

needs.” Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 417 (noting that child-support award

exceeding statutory guidelines must be based on child’s unmet needs).

Here, there was no evidence introduced at trial that indicated the child’s

needs amounted to an amount greater than 20 percent of Terry’s income.

24
Further, there was no evidence introduced showing that a deviation was

justified for any of the other Section 154.123 reasons. TEX. FAM. CODE §

154.123. Thus, the court abused its discretion.

III. Terry did not agree that the value of his separate property
was $20,000 as the court’s Findings of Fact indicate. Further,
the court committed reversible error by awarding the
majority of the proceeds from the sale of his separate
property to the community.

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court

stated:

21. The real property sold included a portion owned as Terry
Brent Williams’ separate property. Terry Brent Williams
agreed the value of the separate property was $20,000.00.

C.R. at 200.

Terry did not agree that his separate property was worth $20,000.

Instead, Terry testified:

Q. Okay. And the -- Do you understand the Judge -- although
it's not $60,000, the Judge has found $20,000 as a separate
property offset that you're entitled to? Do you understand
that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And we won't go into all of the details about all of that, but
you do understand that that's the Judge's finding on it?

A. Yes, sir.

25
4 R.R. at 30-31.

Asking a person if he understands that the Judge has determined

the value of his separate property is $20,000 is not him agreeing that the

value of the property is $20,000. Appellant’s testimony was that he

understood what the court had ordered, not that he agreed with it. 4 R.R.

at 30-31. Appellant’s counsel has not been able to locate anywhere in the

record where Terry agreed that his 10.8 acres of separate property was

worth only $20,000. Instead, the record indicates that the property would

be worth substantially more as Terry purchased those 10.8 acres on April

23, 2009 (before his 2011 marriage 4) for $127,645. 5 R.R. at pdf p. 17; see

also 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 18-21 (rest of the Deed and survey).

A court determines whether property is separate or community by

its character at the time of inception. Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107,

111 (Tex. 2001). “Inception of title occurs when a party first has a right

of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.” Zagorski

v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,

pet denied). Once determined, the character of the property is not altered

by the sale, exchange or substitution of the property. In re Marriage of

4 The couple was married September 10, 2011. C.R. 198.

26
Grisham, No. 10-09-00429-CV, 2010 WL 4570266, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Waco Oct. 10 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Separate property remains

separate property although it may undergo any number of mutations and

changes in form. Id.

Further, Texas courts have long held that land acquired by a spouse

before marriage is separate property. E.g., Cade v. Dudney, 279 S.W.2d

370, 373 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A spouse can show

the separate property origin of a property through evidence showing the

time and means by which the spouse originally obtained possession of the

property. Matter of Marriage of Price, No. 10-14-00260-CV, 2015 WL

6119457, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

Ganesan v. Vallabhaneni, 96 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,

pet denied)).

Here, Terry showed that he was deeded title to the 10.8 acres in

2009 as a single man. 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-21. This was before the couple

was married in 2011. C.R. at 198.

Further, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized the importance

of one’s right to their own property as “fundamental, natural, inherent,

[and] inalienable.” Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 140. This right is so

27
fundamental that it is recognized in the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST.

ART. XVI, § 15. A trial court may not divest a party of his or her separate

property because the nature of separate property is determined by the

Constitution, rather than by what is “just and right.” Eggemeyer, 554

S.W.2d at 140, 142.

Here the court ordered the sale of Terry’s separate property piece

of land, then decided (with no evidence to back up its findings) that Terry

should only receive $20,000 of the proceeds from that sale, and then

awarded the rest of the proceeds from the sale to the community. See C.R.

200. (Terry’s separate property land was sold together with other land

owned by the community in one transaction. See C.R. 164-66.)

Additionally, an individual’s right to their own property is so

important that where a trial court divests a party of his or her separate

property, it is not necessary for that party to show harm because

divestiture of separate property is reversible error as a matter of law.

Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 140, 142.; Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 424.

Further, “[i]f the trial court mischaracterizes a spouse's separate

property as community property and awards some of the property to the

other spouse, then the trial court abuses its discretion and reversibly

28
errs.” Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 348 (emphasis added); Sharma v. Routh, 302

S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)

(emphasis added). That is what has occurred here—the trial court

mischaracterized Terry’s interest in the 44 acres (that netted over

$385,000 after fees at sale) as being only $20,000 even though Terry

produced documents to the court showing that he owned 10.8 of the 44

acres as his separate property and had purchased that land for over

$127,645 before the marriage. 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-21, C.R. 200. The

court’s determination that $20,000 was the extent of Terry’s separate

property interest in the 44-acres suggests that Terry had only owned

about 5 percent of the 44 acres as his separate property. See C.R. 200.

However, Terry owned 25 percent (i.e., 10.8 acres) of the 44-acre parcel

of land as his separate property. 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-21. Improperly

divesting a party of their interest in separate property is reversible error

as a matter of law, in a divorce proceeding, without the need to conduct

a harm analysis. TEX. CONST. ART. 16 § 15; TEX. FAMILY CODE §§ 3.001,

3.002. It is unconstitutional for a trial court to divest a party of their

separate property by awarding any portion of it to the other party in a

divorce proceeding. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 140-41. Further, unlike the

29
situation in which a trial court has mischaracterized community property

in a divorce proceeding, improperly divesting a party of their interest in

separate property is reversible error as a matter of law without the need

to conduct a harm analysis. Id.

Eggemeyer is both binding authority and factually similar to this

case. Id. In Eggemeyer, the husband owned as his separate property an

undivided one-third interest in a farm. Id. at 138. The trial court divested

the husband of that interest and transferred his title to his wife. Id. This

was reversible error because the nature of separate property of property

is fixed by the Texas Constitution, and not by what is “just and right.” Id.

at 139. Furthermore, the court said that culpability or bad acts may be a

basis for the dissolution of marriage, but they are “no basis for a

redefinition of property at variance with the Texas Constitution.” Id.

Additionally, the protection of one's right to own property is “one of the

most important purposes of government.” Id. at 140. Even child support

may not cause the divestiture of title to separate property. Id. at 142.

A similar situation occurred in Kelly. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 349-52

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). In that case, the husband

argued that a portion of his 401(k) was separate property as he had made

30
contributions to the account for fifteen years prior to the marriage. Id.

The trial court had wrongly divided the entire 401(k) up as though it was

community property. Id. at 349-52, 362-63. Finding that part of the

401(k) was separate property, the Court of Appeals reversed and

remanded the entire case back to the trial court for a new property

division consistent with its findings regarding the husband’s separate

property. Id. at 352, 370.

Another factually similar case is Sharma. Sharma, 302 S.W.3d at

357. In that case, the husband claimed the trial court reversibly erred by

characterizing income distributions he received from two testamentary

trusts as community property and awarding half of those distributions to

his wife, rather than awarding all of the distributions to him as his

separate property. Id. The appellate court agreed and held that “the trial

court reversibly erred in characterizing the Family Trust Income as

community property rather than [the husband’s] separate property and

by awarding any part of this property to [the wife]… based on the trial

court's reversible error in mischaracterizing the Marital Trust Income

and the Family Trust Income, we sever the remainder of the judgment

and reverse and remand for further proceedings in conformity with this

31
opinion.” Id. at 368.

In another case from the jurisdiction in which this case originated,5

the Waco Court of Appeals found that a trial court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that two companies owned and operated by the

husband prior to the marriage were his separate property even though

he changed the form in which those companies existed during the

marriage. In re Marriage of Grisham, 2010 WL 4570266 at *1-*2.

Specifically, the husband formed a third company during the marriage

into which he transferred the stock and assets of the original companies

without receiving monetary compensation in return and was able to trace

those assets in the new company back to his original separate property.

Id.

Similarly, in Jacobs v. Jacobs, the Texas Supreme Court considered

a situation where an appellate court had reversed part of a trial court’s

division of property because the trial court had, inter alia,

“characterize[ed] as wholly community property certain properties in

which husband had a separate property interest.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687

5 This case was transferred from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco, so that
jurisdiction’s law is the law that should be applied. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3

32
S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1985). “The court of appeals, after finding that the

trial court had erred in determining what was properly a part of the

community estate, reversed and rendered judgment as to part of the

property division; reversed and remanded as to another part; and

affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the remainder.” Id. at 731. The

Texas Supreme Court stated:

Whether the trial court abuses its discretion in dividing the
property, as in McKnight, or commits reversible error in
defining what property is properly a part of the community
estate and therefore subject to division, as in the present case,
the principle to be applied is the same. Once reversible error
affecting the “just and right” division of the community estate
is found, the court of appeals must remand the entire
community estate for a new division.

Id. at 733.

Like Eggemeyer, Kelly, Grisham, Sharma, and Jacobs, the trial

court in this case committed reversible error by divesting Terry of some

his separate property acreage by wrongly classifying some of it as

community property and then awarding it to the other party in the

divorce. 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-21; C.R. at 200. Thus, the case should be

remanded to the trial court for a just and right division of the remainder

of the community estate with Terry’s separate property interest removed

before the community portion is divided.

33
IV. In the alternative to III, the trial court abused its discretion
by valuing Terry’s 10.8 acres of separate property in a 44
acres parcel of land (that netted $385,935 at sale) at only
$20,000 because this valuation was arbitrary, unreasonable,
and unsupported by the record and evidence. The trial
court made this ruling without reference to any guidelines
or principles. Evidence in the record shows this 10.8 acre
parcel of land was purchased by Terry in 2009 for $127,645.
Further, it constituted approximately ¼ of a larger parcel of
land that netted $385,9835 at sale.

In the alternative, Terry argues that the trial court committed

reversible error by misvaluing his separate property interest in land that

was sold for a net of $385,935.33 by only awarding him $20,000 for that

separate property interest. C.R. 164. (Both the community and Terry

individually had interests in parcels of land that were sold together in

one transaction. C.R. 164-66.)

Terry acknowledges that a court can order the sale of property when

it is of a mixed character (i.e., when property consists of both separate

property and community property) and the sale of the property is

necessary to divide the community. Mogford v. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d 936,

945 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Gerami v. Gerami,

666 S.W. 2d 241, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).

However, for such a sale to not be considered a divestment of title, all of

the proceeds that represent the spouse’s separate property

34
interest must be confirmed to that spouse. Mogford, 616 S.W.2d at

945 (emphasis added). That did not occur here because the trial court

awarded the community approximately 85 percent of the value of Terry’s

separate property acreage. Cf 5 R.R. at 17 with C.R. at 200 (showing

Terry paid $127,645 for the property in 2009 and the court valued the

property at only $20,000).

In Gerami, the appellant had owned a home prior to marriage that

was his separate property. Gerami, 666 S.W. 2d at 241-42. The trial court

ordered that this home be sold and then gave the proceeds of one-third of

the value to the appellee and two-thirds to the appellant. Id. The

appellant contended that this was error as it was his separate property

and should not have been sold and, even though it was, he should have

been entitled to the proceeds. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversed

the decision, and remanded the case to the trial court for a division of

property consistent with the finding that the house was appellant’s

separate property. Id.

The present case is similar to Gerami because the trial court here

ordered the sale of Appellant’s 10.8 acres of separate property and, after

Appellant’s 10.8 acres were sold (along with 33 acres of community

35
property), he was only given about fifteen percent of its value. The rest of

the proceeds were awarded to the “community” and then divided 50/50

between Appellee and Appellant. Thus, Appellee here received

approximately $53,800 or 42 percent of the value of Appellant’s separate

property. This is more than the one-third that was reversible error in

Gerami. See Gerami, 666 S.W. 2d at 241-42. Further, under the binding

authority of Eggemeyer, an award of any amount of Appellant’s separate

property to Appellee would constitute unconstitutional divestiture of

one’s separate property and be grounds by itself for reversal and remand.

See Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 138-41.

Notably, the trial court seems to have arbitrarily decided that

Terry’s separate property interest was worth only $20,000. 4 R.R. at 20-

21. The record does not indicate any basis for the trial court’s decision

that Terry’s 10.8 acres of separate property was worth only $20,000. 4

R.R. at 20-21; C.R. 198-201 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law);

see also C.R. 110-70 (Final Divorce Decree). Instead, the record indicates

that Terry’s 10.8 acres of separate property should be worth at least

$127,645 as that is how much he paid for it in 2009, although arguably it

has significantly appreciated since 2009. 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-21.

36
In divorce proceedings, the value of property is typically based on

its fair market value, which is defined as the price a willing buyer, under

no obligation to buy, would pay to a willing seller, under no obligation to

sell. City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex.

2001); Mandell v. Mandell, 310 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2010, pet denied). The property-owner rule establishes that an owner is

qualified to testify to the value of his own property even when he is not

an expert. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150,

156 (Tex. 2012); Reid Rd. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food

Stores, Ltd., 337 S.W.3d 846, 852-53 (Tex. 2011); see also Tex. R. Evid.

701. This rule is based “on the presumption that an owner is familiar

with his property and its value,” and it “is an exception to the

requirement that a witness must otherwise establish his qualifications

to express an opinion on [property] values.” Justiss, 397 S.W.3d at 157.

This rule is also applicable in divorce cases. Banker v. Banker, 517

S.W.3d 863, 871 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, pet. denied).

“Evidence of price paid and any other relevant factors may be offered…”

Justiss, 397 S.W.3d at 159. Here, Terry introduced evidence that he paid

$127,645 for the 10.8 acres he purchased prior to the marriage. 5 R.R. at

37
pdf pp. 17-21.

Other evidence in the record is that in a sale of 44 acres that

included Terry’s 10.8 acres, those 44 acres sold for a net profit of

$385,935.33, or $8,771.36 per acre. See C.R. 164-66, 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-

21. If one arrives at a value by saying that 10.8 acres is approximately ¼

of 44 acres, that would have equated to Terry’s separate property having

a value of $96,483.83. If one assigns value based on a per acre basis—i.e.,

10.8 x $8,771.36—that would equate to Terry’s 10.8 acres having a value

of $94,729.58. Any of these amounts are well more than the $20,000 value

that the trial court awarded Terry for his 10.8 acres of separate property.

