Cecile Erwin Young, in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.; And Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc. v. Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company

ACCEPTED
15-24-00114-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/24/2025 8:31 PM
No. 15-24-00114-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
________________________________________________ CLERK
FILED IN
In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals 15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Austin, Texas 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM
________________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
CECILE E. YOUNG,
in her official capacity as Executive Commissioner of
Texas Health & Human Services Commission, et al.,

Appellant,

v.

COOK CHILDREN’S HEALTH PLAN,
TEXAS CHILDREN’S HEALTH PLAN, SUPERIOR HEALTH PLAN INC.,
and WELLPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellees.
________________________________________________

Reply of Wellpoint Insurance Company
In Support of Motion for Injunctive Relief
________________________________________________

Michelle Y. Ku Robert F. Johnson III
Texas Bar No. 24071452 Texas Bar No. 10786400
mku@foley.com rjohnson@foley.com
Stacy R. Obenhaus Foley & Lardner LLP
Texas Bar No. 15161570 600 Congress, Suite 3000
sobenhaus@foley.com Austin, Texas 78701
Foley & Lardner LLP Tel: 512.542.7000
2021 McKinney, Suite 1600 Fax: 512.542.7100
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel: 214.999.3000 Counsel for
Fax: 214.999.4667 WellPoint Insurance Company
Argument

I. THIS COURT SHOULD ISSUE A WRIT OF INJUNCTION TO PROTECT
ITS JURISDICTION.
A. Proceeding with the procurements may moot at least half of
this appeal.
The Commissioner appeals from two rulings in a single order: denying

a plea to the jurisdiction and issuing a temporary injunction. In its mootness

arguments, Molina fails to acknowledge the appeal of the injunction, instead

focusing only on the merits of the ultra vires case below. If the trial court’s

temporary injunction is not continued for the duration of this appeal, then

the Commissioner could move forward with awarding, executing and

implementing new contracts. With each such act the Commissioner takes,

the Commissioner’s appeal of that portion of the temporary injunction could

become moot, thereby jeopardizing this Court’s jurisdiction over it. Molina’s

flawed mootness arguments focus solely on the appeal of the order denying

the Commissioner’s plea to the jurisdiction. Preserving this Court’s appellate

jurisdiction over the temporary injunction is alone ample reason to grant the

requested relief.

B. The Commissioner’s silence confirms that a writ is proper.
The Commissioner does not address the question of whether this Court

should issue a writ of injunction in order to protect its jurisdiction. Silence

from the Commissioner on this point is telling and confirms that permitting

2
the procurement process to move forward, unhindered by a continuation of

the trial court’s temporary injunction, endangers this Court’s jurisdiction

over this appeal—and justifies a writ of injunction.

Why is that? Recall Wellpoint’s prior warning: that if the trial court’s

temporary injunction is not continued for the duration of this appeal, the

Commissioner would create new facts to further her plea to the jurisdiction—

i.e., she would move forward with awarding, executing and implementing the

Commissioner’s intended award of new STAR and CHIP contracts—which is

precisely what the Commissioner testified she would do (5 RR 180; 6 RR 168;

6 RR 147). The Commissioner will then argue that the entire case (and this

appeal) is moot and that the ultra vires relief Wellpoint seeks in this lawsuit

is now impermissible retrospective relief. See Wellpoint Motion 10 (citing

Wilson v. Cmty. Health Choice Tex., Inc., 607 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2020, pet. denied)).

If that’s correct, then maintaining the temporary injunction is critical

to protecting this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Nowhere in her response

does the Commissioner refute her intent to carry out that course of action.

Rather, she strategically sidesteps this mootness issue altogether, because

she wants to preserve her argument that, if and when new STAR and CHIP

contracts are executed and officially awarded (which, will no doubt happen

3
quickly in the absence of an injunction), the relief Wellpoint seeks is barred

as retrospective relief—and the lawsuit should therefore be dismissed.

