Neil George Switkowski v. Courtney Sinclair Archbold

ACCEPTED
15-25-00155-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
10/20/2025 5:21 PM
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
AUSTIN, TEXAS
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
(On Transfer from the Third Court of Appeals) AUSTIN, TEXAS
Cause No. 03-25-00416-CV 10/20/2025 5:21:02 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
NEIL GEORGE SWITKOWSKI, Appellant Clerk
v.
COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD, Appellee

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR
ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
Filed Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.3 and 57.2

(Reply addressing standing, constitutional certification, and jurisdictional fraud under Title IV-D
enforcement)

Contents
Table of Authorities..................................................................................................................... 3
To the honorable Justices of the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals .......................................... 6
Systemic Failure of Executive Enforcement............................................................................... 6
Material Breach: No Duty to Perform ........................................................................................ 7
Ultra Vires Conduct by the OAG ................................................................................................ 8
Judicial Duty to Certify Constitutional and Jurisdictional Questions ......................................... 8
Appellee’s Brief Relies on Form Over Function ........................................................................ 9
Psychological Manipulation and Calculated Alienation ........................................................... 10
Procedural Evasion Cannot Override Substantive Violations....................................................11
State Culpability and the Threshold of Criminal Interference ...................................................11
Certification as the Only Mechanism to Restore Balance ........................................................ 13
Statement of the Case- Background .......................................................................................... 13
Chronological Summary of Preserved Challenges ................................................................... 14
Current Posture ......................................................................................................................... 14
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Statement of Issues Presented ................................................................................................... 14
Appellee’s Arguments and Appellant’s Legal Response........................................................... 15
Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 1: “Non-Compliant and Frivolous” — Rule 13 / Low v.
Henry......................................................................................................................................... 15
2. Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 2: “Procedurally Defective” — Rule 21a / TRAP 33.1(a)
................................................................................................................................................... 16
3. Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 3: “Waived Constitutional Issues” — TRAP 33.1 & 38.1
................................................................................................................................................... 17
4. Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 4: “Outside Scope of Enforcement” — Collateral Issues
Claim ......................................................................................................................................... 18
5. Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 5: “Factually in Arrears ($23,000 Claim)” ................... 19
The Appellee’s Arrears Claim Is Barred by Her Own Misconduct and Subject to Equitable
Offset ......................................................................................................................................... 19
Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 6: “Misrepresenting the Decree” — Visitation by Mutual
Agreement ................................................................................................................................. 21
Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 7: “Pattern of Coercive Conduct / CPS Testimony” .......... 22
Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 8: “Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion” — Abuse-of-
Discretion Review ..................................................................................................................... 23
Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 9: “Appellate Brief Inadequate” — TRAP 38.1(i) ............ 24
Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 10: “Seeks Deterrence / Sanctions” — Rule 13 & Chambers
v. O’Quinn ................................................................................................................................ 25
Argument: ................................................................................................................................. 26
Certificate of Compliance (TRAP 9.4(i)(3)) ............................................................................. 27
Conclusion and Prayer for Relief .............................................................................................. 27
Certificate of Service ................................................................................................................ 32
Appendix 1: Calculation of Denied Visitation under the Texas Standard Possession Order .... 33
Accounting, Offset, and the Doctrine of Unclean Hands ......................................................... 37
Appendix 2 – Proof of Attempted Service and Return Receipts .............................................. 39
Appendix 3: Chronological Summary of Preserved Challenges .............................................. 48

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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Table of Authorities
Cases
• Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) – Equal protection, selective
enforcement
• Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) – Title IV-D fiduciary limits
• Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) –
Fraud upon the court / United States
• Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1990) – Material breach bars
enforcement
• Glass v. Anderson, 596 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1980) – Material breach and
contract enforceability
• Park v. Essa Texas Corp., 311 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. 1958) – Clean hands
doctrine in equity
• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) –
Standing as a prerequisite to jurisdiction
• Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2007) – Rule 13 sanctions; evidentiary
hearing requirement
• Gonzalez v. Surplus Ins. Servs., 863 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
1993, writ denied) – Refusal of certified mail constitutes waiver of service
objection
• Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2005) – Harmless error and due
process notice
• Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) – Liberal construction of pro se
filings
• In re Baby Boy R., 191 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) –
Pro se pleadings to be liberally construed
• In re Estate of Aguilar, 492 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet.
denied) – Judicial admission through response filings
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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
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IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

• Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 2009) – Preservation of
constitutional issues through adverse rulings
• Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) – Abuse of discretion; lack of
evidentiary foundation
• Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1995) – Ability to pay required
for contempt purge condition
• Sterner v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no
pet.) – Substance over form in appellate briefing
• Hernandez v. Gallardo, No. 03-18-00421-CV, 2019 WL 2052115 (Tex.
App.—Austin May 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) – Liberal construction of
pro se appeals
• Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2007) – Findings and notice
required for sanctions
• Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1992)
– Unjust enrichment principle
• Bruen v. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) –
Historical test for constitutional review
• Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) – Invalidating state marriage
restrictions; equal protection and due process
Statutes and Codes
Federal Statutes:
• 42 U.S.C. § 654 – Federal requirements for Title IV-D plans
• 18 U.S.C. § 1001 – False statements to the United States
• 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) – Definition of “debt collector” under federal law
Texas Statutes and Codes:
• Tex. Fam. Code §§ 231.101–104 – OAG authority limited to cases
involving public funds or assignment of rights
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IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

• Tex. Fam. Code § 231.016 – Administrative dismissal provisions
• Tex. Fam. Code § 156.101(a)(1) – Grounds for modification based on
material and substantial change / interference
• Tex. Penal Code § 25.03 – Interference with Child Custody (state jail
felony)
• Tex. Penal Code § 15.02(a) – Criminal conspiracy elements
• Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.010(a-1) – Notice to Attorney General of
constitutional challenge
• Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134.002(2) – Definition of unlawful
benefit / unjust enrichment
• Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 2.01–2.21 – Duties of peace officers and
prosecutors
Constitutional Provisions:
• U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 – Equal protection and due process
• Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 13, 19 – Equal rights, open courts, and due process
clauses
Rules
• Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) – Word limit for briefs
• TRAP 33.1(a) – Preservation of error
• TRAP 34.6 – Limitation to record on appeal
• TRAP 38.1(i) – Requirements for appellate briefing
• TRAP 44.1(a) – Harmless error rule
• TRAP 57.2 – Certification of questions to the Texas Supreme Court
• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 – Sanctions for groundless pleadings
• TRCP 21a – Service of pleadings

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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