Other proper valuations include: 1) A sworn inventory and

appraisement. In re Marriage of Scott, 117 S.W.3d 580, 584-85 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.); 2) A real property appraisal. See, e.g.,

Phillips, 75 S.W.3d at 574; and 3) The value on the county appraisal

district’s tax roll. See In re Marriage of Scott, 117 S.W.3d at 585.

However, this valuation method is problematic as property values are

typically lower in tax records. Id.

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s valuation of property in a

divorce under an abuse of discretion standard. See Phillips, 75 S.W.3d at

38
574. The test for abuse of discretion is “whether the court acted without

reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Downer v. Aquamarine

Operators, Inc., S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). Another way of stating

the test is whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 242;

Smithson, 665 S.W.2d at 443; Landry, 458 S.W.2d at 651. Here, the court

acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. There is

nothing in the reporter’s record, the clerk’s record, the court’s orders, or

the court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support the trial

court’s finding that Terry’s 10.8 acres were worth only $20,000. See, e.g.,

C.R. 198-201; 4 R.R. at 20-21; C.R. 110-70 (Final Divorce Decree).

However, evidence of the property’s value is in the record because

Terry produced documents showing that he purchased the property in

April of 2009 for $127,645. 5 R.R. at 17-21. Notably, April of 2009 was

shortly after the 2008 housing crash when property values were

extremely low. Thus, it stands to reason that sixteen years later Terry’s

10.8 acres would be worth at least as much as he paid for that acreage in

2009. There is also the evidence in the record that the 44-acre parcel of

land containing the 10.8 acres sold for a net of $385,935.33, or a net profit

of $8,771.36 per acre. See C.R. 164-66, 5 R.R. at pdf pp. 17-21.

39
The record does not indicate that the trial court attempted any sort

of analysis or referenced any sort of guidelines, guiding principles, tax

records, inventory, or any sort of appraisal in determining that Terry’s

separate property interest was worth only $20,000. 4 R.R. at 20-21; C.R.

198-201 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law); see also C.R. 110-70

(Final Divorce Decree). Its ruling was arbitrary and unsupported by the

record. Additionally, it is not necessary for Terry to show harm because

divestiture of separate property is reversible error as a matter of law.

Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 140, 142; Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 424. Further,

even a mischaracterization of a portion or “some” of a spouse’s separate

property as community property followed by an award of that property to

the other spouse is sufficient for an appellate court to find that the trial

court abused its discretion and reversibly errored. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at

348-52, 362-63; see also Sharma, 302 S.W.3d at 360. Kelly presents a case

similar to the case here wherein the trial court mischaracterized the

husband’s 401(k)—that he had contributed to for fifteen years prior to

the marriage—as entirely community property and awarded over seventy

percent of its value to the wife. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 349-352. Finding

that a portion of the value of the 401(k) was separate property, the Court

40
of Appeals reversed and remanded the entire case for a new property

division consistent with a recognition of the husband’s separate property

interest in the 401(k). Id. Notably, the Court of Appeals in Kelly did not

attempt to determine what value to assign to the community portion

versus the separate property portion of the 401k. Id. That was left for the

trial court to decide on remand. Id. However, even a misallocation, mis-

valuation, or mischaracterization of “some” of a spouse’s separate

property as community is all that is needed for a finding that the trial

court abused its discretion and reversibly errored. See Kelly, 634 S.W.3d

at 349-52; see also Sharma, 302 S.W.3d at 360.

In sum, the entire property division must be reversed and

remanded for a determination of the value of Terry’s separate property

based on established valuation methods and for a just and equitable

division of the community estate with Terry’s separate property interest

removed from the community estate.

V. The trial court committed reversible error by awarding
Appellee 100 percent of the value of certain personal
property rather than making a just and right division of
that property.

The court ordered the sale of multiple items of personal property

that belonged primarily to Terry. C.R. at 74-75. Terry turned over almost

41
all of these items which netted the community (after paying the receiver

ten percent to sell the items) over $45,000. C.R. 199.

The trial court’s Order for Sale of Personal Property of the Parties

(“Order”) provided that:

42
C.R. at 74-76.

The court contended that the following items were not produced in

an appropriate form to the receiver:

C.R. at 199.

With respect to the Kubota tractor and the John Deere skid steer,

Terry did produce the Kubota tractor and the John Deere skid steer.

However, the court decided that he was in violation of its Order as he did

not produce the tractor’s attachments even though the Order had only

43
stated he needed to produce both the tractor and skid steer and did not

mention their attachments. C.R. at 74-76. Terry explained:

Q. Mr. Warren had indicated that there were things missing,
problems with some of the equipment. Like, for instance, some
of the skid steer, he had indicated that there were skid
missing, pallet forks missing, grapple missing. What was your
understanding of the equipment, and the status of the
equipment before it was delivered to Mr. Warren?

A. I thought it was just the skid steer. If I had known it was
the forks, and the grapple, and the bucket, I would have taken
it all with it. …Q. Okay. And then, the hydraulics on the
Kubota, and the bucket on the Kubota were missing. Can you
explain to the Court that situation?

A. I put a loader on the tractor last summer, so I took it off,
because it wasn't -- that wasn't in the picture, or the
paperwork.

4 R.R. at 29-30. As can be seen above, the Order does not state that

Terry was supposed to include the attachments (which are extra pieces

of equipment not typically sold with a tractor6) with the Kubota cab

tractor. C.R. 74-76. With respect to the John Deere skid steer, the Order

also does not reference the attachments. C.R. 74-76.

When construing the meaning of a court order or judgment, the goal

6 See Kubota, USA, “Build my Kubota,” Kubota Tractor - Build My Kubota - M60

Series, retrieved September 4, 2025; Ewald Kubota, Equipment for Sale - Ewald
Kubota, retrieved September 4, 2025.

44
is to “determine not what the trial court should have done but, if possible,

what the court actually did.” Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 446

(Tex. 2003); Bush v. Yarborough Oil & Gas, 705 S.W.3d 451, 459 (Tex.

App—El Paso 2024, pet. denied). Additionally, courts apply the ordinary

and generally accepted meaning of words unless the terms are defined or

used in a technical or specialized way. Bush, 705 S.W.3d at 459. While

the above authority arose in the context of appellate courts interpreting

court orders rather than an individual interpreting an order, an

individual should not be held to a higher standard than appellate judges.

Here, Terry complied with the literal language of the court’s Order and

the court punished him for it. The court here was expecting Terry to know

what it meant rather than what it wrote.

Further, when a tractor or skid steer such as the ones in the order

are sold at a dealership, any attachments are often sold separately from

the tractor itself. Thus, it is not strange that Terry would remove the

extra attachments since the Order did not include them. The reason

attachments are typically sold separately is because they are extremely

heavy duty and will last a lifetime, but a tractor’s engine and drivetrain

do not last as long. Buyers of farm equipment will often have to replace

45
a tractor or skid steer before they need to replace the attachments.

Another item that the court claim was wrongly withheld was a shop

door. The court had stated at the hearing, “Now, we're not going to take

a garage door off the garage, or we're not going to take a -- things like

that within reason. We're just going to tally the value of it, and then I'll

deal with that.” 3 R.R. at 15. Then the court turned around and penalized

Terry for not taking the shop door off of the shop and awarded 100

percent value to the wife. C.R. at 199.

The appraiser valued the front-end loader at $3,000, the bucket at

$1,000, the hydraulic grapple at $2,500, and the pallet forks at $1,000. 4

R.R. at 4. The receiver valued the shop door at $800. 4 R.R. at 6. These

items total $8,300. See 4 R.R. at 4. Additionally, $1,000 in repairs had to

be made on the hydraulics system of the skid steer. These items totaled

$9,300.

The court awarded the wife the full value of the $8,300 for these

items and accessed the full value of the $1,000 repair against Terry. 4

R.R. at 45; C.R. at 198-99. This was an abuse of discretion. Terry did

nothing wrong in not turning over items that were either not in a court’s

Order or that the Court had verbally told him he did not need to produce.

46
Division in divorce proceedings must be “just and right.” TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 7.001. Thus, it was error for the court to award the full value of these

items to Appellee and award no value to Terry.

Where error affects the trial court’s just and right division of

property, the appellate court must reverse and remand the community

property estate back to the trial court for a new division. See Jacobs, 687

S.W.2d at 733. The total of these errors was approximately $9,300. See

C.R. 199-200. The total value of the community estate was approximately

$303,237 with Terry’s separate property claim removed. Thus, the court’s

errors caused 3.1 percent of the community estate to be wrongly

apportioned.

In McElwee, the Houston Court of Appeals held that an error that

had “more than a mere de minimis effect upon the trial court’s division”

required the Appellate Court to remand the community estate to the trial

court for a just and right division. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d at 190. In that

case, an error that constituted approximately three percent of the total

estate was more than de minimis and warranted remand. Id. at 188-90.

Here, the error constituted 3.1 percent of the total community estate and,

therefore, remand is warranted.

47
VI. The court committed reversible error by divesting Terry of
the value of his separate property welding equipment.

The Order required Terry to produce a 2500 Dodge truck to the

receiver for sale. C.R. 74-76. The receiver testified that while the truck

was delivered to him, it was delivered to him with different tires and with

the welding equipment removed from the truck. 4 R.R. at 5. The receiver

valued the missing welding equipment at $1,000, but did not seem to

place a value on the difference between the old tires and the new ones.

See 4 R.R. at 5.

Terry explained why he changed the tires:

Q. The wheels on the -- on the welding [truck] machine, he
said the wheels and tires had been changed from what he had
seen. What happened with that?

A. It had a bulge on the tire, so I took them off and put --
They're not mud tires, but they were good street tires.

4 R.R. at 29-30

With respect to the welding equipment, Terry testified that the

welding equipment was his separate property that he had before

marriage. 4 R.R. at 38-39. There was no evidence in the record to refute

this. Notably, Terry did produce the truck that was the subject of the

court’s Order but removed the welding equipment from it because it had

48
been his prior to marriage and he could use it to earn a living as he had

previously been employed as a welder. 4 R.R. at 38-39.

The receiver valued the missing welding equipment at $1,000. 4

R.R. at 5. While the receiver complained that the tires had been changed,

he did not state a value for the difference between the new tires and the

old tires. 4 R.R. at 5.

A trial court may not divest a party of his or her separate property

because the nature of separate property is determined by the Texas

Constitution, rather than by what is “just and right.” Eggemeyer, 554

S.W.2d at 140, 142 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court here errored

because it took the value of the separate property welding equipment and

awarded it entirely to the wife. See 4 R.R. at 19 (this was included in the

$12,800 amount awarded to the wife); C.R. 199-200. This was reversible

error.

VII. The trial court committed reversible error by requiring
Terry to pay for Appellee’s attorney’s fees.

The court’s award of the wife’s attorney’s fees for punitive purposes

was also an abuse of discretion. C.R. at 198-201. Attorney fees are

generally not recoverable from the other party in the absence of a specific

statutory or contractual provision. Turner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230, 233

49
(Tex. 1964); Wright v. Wright, 280 S.W.3d 901, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland

2009, no pet.).

The court indicated it was angry at Terry for not settling the case:

[T]hese parties out there made it just astronomically
complicated. I gave them an opportunity through mediation,
through that full morning of that last hearing, we negotiated
to trade what they wanted to trade, and here we are.

3 R.R. at 15.
This anger affected the just division of the property:

In addition to the conduct, and misleading the Court, not
following directions, [and] making this case a lot harder than
it had to be, I'm assessing the attorney's fees…

4 R.R. at 45.

The “misleading” and “not following directions” referred to the acts

described above, which were: 1) Terry not turning over the tractor

attachments that were not the subject of the Order, 2) Terry removing

his separate property welding equipment from a truck he turned over, 3)

putting new tires on a truck he turned over because the old ones were

defective, and 4) not removing a shop door from a shop that the judge told

him in court on the record that he didn’t have to remove.

Additionally, the “making things harder than they have to be” and

the judge’s comments about the couple not settling in mediation were, to

50
the extent that they affected his award of attorney’s fees, improper. While

a court can compel litigants to engage in mediation, they cannot force or

mandate them to settle their differences. In re City of McAllen, 677

S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2023). Penalizing a party because he would not settle a

case in mediation goes against the voluntary nature of mediation. In re

Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d at 452-54; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 154.002. The statutory framework regarding mediation

underscores that mediation is intended to be a cooperative and non-

coercive process. See In re Acceptance, 33 S.W.3d at 452-54; see also TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.002. In fact, the way Terry negotiated

during mediation should never have been disclosed to the trial court.

Texas Parks and Wildlife v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1999, no pet.); In re Acceptance, 33 S.W.3d at 452-54. Thus, the

trial court’s act of awarding the Appellee her attorney’s because

Appellant “made this case a lot harder than it had to be” (i.e., didn’t

settle) and made it “astronomically complicated” because he wouldn’t

settle, was reversible error.

Division in divorce proceedings must be “just and right.” TEX. FAM.

CODE § 7.001. Where error affects the trial court’s just and right division

51
of property, the appellate court must reverse and remand the community

property estate back to the trial court for a new division. See Jacobs, 687

S.W.2d at 733. The wife’s attorney’s fees that were borne solely by Terry

were $8,018.50. See C.R. 199-200. The total value of the community

estate was approximately $303,237 (with Terry’s separate property claim

removed). See C.R. 198-201. Thus, the court’s errors caused 2.6 percent

of the community estate to be wrongly apportioned. If the Court believes

that this 2.6 percent had “more than a mere de minimis effect upon the

trial court’s division,” then the case should be remanded for a just and

right division of the community estate. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 190

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ den’d).