The reason that the Commissioner cannot venture to assert a contrary

position now is that doing so could implicate the Texas doctrine of judicial

estoppel, which “prevents a party from assuming inconsistent positions in

litigation.” See Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Cap. Partners Ltd., 546 S.W.3d

110, 117 (Tex. 2018). In short, if the Commissioner had argued what Molina

argues in its response—that “there is no risk of mootness” because even if

new STAR and CHIP contracts are awarded, executed, and implemented,

Wellpoint will not “lose interest in the outcome of this litigation,” Molina

Response 13-16—and were this Court to adopt that argument, the doctrine of

judicial estoppel could preclude the Commissioner from asserting mootness

in the future. See George Fleming & Fleming & Assocs. LLP v. Wilson, 694

S.W.3d 186, 192 (Tex. 2024) (noting that the judicial estoppel doctrine can

apply “if the successful representation arose . . . ‘in another phase’ of the

same case”).

To be sure—and as Molina suggests—one could argue that the lawsuit

would not be moot in those circumstances. See Molina Response 14 (citing

Children’s Plans Motion 18). But absent a definitive answer—and there may

not be one yet—this Court should not be misled: the Commissioner’s silence

4
confirms that in the assessment of the Texas Office of Attorney General, the

risk of mooting this appeal looms large if Wellpoint’s requested injunction is

denied. That silence shows that the Commissioner understands the threat of

undermining that desirable outcome should she join in Molina’s argument.

The jurisdictional jeopardy these circumstances pose, conceded by the

Commissioner’s silence here, merits a writ to protect this Court’s jurisdiction

over this appeal.

C. Molina’s reticence confirms that a writ is proper.
The propriety of a writ of injunction to protect appellate jurisdiction is

underscored by Molina’s failure to cite authority dispelling a mootness risk.

Although the plaintiffs bear the burden to prove the need for a writ (a

burden they have satisfied), the Commissioner has a record of attempting to

moot litigation regarding procurements and, in prior ultra vires litigation,

has moved to dismiss claims as moot on the grounds that ultra vires relief

must be prospective, not retrospective, and therefore cannot undo a signed

managed care contract. Wellpoint Motion 10-11 (citing Wilson, 607 S.W.3d

at 848, and noting the Commissioner’s supplemental plea to the jurisdiction

arguing mootness in these circumstances). Thus, a writ is essential to protect

this Court’s jurisdiction over the issues on appeal.

5
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Molina argues that were this Court to

deny the requested injunction and allow the Commissioner to award and sign

the contracts, performance of those contracts could continue for six to twelve

years, during which time the plaintiffs would supposedly retain “a concrete

interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation” such that this appeal

and the underlying claims could continue to move forward. Molina Response

15. Yet Molina cites no authority affirming that the trial court may properly

grant relief in that circumstance by cancelling executed contracts—and the

Commissioner has previously argued the opposite. At the very least, Molina

fails to discuss case law Wellpoint cites that such relief is likely unavailable.

Wellpoint Motion 9 (citing City of Austin v. Utility Assocs., 517 S.W.3d 300

(Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) and Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs.

v. Balquinta, 429 S.W.3d 726 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. dism’d)).

And contrary to what Molina suggests, Wellpoint certainly does argue

that it could well lose its interest in the outcome of this lawsuit should the

Commissioner be permitted to move forward with the new STAR and CHIP

contracts. Wellpoint Motion 11. It’s just that Molina transmogrifies that

straightforward argument and suggests that the plaintiffs are confusing

mootness with the merits. Molina Response 15-16. That rejoinder certainly

comes out of left field, as it seems much more related to the arguments

6
regarding Rule 29.3 relief—including likelihood of success on the merits.

Molina Response 16-21; Comm’r Response 16-25. The rejoinder has little to

do with the standard for issuing the writ to protect appellate jurisdiction:

whether the Commissioner’s actions absent the requested injunction could

“prevent the effective operation of any judgment this court might render.”

Madison v. Martinez, 42 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1931, writ

ref’d), cited in In re Tex. Educ. Agency, 619 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. 2021)).

Indeed, neither Molina nor the Commissioner have agreed to withhold

contract signatures or waive the mootness argument that would likely follow.