• TRCP 296–299a – Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
• Texas Rules of Evidence 401, 403, 802, 901 – Relevance, prejudice, hearsay,
and authentication standards
Additional References / Authorities
• Texas Family Law Practice Manual, State Bar of Texas – Standard
possession orders and enforcement procedures (referenced conceptually)
• Public Policy Doctrine – “Clean hands” and mutual compliance principles in
equitable proceedings

To the honorable Justices of the Fifteenth Circuit
Court of Appeals
This appeal challenges enforcement validity, standing, and due process,
not parenthood or morality. It now stands as a case study in how the State of
Texas, through the Executive Branch and its Title IV-D agents, enforces selective
justice: punishing the Non-Custodial Parent while protecting a Custodial Parent
who has committed more than four hundred acts of visitation interference [See
Appendix 1] in open defiance of court orders.
For over four years, no Standard Possession Order has ever been
followed. Appellee Courtney Sinclair Archbold simply “agreed to NEVER agree”
to ANYTHING, nullifying all visitation and using the decree’s “mutual-
agreement” clause as a weapon to erase access entirely.

Systemic Failure of Executive Enforcement
This conduct is not a private quarrel; it is evidence of a systemic failure in
how the Executive Branch enforces family-law obligations. The Office of the
Attorney General (“OAG”) has pursued financial collection under Title IV-D while
ignoring an unbroken felony pattern under Texas Penal Code § 25.03
(Interference with Child Custody). Such selective enforcement violates equal
protection (Yick Wo v. Hopkins) (as a class- NCP) and due process, transforming
Title IV-D into a mechanism of discrimination rather than child welfare.
Since Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), confirms that Title IV-D
agencies owe no fiduciary duty to parents or children, the OAG cannot claim to act
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as guardian ad litem, trustee, or legal representative of the minors. In reality, it
operates a federally-incentivized debt-collection enterprise, filing
reimbursement claims for funds the State never expended for these minor children,
merely collected from one private party and redistributed to another under color of
federal authority. These filings generate federal performance bonuses for
“enforcement activities” unrelated to public assistance while purporting to act “on
behalf of the children” it does not, in law or fact, represent. What should be a
child-welfare program has become a profit-driven collection scheme that
weaponizes the power of the State against one parent for the enrichment of the
other and of the agency itself.
What should we call a child-welfare program that’s sole business model has
become a profit-driven collection scheme that weaponizes the power of the State
against one parent for the enrichment of the other and of the agency itself? Under
Texas Penal Code § 15.02(a), a person commits criminal conspiracy when,
with intent that a felony be committed (25.03 by the CP and application for
reimbursement by the state for funds that were never paid out for these minor
children), they agree with one or more persons to engage in conduct
constituting the offense (both Appellee’s show up to court together and stand
at the same table), and one or more of them performs an overt act in
furtherance of the agreement by creating a fiction called “in the interest of the
minor children.” When state actors knowingly advance false reimbursement
claims or coordinate enforcement for financial gain, the elements of conspiracy to
defraud are satisfied.

Material Breach: No Duty to Perform
The decree functions as both a judicial order and a private contract. Under
settled Texas law, a party in material breach cannot enforce the contract
(Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1990); Glass v. Anderson, 596 S.W.2d
507 (Tex. 1980)). Archbold’s refusal to allow possession is a continuing material
breach that suspends Appellant’s duty to perform any reciprocal financial
obligations. Equity does not compel unilateral servitude; it demands mutual
compliance.
Even viewed purely as an equitable order, enforcement fails the same test.
Park v. Essa Texas Corp., 311 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. 1958) bars equitable relief to one
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whose hands are unclean. Appellee’s conduct forecloses the equitable powers
Appellee now seeks to invoke.

Ultra Vires Conduct by the OAG
The OAG (a law enforcement arm of the Executive branch) was repeatedly
notified, through filings and certified correspondence, that Appellee’s actions
constitute hundreds of felony-grade violations of § 25.03. Yet it persisted in
prosecuting Title IV-D enforcement. Texas Family Code §§ 231.101–104 and 42
U.S.C. § 654 limits the OAG’s participation to cases involving expended public
funds or an assignment of rights. Neither currently exists here. By proceeding
regardless, the agency acted without standing and in ultra vires violation of its
statutory authority, effectively compelling performance on an unenforceable decree
while misrepresenting to federal authorities that State funds were expended for
these minor children in the amount of [creating another fiction]. Such conduct
approaches fraud upon the United States (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)) and violates the constitutional separation of
powers.
No statute, rule, or equitable doctrine authorizes a court to compel
performance under a decree in active, material breach, let alone one in where the
breach is a state jail felony vs. a civil contempt charge [which act has more weight
on the scales of justice and which act cause more relationship damage?]. The law
imposes mutual obligation, not unilateral servitude. When one party’s ongoing
violations reach criminal magnitude and the Executive Branch advances that
party’s claim despite full knowledge of her misconduct, enforcement is void ab
initio for want of standing, jurisdiction, and equity.

Judicial Duty to Certify Constitutional and
Jurisdictional Questions
From the outset, beginning with Appellant’s December 2024 Motion to
Dismiss for Gross Material Breach of Contract, this case has presented unresolved
constitutional and jurisdictional questions that the trial court was both empowered
and obligated to certify for higher review. Those filings explicitly requested
judicial certification to the Texas Supreme Court under TRAP 57.2 and formal
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notice under Texas Government Code § 402.010(a-1), triggering the court’s duty
to notify the Attorney General and evaluate the constitutional validity of the
challenged statutes before proceeding with enforcement.
At no point has Appellant been protected by the shield of justice. Instead,
the State has acted as both litigant and collector, prosecuting claims for clients
(children nor the CP) it does not possess in order to recover funds it never
expended, all initiated by an individual who CURRENTLY remains in felonious
breach of the very decree that created the cause of action in the first place.
Such conduct violates the first principles of due process, equal protection, and
separation of powers.
The judiciary cannot remain silent when the Executive Branch transforms a
civil family dispute into an instrument of coerced revenue extraction. The OAG’s
participation, absent standing, fiduciary relationship, or lawful expenditure,
amounts to the use of governmental machinery to collect private debts, an
arrangement indistinguishable in operation from racketeering under color of
state authority. When an agency files reimbursement claims for nonexistent
expenditures, compels payment through contempt, and distributes the proceeds to a
private party engaged in ongoing criminal conduct, the process ceases to be law
enforcement and becomes state-sponsored extortion.
This Court therefore bears a constitutional duty to intervene. A ruling
from this court in support of the Appellant [and all others similarly situated] or
certification to the Texas Supreme Court is necessary not merely to clarify
statutory ambiguity, but to protect the integrity of the judiciary itself. The
questions presented in Appellants filings, standing of the OAG under Title IV-D,
due-process limits on enforcement of a decree in material breach, and the systemic
conflict between equity and federal financial incentives, are questions of first
impression and statewide importance that cannot be left unresolved.