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Terry Brent Williams,

respectfully requests this Court: (1) vacate the Final Decree of Divorce as

to the child support order and remand this matter to the trial court for

an order consistent with a finding that Terry’s current income is only

approximately $460 per week gross or $407 net; and (2) vacate the Final

Decree of Divorce as to the property division and remand this matter to

the trial court for a just and right division of the marital estate

52
confirming Terry’s separate property interest in 10.8 acres of land that

was sold and use proper valuation methods to determine the value of that

land; and (3) vacate the Final Decree of Divorce as to the property

division and remand this matter to the trial court for a just and right

division of the marital estate without the court’s punitive $9,300 award

to Appellee against Appellant; (4) vacate the Final Decree of Divorce as

to the property division and remand this matter to the trial court for a

just and right division of the marital estate confirming Terry’s separate

property interest in his welding equipment; and (5) vacate the Final

Decree of Divorce as to the property division and remand this matter to

the trial court for a just and right division of the marital estate without

the court awarding Terry pay $8,018.50 for Appellee’s attorney’s fees.

Terry also respectfully requests all other relief, whether at law or in

equity, to which he may show himself justly entitled.

September 11, 2025

Respectfully Submitted,

CLOUTHIER LAW, PLLC

/s/Susan J. Clouthier
Susan J. Clouthier
Tex. Bar No. 24062673
Elizabeth M. Steiner

53
Tex. Bar No. 24057028
9950 Woodloch Forest Dr., Ste. 1300
The Woodlands, Texas 77380
Tel: (346) 443-4300
Fax: (346) 443-4343
susan@clouthierlaw.com

Attorneys for Appellant
Terry Brent Williams

54
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 11, 2025, a true and correct

copy of Appellant’s Brief was e-served to:

via e-filing

Clint F. Sare
Tex. Bar No. 00788354
P.O. Box 1694
Bryan, Texas 77806
Tel: (979) 822-1505
cfs@sarelaw.com

Attorney for Respondent
Tracy Leeann Williams

/s/Susan J. Clouthier
Susan J. Clouthier

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Tex. R. App.

P. 9.4(i)(2) because this brief contains 10,199 words, excluding the parts

of the brief exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1). This brief complies with

the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because this brief has

been prepared in a conventional typeface using Microsoft Word 365 in

Century Schoolbook font size 14.

/s/Susan J. Clouthier
Susan J. Clouthier

55
APPENDIX

Final Decree of Divorce ........................................................................... 57

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ............................................. 124

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.002 ................................................ 128

Tex. Fam. Code § 3.001 ......................................................................... 129

Tex. Fam. Code § 3.002 ......................................................................... 130

Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 ......................................................................... 131

Tex. Fam. Code § 154.123 ..................................................................... 132

Tex. Fam. Code § 154.125 ..................................................................... 134

Tex. Fam. Code § 154.130 ..................................................................... 136

56
CAUSE NO. 22-0059CV

IN THE MATTER OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT
THE MARRIAGE OF

TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS
AND 369TH JUDIOAL DISTRICT
TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS

AND IN THE INTEREST OF
, A CHILD LEON COUNTY, T'EXAS

FILED
CASSANDRA NOEY WILSON, DISTRICT CLERK
FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE LEON COUNTY. TEXAS

MAR 18 2025
On the 25 th day of February 2025, the Court heard this case.

BY~
AP.Pffrances

Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS, appeared in person and through

attorney of record, JEFFREY L. COE, and announced ready.

Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS, appeared in person and through

attorney of record, JOHN R. BANKHEAD, and announced ready.

Record

The making of a record of testimony was waived by the parties with the

consent of the Court.

Jurisdiction and Domicile

The Court finds that the pleadings of Respondent are in due form and

contain all the allegations, information, and prerequisites required by law. The

110 57
Court, after receiving evidence, finds that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all

the parties and that at least sixty days have elapsed since the date the suit was

filed.

The Court further finds that, at the time this suit was filed, Respondent had

been a domiciliary of Texas for the preceding six-month period and a resident of

the county in which this suit was filed for the preceding ninety-day period. All

per.sons entitled to citation were properly cited.

Ju,:y

A jury was waived, and questions of fact and of law were submitted to the

Court.

Divorce

The Court finds that Petitioner and Respondent were married on September 10th,

2011.

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, Petitioner,

and TRACY LEEANN WJLUAMS, Respondent, are divorced and that the

marriage between them is dissolved on the ground of insupportability.

Child

The Court finds that Petitioner and Respondent are the parents of the

following child:
2,

111 58
Name:
Sex: Female
Birth date:
Home state: Texas
Social Security number:

The Court finds no other children of the marriage are expected.

Parenting Plan

The Court finds that the provisions in this decree relating to the rights and

duties of the parties with relation to the child, possession of and access to the

child, child support, and optimizing the development of a close and continuing

relationship between each party and the child constitute the parties' agreed

parenting plan.

Conservatorshlp

The Court, having considered the circumstances of the parents and of the

child, finds that the following orders are in the best interest of the child.

IT IS ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WILUAMS and TRACY LEEANN

WILUAMS are appointed parent Joint Managing Conservators of the following

child:

IT IS ORDERED that, at all times, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS as parent Joint Managing Conservators, shall have the

.l

112 59
following rights:

1. the right to receive information from any other conservator of the
child concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child;

2.the right to confer with the other parent to the extent possible
before making a decision concerning the health, education, and welfare of the
child;

3. the right of access to medical, dental, psychological, and educational
records of the child;

4. the right to consult with a physician, dentist, or psychologist of the
child;

5. the right to consult with school officials concerning the child's
welfare and educational status, including, school activities;

6. the right to attend school activities, including school lunches,
performances, and field trips;

7. the right to be designated on the child's records as a person to be
notified in case of an emergency;

8. the right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment
during an emergency involving an immediate danger to the health and safety of
the child; and

9. the right to manage the estate of the child to the extent the estate
has been created by the parent's family or by the parent, other than by the
community or joint property of the parent.

IT IS ORDERED that, at all times, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS as parent Joint Managing Conservators, shall each have the

113 60
following duties:

1. the duty to inform the other conservator of the child in a timely
manner of significant information concerning the health, education, and welfare
of the child;

2. the duty to inform the other conservator of the child if the
conservator resides with for at least thirty days, marries, or intends to marry a
person who the conservator knows is registered as a sex offender under chapter
62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure or is currently charged with an
offense for which om conviction the person would be required to register under
that chapter. IT IS ORDERED that notice of this information shall be provided to
the other conservator of the child as soon as practicable, but not later than the
fortieth day after the date the conservator of the child begins to reside with the
person or on the tenth day after the date the marriage occurs, as appropriate. IT
IS ORDERED that the notice must include a description ot the offense that is the
basis of the person's requirement to register as a sex offender or of the offense
with which the person is charged. WARNING: A CONSERVATOR COMMITS
AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE AS A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR IF THE
CONSERVATOR FAILS TO PROVIDE THIS NOTICE;

3. the duty to inform the other conservator of the child if the
conservator establishes a residence with a person who the conservator knows is
the subject of a final protective order sought by an individual other than the
conservator that is in effect on the date the residence with the person is
established. IT IS ORDERED that notice of this information shall be provided to
the other conservator of the child as soon as practicable, but not later than the
thirtieth day after the date the conservator establishes residence with the person
who is the subject of the final protective order. WARNING: A CONSERVATOR
COMMITS AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE AS A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR IF THE
CONSERVATOR FAILS TO PROVIDE THIS NO'TICE;

4. the duty to inform the other conservator of the child if the
conservator resides with, or allows unsupervised access to a child by, a person
who is the subject of a final protective order sought by the conservator after the
e><piration of sixty day period following the date the final protective order is

S,

114 61
issued. IT IS ORDERED that notice of this information shall be provided to the
other conservator of the child as soon as practicable, but not later than the
ninetieth day after the date the final protective order was issued. WARNING: A
CONSERVATOR COMMITS AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE AS A ClASS C
MISDEMEANOR IF THE CONSERVATOR FAILS TO PROVIDE THIS NOTICE; and

5. the duty to inform the other •conservator of the child if the
conservator is the subject of a final protective order issued after the date of the
order establishing conservatorship. IT IS ORDERED that notice of this
information shall be provided to the other conservator of the child as soon as
practicable, but not later than the thirtieth day after the date the final protective
order was issued. WARNING: A CONSERVATOR COMMITS AN OFFENSE
PUNISHABLE AS A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR IF THE CONSERVATOR FAILS TO
PROVIDE THIS NOTICE.

IT IS ORDERED that, during her periods of possession, TERRY BRENT

WILLIAMS and TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS as parent Joint Managing

Conservators shall have the following rights and duties:

1. the duty of care, control, protection, and reasonable discipline of the
child;

2. the duty to support the child, including providing the child with
clothing, food, shelter, and medical and dental care not involving an invasive
procedure;

3. the right to consent for the child to medical and dental care not
involving .an invasive procedure; and

4. the right to direct the moral and rel igious training of the child.

IT IS ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, as a parent Joint

Managing Conservator, shall have the fol lowing rights and duty:

6

115 62
1. the independent right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical
treatment involving invasive procedures;

2. the independent right to consent to psychiatric and psychological
treatment of the child;

3. the independent right to receive and give receipt for periodic payments
for the support of the children and to hold or disburse these funds for the benefit of
the child;

4. the independent right to represent the children in legal action and to
make other decisions of substantial legal significance concerning the chlld;

5. the independent right to consent to marriage and to enlistment in the
armed forces of the United States;

6. the independent right to make decisions concerning the child's
education;

7. except as provided by section 264.0111 of the Texas Family Code, the
independent right to the services and earnings of the child;

8. except when a guardian of the child's estates or a guardian or attorney
ad litem has been appointed for the child, the independent right to act as an agent
of the child in relation to the child's estates if the child's action is required by a state,
the United States, or a foreign government;

9. the right, subject to the agreement of the other conservator, to apply
for passports for the child, to renew the child's passports, and to maintain
possession of the child's passports; and

10. the independent duty to manage the estates of the child to the extent
the estates have been created by the community or joint property of the parent.

IT IS ORDERED that TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS, as a Parent Joint

Managing Conservator, shall have the following rights and duty:

7

116 63
1. the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child
within, Leon County, Texas, and all Counties contiguous to Leon County;

2. the independent right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical
treatment involving invasive procedures;

3. the independent right to consent to psychiatric and psychological
treatment of the child;

4. the independent right to receive and give receipt for periodic payments
for the support of the child and to hold or disburse these funds for the benefit of the
child;

5. the independent right to represent the child in legal action and to make
other decisions of substantial legal significance concerning the child;

6. the independent right to consent to marriage and to enlistment in the
armed forces of the United States;

7. the independent right to make decisions concerning the child's
education;

8. except as provided by section 264.011 l of the Texas Family Code, the
independent right to the services and earnings of the child;

9. except when a guardian of the children's estates or a guardian or
attorney ad litem has been appointed for the child, the independent right to act as
an agent of the child in relation to the child's estates if the child 's action is required
by a state, the United States, or a foreign government;

10. the right, subject to the agreement of the other conservator, to apply
for passports for the child, to renew the child's passports, and to maintain
possession of the child's passports; and

11. the independent duty to manage the estates of the child to the extent
the estates have been created by the community or joint property of the parent.

Notwithstanding any provision in this decree to the contrary, IT IS

8

117 64
ORDERED that TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shafl have the exclusive right to

enroll the child in school. Each conservator, during that conservator's period of

possession, is ORDERED to ensure the child's attendance in the schools in which

TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS has enrolled the child .

Except as expressly provided otherwise in this order, IT IS ORDERED that

all information of which a conservator is required to notify the other conservator

and all documents and information that a conservator is required to provide to

the other conservator shall be sent in the following manner.

a. delivery to the recipient at the recipient's electronic mail

address as follows ,or to such other electronic mail address

subsequently designated by the recipient:

TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS terrybwilliams@yahoo.com

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS twilliams@freestonemc.com

and in the event of any change in a recipient's electronic mail

address, that recipient is ORDERED to notify the other

recipient of such change in writing within twenty-four hours

after the change or

b. delivery to the recipient at the recipient's mobile telephone

118 65
number by text message as follows or to such other mobile

telephone number subsequently designated by the recipient:

TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS (903) 466-1334

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS (903) 391-4636

and in the event of any change in a recipient's electronic

mobile telephone number, that recipient is ORDERED to notify

the other recipient of such change in writing within twenty-

four hours after the change .

IT IS ORDERED that TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shall have the exclusive

right and duty to prepare and file income tax returns for the estates of

IT IS ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall provide such

information to TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS as is requested to prepare federal

income tax returns for the child's estates within thirty days of receipt of a written

request for the information, and in no event shall the information be provided

later than thirty (30) days from request. As requested information becomes

available after that date, TERRY BRENT WlilLIAMS is ORDERED to provide it to

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS within ten days of TERRY' BRENT WILUAMS'

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119 66
receipt of the information.

Possession andAccess
IT IS ORDERED that nothing in this order shall supersede any term
of any protective order or condit ion of bond, probation, or parole.

1. Standard Possession Order

IT IS ORDERED that each conservator shal l comply with all terms
and conditions of this Standard Possession Order. IT IS ORDERED that
this Standard Possession Order is effective immediately and appl ies to all
periods of possession occurring on and after the date the Court signs this
Standard Possession Order. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

(a) Definitions

1. In this S,tandard Possession Order "school" means the
elementary or secondary school in which the child is enrolled or, if
the child is not enrolled in an elementary or secondary school, the
public school district in which the child primarily resides.

2. In this Standard Possession Order "child" includes each
child, whether one or more, who is a subject of this suit while that
child is under the age of eighteen years and not otherwise
emancipated.

(b) Mutual Agreement or Specified Terms for Possession

IT IS ORDERED that the conservators shall have possession of
the child at times mutually agreed to in advance by the parties, and,
in the absence of mutual agreement, it is ORDERED that the
conservators shall have possession of the child under the specified
terms set out in this Standard P·ossession Order.

(c) When Parents Reside 100 Miles or Less Apart

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120 67
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Possession Order, when TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS resides 100 miles
or less from the primary residence of the child, TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS shall have the right to possession of the child as follows:

1. Weekends -

On weekends that occur during the regular school term,
beginning at 6:00 P.M., on the first, third, and fifth Friday of each
month and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the following Sunday.