All that remains of Molina’s argument is a straw man: that the plaintiffs, in

warning this Court that the Commissioner may seek to preclude the courts

from granting effective relief, are “confusing mootness with the merits.” See

Molina Response 15. But issues about effective relief transcend the merits;

whether a trial court can grant effective relief bears directly on maintenance

of appellate jurisdiction—as shown by authority Molina cites. Madison, 42

S.W.2d at 86 (“If this court should hold . . . that the district court erred in

refusing to grant the temporary writ of injunction, and should reverse the

case with instruction to the judge of the district court to grant the temporary

writ, there would be nothing in such an event on which such judgment could

operate, and the judgment of this court would be a nullity.”).

7
“Mootness occurs when events make it impossible for the court to grant

the relief requested or otherwise ‘affect the parties’ rights or interests.’” State

ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018) (cite omitted). Wellpoint’s

arguments about the availability of relief—and the Commissioner’s history of

attempting to moot such relief—go directly to the issue of mootness and the

effective maintenance of this Court’s jurisdiction.

D. Molina’s argument confirms that a writ is proper.
Molina makes the case for potential mootness when it argues that the

plaintiffs, to the extent they lost their bids, have “no legally enforceable rights

against the award of the contract to a competitor.” Molina Response 16. It’s

avoiding that situation that requires injunctive relief: if the Commissioner

awards and signs contracts based on this procurement, Molina asserts the

courts cannot undo that act, because there is no judicial review of it. Molina

Response 17 n.17. At that point, assuming as Molina does that the trial court

can grant no effective relief, this appeal could be moot.

Molina’s reliance on Texas Highway Commission v. El Paso Building

& Construction Trades Council, 234 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1950), is misplaced

and does not help its argument. The government in that case had unfettered

discretion to set wage rates, but as the Supreme Court of Texas has since

explained in Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d

8
154 (Tex. 2016): “Only when such absolute discretion—free decision-making

without any constraints—is granted are ultra vires suits absolutely barred.

And, as a general rule, ‘a public officer has no discretion or authority to

misinterpret the law.’” Id. at 163. Molina’s argument is an implicit merits

argument—i.e., that because no statute authorizes review here, the plaintiffs

have no recourse because they have no valid ultra vires claim, either. But

until the parties brief that merits issue, this Court should issue a writ to

protect its ability to address that issue.

E. This Court has authority to issue a writ of injunction.
This Court can make quick work of Molina’s argument questioning

whether appellate courts have inherent authority to issue writs to protect

appellate jurisdiction. Molina Response 21-23. The Texas Constitution and

statutes grant this Court such authority, as Molina concedes, so whether the

authority is also inherent doesn’t matter. Molina Response 13. Wellpoint

does not seek the writ of injunction to prevent harm to the parties; it seeks

the writ to protect this Court’s ability to issue effective relief in this appeal.

II. THIS COURT MAY TREAT THIS MOTION AS A PETITION FOR WRIT
OF INJUNCTION.
Neither Molina nor the Commissioner question: (a) this Court’s power

to issue such a writ of injunction to protect its jurisdiction, (b) Wellpoint’s

framing of the subject matter of this appeal, or (c) this Court’s power, should

9
it believe that a writ is proper, to treat Wellpoint’s motion as a petition for a

writ of injunction. Wellpoint Motion 8-11; Molina Response 13-16.

III. THE LAWSUIT IS RIPE.
A. Molina’s argument confirms a real controversy exists.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act entitles a party to seek “relief

from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal

relations,” and the Act “is to be liberally construed and administered.” Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.002(b). Molina concedes that there is presently

“uncertainty and insecurity with respect to . . . legal relations.” Molina admits

that the Commissioner presently disagrees with Wellpoint’s claims and

presently contends that she has complied with the pertinent statutes. Molina

Response 25-26. That’s not a hypothetical dispute, and it constitutes present

“uncertainty and insecurity” as to whether the Commissioner will comply.

The right to declaratory relief does not kick in only after a wrong has

caused injury. The statute expresses this principle as to contract disputes: “A

contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach.” Id.

§ 37.004(b). So as to ripeness in that context, the fact that the parties to the

contract dispute continued performance is not controlling.

Case law expresses this principle in other disputes. Specifically, “there

must exist a real and substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of

tangible interests and not merely a theoretical dispute.” Bonham State Bank

10
v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added). Lawsuits for

declaratory relief “are often brought with an eye to future harm.” Sw. Elec.

Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. 2020). Indeed, relief under

the Act is deemed proper “when a real controversy has arisen and even before

the wrong has actually been committed.” Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d

709, 713 (Tex. 1945). The Commissioner’s notice of intent to award contracts

after having scored the bids, the denial of plaintiffs’ protests of the awards,

and the stalled protest appeals constitute “a real and substantial controversy

involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests.” It is no longer theoretical.

B. It’s immaterial that administrative appeals are pending.
The lack of a final determination of the parties’ administrative protest

appeals is immaterial. To begin with, the Commissioner stayed those appeal

decisions pending this lawsuit. Moreover, sitting on those appeals during the

lawsuit does not dispel the reality of the controversy but rather confirms it.

In Lynch, the controversy over the easements continued to be ripe even after

the defendant had dismissed its trespass counterclaims—as the court noted:

“Here, a real and substantial controversy exists . . . . SWEPCO asserted

counterclaims of trespass and breach of contract . . . . While SWEPCO later

nonsuited these counterclaims, the counterclaims underscore that a

controversy exists . . . .” 595 S.W.3d at 685–86 (emphasis added).

11
The Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act works to determine the

parties’ rights “when a controversy has arisen but before a wrong has been

committed, and is preventative in nature.” See Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann,

359 S.W.3d 620, 624 (Tex. 2011) (emphasis added). As a result, one seeking

declaratory relief “need not have incurred actual injury.” Bexar Metropolitan

Water Dist. v. City of Bulverde, 156 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004,

pet. denied); In re City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 1998, no pet.) (“Actual injury or harm is not a prerequisite.”). So the

“plaintiffs have no injury yet” arguments don’t hold water.

C. The scope of the remedy is not at issue.
The Commissioner questions whether Wellpoint has a valid remedy.

Comm’r Response 17-21. That’s off the mark for two reasons.

First, a claim may be ripe despite questions as to the availability of the

remedies sought. Thus, in Hensley v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct,

717 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet. h.), the court of appeals held

that the plaintiff’s claim against the Commission for violating the Texas

Religious Freedom Restoration Act was ripe, despite questions regarding the

scope of the remedy. The court said: “The Commission’s argument that the

remedy of a particular form of injunctive relief is not available to Hensley

under the TRFRA does not render her TRFRA claim unripe.” Id. at 112.

12
Second, Wellpoint requests no “redo” remedy. It seeks declaratory and

“prospective injunctive relief, as measured from the date of injunction.” City

of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 376 (Tex. 2009). The trial court must

declare the Commissioner’s obligations to follow the relevant statutes in the

future and order the Commissioner to follow the statutes in the future. The

injunction would bar the Commissioner from signing contracts in the future

for this procurement based on the Commissioner’s past and ongoing ultra

vires actions. Even if the Commissioner is pen-in-hand, ready to sign, signing

the contracts is still in the future.

And if the injunction simply enjoins future ultra vires action but says

nothing about the STAR and CHIP procurement and the pending STAR Kids

procurement, whether the Commissioner must redo any procurement is a

question answered by Texas law. If Texas statutes compel the Commissioner

to redo any procurement or procurement-related act, the Commissioner is

acting under a statutory duty rather than a court judgment (a judgment that

would simply order the Commissioner to comply with the statutes, whether

she decides to continue with the procurement process or to start over).

13
IV. NO EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT PRECLUDES JUSTICIABILITY.
A. The Commissioner was not granted exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether she’s acting ultra vires.
Molina suggests that jurisdiction over Wellpoint’s complaints “remains

exclusively with the agency” and “there’s no loophole for ultra vires claims.”

Molina Response 28-31. Because Molina surely does not mean to say that the

Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether she’s acting ultra

vires, this is another disguised merits argument—i.e., Wellpoint has no valid

ultra vires claim to begin with; only the Commissioner may decide the claims

asserted (because only she has power to “procure[] . . . contracts necessary

to implement” the STAR and CHIP programs). Molina Response 28.