Appellee’s Brief Relies on Form Over Function
Appellee’s response does not engage the substance of this appeal. Instead, it
deploys procedural technicalities as weapons of evasion, attacking the form of
Appellant’s filings rather than the constitutional and factual substance of the case.
Every one of the ten issues Appellee raises, ranging from alleged procedural
defects and briefing formalities to claims of frivolity, seeks to avoid the undeniable
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truth that Appellee has spent four years willfully violating the decree’s access
provisions (inflicting extreme emotional distress to both NCP and children) while
demanding the State compel financial performance from appellee’s victim.
Appellee invokes procedural provisions to inflict extreme emotional distress
upon both the Non-Custodial Parent and the children while demanding that the
State compel financial performance from her victim. Blessing v. Freestone forbids
such misuse of Title IV-D authority. The oft-repeated claim that the OAG acts “on
behalf of the children” is a legal fiction, there exists no fiduciary duty, no agency
relationship, and no expenditure of public funds. What is labeled a “child-support
obligation” is, in truth, a private financial obligation enforced as a debt but exempt
from the very federal debt-collection protections that govern every other creditor in
the nation. Such asymmetry is not justice; it is an institutional farce.
These ten issues are not defenses; they are distractions. They rely on the
appearance of procedural order to conceal a reality of ongoing criminality. No
amount of citation to Rule 13, TRAP 33.1, or Rule 21a can sanitize a pattern of
conduct that, on its face, constitutes more than four hundred violations of Texas
Penal Code § 25.03. The courts of this State do not exist to elevate technical
precision over constitutional justice, nor to grant refuge to a party who has turned
parental alienation into a methodical campaign of control.

Psychological Manipulation and Calculated Alienation
Appellee’s conduct has never been the product of ignorance or
misunderstanding. Appellee possesses a master’s degree in Organizational
Psychology, a discipline centered on behavioral analysis, motivational theory, and
manipulation of interpersonal dynamics. Her education and professional training
provide her with expert-level understanding of how to influence, condition, and
control human behavior, including the behavior of her own children and their
father.
Accordingly, her campaign of alienation cannot be dismissed as impulsive or
emotional; it constitutes a deliberate and informed exercise in psychological
control. Every denial of visitation, every refusal to communicate, and every
strategic misdirection reflects an understanding of how repeated emotional
deprivation reshapes a child’s perception and loyalty. This is not accidental

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estrangement, it is psychological warfare, executed by an individual who knows
exactly how to break attachment bonds and weaponize them for advantage in court.
Such conduct amplifies the need for judicial intervention. When a litigant
with this level of psychological expertise uses that knowledge to violate court
orders and inflict emotional injury upon both the children, Appellee ceases to be a
private wrongdoer and becomes a systemic threat to the administration of justice
itself. Appellee’s actions demonstrate calculated intent, not misunderstanding;
conscious coercion, not confusion. The resulting harm, both to the children and to
the integrity of the court’s orders, demands certification of these issues as matters
of statewide legal importance rather than mere domestic dispute.

Procedural Evasion Cannot Override Substantive
Violations
The appellate process exists to ensure that form never triumphs over
function. When the judiciary becomes so preoccupied with procedural purity that
it ignores ongoing felonies in the name of “order,” justice ceases to function as a
shield and becomes a sword wielded by the aggressor. Appellee’s reliance on form
over substance proves the need for judicial certification: this case is not about
whether a motion was formatted correctly, but whether the Texas judiciary will
continue to enforce unconstitutional and inequitable mechanisms in the face of
criminal contempt.

State Culpability and the Threshold of Criminal
Interference
The record establishes Appellees that this case long ago crossed from civil
noncompliance into criminal territory. Under Texas Penal Code § 25.03
(Interference with Child Custody), each willful denial of court-ordered
possession constitutes a separate state jail felony. The decree in this case is valid,
unambiguous, and continuously violated. Appellee has admitted, in her own
pleadings, that no visitation occurs unless Appellee personally consents, an
admission that satisfies every element of § 25.03. The cumulative pattern of more
than four hundred denials of possession is not merely contemptuous conduct; it is
an unprosecuted series of felonies.

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Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 2.01–2.21, both peace
officers and prosecuting attorneys have a statutory duty to act upon credible
evidence of such violations. Yet no investigation, referral, or prosecution has ever
been initiated. Instead, the Executive Branch, through the Office of the Attorney
General (a law enforcement branch of the Executive Branch), has elected to protect
and empower the offender by prosecuting financial enforcement actions on her
behalf. This abdication of law-enforcement duty, and the corresponding use of
state resources to enrich a criminal actor, renders the State a participant in the
continuing harm rather than a guardian against it.
The OAG’s conduct moves beyond neglect into color-of-law complicity.
Once notified of this conduct by the other party, engaged in felony conduct, the
agency had an affirmative obligation to withdraw, report, or refer the matter to
appropriate authorities. Instead, it advanced the violator’s cause and filed federal
reimbursement claims for funds the State never expended, all while asserting
representation of “the children” it neither legally represents nor serves. This
pattern of behavior transforms administrative enforcement into state-sponsored
fraud and selective prosecution, violating due-process and equal-protection
guarantees recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and
constituting an ultra vires act under both federal and state law.
At this juncture, the State’s involvement can no longer be viewed as a good-
faith error. By maintaining enforcement proceedings in favor of a party engaged in
continuous criminal conduct, the OAG has crossed the threshold into institutional
culpability. The Executive Branch has used the machinery of government to
compel payment on an invalid obligation, to the benefit of a known violator, and to
the financial enrichment of the State through false federal reimbursement claims.
This Court cannot permit such conduct to stand unexamined. Certification of these
constitutional and jurisdictional questions to the Texas Supreme Court is therefore
essential, not only to determine the limits of Title IV-D authority, but to reaffirm
that no arm of government may profit from or protect ongoing criminal
activity under color of law.
This is precisely why Appellant seeks certification of a new civil tort. If the
State elects not to prosecute the disproportionate number of custodial parents—
most of whom are women—who commit acts that constitute state jail felonies by

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interfering with visitation, then equity and due process demand that non-custodial
parents and their children be granted the right to seek redress directly through the
Texas courts. Such recognition would restore balance and ensure that the injury
inflicted upon the child and the non-custodial parent is no longer shielded by
prosecutorial discretion, but addressed as a compensable wrong under Texas law.