On weekends that do not occur during the regular school
term, beginning at 6:00 P.M., on the first. third, and fifth Friday of
each month and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the following Sunday.

2. Weekend Possession Extended by a Holiday -

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Posse·ssion Order, if a weekend period of possession by TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS begins on a student holiday or a teacher in-
service day that falls on a Friday during the regular school term, as
determined by the school in which the child is enrolled, or a federal,
state, or local holiday that falls on a Friday during the summer
months when school is not in session, that weekend period of
possession shall begin at 6:00 P.M. on the immediately preceding
Thursday.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Possession Order, if a weekend period o'f possession by TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS ends on or is immediately followed by a student
holiday or a teacher in -service day that falls on a Monday during the
regular school term, as determined by the school in which the child
is enrolled, that weekend period of possession shall end at 6:00 P.M.
on that Monday.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard

12 1

121 68
Possession Order, if a weekend period of possession by TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS ends on or is immediately followed by a federal,
state, or local holiday that falls on a Monday during the summer
months when school is not in session, that weekend period of
possession shall end at 6:00 P.M. on that Monday.

3. Thursdays • On Thursday of each week during the
regular school term, beginning at 6:00 P.M. and ending at 8:00 P.M.
with visits to take place in Leon County, Texas.

4. Spring Vacation in Even-Numbered Years - In even-
numbered years, beginning at 6:00 P.M. for the school's spring
vacation and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the day before school resumes
after that vacation.

5. Extended Summer Possession by TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS -

With Written Notice by April 1 - If TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS
gives TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS written notice by April 1 of a year
specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession for
that year, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall have possession of the
child for thirty days beginning no earlier than the day after the
child's school is dismissed for the summer vacation and ending no
later than seven days before school resumes at the end of the
summer vacation in that year, to be exercised in no more than two
separate periods of at least seven consecutive days each, as specified
in the written notice. These periods of possession shall begin and
end at 6:00 P.M. on each applicable day.

Without Written Notice by April 1 - If TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS does not give TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS written notice
by April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of
summer possession for that year, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall
have possession of the child for thirty consecutive days in that year
beginning at 6:00 P.M. on July 1 and ending at 6:00 P.M. on July 31.

I)

122 69
Notwithstanding the Thursday periods of possession during
the regular school term and the weekend periods of possession
ORDERED for TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, it is expressly ORDERED
that TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shall have a superior right of
possession of the child as follows:

1. Spring Vacation in Odd-Numbered Years - In odd-
numbered years, beginning at 6:00 P.M. for the school's spring
vacation and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the day before school resumes
after that vacation.

2. Summer Weekend Possession by TRA.CY LEEANN
WILUAMS - If TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS gives TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS written notice by April 15 of a year, TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS shall have possession of the child on any one weekend
beginning at 6:00 P.M. on Friday and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the
following Sunday during any one period o,f the extended summer
possession by TERRY BRENT WILUAMS in that year, provided that
TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS picks up the child from TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS and returns the child to that same place and that the
weekend so designated does not interfere with Father's Day
possession. Not later than the fifteenth day before the Friday that
begins the designated weekend, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS must
give TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS written notice of the location at
which TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS is to pick up and return the child .

3. Extended Summer Possession by TRACY LEEANN
WILLJAMS • If TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS gives TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS written notice by April 15 of a year or gives TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS fourteen days' written notice on or after April 16
of a year, TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS may designate one weekend
beginning no earlier than the day after the child's school is dismissed
for the summer vacation and ending no later than seven days before
school resumes at the end of the summer vacation, during which an
otherwise scheduled weekend period of possession by TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS shall not take place in that year, provided that

123 70
the weekend so designated does not interfere with TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS' period or periods of extended summer possession or
with Father's Day possession.

(d) Parents Who Reside More Than 100 Miles Apart

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Possession Order, when TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS resides more
than 100 miles from the residence of the child, TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS shall have the right to possession of the child as follows:

1. Weekends - Unless TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS elects the
alternative period of weekend possession described in the next
paragraph, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall have the right to
possession of the child on weekends beginning at 6:00 P.M., on the
first, third, and fifth Friday of each month and ending at 6:00 P.M. on
the following Sunday.

Alternate Weekend Possession - In lieu of the weekend
possession described In the foregoing paragraph, TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS shall have the right to possession of the child not more
than one weekend per month of TERRY BRENT WILUAMS choice
beginning at 6:00 P.M. on the day school recesses for the weekend
and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the day before school resumes after the
weekend. TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS may elect an optio,n for this
alternative period of weekend possession by giving written notice to
TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS within ninety days after the parties
begin to reside more than 100 miles apart. If TERRY BRENT
WILUAMS makes this election, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall give
TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS fourteen days' written or telephonic
notice preceding a designated weekend. The weekends chosen shall
not conflict with the provisions regarding Christmas, Thanksgiving,
the child's birthday, and Mother's Day possess ion below.

2. Weekend Possession Extended by a Holiday -

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124 71
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Possession Order, if a weekend period of possession by TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS begins on a student holiday or a teacher in-
service day that falls on a Friday during the regular school term, as
determined by the school in which the child is enrolled, or a federal,
state, or local holiday during the summer months when school is not
in session, that weekend period of possession shall begin at 6:00
P.M. on the immediately preceding Thursday.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Possession Order, if a weekend period of possession by TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS ends on or is immediately followed by a student
holiday or a teacher in-service day that falls on a Monday during the
regular school term, as determined by the school in which the child
is enrolled, that weekend period of possession shall end at 6:00 P.M.
on that Monday.

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Possession Order, if a weekend period of possession by TERRY
a
BRENT WILLIAMS ends on or is immediately followed by federal,
state, or local holiday that falls on a Monday during the summer
months when school is not in session, that weekend period of
possession shall end at 6:00 P.M. on that Monday.

3. Spring Vacation in All Years - Every year, beginning at
6:00 P.M. on the day the child is dismissed from school for the
school's spring vacation and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the day before
school resumes after that vacation.

4. Extended Summer Possession by TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS -

With Written Notice by April 1 - If TERRY BRENT WJLUAMS
gives TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS written notice by April 1 of a year
specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession for
that year, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS shall have possession of the

16

125 72
child for forty-two days beginning no earli er than the day after the
child's school is dismissed for the summer vacation and ending no
later than seven days before school resumes at the end of the
summer vacation in that year, to be exercised in no more than two
separate periods of at least seven consecutive days each, as specified
in the written notice. These periods of possession shall begin and
end at 6:00 P.M. on each applicable day.

Without Written Notice by April 1 - If TERRY BRENT
WJLUAMS does not give TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS written notice
by April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of
summer possession for that year, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall
have possession of the child for forty-two consecutive days
beginning at 6:00 P.M. on June 15 and ending at 6:00 P.M. on July 27
of that year.

Notwithstanding the weekend periods of possession
ORDERED for TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, it is expressly ORDERED
that TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shall have a superior right of
possession of the child as follows:

1. Summer Weekend Possession by TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS - If TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS gives TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS written notice by April 15 of a year, lRACV LEEANN
WILUAMS shall have possession of the child on any one weekend
beginning at 6:00 P.M. on Friday and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the
following Sunday during any one period of possession by TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS during TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS' extended
summer possession in that year, provided that if a period of
possession by TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS in that year exceeds thirty
days, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS may have possession of the child
under the terms of this provision on any two nonconsecutive
weekends during that period and provided that TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS picks up the child from TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and
returns the child to that same place and that the weekend so
designated does not interfere with Father's Day possession.

11

126 73
2. Extended Summer Possession by TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS - If TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS gives TERRY BRENT
WILLIAMS written notice by April 15 of a year, TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS may designate twenty-one days beginning no earlier
than the day after the child's school is dismissed for the summer
vacation and ending no later than seven days before school resumes
at the end of the summer vacation in that year, to be exercised in no
more than two separate periods of at least seven consecutive days
each, during which TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall not have
possession of the child, provided that the period or periods so
designated do not interfere with TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS' period
or periods of extended summer possession or with Father's Day
possession. These periods of possession shall begin and end at 6:00
P.M . on each applicable day.

(e) Holidays

Notwithstanding the weekend and Thursday periods of
possession of TERRY BRENT WILUAMS, TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS and TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall have the right to
possession of the child as follows:

1. Christmas Holidays in Even-Numbered Years - In even-
numbered years, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS shall have the right to
possession of the child beginning at 6:00 P.M. on the day the child is
dismissed from school for the Christmas school vacation and ending
at noon on December 28, and TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shall
have the right to possession of the child beginning at noon on
December 28 and end;ng at 6:00 P.M. on the day before school
resumes after that Christmas school vacation.

2. Christmas Holidays in Odd-Numbered Years - In odd ·
numbered years, TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS shall have the right to
possession of the child beginning at 6:00 P.M. on the day the child is
dismissed from school for the Christmas school vacation and ending
at noon on December 28, and TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall have

18

127 74
the right to possession of the child beginning at noon on December
28 and ending at 6:00 P.M. on the day before school resumes after
that Christmas school vacation.

3. Thanksgiving in Odd-Numbered Years - In odd-
numbered years, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall have the right to
possession of the child beginning at 6:00 P.M. on the day the child is
dismissed from school before Th~nksgiving and ending at 6:00 P.M.
on the Sunday following Thanksgiving.

4. Thanksgiving in Even-Numbered Years - In even-
numbered years, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shall have the right to
possession of the child beginning at 6:00 P.M. on the day the child is
dismissed from school before Thanksgiving and ending at 6:00 P.M.
on the Sunday following Thanksgiving.

5. Child's Birthday • If a parent is not otherwise entitled
under this Standard Possession Order to present possession of a
child on the child's birthday, that parent shall have possession of the
child and the child's minor siblings beginning at 6:00 P.M. and
ending at 8:00 P.M. on that day, provided that that parent picks up
the children from the other parent's residence and returns the
children to that same place.

6. Father's Day - TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall have the
right to possession of the children each year, beginning at 6:00 P.M.
on the Friday preceding Father's iDay· and ending at 6:00 P.M. on
Father's Day, provided that if TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is not
otherwise entitled under this Standard Possession Order to present
possession of the children, he shall pick up the child from TRACY
LEEANN WILLIAMS home located at 1817 (1st Railroad St..
Buffalo. Texas 75831 and return the children to that same place.

7. Mother's Day - TRACY LEEANN WIWAMS shall have
the right to possession of the children each year, beginning at 6:00
P.M. on the Friday preceding Mother's Day and ending at 6:00 P.M.

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128 75
on Mother's Day, provided that if TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS is not
otherwise entitled under this Standard Possession Order to present
possession of the child, she shall pick up the children from TRACY
LEEANN WILUAMS home located at 1817 East Railroad St.,
Buffalo. Texas 75831 and return the child to that same place.

(f) Undesignated Periods of Possession

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS shall have the right of possession
of the child at all other times not specifically designated in this
Standard Possession Order for TERRY BRENT WJLUAMS.

(g) General Terms and Conditions

Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard
Possession Order, the terms and conditions of possession of the
child that apply regardless of the distance between the residence of
a parent and the child are as follows:

1. Surrender of Child by TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS -
TRACY LEEA.N N WILLIAMS is ORDERED to surrender the child to
TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS at the beginning of each period of TERRY
BRENT WILUAMS's possession at TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS
home located at 1817 East Railroad St.. Buffalo. Texas 75831.

2. Return of Child by TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS - TERRY
BRENT WILLIAMS is ORDERED to return the child to Respondent,
TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS at TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS home
located at 1817 East Railroad St.. Buffalo. Texas 75831.

3. Surrender of Child by TERRY BRENT WJLllAMS -
TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is ORDERED to surrender the child to
TRACY LEEANN WJLUAMS, if the child is in TERR'V BRENT
WILLIAMS 's possession or subject to TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS's
control, at the beginning of each period of TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS 's exclusive periods of possession, at TRACY LEEANN

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129 76
WILUAMS home located at 1817----E-.st Railroad St.. Buffalo. Jex-as
75831 .

4. Return of Child by TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS - TRACY
LEEANN WILLIAMS is ORDERED to return the child to TERRY
BRENT WILUAMS, if TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is entitled to
possession of the child, at the end of each of lRACY LEEANN
WILUAMS's exclusive periods of possession, at TRACY LEEANN
WILLIAMS home located at 1817 East Railroad St .. Buffalo. Texas
--75831.

5. Personal Effects Each conservator is ORDERED to
retu rn with the child with the personal effects that the child brought
at the beginning of the period of possession.

6. Designation of Competent Adult - Each conservator may
designate any competent adult to pick up and return the child, as
applicable. IT IS ORDERED that a conservator or a designated
competent adult be present when the child is picked up or returned .

7. Inability to Exercise Possession - Each conservator is
ORDERED to give notice to the person in possession of the child on
each occasion that the conservator will be unable to exercise that
conservator's right of possession for any specified period.

8. Written Notice - Written notice, including notice
provided by electronic mail or facsimile or as otherwise authorized in
this order, shall be deemed to have been timely made if received or,
if applicable, postmarked before or at the t ime that notice is due.
Each conservator is ORDERED to notify the other conservator of any
change in the conservator's electronic mail address or facsimile
number within twenty -four hours after the change.

This concludes the Standard Possession Order.

.!I

130 77
2. -Duration

The periods of possession ordered above apply to the child the

subject of this suit while that child is under the age of eighteen years and

not otherwise emancipated.

3. Noninterference with Possession

Except as expressly provided herein, IT IS ORDERED that neither

conservator shall take possession of the child during the other

conservator's period of possession unless there is a prior written

agreement signed by both conservators or in case of an emergency.

4. Termination of Orders

The provisions of this decree relating to conservatorship, possession,

or access terminate on the remarriage of TERRY BRENT WILUAMS to

TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS unless a nonparent or agency has been

appointed conservator of the children under chapter 153 of the Texas

Family Code.