To be sure, in its protests filed with the Commissioner, Wellpoint has

raised many ultra vires issues that Wellpoint pleads in its petition. That’s no

concession that she has exclusive jurisdiction over those matters; it’s just a

concession that she has power to change her mind and start acting within the

scope of her statutory discretion if she so chooses.

B. Ultra vires claims do not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Neither the Commissioner nor Molina cites Texas case law requiring

exhaustion of administrative remedies to bring an ultra vires claim – because

there is none. Unlike the APA cases upon which the defendants rely, a claim

that the Commissioner has acted ultra vires in the procurement of managed

14
care services is not an appeal of a final administrative act or decision. It is a

cause of action to prevent the government official from acting without or

beyond legal authority. It would be against public policy to require that a

rogue state official be allowed to complete a series of ultra vires acts before a

claim for prospective injunctive relief could be brought. The attempts by the

Commissioner and Molina to confuse administrative appeals with ultra vires

claims is contrary to Texas jurisprudence and public policy.

C. Even if required, Wellpoint sufficiently exhausted
administrative remedies.
Before Wellpoint submitted its bid proposal under the procurement,

Wellpoint’s specifications protest raised its concerns about the legality of the

procurement’s framework and the contract awards that could result from it

(8 RR 70-72). Among the concerns raised was that the Commissioner could

not award contracts for STAR and CHIP services using the same selection

basis for both, but the Commissioner’s request for proposals confirmed she

would do just that, without statutory authority (P. Exs. 38, 44).

After the Commissioner denied Wellpoint’s specifications protest as

premature, the Commissioner conducted the procurement and scored the

bids; when Wellpoint protested the intended award of contracts, that protest

was denied (5 RR 111-19; 8 RR 70-84; P. Ex. 160). In its petition in this

lawsuit, Wellpoint seeks declaratory relief as to the Commissioner’s past and

15
ongoing ultra vires acts (CR 4270-76 [¶¶ 113-18]). Wellpoint thus pursued

every administrative option under the procurement rules. There is nothing

more for Wellpoint to do. It is only the Commissioner that has not completed

the administrative process.

Indeed, a contrary conclusion would plainly smack of bad faith given

the Commissioner’s denial of Wellpoint’s specifications protest as premature

because Wellpoint could not yet demonstrate harm from the Commissioner’s

conducting an illegal procurement and awarding contracts resulting from it

(5 RR 111-19; 8 RR 70-84; P. Exs. 44, 46, 95, 160). And the Commissioner’s

testimony belies the reality behind the speculation that the Commissioner

might administratively go in Wellpoint’s favor should no injunction issue.

Neither the Commissioner nor Molina can point to anything in the record

refuting the Commissioner’s stated intent—absent a court order requiring

compliance with the law—to deny plaintiffs’ outstanding protests and move

forward with awarding, executing and implementing the intended award of

new STAR and CHIP contracts (5 RR 180; 6 RR 168; 6 RR 147).

In short, Wellpoint exhausted administrative remedies. Wellpoint filed

protests before and after the proposals were submitted and scored. All were

denied. So even were Wellpoint required to exhaust administrative remedies,

Wellpoint’s pursuit of declaratory, mandamus, and prospective injunctive

16
relief necessitates temporary relief by this Court to maintain the status quo

and to protect this Court’s jurisdiction

V. WELLPOINT ADOPTS THE OTHER PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS.
To the extent consistent herewith, Wellpoint adopts the arguments in

the reply briefs of Superior HealthPlan, Inc., Cook Children’s Health Plan,

and Texas Children’s Health Plan, filed in support of their motions for relief

under Rule 29.3. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.7.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michelle Y. Ku
Michelle Y. Ku Robert F. Johnson III
Texas Bar No. 24071452 Texas Bar No. 10786400
mku@foley.com rjohnson@foley.com
Stacy R. Obenhaus Foley & Lardner LLP
Texas Bar No. 15161570 600 Congress, Suite 3000
sobenhaus@foley.com Austin, Texas 78701
Foley & Lardner LLP Tel: 512.542.7000
2021 McKinney, Suite 1600 Fax: 512.542.7100
Dallas, Texas 75201
Tel: 214.999.3000 Counsel for
Fax: 214.999.4667 WellPoint Insurance Company

Of counsel:
Benjamin J. Grossman
Florida Bar No. 92426
bjgrossman@foley.com
106 E. College Ave., Suite 900
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Tel: 850.222.6100
Fax: 850.561.6475

17
Certificate of Service

I certify that a copy of this document was served September 24, 2025,

by delivery to all registered counsel upon filing this document through the

electronic filing manager using counsel’s electronic filing service provider,

pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5.