Certification as the Only Mechanism to Restore
Balance
The magnitude of the constitutional contradictions here at this point: an
Executive Branch collecting money for a criminal violator under the guise of child
welfare, while silencing the parent seeking redress, demands resolution from this
court or certified on to the highest court of this State. This Court or the Texas
Supreme Court must decide whether the law can compel performance under a
decree in active breach, and whether procedural defects may be used as a shield for
systemic corruption.
Certification is not a request for sympathy; it is a demand for judicial
accountability. The appellate record demonstrates a complete miscarriage of
justice: a Non-Custodial Parent stripped of access, targeted for collection by an
agency without standing, and denied adjudication of his constitutional objections.
Only this court or the Texas Supreme Court can define the limits of this abuse of
power and restore faith that the House of Justice still stands as a refuge for those
wronged by bureaucratic overreach and systemic indifference to criminal activity
degrading the best interest of the children in order to focus on a unconstitutional
scheme to insert itself into the private lives of the citizens of this state.

Statement of the Case- Background
This appeal arises from the Milam County 20th District Court’s dismissal
under Texas Family Code §231.016. Appellant challenges the State’s jurisdiction
and the constitutional validity of Title IV-D enforcement.
Appellant Switkowski has raised a consistent, escalating series of
jurisdictional and constitutional challenges from inception to appeal. Each filing
added a distinct legal layer the trial court was constitutionally required to address
before ruling. The 20th Judicial District Court of Milam County instead issued a
blanket dismissal under Tex. Fam. Code § 231.016, without ruling on standing,
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fraud, or the pending constitutional questions, and then ordered Appellant jailed for
six months while the custodial parent (Archbold) continues to commit a state-jail
felony under Tex. Penal Code § 25.03 by withholding visitation.

Chronological Summary of Preserved Challenges
Reference to Clerk’s Record (Procedural Chronology Source)
See Appendix 3 for a complete chronological summary of preserved filings and
issues raised below.

Current Posture
Despite these unresolved constitutional questions, the Executive Branch
continues to act as though enforcement authority remains intact, collecting funds
under Title IV-D for a private litigant engaged in criminal contempt while ignoring
the court’s failure to adjudicate standing or due process. The judiciary’s silence in
the face of such conduct leaves Appellant without the protection of law, forcing
him to seek sanctuary in the appellate process itself.
This appeal therefore presents a live, statewide question of law:
whether a Texas court may extinguish preserved constitutional and jurisdictional
challenges by blanket dismissal without findings, while the State continues to
enforce the same unconstitutional mechanisms against the Non-Custodial Parent at
the request of a Custodial Parent currently committing multiple state jail felony
every month.
The answer must be no. The judiciary cannot abdicate review of a live
constitutional controversy through silence. Until the Texas Supreme Court has
certified and ruled on these questions, all enforcement actions derived from this
defective process remain void ab initio for want of standing, jurisdiction, and
equity.

Statement of Issues Presented
1. Non-compliant and frivolous (Rule 13 & Low v. Henry)
2. Procedurally defective (Rule 21a, 33.1(a))
3. Waived constitutional issues (TRAP 33.1, 38.1(i))

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4. Outside scope of enforcement (arguing you raised collateral issues)
5. Factually in arrears ($23,000 claim; no dispute)
6. Misrepresenting the decree (visitation by mutual agreement only)
7. Pattern of coercive conduct (citing “CPS testimony” and “coercive
control”)
8. Trial court acted within discretion (abuse-of-discretion standard)
9. Appellate brief inadequate (TRAP 38.1(i))
10.Seeks deterrence / sanctions (Rule 13 and Chambers v. O’Quinn)

Appellee’s Arguments and Appellant’s Legal Response
Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 1: “Non-Compliant
and Frivolous” — Rule 13 / Low v. Henry
Appellee’s reliance on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 is misplaced.
Rule 13 sanctions apply only when a pleading is both (1) groundless and (2) filed
in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. The rule further requires that the trial
court conduct an evidentiary hearing and make explicit findings of bad faith
before imposing sanctions. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614–17 (Tex. 2007).
No such hearing or findings occurred in this case. Without them, any allegation of
frivolity or bad faith is void as a matter of law.
Each of Appellant’s filings below, including the Motion to Dismiss for
Gross Material Breach of Contract, Motion to Compel Discovery and for
Sanctions, and Motion for Order to Show Cause for Contempt, was brought in
good faith to address unresolved constitutional and jurisdictional defects. These
pleadings challenged the standing of the Office of the Attorney General under
Title IV-D, ongoing due-process violations, and the question of continuing post-
divorce jurisdiction, issues of first impression and statewide significance. Efforts
to clarify unsettled constitutional law cannot, by definition, constitute bad faith or
harassment.
Accordingly:

1. No evidentiary hearing or findings of bad faith were held as required by
Rule 13;
2. Each filing presented legitimate constitutional questions preserved for
appellate review; and
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3. Under Low v. Henry, litigants who raise novel legal issues in good faith are
protected from sanctions.

Appellee’s attempt to characterize these filings as “frivolous” is an improper
use of Rule 13 as a retaliatory weapon rather than a safeguard against abuse. Her
argument fails as a matter of both law and record.