Child-Support

IT IS ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is obligated to pay and

shall pay to TRACY LEEANN WJLUAMS child support of ONE THOUSAND

SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT DOLLARS AND 00/100 (S 1758.00) PER

22

131 78
MONTH. with the first payment being due and payable on OCTOBER ,sr, 2024.

and a like payment being due and payable on the 1st day of each month

thereafter until the first month following the date of the earliest occurrence of

one of the events specified below:

1. the child reaches the a•ge of eighteen years or graduates from high

school, whichever occurs later, subject to the provisions for support beyond the

age of eighteen years set out below;

2. the child marries;

3. the child dies;

4. the child enlists in the armed forces of the United States and begins

active service as defined by section 101 of title 10 of the United States Code; or

5. the child's disabilities are otherwise removed for general purposes.

If the child is eighteen years of age and has not graduated from high

school and TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS's obligation to support the child has not

already terminated, IT IS ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WILUAMS's obligation

to pay child support to TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shall not terminate but shall

continue for as long as the child is enrolled-

1. under chapter 25 of the Texas Education Code in an accredited

132 79
secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma or under

section 130.008 of the Education Code in courses for joint high school and junior

college credit and is complying with the minimum attendance requirements of

subchapter C of chapter 25 of the Education Code or

2. on a full-time basis in a private secondary school in a program

leading toward a high school diploma and is complying with the minimum

attendance requirements imposed by that school.

Statement on Guidelines

In accordance with Texas Family Code section 154.130, the Court makes

the following findings and conclusions regarding the child support order made in

open court in this case on FEBRUARY 251 H, 2025:

1. The amount of child support ordered by the Court is in accordance

with the percentage guidelines.

2. The net resources of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS per month are

$8,790.60.

3. The percentage applied to TERRY BRENT WILUAMS's net resources

for child support is 20% percent.

133 80
Withholding from Earnings

IT IS ORDERED that any employer of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall be

ordered to withhold the child support payments ordered in this order from the

disposable earnings of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS for the support of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all amounts withheld from the di,sposable

earnings of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS by the employer and paid in accordance

with the order to that employer shall constitute a credit against the child support

obligation . Payment of the full amount of child support ordered paid by this

order through the means of withholding from earnings shall discharge the child

support obligation . If the amount withheld from earnings and credited against

the child support obligation is less than 100 percent of the amount ordered to be

paid by this order, the balance due remains an obligation of TERRY BRENT

WILLIAMS, and it is hereby ORDERED that TERRY BRENT 'WILLIAMS pay the

balance due directly as specified below.

On this date the Court authorized the issuance of an Income Withholding

for Support.

2, 1

134 81
Pavment

IT IS ORDERED that all payments shall be made through the state

disbursement unit at Texas Child Support Disbursement Unit, P.O. Box 659791,

San Antonio, Texas 78265-9791, and thereafter promptly remitted to TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS for the support of the child. IT JS ORDERED that all

payments shall be made payable to the Office of the Attorney General and

include the ten-digit Office of the Attorney General case number (if available), the

cause number of this suit, TERRY BRENT WJLLIAMS's name as the name of the

noncustodial parent (NCP), and TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS name as the name

of the custodial parent (CP). Payment options are found on the Office of the

Attorney General's website at https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/cs/payment-

options-a nd-types.

IT IS ORDERED that each party shall pay, when due, all fees charged to

that party by the state disbursement unit and any other agency statutorily

authorized to charge a fee.

.
Change of Emplovment

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WJLLJAMS shall notify this

Court and TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS by U.S. certified mail, return receipt

135 82
requested, of any change of address and of any termination of employment. This

notice shall be given no later than seven days after the change of address or the

termination of employment. This notice or a subsequent notice shall also provide

the current address of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and the name and address of

his current employer, whenever that information becomes available.

Clerk~ Duties

IT IS ORDERED that, on the request of a prosecuting attorney, the title N-

D agency, the friend of the Court, a domestic relations office, TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, or an attorney representing TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS or TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, the clerk of this Court shall

cause a certified copy of the Income Withholding for Support to be delivered to

any employer.

Medical and Dental and Vision Sup_port

1. IT IS ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS shall each provide additional child support for each child as set out in

this order for as long as the Court may order TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS to provide support for the child under sections

154.001 and 154.002 of the Te,xas Family Code. Beginning on the day T:E'RRY

136 83
BRENT WILLIAMS and TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS'S actual or potential

obligation to support a child under sections 154.001 and 154.002 of the Family

Code terminates, IT IS ORDERED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and TRACY

LEEANN WILLJAMS are discharged from these obligations with respect to that

child, except for any failure by a parent to fully comply with these obligations

before that date.

2. Definitions -

"Health Insurance" means insurance coverage that provides basic health-

care .services, including usual physician services, office visits, hospitalization, and

laboratory, X-ray, and emergency services, that may be provided through a health

maintenance organization or other private or public organization, other than

medical assistance under chapter 32 of the Texas Human Resources Code.

"Reasonable cost" means the total cost of health insurance coverage for all

children for which TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is responsible under a medical

support order that does not exceed 9 percent of TERRY BRENT WILUAMS's

annual resources, as described by section 154.062(b) of the Texas Family Code.

"Dental insurance" means insurance coverage that provides preventive

dental care and other dental services, including usual dentist services, office visits,

21

137 84
-
examinations, X-rays, and emergency services, that may be provided through a

single service health maintenance organizat ion or other private or public

organization.

"Reasonable cost" of dental insurance means the total cost of dental

insurance coverage for the child for which TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is

responsible under a medical support order that does not exceed 1.5 percent of

TERRY BRENT WILUAMS's annual resources, as described by section 154.062(b)

of the Texas Family Code.

"Health-care expenses" include, without limitation, medical, surg ical,

prescription drug, mental health-care services, dental, eye care, ophthalmological,

and orthodontic charges but do not include expenses for travel to and from the

provider or for nonprescription medication.

"Health-care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance"

("unreimbursed expenses") include related copayments and deductibles.

3. Findings on Availability of Health Insurance - Having considered the

cost, accessibility, and quality of health insurance coverage available to the

parties, the Cou~ finds:

Health insurance is available or is in effect for the child through TRACY

138 85
LEEANN WILUAMS's employment or membership in a union, trade association, or

other organization at a reasonable cost of $150.17 per month. (Medical support

only).

IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the following orders regarding health-care

coverage are in the best interest of the child.

4. Provision of Health-Care Coverage - (Medical Coverage only).

TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS is ORDERED to maintain health insurance for

the child as long as child support is payable for that child. TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS is ORDERED-

a. to provide to each conservator of the child the following information

no later than the thirtieth day after the date the notice of the

rendition of this order is received:

i. TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS's Social Security number;

11. the name and address of TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS's

employer;

iii. whether TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS's employer is self-insured

or has health insurance available;

iv. proof that health insurance has been provided for each child;

v. if TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS's employer has health insurance

JO

139 86
available:

(a) the name of the health insurance carrier;

(b) the number of the policy;

(c) a copy of the policy;

(d) a schedule of benefits;

{e) a health insurance membership card;

(f) claim forms, and

(g) any other information necessary to submit a claim; and

v1. if TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS's employer is self-insured:

(a) a copy of the schedule of benefits;

{b) a membership card;

(c) claim forms; and

(d) any other information necessary to submit a claim;

b. to provide to each conservator of the child a copy of any renewals or

changes to the health insurance coverage of a child and additional

information regarding health insurance coverage of the child not later

than the fifteenth day after TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS receives or is

provided with the renewal, change, or additional information;

c. to notify each conservator of the child of any termination or lapse of

140 87
the health insurance coverage of a child no later than the fifteenth day

after the date of the termination or lapse;

d. after termination or lapse of health insurance coverage, to notify each

conservator of the child of the availability to TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS of additional health insurance for the child not later than

the fifteenth day after the date the insurance becomes available;

e. after termination or lapse of health insurance coverage, to enroll the

child in a health insurance plan that is available to TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS at reasonable cost at the next available enrollment period.

Pursuant to section 1504.051 of the Texas Insurance Code, n JS ORDERED
that if TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS is eligible for dependent health coverage but fails

to apply to obtain coverage for the child, the insurer shall enroll the child on

application of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS or others as authorized by law.

IT IS ORDERED tha.t in addition to the $1,758.00 of child support per month,

to be paid by Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WlllJAMS, Petitioner, TERRY BRENT

WILLIAMS is ORDERED to reimburse Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS, the

sum of $150.17 per month for medical child support. beginning OCTOBER 151,

2024.

5. Findings on Availability of Dental Insurance - Having considered the

32

141 88
cost accessibility, and quality of dental insurance coverage available to the parties,

the Court finds:

Dental and Vision insurance is available or is in effect for the child through

TRACY LEEANN WILLIAM'S employment or membership in a union, trade

association, or other organization at a reasonable cost of $26.37 per month.

IT IS FURTHER FOUND that the following orders regarding dental and vision

coverage are in the best interest of the children.

6. Provision of Dental and Vision Coverage -

TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS is ORDERED to maintain dental and vision

insurance for each child as long as child support is payable for that child. TRA.CY

LEEANN WILLIAMS is ORDERED-

a. to provide to each conservator of the child the following information

no later than the thirtieth day after the date the notice of the rendition

of this order is received:

t. TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS'S Social Security number;

ii. the name and address of TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS'S

employer;

111. whether TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS'S employer is self-insured

or has dental or vision insurance available;

.i .1

142 89
1v. proof that dental and vision insurance has been provided for

each child;

v. if TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS'S employer has dental and vision

insurance available:

{a) the name of the dental and vision insurance carrier;

(b) the number of the policy;

(c) a copy of the policy;
I

(d) a schedule of benefits;

(e) a dental insurance membership card;

(f) claim forms, and

(g) any other information necessary to submit a claim; and

v1. if TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS'S employer is self-insured:

(a) a copy of the schedule of benefits;

(b) a membership card;

(c) claim forms; and

(d) any other information necessary to submit a claim;

b to provide to each conservator of the child a copy of any renewals or

changes to the dental and vision insurance coverage of a child and

additional information regarding dental and vision insurance coverage

H

143 90
of the child not later than the fifteenth day after TRACY LEEANN

WIWAMS receives or is provided with the renewal, change, or

additional information;

c. to notify each conservator of the child of any termination or lapse of

the dental and vision insurance coverage of a child no later than the

fifteenth day after the date of the termination or lapse;

d. after termination or lapse of dental and vision insurance coverage, to

notify each conservator of the child of the availability to TRACY

LEEANN WILLIA.MS of additional dental and vision insurance for the

child not later than the fifteenth day after the date the insurance

becomes available;

e. after termination or lapse of dental and vision insurance coverage, to

enroll the child in a dental and vision insurance plan that is available to

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS at reasonable cost at the next available

enrollment period.

Pursuant to section 1504.051 of the Texas Insurance Code, IT IS ORDERED

that if TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS is eligible for dependent dental and vision

coverage but fails to apply to obtain coverage for the child, the insurer shall enroll

the children on application of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS or others as authorized by

144 91
law.

IT IS ORDERED that in addition to the $1,758.00 of child support per month,

to be paid by Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLJAMS, Petitioner, TERRY BRENT

WILUAMS is ORDERED to reimburse Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS-, the

sum of $26.37 per month for dental and vision support, beginning OCTOBER ,sr,

2024.

7. Allocation of Unreimbursed Expenses -

Pursuant to section 154.183(c) of the Texas Family Code, the reasonable and

necessary health-care expenses of the children that are not reimbursed by health

insurance are allocated as follows:

TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is ORDERED to pay 50 percent and TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS is ORDERED to pay 50 percent of the unreimbursed health-care

expenses other than dental expenses if, at the time the expenses are incurred,

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS is providing health insurance as ordered.

Pursuant to section 154.183{c) of the Texas Family Code, the reasonable and

necessary dental expenses of the children that are not reimbursed by dental

insurance are allocated as follows:

TERRY BRENT WILUAMS is ORDERED to pay SO percent and TRACY'

LEEANN WILLIAMS is ORDERED to pay 50 percent of the unreimbursed dental

16 !

145 92
expenses if, at the time the expenses are incurred, TRACY LEEANN WIWAMS is

providing dental and vision insurance as ordered.

The conservator who incurs a health-care expense on behalf of a child is

ORDERED to provide to the other conservator receipts, bills, statements, or

explanations of benefits showing the uninsured portion of the health-care expenses

within thirty days after the incurring conservator receives them. The nonincurring

conservator is ORDERED to pay the non-incurring conservator's percentage of the

unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses either by paying the health-care

provider directly or by· reimbursing the incurring conservator for any advance

payment exceeding the incurring conservator's percentage of the unreimbursed

portion of the health-care expenses within thirty days after the nonincurring

conservator receives receipts, bills, statements, or explanations of benefits showing

the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expense.

For the Court to hold the nonincurring conservator m civil or criminal

contempt for failing to pay the nonincurring conservator's percentage of the

unreimbursed portion of a health-care expense, the incurring conservator must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the nonincurring conservator personally

received receipts, bills, statements, or explanations of benefits reflecting the

unreimbursed portion of the health-care expense no later than thirty days a~er the

146 93
incurring conservator received them. Even if the incurring conservator fails to meet

that burden of proof, the Court may award the incurring conservator a judgment in

the nature of child support against the nonincurring conservator in the amount of

the unreimbursed portion of the heath -care expense the nonincurring conservator

was ordered but fail to pay.

8. Secondary Coverage - IT IS ORDERED that if a conservator provides

secondary health insurance coverage or dental insurance coverage for the children,

the conservators shall cooperate fully with regard to the handling and filing of claims

with the insurance carrier providing the coverage in order to maximize the benefits

available to the children and to ensure that the conservator who pays for health-care

expenses for the children is reimbursed for the payment from both carriers to the

fullest extent possible.