/s/ Michelle Y. Ku
Michelle Y. Ku

18
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Envelope ID: 106051454
Filing Code Description: Other Document
Filing Description: Wellpoint's Reply In Support of Motion for Injunctive
Relief
Status as of 9/25/2025 7:05 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Michaelle Peters mpeters@scottdoug.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Julie Wright julie.wright@nortonrosefulbright.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Amanda DoddsPrice amanda.price@squirepb.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Maria Williamson maria.williamson@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Mandy Patterson mpatterson@adjtlaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Michelle Joyner mjoyner@scottdoug.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

William FCole William.Cole@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Abril Rivera arivera@scottdoug.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Nancy Villarreal nancy.villarreal@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Cory Scanlon cory.scanlon@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

David Johns david@cobbjohns.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

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Stacey Jett sjett@adjltaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Cook Children's Health Plan

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Karen Burgess 796276 kburgess@burgesslawpc.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Anna Baker 791362 abaker@adjtlaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Amy Warr 795708 awarr@adjtlaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Juliana Bennington jbennington@perkinscoie.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Jonathan Hawley jhawley@perkinscoie.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM ERROR
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
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Robert Johnson on behalf of Robert Johnson
Bar No. 10786400
rjohnson@foley.com
Envelope ID: 106051454
Filing Code Description: Other Document
Filing Description: Wellpoint's Reply In Support of Motion for Injunctive
Relief
Status as of 9/25/2025 7:05 AM CST

Associated Case Party: Cook Children's Health Plan

Jonathan Hawley jhawley@perkinscoie.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM ERROR

Trisha Marino tmarino@perkinscoie.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

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Matthew Gordon mgordon@perkinscoie.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Texas Children's Health Plan

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Mark Emery 24050564 mark.emery@nortonrosefulbright.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Warren Huang 796788 warren.huang@nortonrosefulbright.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

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Kayla Ahmed kayla.ahmed@nortonrosefulbright.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Wellpoint Insurance Company

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Robert Johnson 10786400 rjohnson@foley.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Michelle Ku 24071452 mku@foley.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Kristin Hernandez kristin.hernandez@foley.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

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Benjamin Grossman bjgrossman@foley.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Robert Johnson on behalf of Robert Johnson
Bar No. 10786400
rjohnson@foley.com
Envelope ID: 106051454
Filing Code Description: Other Document
Filing Description: Wellpoint's Reply In Support of Motion for Injunctive
Relief
Status as of 9/25/2025 7:05 AM CST

Associated Case Party: Superior Healthplan Inc.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Richard Phillips 24032833 Rich.Phillips@hklaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

J McCaig 24070083 meghan.mccaig@outlook.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Karen Walker karen.walker@hklaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Tiffany Roddenberry tiffany.roddenberry@hklaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Texas Health and Human Services

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Victoria Gomez victoria.gomez@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Jennifer Cook Jennifer.Cook@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Cheryl LaFond 24104015 clafond@scottdoug.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Jason R.LaFond jlafond@scottdoug.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc.

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Joseph Knight 11601275 jknight@ebbklaw.com 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Associated Case Party: Cecile Erwin Young, Texas Health and Human Services
Automated Certificate of eService
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Robert Johnson on behalf of Robert Johnson
Bar No. 10786400
rjohnson@foley.com
Envelope ID: 106051454
Filing Code Description: Other Document
Filing Description: Wellpoint's Reply In Support of Motion for Injunctive
Relief
Status as of 9/25/2025 7:05 AM CST

Associated Case Party: Cecile Erwin Young, Texas Health and Human Services

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Cory Scanlon 24104599 cory.scanlon@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT

Jeffrey Stephens jeff.stephens@oag.texas.gov 9/24/2025 8:31:23 PM SENT