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 2: “Procedurally
Defective” — Rule 21a / TRAP 33.1(a)
Appellee’s assertion that Appellant’s filings were procedurally defective
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a and Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33.1(a) is unsupported by the record and contrary to law. Rule
21a(b)(3) expressly authorizes service by the clerk’s electronic-filing system or by
certified United States mail sent to the party’s last known address. Appellant
complied with both methods. Multiple USPS tracking confirmations and return-
receipt images show timely attempts at delivery, with written notices left at
Appellee’s address of record. Appellee, however, failed or refused to retrieve
the mailings, as evidenced by the returned envelopes reproduced in Appendix 2
(Proof of Attempted Service and Return Receipts).
Texas courts have long held that a party cannot defeat valid service by
evading receipt of certified mail. Gonzalez v. Surplus Ins. Servs., 863 S.W.2d
96, 102 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1993, writ denied). A litigant who intentionally
avoids notice waives any objection to service. Moreover, Appellee filed written
responses to the very motions Appellee claims never to have received, an implicit
admission of actual notice. If those documents were obtained through the Office
of the Attorney General, as the timing and content suggest, that exchange
demonstrates coordination between the OAG and Appellee in circumventing
formal service while denying receipt in the record.
Even assuming a technical irregularity in a certificate of service, actual
notice satisfies due process and renders any error harmless under TRCP 44.1(a).
Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). Texas appellate courts
further direct that pro se filings be construed liberally so that meritorious
constitutional claims are not lost to curable formatting errors. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); In re Baby Boy R., 191 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
Appellee’s own pleadings conclusively establish that Appellee received the
filings in question. Her written responses directly reference the contents, dates,
and subject matter of the very motions Appellee now claims were never served.
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Under well-settled Texas law, a party’s responsive pleading or argument
referencing a document constitutes judicial admission of receipt and
knowledge of that filing. See In re Estate of Aguilar, 492 S.W.3d 807, 814 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied). By engaging the merits of those motions
and addressing their arguments line-by-line, Appellee demonstrated actual notice
far beyond any constructive presumption. Her responses cannot exist without prior
access to the filings; therefore, her own record activity operates as an admission
that service occurred.
Accordingly:
1. Service was properly attempted and documented under Rule 21a(b)(3);
2. Appellee’s deliberate refusal to accept certified mail constitutes waiver of
any objection to notice;
3. Her subsequent responsive pleadings confirm actual notice, curing any
alleged defect; and
4. Any minor technical error is harmless under Mathis and Rule 44.1(a).

Appellee’s “procedurally defective” argument therefore fails as a matter of
law and fact. Her conduct reflects not lack of notice, but a calculated attempt to
manufacture procedural error where none exists.

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 3: “Waived
Constitutional Issues” — TRAP 33.1 & 38.1
Appellee’s assertion that Appellant “waived” constitutional challenges under
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and 38.1 is directly contradicted by the
record. Constitutional objections were raised repeatedly, both in writing and
orally, and formally placed before the trial court at the May 19, 2025 hearing.
The presiding judge expressly ruled that those issues were “outside the scope” of
the proceeding. That statement constitutes a ruling on the record, thereby
preserving the constitutional issues for appellate review. See Hernandez v.
Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. 2009) (holding that once a trial court
acknowledges and refuses to reach a constitutional argument, error is preserved).
Texas law requires only that (1) a complaint be made to the trial court with
sufficient specificity, and (2) the court rule on or refuse to rule on the request.
TRAP 33.1(a) does not require a favorable ruling to preserve error; it requires only
that the issue be raised and that a ruling, favorable or not, appear in the record.
Both conditions were met here. Appellant’s constitutional objections were
presented, recorded, and rejected as “outside the scope,” satisfying preservation
requirements in full for proper appellate review.
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Appellee’s reliance on TRAP 38.1(i) is equally misplaced. The Opening
Brief and accompanying Notice of Constitutional Challenge filed pursuant to
Texas Government Code § 402.010(a-1) contain detailed constitutional analysis
supported by citations to Bruen v. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Loving v.
Virginia, and Yick Wo v. Hopkins. The record therefore contains both the factual
basis and legal authority required to preserve and brief each constitutional issue
in compliance with TRAP 38.1(i).
Accordingly:
1. The constitutional issues were timely raised and expressly ruled “outside the
scope,” satisfying TRAP 33.1(a);
2. A ruling adverse to the movant is still a ruling for preservation purposes
(Hernandez v. Ebrom); and
3. Detailed constitutional argument and authority were presented in the record,
satisfying TRAP 38.1(i).

Appellee’s waiver argument fails as a matter of law. The constitutional
issues are properly before this Court and must be adjudicated or certified to the
Texas Supreme Court under TRAP 57.2.

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 4: “Outside Scope of
Enforcement” — Collateral Issues Claim
Appellee’s assertion that Appellant’s constitutional and jurisdictional
challenges were “outside the scope of enforcement” is legally untenable. The
threshold question of standing and jurisdiction is never collateral; it is a
prerequisite to enforcement. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998), the United States Supreme Court made clear that a
court must first establish Article III standing and subject-matter jurisdiction before
addressing the merits of any claim. Without such standing, all subsequent actions
are void ab initio.
Here, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) asserted enforcement
authority under Title IV-D without ever demonstrating expenditure of public
assistance funds or assignment of rights, as required by Texas Family Code §§
231.101–104. Appellant’s motion to dismiss for gross material breach of contract
therefore properly raised a jurisdictional defect and constitutional challenge that
precedes enforcement. The trial court’s refusal to address that challenge, labeling
it “outside the scope,” constituted reversible error under Steel Co. and violated
Appellant’s right to due process under both the Texas and United States
Constitutions.
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Additionally, Appellant’s claims regarding Appellee’s material breach of
the decree through continuous denial of visitation are not collateral; they go
directly to the equity and enforceability of support obligations. A party who has
nullified one side of a reciprocal obligation cannot invoke the court’s enforcement
powers to compel performance of the other. Texas law requires that equity be
mutual and that enforcement proceed only where both parties are in substantial
compliance.
Accordingly:
1. Standing and jurisdiction challenges are structural questions that precede
enforcement and cannot be dismissed as collateral;
2. The Texas Family Code imposes no bar to raising jurisdictional or
constitutional objections within enforcement proceedings; and
3. The trial court abused its discretion by enforcing a decree without first
requiring the OAG to establish standing or statutory authority.

Appellee’s “outside the scope” argument therefore fails as a matter of both
law and logic. This Court should find that the trial court erred in refusing to
adjudicate jurisdictional and standing defects prior to enforcement and should
certify those questions to the Texas Supreme Court for resolution under TRAP
57.2.

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 5: “Factually in
Arrears ($23,000 Claim)”
The Appellee’s Arrears Claim Is Barred by Her Own
Misconduct and Subject to Equitable Offset
Appellee’s assertion that Appellant is “factually in arrears” in the amount of
approximately $23,000 is moot in light of the unconstitutional actions of the
Office of the Attorney General and the felonious conduct of Appellee herself.
The validity of any claimed arrearage cannot be adjudicated or enforced until the
underlying constitutional defects and ongoing violations of law have been
resolved. Enforcement has now become a secondary issue, eclipsed by the far
greater questions of due process, standing, and criminal interference.
Moreover, a new expense-based child-support model, which must be
certified by the judiciary as constitutionally compliant and aligned with public
policy promoting the best interest of the child’s reasonable and necessary
expenses, is required to replace the outdated income-based formula that promotes