9. Compliance with Insurance Company Requirements - Each conservator

is ORDERED to conform to all requirements imposed by the terms and conditions of

any policy of health or dental insurance covering the children in order to assure the

maximum reimbursement or direct payment by any insurance company of the

incurred health-care expense, including but not limited to requirements for advance

notice to any carrier, second opinions, and the like. Each conservator is ORDERED to

use "preferred providers," or services within the health maintenance organization or

147 94
preferred provider network, if applicable. Disallowance of the· bill by an insurance

company shall not excuse the obligation of a conservator to make payment.

Excepting emergency health-care expenses incurred on behalf of the child, if a party

incurs health-care expenses for the child using Neut-of-network" health-care

providers or services, or fails to follow the insurance company procedures or

requirements, that cons,ervator shall pay all such health-care expenses incurred

absent (1) written agreement of the conservators allocating such health-care

expenses or (2) further order of the Court.

10. Claims - Except as provided in this paragraph, a conservator who is not

carrying the health or dental insurance policy covering the child is ORDERED to

provide to the party canying the policy, within fifteen days of receiving them, all

forms, receipts, bills, and statements reflecting the health-care expenses the

conservator not carrying the policy incurs on behalf of the children. In accordance

with section 1204.251 and 1504.0SS(a) of the Texas Insurance Code, IT IS ORDERED

that the conservator who is not carrying the health or dental or vision insurance

policy covering the children, at that conservator's option, or others as authorized by

law, may file any claims for health-care expenses directly with the insurance carrier

with and from whom coverage is provided for the benefit of the child and receive

payments directly from the insurance company. Further, for the sole purpose of

)91

148 95
section 1204.251 of the Texas Insurance Code, TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS Is

designated as the joint managing conservator of the child for insurance purposes.

The conservator who is carrying the health or dental or vision insurance policy

covering the child is ORDERED to submit all forms required by the insurance

company for payment or reimbursement of health-care expenses incurred by either

conservator on behalf of a child to the insurance carrier within fifteen days of that

conservator's receiving any form, receipt, bill, or statement reflecting the expenses.

11. Constructive Trust for Payments Received IT IS ORDERED that any

insurance payments received by a conservator from the health or dental or vision

insurance carrier as reimbursement for health-care expenses incurred by or on

behalf of a child shall belong to the conservator who paid those expenses. IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that the conservator receiving the insurance payments is

designated a constructive trustee to receive any insurance checks or payments for

health-care expenses paid by the other conservator, and the conservator carrying the

policy shall endorse and forward the checks or payments, along with any explanation

of benefits received, to the other conservator within three days of receiving them.

12. WARNING - A PARENT ORDERED TO PROVIDE HEALTH

INSURANCE OR DENTAL OR VISIOAN INSURANCE OR TO PA'V THE OTHER

PARENT ADDmONAL CHILD SUPPORT FOR THE COST OF HEALTH INSURANCE

-Hl

149 96
OR DENTAL INSURANCE OR VISION INSURANCE WHO FAILS TO DO SO IS

UABLE FOR NECESSARY MEDICAL EXPENSES OF THE CHILD, WITHOUT

REGARD TO WHETHER THE EXPENSES WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID IF HEALTH

INSURANCE OR DENTAL INSURANCE OR VISION INSURANCE HAD BEEN

PROVIDED, AND FOR THE COST OF HEALTH INSURANCE PR.EMIUMS, DENTAL

INSURANCE PREMIUMS, VISION INSURANCE PREMIUMS, OR CONTRIBUTIONS,

IF ANY, PAID ON BEHALF OF THE CHILD.

SuPRort as Obliga'fion a/Estate

11' IS ORDERED that the provisions for child support in this decree shall be

an obligation of the estate of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and shall not terminate

on the death of TERRY BRENT WILUAMS. IT IS ORDERED that payment

received by TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS for the benefit of the child due to the

death of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, including payments from the Social Security

Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs or other governmental agency or

life insurance proceeds, annuity payments, trust distributions, or retirement

survivor benefits, shall be a credit against this obligation. Any remaining balance

of the child support is an obligation of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS'S estate.

Termination of Orders an Remarri,ge of Parties but Not on Death of
Obligee

The provisions of this decree relating to current child support terminate on

41

150 97
the remarriage of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS to TRACY LEEANN WJLUAMS

unless a nonparent or agency has been appointed conservator of the children

under chapter 153 of the Texas Family Code. An obligation to pay child support

under this decree does not terminate on the death of TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS

but continues as an obligation to TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS for the benefit of

.

Optimizing Oev~opment-of Relationship-between P•rties and Children

IT IS ORDERED that the parties shall make every effort to foster the respect,

love and affection of the child for the other parent. Each party shall do nothing that

would in any way estrange the child from the other parent, that would hamper the

free and natural continuation of the love and affection of the child for the other

parent, or that would injure the opinion of the child for the other parent, and neither

shall do anything to undermine the child's love, affection and respect for the other

parent. This specifically includes that the parties will refrain from punishing the child

in any way for expressing love, affection or respect for the other parent or for

wishing to communicate with the other parent or for expressing sadness upon

separation from the other parent.

Information Regarding Parties

The information required for each party by section 105.006(a) of the Texas

42

151 98
Family Code is as follows:

Name: TERRY BRENT WILUAMS

Social Security number: XXX-XX-X147

Driver's license number: XX.XX Issuing state:
- - Texas
Current residence address:
----- ----- ----- --
Mai Ii ng address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Email address: terrybwilliams@yahoo.com

Home telephone number: (903) 466- 1334

Name of employer:

Address of employment:

Work telephone number:

Name: TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS

Social Security number: XXX-XX-X448

Driver's license number XXXXX543 Issuing state: Texas
Current residence address: 1817 East Railroad St., Buffalo, Texas 7583 1

Mailing address: P. 0 . Box 876, Buffalo, Texas 75831

Email address: twjUiams@freestonemc.com

Home telephone number: (903) 391 -4636

Name of employer: Fairfield Hospital District
Address of employment: 125 Newman Street, Fairfield, l exas 75840
Work telephone number: (903) 389 -2121

Required Notices

EACH PERSON WHO IS A PARTY TO THI-S ORDER IS ORDERED TO

0 1

152 99
NOTIFY EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY

OF ANY CHANGE IN THE PARTY'S CURRENT RESIDENCE ADDRESS, MAIUNG

ADDRESS, EMAIL ADDRESS, HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER, NAME OF

EMPLOYER. ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT, DRIVER'S UCENSE NUMBER, AND

WORK TELEPHONE NUMBER. THE PARTY IS ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE OF

AN INTENDED CHANGE IN ANY OF THE REQUIRED INFORMATION ro EACH

OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY ON OR BEFORE

THE 60TH DAY BEFORE THE INTENDED CHANGE. l'F THE PARTY DOES NOT

KNOW OR COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN OF THE CHANGE IN SUFFICIENT

TIME TO PROVIDE 60-DAY NOTICE, THE PARTY 1S ORDERED TO GIVE

NOTICE OF THE CHANGE ON OR BEFORE THE FIFTH DAY AFTER THE DATE

THAT THE PARTY KNOWS OF THE CHANGE.

THE DUTY TO FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY,

THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY CONTINUES AS LONG AS ANY

PERSON, BY VIRTUE OF THIS ORDER, IS UNDER AN OBUGATION TO PAY

CHILD SUPPORT OR ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD.

FAILURE BY A PARTY TO OBEY THE ORDER OF THIS COURT TO

PROVIDE EACH OTHER PARTY. THE COUR.T, AND THE STATE CASE

REGISTRY WITH T1i£ CHANGE IN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION MAY

RESULT IN FURTHER UTJGATlON TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING

153 100
CONTEMPT OF COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY

CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP 10 $500

FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.

Notice shall be given to the other party by delivering a copy of the notice

to the party by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice shall

be given to the Court by delivering a copy of the notice either in person to the

clerk of this Court or by registered or certified mail addressed to the clerk at 139

E Main, Centerville, Texas 75833. Notice shall be given to the state case registry

by mailing a copy of the notice to State Case Registry, Contract Services Section,

MC046S, P.O. Box 12017, Austin, Texas 78711 -2017.

NOTICE TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: YOU MAY

USE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE TE.RMS OF CHILD CUSTOD'V;

SPECFIED IN THIS ORDER. A PEACE OFFICER WHO REUES ON THE TERMS

Of A COURT ORDER AND THE OFFICER'S AGENCY ARE ENTITLED TO THE

APPUCABLE IMMUNITY AGAINST ANY C'LAIM, CML OR OTHE,RWISE,

REGARDING THE OFFICER'S GOOD FAITH ACTS PERFORMED IN THE SCOPE

OF THE OFFICER'S DUTIES IN ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE ORDER THAT

RELATE TO CHILD CUSTODY. ANY PERSON WHO, KNOWINGLY PRESENTS

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154 101
FOR ENFORCEMENT AN ORDER THAT IS INVALID OR NO LONGER IN EFFECT

COMMITS AN OFFENSE THAT MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY CONFINEMENT IN

JAIL FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS AND A, FINE OF AS MUCH AS $10,000.

THE COURT MAY MODIFY THIS ORDER THAT PROVIDES FOR THE

SUPPORT OF A CHILD, IF:
1

(1) THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CHILD OR A PERSON AFFECTED

BY THE ORDER HAVE MATERIALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED; OR

(2) IT HAS BEEN THREE YEARS SINCE THE ORDER WAS RENDERED

OR LAST MODIFIED AND THE MONTHLY AMOUNT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT

AWARD UNDER THE ORDER DIFFERS BY EITHER 20 PERCENT OR $100

FROM THE AMOUNT 'THAT WOULD BE AWARDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES.

Warnings to Parties

WARNINGS TO PARTIES: FAILURE TO OBEY A COURT ORDER FOR

CHILD SUPPORT OR FOR POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD MAY

RESULT IN FURTHER UTIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING

CONTEMPT OF COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY

CONFINEMENT IN JAlL FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500

FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.
46

155 102
FAILURE OF A PARTY TO MAKE A CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT TO THE

PLACE AND IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY A COURT ORDER MAY RESULT

IN THE PARTY'S NOT RECEMNG CREDIT FOR MAKING THE PAYMENT.

FAILURE OF A PARTY TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT DOES NOT JUSTIFY

DENYJNG THAT PARTY COURT-ORDERED POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A.

CHILD. REFUSAL BY A PARTY TO ALLOW POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A

CHILD DOES NOT JUSTIFY FAILURE TO PAY COURT-ORDERED CHILD

SUPPORT TO THAT PARTY.

Division of Marital Estate

The Court finds that the following is a just and right division of he parties'

marital estate, having due regard for the rights of each party and the child of the

marriage.

Property of Child

IT IS ORDERED that the Edward Jones Custodian Account (account

number xxx-xxx10-1-4) of ' shall remain property of the

child, . IT IS ORDERED that any withdrawals from this

account shall require signatures and consent of both parents, TERRY BRENT

WILUAMS i!lQ TRACY LEEANN WILLI.AMS before any funds are removed from

this account.

F

156 103
Property to Petitioner

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS.

is awarded the following as his sole and separate property, and Respondent,

TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS is divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in
1

and to that property:

P- 1. All household furniture, furnishings, fixtures, goods, art objects,

collectibles, appliances, and equipment in the possession of Petitioner or subject

to his sole control.

P-2. All clothing, jewelry, and other personal effects in the possession of

Petitioner or subject to his sole control.

P-3. All sums of cash in the possession of Petitioner or subject to his sole

control, including funds on deposit, together with accrued but unpaid interest, in

banks, savings institutions, or other financial institutions, which accounts stand in

Petitioner's sole name or from which Petitioner has the sole right to withdraw

funds or which are subject to Petitioner's sole control.

P-4. All individual retirement accounts, simplified employee pensions,

annuities, and variable annuity life insurance benefits in Petitioner's name.

P-5. All policies of life insurance (including cash values) insuring

-18

157 104
Petitioner's life.

P-6. The motor vehicle, vehicle

identification number - - - - -- -- - - - - - J together with all prepaid

insurance, keys, and title documents.

P-7. All other property in the possession of Petitioner, TERRY BRENT

WILLIAMS.

Pamertx te.ielJlOndeat

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Respondent; TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS is awarded the following as her sole and separate property, and

Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, is divested of all right, title, interest, and

claim in and to that property:

R-1. All household furniture, furnishings, fixtures, goods, art objects,

collectibles, appliances, and equipment in the possession of Respondent or

subject to her sole control.

R-2. All clothing, jewelry, and other personal effects in the possession of

Respondent or subject to her sole control.

R-3. All sums of cash in the possession of Respondent or subject to his

sole control, including funds on deposit, together with accrued but unpaid

158 105
interest, in banks, savings institutions, or other financial institutions, which

accounts stand in Respondent's sole name or from which Respondent has the

sole right to withdraw funds or which are subject to Respondent's sole control.

R-4. All individual retirement accounts, simplified employee pensions,

annuities, and variable annuity life insurance benefits in Respondent's name.

R-5. All policies of life insurance (including cash values) insuring

Respondent's life.

R-6. The 2024 Cadillac XT4 motor vehicle, vehicle identification number

1GYFZCR44RF100842, together with all prepaid insurance, keys, and t itle

documents.

R-7. All other property in the possession of Respondent, TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS.

Division of Debt

Debts to Petitioner

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS,

shall timely pay, as a part of the division of the estate of the parties, and shall

indemnify and hold Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS, and her property

harmless from any failure to so discharge, these items:

159 106
P- 1. All debts, charges, liabilities, and other obligations incurred solely by

Petitioner from and after March 3rd, 2022, unless express provision is made in this

decree to the contrary.

P-2. The balance due, including principal, interest, and all other charges,

on the promissory note payable to _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ and given as part

of the purchase price of and secured by a lien on the _ _ __ _ _ __

motor vehicle awarded to Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS.

Debts to Rnpondent

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Respondent, TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS, shall timely pay, as a part of the division of the estate of the parties,

and shall indemnify and hold Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS, and his

property harmless from any failure to so discharge, these items:

R-1. All debts, charges, liabilities, and other obligations incurred solely by

Respondent from and after March 3rd, 2022, unless express provision is made in

this decree to the contrary.

R-2. The balance due, includ ing principal, interest, and all other charges,

on the promissory note payable to Santander Finance and given as part of the

purchase price of and secured by a lien on the 2024 Cadillac XT4 motor vehicle

160 107
awarded to Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS.

Division of Personal Property Sale Proceeds

The Court hereby ORDERS AND DECREES that the sale proceeds from the

sale of the personal property of the parties shall be divided as follows:

The Court finds that both Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS and

Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS were ORDERED to deliver the

following items to HUNTER M. WARREN, the Court Appointed Receiver, all of

the personal properties belonging to the parties following the Court's hearing on

December 6th, 2024.

The Court finds that Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS directly

interfered with the Court's Order and did not deliver all of the property items as

follows:

1. JOHN DEERE SKID STEER- Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS

removed the Front Bucket attachment ($1,000.00), Pallet Forks

($1,000.00), and the Hydraulic Grapple. ($2,500.00). ($4,500.00) in

value.

2. 15FT BATWING SHREDDER AND KUBOTA CAB- Petitioner, TERRY

BRENT WILLIAMS removed the Front-End loader ($3,000.00) . Due to

161 108
the front-end loader being removed, the hydraulics on the batwing do

not work because the hydraulics are dumping back into the tractor and

need ($1,000.00) in repairs due to Petitioner's interierence with this

tractor. ($4,000.00) in value.

3. DODGE 3500 SJNGLE CAB WELDJNG TRUCK- Petitioner, TERRY

BRENT WJLLIAMS delivered the welding truck with a blown-out tire

and the other tires are in poor condition. Petitioner, TERRY BRENT

WILLIAMS failed to provide grounding leads with matching reels,

oxygen, acetylene bottles, gauges, and another reel for the cutting

torch. ($1,000.00) worth of missing items. ($1,000.00) in value.

4. 2002 DODGE RAM 3500- Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS failed

to deliver this vehicle, and claims this vehicle was used as a parts truck.

($1,000.00) in value.

5. 1998 DODGE 3500 Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS delivered

this vehicle with missing rear dual wheels and tires. The doors have

holes in them. The passenger door has damage causing the door not to

close. The paint is com ing off of the exterior and the top of the cab is

rusting. The interior of the truck is in poor condition, the dash is 85%

51

162 109
gone, and the frame is falling apart. ($1,500.00) in missing or damaged

parts. ($1,500.00) in val ue.

6. SHOP DOOR- Petitioner. TERRY BRENT WILUAMS failed to deliver

this item. The shop door was taken to his mother's house. ($800.00) in

value.

TOTAL INTERFERENE£ WITH PERSONAL PROPERTY AMOUNT $12,800.00

The Court hereby ORDERS that from Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS'

portion of the personal property sale proceeds shall be deducted in the following

amounts as follows:

$22,523 .50

1. Amount of interference with personal
property delivered to Hunter M. Warren . .................. $12,800.00

2. One half (1/2) of
Orthodontic braces paid by Respondent
TRACY LE.E ANN WILLIAMS .......................................... $2,626.00

3. Purchase of Respondent TRACY
LEEANN WILUAMS ' one half
(1/ 2) ownership of the 34FT Keystone
Camper....................................................................... $2,750.00

4. Reimbursement to Respondent
TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS for
the lien on the Scag Freedom
Z mower paid by Respondent
TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS ........................................ $1 ,100.00

163 110
Of the total $45,047.00 (after Receivers Fee of 10% paid to Hunter M.

Warren) of the personal property, the Court divides the personal property

proceeds as follows:

Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS shall be paid $3,247.50.

Respondent, TRACY LEEAN N WILLIAMS shall be paid $41,799.50.
1

It is ORDERED AND DECREED that the Leon County District Clerk shall

issue checks in the following amount of the remaining proceeds from the sale of

personal property as follows:

TERRY BRENT wtlUAMS ..................................................... $3,247.50

TRACY' LEEA.NN WILLIA.MS .................................................. $41,79'-S8
TOTAL ................................................................................ $45,047.00

Division of Real Pro.perty Sale Proc,eds

The Court finds that the Real Property located at 44.0250 AC, A.

SMITH SURVEY, A-834 & D. DAVIS SURVEY, A-248. LEON COUNTY, TX was

sold on or about March 14th, 2025, resulting in net sale proceeds of $385,935.33

to be divided between the parties. The Court finds that the sum of $385,935.33

is currently held in the registry of the Court.

Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS is awarded $20,000.00 from the sale

proceeds for reimbursement of the amount agreed as the property value of the

ss I

164 111
separate property tract that Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS purchased

prior to marriage, which is part of the 44.0250 acre tract, the tract that the parties

purchased a community property single wide trailer after marriage, leaving

$365,935.33 to be divided by the parties.

The Court further finds that the net sale proceeds of $365,935.33 should

be divided between the parties 50/50, subject to the following Orders.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS is awarded the sum of $182.967.66, from the net sale

proceeds.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that TERRY

BRENT WILLIAMS is awarded the remainder of the sum of $163,341.92 after

the District Clerk of Leon County, Texas makes the following disbursements from

TERRY BRENT WILUAMS' portion of the net sale proceeds from the sale of the

44.0250 acre tract of land:

(1) $8,018.50 is reasonable and necessary attorney fees payable to JOHN

R. BANKHEAD for representation of TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS; and

(2) $11,607.24 to TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS for back child support,

Medical, Dental, and Vision support previously ordered in this cause and

165 112
unpaid by TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS from October 1st, 2024, through

March 1st, 2025.

The DISTRICT CLERK OF LEON COUNTY, TEXAS is THEREFORE

ORDERED to make the following disbursements from the sum of $.385,935.33

held in the Registry of the Court from the Net Sale Proceeds from the sale of the

parties Real Property:

(1) $182,967.66 to TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS

(Z) $8,018.50 to JOHN R. BANKHEAD

(3) $11,607.24 to TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS

(4) $163,341.92 to TERRY BR,ENT WILLIAMS

(5',) $20,000.00 to TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS

P,rman,nt Injunctions as to, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS for the prpt«tion of
TRACY LEEANN
The Court finds that, because of the conduct of TERRY BRENT WJWAMS, a

permanent injunction against him should be granted as appropriate relief because

there is no adequate remedy at law.

The permanent injunction granted below shall be effective immedia ely and

shall be binding on TERRY BRENT WllllAMS; on his agents, servants, employees,

and attorneys; and on those persons in active concert or participation with them

who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or otherwise.
S7

166 113
IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS is

permanently enjoined from:

1. Communicating with Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS in

person or in any other manner, including by telephone or another electronic

voice transmission, video chat, in wrifng, or electronic messaging, in vulgar,

profane, obscene, or indecent language or in a coarse or offensive manner.

2. Threatening Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS in person or

in any other manner, including by telephone or another electronic voice

transmission, video chat, in writing, or electronic messaging, to take unlawful

action against any person.

3. Placing one or more telephone calls, anonymously, at any

unreasonable hour, in an offensive and repetitious manner, or without a

legitimate purpose of communication.

4. Causing bodily injury to Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS or

to the child .

5. Threatening Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS or the child

with imminent bod ily injury.

6. Destroying, removing, concealing, encumbering, transferring, or

S!I

167 114
otherwise harming or reducing the va lue of the property Respondent, TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS and/or the child .

7. Opening or diverting mail or email or any other electronic

communication addressed to Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS and/or

the child .

8. Signing or endorsing Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS

name on any negotiable instrument, check, or draft, including a tax refund,

insurance payment, and dividend, or attempting to negotiate any negotiable

instrument payable to Respondent, 'TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS without the

personal signature of Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS.

9. Destroying, disposing of, or altering any financial records of the

parties, including but not limited to a canceled check, deposit slip, and other

records from a financial institution, a record of credit purchases or cash advances,

a tax return, and a financial statement.

10. Using any password or personal identification number to gain access

to Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS email account, bank account, social

media account, or any other electronic account.

11. Entering, operating, or exercising control over the 2024 Cadillac XT4

168 115
or any motor vehicle in the possession of Petitioner.

12. Tracking or monitoring personal property or a motor vehicle in the

possession of Respondent, TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS-

a. using a tracking application on a personal electronic device in

the possession of that party or using a tracking device; or

b. physically following that party or causing another to physically

follow that party.

13. Disturbing the peace of the child or of another party.

14. Withdrawing the child from enrollment in the school where the child

is presently enrolled .

15. Hiding or secreting the child from Respondent, TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS.

16. Making disparaging remarks rega.rding Respondent, TRACY

LEEANN WILLIAMS in the presence or within the hearing of the child.

Notice

IT IS ORDERED AN D DECREED that each party shall send to the other

party by email to the other party's last known email address or by text message

to the other party's last known mobile telephone number, within three days O'f its

btl

169 116
receipt, a copy of any correspondence from a creditor or taxing authority

concerning any potential liability of the other party.

Attornev:S Fees

The Court has entered Orders for payment of Attorney Fees herein to effect

an equitable division for the estate of the parties and has found that Petitioner,

TERRY BRENT WILUAMS has disobeyed the Court's Orders and has directly and

intentionally interfered with the specific Orders of this Court regarding the sale of

the parties properties and based upon Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS'

conduct he has not followed the Court's specific instructions and orders, and has

prolonged this matter and should there·fore be ORDERED to pay Respondent,

TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS' attorney fees payable to JOHN R. BANKHEAD in

the amount of $8,018.50 out of Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILUAMS' portion of

the Real Property Sale proceeds, as ordered herein above.

Liability for Federal Income Taxes for Prior Yeaa 12011 through 20251

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall be

individually responsible for all of his individual federal income tax liabilities

contributable to his personal earnings for the period from tax years 2011 through

December 31 5\ 2025, and TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS shall timely pay 100 percent

170 117
of any taxes, penalties, and interest due on his earnings for those years. IT IS

ORDERED that 100% of TERRY BRENT WILUAMS'S withholding taxes, losses,

and deductions shall be claimed by TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS.

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS shall be

individually responsible for all of her individual federal income tax liabilities

contributable to her personal earnings for the period from tax years 2011

through December 31 51, 2025, and TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS shall timely pay

100 percent of any taxes, penalties, and interest due on her earnings for those

years. IT IS ORDERED that 100% of TRACY LEEANN WILUAMS'S withholding

taxes, losses, and deductions shall be claimed by TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS.

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that the parties .shall cooperate with each

other and exchange all relevant information, notices, and documents in the event

O•f an audit or examination (or notice thereof) of their income tax returns for any

period during their marriage through the date of divorce by the Internal Revenue

Service or other governmental agency, and each party shall have the right to

participate, at that participant party's cost and expense, in that audit or

examination individually or by that party's designated representative.

171 118
Councosts

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that costs of court are to be borne by the

party who incurred them.

Discharg~ from Discovery Retention Rll(luirement

IT IS ORDERED AND D·ECREED that the parties and their respective

attorneys are discharged from the requirement of keeping and storing the

documents produced in this case in accordance with rule 191.4(d) of the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure.

o«ree Acknowledgment

Petitioner, TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, and Respondent, TRACY LEEANN

WILLIAMS, each acknowledge that before signing this Final Decree of Divorce

they have read this Final Decree of Divorce fully and completely, have had the

opportunity to ask any questions regarding the same, and fully understand that

the contents of this Final Decree of Divorce c:onstitute a full and complete

resolution of this case. Petitioner and Respondent acknowledge that they have

voluntarily affixed their signatures to this Final Decree of Divorce, believing this

agreement to be a just and right division of the marital debt and assets, and state

that they have not signed by virtue of any coercion, any duress, or any agreement

other than those specifically set forth in this Final Decree of Divorce.
63

172 119
lndemmfication

Each party represents and warrants that he or she has not incurred any

outstanding debt, obligation, or other liability on which the other party is or may

be liable, other than those described in this decree. Each party agrees and IT JS

ORDERED that if any cl.aim, action, or proceeding is hereafter initiated seeking to

hold the party not assuming a debt, an obligation, a liability, an act, or an

omission of the other party liable for such debt, obligation, liability, act or

omission of the other party, that other party will, at that other party's sole

expense, defend the party not assuming the debt, obligation, liability, act, or

omission of the other party against any such claim or demand, whether or not

well founded, and will indemnify the party not assuming the debt, obligation,

liability, act, or omission of the other party and hold him or her harmless from all

damages resulting from the claim or demand.

Damages, as used in this provision, includes any reasonable loss, cost,

expense, penalty, and other damage, including without limitation attorney's fees

and other costs and expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in enforcing

this indemnity.

IT IS ORDERED that the indemnifying party will reimburse the indemnified

173 120
party, on demand, for any payment made by the indemnified party at any time

after the entry of the divorce decree to satisfy any judgment of any court of

competent jurisdiction or in accordance with a bona fide compromise or

settlement of claims, demands, or actions for any damages to which this

indemnity relates.

The parties agree and IT IS ORDERED that each party will give the other

party prompt written notice of any litigation threatened or instituted against

either party that might constitute the basis of a claim for indemnity under this

decree. The parties agree and JT IS ORDERED that each party shall send this

written notice to the other party by email to the other party's last known email

address or by text to the other party's last known mobile telephone number

within t_hree days of the party's being notified of the threatened or instituted

litigation.

aarilying Orders

Without affecting the finality of this Final Decree of Divorce, this Court

expressly reserves the right to make orders necessary to clarify and enforce this

decree.

174 121
R,tief Not Granted

IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that all relief requested in this case and

not expressly granted is denied. This is a final judgment, for which let execution

and all writs and processes necessary to enforce this judgment issue. This

judgment finally disposes of all claims and all parties and is appealabfe.