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unjust enrichment and systemic inequity. Texas law recognizes that unjust
enrichment occurs when one party wrongfully secures or passively receives a
benefit that, in equity and good conscience, belongs to another. See Heldenfels
Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992); see also
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134.002(2) (defining unlawful benefit as
enrichment derived through wrongful act). The continued use of an income-based
system that disproportionately burdens the Non-Custodial Parent, predominantly
fathers, constitutes an ongoing act of state-sanctioned unjust enrichment and
violates the equal-protection principles embodied in Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 3 and
19. Under this evolving standard, any monetary claim by Appellee must be
evaluated not through a defunct income-ratio formula but through a civil tort for
Loss of Parent–Child Consortium, as outlined in Appendix 1. Until that tort is
formally recognized and adjudicated, all existing arrearage claims remain
constitutionally and equitably premature.
The distinction between obligation and debt, how it is actually classified
and collected has been fully developed in Appellant’s Opening Brief, is referenced
here only to maintain continuity of analysis. Its mention in this Reply Brief serves
solely to link that foundational argument to the present discussion of equitable
enforcement and unjust enrichment, ensuring the record reflects the consistent
constitutional theory advanced throughout the appeal.
Until the Parent/ Child Consortium tort is formally certified and adjudicated,
no meaningful or lawful accounting of financial responsibility can occur. Thus,
Appellee’s arrears claim is not merely unsupported by evidence, it is
constitutionally and equitably premature.
Even if the arrearage figure were accepted as accurate, it represents a trivial
fraction of the estimated [$981,600 – $1,831,200] in quantifiable damages arising
from Appellee’s deprivation of Parent/ Child Consortium, as demonstrated in
Appendix A. Under standard civil-accounting principles, competing obligations
between the same parties are reconciled through offset and renouncement,
ensuring that one party’s recovery is reduced or extinguished by the other’s
verified counter-claim. Until Appellee’s liability for the loss of consortium is
adjudicated, any enforcement of her arrears claim would be premature, inequitable,
and constitutionally infirm.
By invoking the court’s aid while continuing to violate its orders, Appellee
seeks to profit from her own wrongdoing. Equity and due process prohibit the
Executive or Judicial Branch from enforcing financial claims in favor of a party
whose hands remain unclean. The proper remedy is to stay enforcement and
certify all competing monetary issues for comprehensive accounting and offset
once the pending constitutional and tort matters are resolved.
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Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 6: “Misrepresenting
the Decree” — Visitation by Mutual Agreement
Appellee misrepresents the decree’s “mutual agreement” clause as granting
her unilateral authority to control all visitation. The plain language of the decree,
read in context and under Texas Family Code § 156.101(a)(1), provides for
shared discretion between the parties, not absolute de-facto veto power by one
parent over another. The purpose of the “mutual agreement” clause was to
accommodate “reasonable flexibility for the children’s school schedules and
extracurricular activities,” recognizing that multiple children enrolled in different
programs may require occasional adjustment of visitation times. The intent was to
promote cooperation and stability for the children, not to empower one parent to
terminate the other’s access altogether AT WILL.
Appellee’s admitted refusal to permit any visitation unless Appellee
personally consents converts a cooperative provision into a mechanism of
constructive interference, amounting to a material breach of the decree.
Denying all standard Texas visitation access under the guise of “mutual
agreement” effectively nullifies the Standard Possession Order by Texas law and
violates public policy favoring frequent and continuing contact between children
and both parents.
Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss for Gross Material Breach of Contract
directly addressed this live controversy by asserting that Appellee’s ongoing
violations has extinguished Appellants mutuality of obligation under the decree.
The trial court’s decision to ignore that motion, labeling it “outside the scope,” was
legal error. Texas law recognizes that material breach of a court-approved
contract operates as a complete defense to enforcement of related duties, including
financial obligations. Dobbins v. Redden, 785 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. 1990).
Accordingly:

1. The “mutual agreement” clause was intended to facilitate coordination, not
unilateral denial;
2. Appellee’s refusal of all access constitutes constructive interference and
material breach under Tex. Fam. Code § 156.101(a)(1); and
3. The trial court erred in disregarding Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss for
Material Breach, which presented a live, justiciable controversy affecting
enforceability.

Appellee cannot nullify visitation by invoking cooperation language as a
weapon of control. Appellee misuse of the decree’s terms destroys the reciprocal
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foundation of the order and bars her from seeking enforcement of its financial
provisions until full compliance and restoration of access are achieved.

“At no point is any of this in the best interest of the children!”

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 7: “Pattern of
Coercive Conduct / CPS Testimony”
Appellee’s attempt to introduce allegations of a so-called “pattern of
coercive conduct” through CPS testimony, text screenshots, and social-media
posts is procedurally improper and legally inadmissible. The supplemental
materials Appellee references were never authenticated, never admitted into
evidence, and never subjected to cross-examination. They therefore hold no
evidentiary value on appeal and cannot be considered by this Court.
Under Texas Rules of Evidence 802 and 901, hearsay evidence and
unauthenticated documents are inadmissible unless properly verified by a
sponsoring witness with personal knowledge. None of the exhibits in Appellee’s
supplemental record meet those standards. The alleged CPS notes are unsworn,
unsigned, and not certified by any agency custodian as required in Texas Rules of
Evidence; the text screenshots and social-media excerpts lack metadata or chain-
of-custody authentication. As such, they are inadmissible hearsay and cannot
form the basis for any factual finding or appellate argument.
Even if such materials had been admitted, their inclusion is irrelevant to the
issues on appeal. None of the purported statements or posts relate to arrears,
standing, or the enforceability of the decree. Instead, they constitute character
smears intended to inflame rather than inform. Introducing such inflammatory
and unverified materials violates Rule of Evidence 403, which prohibits evidence
offered for unfair prejudice or to mislead the trier of fact.
Texas appellate courts have consistently held that items outside the record
or not formally admitted into evidence must be disregarded. See TRAP 34.6
(limiting review to the clerk’s and reporter’s record). Accordingly, these exhibits
should be struck or ignored in their entirety. Appellee’s reliance on unverified,
mischaracterized and irrelevant accusations reveals an improper motive, to malign
Appellant’s character rather than to address the actual legal issues before this
Court.
Accordingly:
1. The materials cited by Appellee are unauthenticated hearsay under TRE
802 and 901;
2. None were admitted into the record or verified by any sponsoring witness;
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3. Their inclusion is irrelevant and prejudicial under TRE 403; and
4. They must be disregarded under TRAP 34.6 as matters outside the
appellate record.