Date of1JudgnMnt

SIGNED on J l M.W.GI\ 1.lf.S"

JU~

FILED
CASSANDRA NOEY WILSON, DISTRICT CLERK
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY: LEON COUNTY, TEXAS

MAR 18 2025

BY Ccv,d~){hv
JEFFREY L COE
P. 0. Box 1157
Palestine, Texas 75802
Tel: (903) 723-0331
State Bar No. 24001902
Jeff@coelawfjrm.com
Attorney for Petitioner
TERRY BR'ENT WILLIAMS

66

175 122
M ISONVILLE,
.I (936} 348 -3400
Fax (936) 348-9046
Attorney for Petitioner
TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS
State Bar No. 01676600
wne

APPROVED AND CONSENTED ro AS TO BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS, Petitioner

n,mm tam 15711$ Flfll\l OL< Hll Of OIVOllCE

176 123
FILED
CASSANDRA NOEY WILSON, 01S1RICT CLERK
LEO COUNTY, TEXAS

APR 2 1 202S
No. 22-00059CV

IN THE MATIER OF §
THEM.ARRlAGEOF § IN THE 369TH DISTRICT COURT
TERRY BRENT WILLIAMS §
AND § OF
TRACY LEEANN WILLIAMS §
§ LEON COUNTY, TEXAS
AND IN THE INTEREST OF §
, A CHILD §

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On March 18, 2025 the Court signed the final decree of divorce in this case. Terry

Brent Williams filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 24,

2025. The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Rule of Civil Procedure 297.

Findings of Fact
I. Terry Brent Williams and Tracy Leeann Williams were married September 10,
2011.
2. Terry Brent Williams and Tracy Leeann Williams are the parents of

3. Terry Brent Williams filed the petition for divorce in this proceeding.
4. At the time the suit was filed, the parties had been domiciled in Texas for the
preceding six months and residents of Leon County for the preceding 90 days.
S. The marriage of the parties had become insupportable due to discord or conflict of
personalities that destroyed the legitimate ends of the marital relationship.
6. There is no reasonable expectation of reconciliation.
7. It is in the best interest of that the parties be named joint
managing conservators.

1

198 124
8. It is in the best interest of that Tracy Leeann Williams have
the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of
within Leon County or contiguous counties.
9. It is in the best interest of that conservatorship and access be
governed by a standard possession order.
10. The monthly net resources of Terry Brent Williams are $8,790.60.
11. Application of the Child Support Guidelines of the Texas Family Code of 20
percent supports the Court's award of child support in the amount of$1,758.00 per
month beginning October 1, 2024.
12. Health insurance is available for Pre ley Rae Williams through the employment of
Tracy Leeann Williams.
13. lt is in the best interest of that Tracy Leeann Williams provide
health insurance through her employment and that Terry Brent Williams pay
medical support in the amount of $150.17 per month beginning October I, 2024.
14. To effect a just and right division of the marital estate, the Court ordered the sale
of personal property by a court appointed receiver.
15. Terry Brent Williams interfered with the court's order by failing to deliver the
following items to the receiver:
a. John Deere skid steer.
b. 15ft batwing shredder and Kubota cab
c. Dodge 3500 single cab welding truck.
d. 2002 Dodge Ram 3500
e. 1998 Dodge 3500
f. Shop Door.
16. Teny Brent Williams' interference reduced the value of the personal property
subject to sale in the amouat of $12,800.00.
17. The proceeds of the sale ofpersonaJ property were $45,047.00.
18. To effect a just and right division of the proceeds from the sale of personal property
the Court ordered the following deductions from the portion disbursed to Terry
Brent Williams:
a. $12,800.00 for interference with the sale of personal property.

2

199 125
b. $2,626.00 to reimburse Tracy Leeann Williams for½ the cost of orthodontic
braces for .
c. $2,750.00 for the interest of Tracy Leeann Williams in the 34ft Keystone
Camper.
d. $1,100.00 to reimburse Tracy Leeann Williams
19. To effect a just and right division of the marital estate, the Court ordered the sale

of real property.

20. The proceeds of the sale ofreal property were $385,835.33

21. The real property sold included a portion owned as Terry Brent Williams' separate
property. Terry Brent Williams agreed the value of the separate property was
$20,000.00.
22. The Court awarded $20,000.00 of the sale proceeds to Terry Brent Williams to
reimburse his separate property interest.
23. The remaining proceeds of$365,935.33, were divided equally between the parties.
24. The disbursement to Terry Brent Williams was subject to 1) the award of $8,018.50
in attorney's fees for representation of Tracy Leeann Williams and 2) $11,607.24
in back child support for the period from October 1, 2024 through March 1, 2025.
25. Tracy Leeann Williams incurred reasonable and necessary attorney's fees in the
amount of $8,018.50 in defending this proceeding.

Conclusions ofLaw

1. The petition for divorce contains the allegations required by law.
2. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties, the subject matter of the suit,
including the minor child of the parties.
3. The evidence established each of the requirements to entitle the parties to divorce
on the ground of insupportablity.
4. No characterization and valuation of individual assets and liabilities is required
in the absence of a request under Section 6.711 of the Family Code.

3

200 126
5. No findings of the obligee parent's net resources are required in the absence of
a request under section 154.130 of the Family Code.
6. No findings of fact are required under section 153.258 of the Family Code when
there has been no variance from a standard possession order.

Signed on ilie ;2..1 %y of April 2025.

FILED
CASSANO RA NOEY WILSON, DISTRICT CLERK
LEON COUNTY, TEXAS

APR 2 1 2025

BY A '9~

4

201 127
§ 154.002. Policy, TX CIV PRAC & REM § 154.002

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Civil Practice and Remedies Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 7. Alternate Methods of Dispute Resolution (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 154. Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter A. General Provisions

V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 154.002

§ 154.002. Policy

Currentness

It is the policy of this state to encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes, with special consideration given to disputes
involving the parent-child relationship, including the mediation of issues involving conservatorship, possession, and support of
children, and the early settlement of pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures.

Credits
Added by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1121, § 1, eff. June 20, 1987.

V. T. C. A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 154.002, TX CIV PRAC & REM § 154.002
Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections
may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 128 1
§ 3.001. Separate Property, TX FAMILY § 3.001

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. The Marriage Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Property Rights and Liabilities
Chapter 3. Marital Property Rights and Liabilities (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter A. General Rules for Separate and Community Property (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Family Code § 3.001

§ 3.001. Separate Property

Currentness

A spouse's separate property consists of:

(1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage;

(2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and

(3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity
during marriage.

Credits
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.

V. T. C. A., Family Code § 3.001, TX FAMILY § 3.001
Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections
may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 129 1
§ 3.002. Community Property, TX FAMILY § 3.002

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. The Marriage Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Property Rights and Liabilities
Chapter 3. Marital Property Rights and Liabilities (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter A. General Rules for Separate and Community Property (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Family Code § 3.002

§ 3.002. Community Property

Currentness

Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.

Credits
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.

V. T. C. A., Family Code § 3.002, TX FAMILY § 3.002
Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections
may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 130 1
§ 7.001. General Rule of Property Division, TX FAMILY § 7.001

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. The Marriage Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle C. Dissolution of Marriage
Chapter 7. Award of Marital Property

V.T.C.A., Family Code § 7.001

§ 7.001. General Rule of Property Division

Currentness

In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems
just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.

Credits
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.

V. T. C. A., Family Code § 7.001, TX FAMILY § 7.001
Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections
may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 131 1
§ 154.123. Additional Factors for Court to Consider, TX FAMILY § 154.123

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 5. The Parent-Child Relationship and the Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Suits Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship
Chapter 154. Child Support (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter C. Child Support Guidelines (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Family Code § 154.123

§ 154.123. Additional Factors for Court to Consider

Currentness

(a) The court may order periodic child support payments in an amount other than that established by the guidelines if the
evidence rebuts the presumption that application of the guidelines is in the best interest of the child and justifies a variance
from the guidelines.

(b) In determining whether application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances, the court
shall consider evidence of all relevant factors, including:

(1) the age and needs of the child;

(2) the ability of the parents to contribute to the support of the child;

(3) any financial resources available for the support of the child;

(4) the amount of time of possession of and access to a child;

(5) the amount of the obligee's net resources, including the earning potential of the obligee if the actual income of the obligee
is significantly less than what the obligee could earn because the obligee is intentionally unemployed or underemployed and
including an increase or decrease in the income of the obligee or income that may be attributed to the property and assets
of the obligee;

(6) child care expenses incurred by either party in order to maintain gainful employment;

(7) whether either party has the managing conservatorship or actual physical custody of another child;

(8) the amount of alimony or spousal maintenance actually and currently being paid or received by a party;

(9) the expenses for a son or daughter for education beyond secondary school;

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 132 1
§ 154.123. Additional Factors for Court to Consider, TX FAMILY § 154.123

(10) whether the obligor or obligee has an automobile, housing, or other benefits furnished by his or her employer, another
person, or a business entity;

(11) the amount of other deductions from the wage or salary income and from other compensation for personal services of
the parties;

(12) provision for health care insurance and payment of uninsured medical expenses;

(13) special or extraordinary educational, health care, or other expenses of the parties or of the child;

(14) the cost of travel in order to exercise possession of and access to a child;

(15) positive or negative cash flow from any real and personal property and assets, including a business and investments;

(16) debts or debt service assumed by either party; and

(17) any other reason consistent with the best interest of the child, taking into consideration the circumstances of the parents.

Credits
Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995.

V. T. C. A., Family Code § 154.123, TX FAMILY § 154.123
Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections
may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

133 U.S. Government Works.
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original 133 2
§ 154.125. Application of Guidelines to Net Resources, TX FAMILY § 154.125

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 5. The Parent-Child Relationship and the Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Suits Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship
Chapter 154. Child Support (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter C. Child Support Guidelines (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Family Code § 154.125

§ 154.125. Application of Guidelines to Net Resources

Currentness

(a) The guidelines for the support of a child in this section are specifically designed to apply to situations in which the obligor's
monthly net resources are not greater than the maximum amount of net resources to which the statutory guidelines are applicable,
as most recently published by the Title IV-D agency in the Texas Register.

(a-1) The amount prescribed by Subsection (a) is adjusted every six years as necessary to reflect inflation. The Title IV-D
agency shall compute the adjusted amount, to take effect beginning September 1 of the year of the adjustment, based on the
percentage change in the consumer price index during the 72-month period preceding March 1 of the year of the adjustment,
as rounded to the nearest $50 increment. The Title IV-D agency shall publish the adjusted amount in the Texas Register before
September 1 of the year in which the adjustment takes effect. For purposes of this subsection, “consumer price index” has the
meaning assigned by Section 341.201, Finance Code.

(b) If the obligor's monthly net resources are not greater than the amount described by Subsection (a) and the obligor's monthly
net resources are equal to or greater than the amount described by Subsection (c), the court shall presumptively apply the
following schedule in rendering the child support order:

CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

BASED ON THE MONTHLY NET RESOURCES OF THE OBLIGOR

1 child 20% of Obligor's Net Resources

2 children 25% of Obligor's Net Resources

3 children 30% of Obligor's Net Resources

4 children 35% of Obligor's Net Resources

5 children 40% of Obligor's Net Resources

6+ children Not less than the amount for 5 children

(c) If the obligor's monthly net resources are less than $1,000, the court shall presumptively apply the following schedule in
rendering the child support order:

134 U.S. Government Works.
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original 134 1
§ 154.125. Application of Guidelines to Net Resources, TX FAMILY § 154.125

LOW-INCOME CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

BASED ON THE MONTHLY NET RESOURCES OF THE OBLIGOR

1 child 15% of Obligor's Net Resources

2 children 20% of Obligor's Net Resources

3 children 25% of Obligor's Net Resources

4 children 30% of Obligor's Net Resources

5 children 35% of Obligor's Net Resources

6+ children Not less than the amount for 5 children

Credits
Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995. Amended by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 620, § 2, eff. Sept. 1,
2007; Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 767, § 5, eff. June 19, 2009; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 552 (S.B. 286), § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 2021.

V. T. C. A., Family Code § 154.125, TX FAMILY § 154.125
Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections
may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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§ 154.130. Findings in Child Support Order, TX FAMILY § 154.130

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 5. The Parent-Child Relationship and the Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Suits Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship
Chapter 154. Child Support (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter C. Child Support Guidelines (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Family Code § 154.130

§ 154.130. Findings in Child Support Order

Currentness

(a) Without regard to Rules 296 through 299, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in rendering an order of child support, the court
shall make the findings required by Subsection (b) if:

(1) a party files a written request with the court before the final order is signed, but not later than 20 days after the date of
rendition of the order;

(2) a party makes an oral request in open court during the hearing; or

(3) the amount of child support ordered by the court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines
under Section 154.125 or 154.129, as applicable.

(a-1) Repealed by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., ch. 421 (S.B. 1237), § 12(2).

(b) If findings are required by this section, the court shall state whether the application of the guidelines would be unjust or
inappropriate and shall state the following in the child support order:

“(1) the net resources of the obligor per month are $__________;

“(2) the net resources of the obligee per month are $__________;

“(3) the percentage applied to the obligor's net resources for child support is __________%; and

“(4) if applicable, the specific reasons that the amount of child support per month ordered by the court varies from the amount
computed by applying the percentage guidelines under Section 154.125 or 154.129, as applicable.”

(c) Findings under Subsection (b)(2) are required only if evidence of the monthly net resources of the obligee has been offered.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 136 1
§ 154.130. Findings in Child Support Order, TX FAMILY § 154.130

Credits
Added by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995. Amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1023, § 8, eff. Sept.
1, 2001; Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 620, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 2007; Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 767, § 6, 37, eff. June 19, 2009; Acts
2017, 85th Leg., ch. 421 (S.B. 1237), §§ 10, 12(2), eff. Sept. 1, 2017.

V. T. C. A., Family Code § 154.130, TX FAMILY § 154.130
Current through legislation effective July 1, 2025, of the 2025 Regular Session of the 89th Legislature. Some statute sections
may be more current, but not necessarily complete through the whole Session. See credits for details.

End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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Automated Certificate of eService
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Susan Clouthier on behalf of Susan Clouthier
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Envelope ID: 105504820
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
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