Appellee’s use of inadmissible and inflammatory material underscores her
pattern of manipulation and bad faith. This Court should strike or disregard these
references and confine its review to the properly admitted evidence in the official
record.
Given Appellee’s advanced education in organizational and behavioral
psychology and her demonstrated ability to influence the perceptions of the minor
children, any attempt to elicit an emotional response from this Court should be
viewed through a subjective and critical evidentiary lens rather than accepted at
face value. Courts are cautioned to separate emotionally charged allegations
from verified fact, particularly where a party possesses specialized training in
persuasion or conditioning. Appellee’s educational background heightens her
responsibility to avoid manipulative advocacy; therefore, this Court should
evaluate all such assertions with heightened scrutiny and limit its consideration to
objective, authenticated evidence contained in the record.

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 8: “Trial Court
Acted Within Its Discretion” — Abuse-of-Discretion
Review
Appellee’s claim that the trial court “acted within its discretion”
misconstrues both the scope and limits of judicial discretion. Discretion ends
where due process begins. A trial court’s decisions are reviewable for abuse of
discretion when they (1) are made without reference to guiding legal principles, (2)
rest on legally or factually insufficient evidence, or (3) disregard constitutional
protections. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78–79 (Tex. 2011). Each of those errors
occurred here.
The court abused its discretion by:
1. Proceeding without first establishing standing or addressing a multitude
of pre-hearing objections—allowing enforcement to continue in the
absence of verified legal authority;
2. Imposing a punitive purge condition of $50 per day unrelated to
Appellant’s proven ability to pay, violating Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d
257 (Tex. 1995); and
3. Refusing to consider Appellant’s constitutional objections, despite being
duly noticed and preserved on the record.
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Any one of these errors would constitute abuse of discretion; together, they
render the enforcement order void. In Iliff, the Texas Supreme Court held that an
enforcement judgment unsupported by competent evidence is an abuse of
discretion subject to reversal. The same principle applies here: discretion cannot
substitute for evidence, fairness, or constitutional compliance or a
constitutional challenge.
The hearing record reveals arbitrary enforcement and unequal treatment,
favoring Appellee, who remains in ongoing contempt, while punishing Appellant
for raising legitimate constitutional defenses in order to make sure that he can see
his kids and making sure they are being properly cared for with the money he is
paying. A court that ignores due process and relies on unsworn assertions ceases
to exercise discretion and instead engages in judicial arbitrariness, which is
reversible error.
Accordingly:
1. Abuse-of-discretion review still requires a lawful evidentiary foundation;
2. The trial court acted without competent evidence or guiding principles; and
3. The resulting order is void under Iliff and Ex parte Chambers.

The judgment below should therefore be reversed and remanded for
findings consistent with constitutional due process and verified evidence.

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 9: “Appellate Brief
Inadequate” — TRAP 38.1(i)
Appellee’s claim that Appellant’s opening brief fails to comply with Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) is factually and legally unfounded. The
Opening Brief contains detailed legal argument supported by citations to the
record, relevant statutes, and controlling precedent, including Bruen v. New York
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Loving v. Virginia, and Yick Wo v. Hopkins. The brief
also identifies specific provisions of the Texas Family Code and includes multiple
appendices with referenced exhibits, clearly satisfying the requirements of TRAP
38.1(i).
Dismissal for “inadequate briefing” is strongly disfavored where the
appellate court can discern the substance of the appellant’s arguments. Sterner v.
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
Texas courts consistently hold that substance prevails over technical form,
particularly when the issues presented are constitutional in nature and fully
developed through citations to law and the record.
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Moreover, while pro se appellants must comply with the rules of appellate
procedure, the courts are required to liberally construe pro se filings to reach the
merits where the essential arguments are clear. Hernandez v. Gallardo, No. 03-
18-00421-CV, 2019 WL 2052115, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 9, 2019, no
pet.) (mem. op.). Appellant’s filings more than satisfy that standard: the record
citations are precise, the legal issues are thoroughly developed, and the
constitutional questions are preserved and properly before this Court.
Appellee’s accusation of inadequate briefing is therefore not a genuine
procedural objection but a rhetorical device to obscure the deficiencies in her own
brief. By misquoting and misapplying TRAP 38.1, Appellee seeks to distract from
her failure to address the substantive constitutional and jurisdictional questions
central to this appeal.
Accordingly:
1. The Opening Brief fully complies with TRAP 38.1(i) by providing detailed
argument, authorities, and record references;
2. Sterner v. Marriott forbids dismissal where the substance of the appeal is
clear; and
3. Under Hernandez v. Gallardo, pro se filings are entitled to liberal
construction to ensure review on the merits.

This Court should reject Appellee’s procedural smokescreen and proceed to
adjudicate the appeal on the constitutional and factual merits, as the rules and the
interests of justice require.

Response to Appellee’s Issue No. 10: “Seeks
Deterrence / Sanctions” — Rule 13 & Chambers v.
O’Quinn
Appellee’s demand for sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13
and Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2007), is procedurally and
legally baseless. Rule 13 sanctions cannot substitute for appellate adjudication or
be imposed in the absence of explicit findings of bad faith and advance notice of
a sanctions hearing. Chambers squarely holds that sanctions must rest on
specific, written findings supported by evidence of improper motive. None exist in
this record.
Every pleading filed by Appellant, including the Motion to Dismiss for
Gross Material Breach of Contract, Motion to Compel Discovery and for
Sanctions, and Notice of Constitutional Challenge, was filed in good faith and
supported by statute, record evidence, and precedent. These filings sought
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resolution of unsettled constitutional questions, not harassment or delay. The trial
court conducted no Rule 13 hearing, entered no findings of bad faith, and issued no
notice of intent to impose sanctions. Appellee’s request for deterrence therefore
lacks both factual and procedural foundation.
Appellee’s invocation of “deterrence” reveals a retaliatory motive: to silence
constitutional challenge and chill protected petitioning activity. Using the threat
of sanctions to suppress legitimate legal argument violates the Open Courts
Clause of the Texas Constitution, Article I, § 13, which guarantees every citizen
the right to seek judicial redress for grievances. Sanctions imposed without
findings and due process are themselves an abuse of discretion and a denial of
fundamental fairness.
The appellate court’s role is to resolve questions of law, not to punish their
presentation. Where, as here, the record contains no hearing, no notice, and no
findings, there exists no legal predicate for sanctions under Rule 13 or
Chambers. Any request for deterrence should therefore be denied, and this Court
should reaffirm that constitutional litigation is not grounds for punishment, but a
protected exercise of the right to seek justice.
Accordingly:
1. No findings of bad faith or notice were made as required by Chambers v.
O’Quinn;
2. Rule 13 cannot be used as a substitute for appellate adjudication;
3. Invoking deterrence to suppress constitutional argument violates Tex.
Const. art. I, § 13; and
4. The appellate court’s duty is to resolve the legal issues, not penalize their
assertion.

For these reasons, Appellee’s request for sanctions should be summarily
rejected, and this Court should proceed to address the preserved constitutional and
jurisdictional questions on their merits.

Argument
For over four years, Appellant has endured a relentless cycle of procedural
evasion, psychological manipulation, and inequitable enforcement. What began as
a family matter governed by a mutual cooperation clause has devolved into an
unbroken pattern of obstruction, contempt, and constitutional violation. Appellee,
an individual with advanced training in organizational psychology, has used that
expertise not to promote the children’s stability, but to engineer their alienation and
to weaponize the legal system against their father. Her filings are not efforts to
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seek justice; they are instruments of control designed to exploit procedural form
while evading substantive accountability.
Throughout this ordeal, Appellant has been denied both access to his
children and the protection of due process. The trial court dismissed every pending
motion, his, hers, and the State’s, without findings, conclusions, or
acknowledgment of the constitutional questions preserved on record. Such judicial
silence has left Appellant trapped between two extremes: a Custodial Parent who
refuses to comply with court orders and an Executive Branch that continues to
enforce an unconstitutional financial scheme.
The evidence shows a complete breakdown of mutuality and equity. No
consistent visitation schedule has ever been established by Appellee since April
2021. No hearing was held to determine standing, ability to pay, or the effect of
Appellee’s admitted violations. In place of law, Appellant has faced bureaucracy;
in place of justice through the retaliation of incarceration. The result is not merely
a personal hardship; it is a systemic failure that threatens the integrity of family-
law enforcement statewide.
This appeal is therefore not about relitigating parenthood or emotion. It is
about the rule of law: whether Texas courts will allow enforcement by those who
act in contempt of their own decrees, and whether constitutional objections or
outright challenges may be silenced through procedural avoidance. Four years of
litigation without access to justice is not discretion, it is deprivation. The record
and the law demand correction.

Certificate of Compliance (TRAP 9.4(i)(3))
I certify that this document contains approximately [7,375] 14-point Times New Romans
Font words (excluding the caption, table of contents, index of authorities, certificate of service,
and this certificate). Every section not included in this list was copy/ pasted into a word
document and counted in order to get the number above. [See: Appellant’s Motion for Leave to
File Reply Brief Out of Time]

Conclusion and Prayer for Relief
For the reasons stated, this appeal presents structural defects that must be
resolved before any further enforcement may proceed. Standing cannot be
presumed, due process cannot be bypassed, and equity cannot be invoked by a
party in continuing material breach. An Executive-branch collection action has
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been pursued without a verified legal basis while more than four hundred
violations of court-ordered standard possession went unaddressed. Form cannot
defeat function, and procedure cannot eclipse the Constitution.
PRAYER
Appellant respectfully prays that this Court:
1. Reverse the dismissal under Texas Family Code § 231.016 and vacate all
enforcement and contempt orders entered without first adjudicating standing
and the preserved constitutional objections.
2. Stay all enforcement (including contempt, license suspensions, credit
reporting, IWO/withholding, intercepts, and collections) pending resolution
of jurisdictional and constitutional questions.
3. Certify to the Texas Supreme Court (TRAP 57.2) all the constitutional
challenges identified in Appellants brief.
4. Hold that sanctions/deterrence are improper absent notice, an evidentiary
hearing, and specific written findings of bad faith under Rule 13 and
Chambers v. O’Quinn; deny Appellee’s sanctions request.
5. Reject “procedural defect” arguments where actual notice occurred and
any technical error was harmless; affirm that deliberate evasion of certified
mail waives service objections and that pro se filings are liberally construed
to reach the merits.
6. Strike or disregard all unauthenticated, extra-record materials and hearsay
(including CPS notes, screenshots, and social-media exhibits) under TRE
802/901, TRE 403, and TRAP 34.6.
7. Vacate purge conditions and any contempt findings not supported by
competent evidence of ability to pay or that conflict with Ex parte
Chambers.
8. Declare ultra vires any OAG enforcement undertaken without statutory
standing or proof of public-fund expenditure/assignment; remand with
instructions that the OAG must first prove standing or withdraw.
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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

9. Recognize material breach as a complete equitable defense to financial
enforcement (e.g., Dobbins v. Redden; Glass v. Anderson), and require
findings on Appellee’s interference with possession and the mutuality of
obligations before any enforcement may resume. The party must have clean
hands before coming to court to seek redress and actively withholding the
children in violation of both state penal code and civil contempt bars further
action until such time as that default has been remedied the court cannot
move forward.
10.Order an evidentiary hearing on interference with possession (Tex.
Penal Code § 25.03) with specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on (i) frequency and willfulness, (ii) effect on equity, and (iii) remedies
to restore access.
11.Direct immediate temporary relief to restore possession/access, including
temporary orders establishing a Standard Possession Order schedule and
make-up visitation, to prevent ongoing irreparable harm to the parent-child
relationship.
12.Allow Appellant and Appellee to take leave in order to test the veracity
of the new civil Parent/ child Loss of Consortium tort settling any
arrearage claims in abeyance, requiring a comprehensive accounting
subject to equitable offset for Appellant’s counterclaims/defenses after
constitutional and standing issues are resolved and a new civil tort has been
created as its first case.
13.Acknowledge that Blessing v. Freestone confirms no fiduciary duty to
parents/children; forbid characterizing the OAG as
GAL/trustee/representative to justify enforcement in this matter.
14.Recognize or, alternatively, certify for consideration the new, historically
first Expense-Based Child Support Program as a constitutionally
compliant alternative to the current income-based enforcement model,
ensuring that future determinations align with actual verified child expenses,
fiduciary accountability, and equal protection under law.

29
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

15.Issue instructions to the clerk: upon issuance of this Court’s judgment or
certification order, promptly notify the Texas Attorney General under Tex.
Gov’t Code § 402.010(a-1) of this ruling and transmit the certified
questions and relevant record excerpts to the Texas Supreme Court.
16.Issue instructions to all trial courts on remand where the OAG is
involved:

Part A – Office of the Attorney General (OAG):
The trial court shall:
(i) set a prompt evidentiary hearing to determine whether the OAG has in
fact expended public funds or obtained a lawful assignment of rights or
custody;
(ii) require live testimony under oath and cross-examination from both the
OAG and any designated caseworker to establish statutory compliance with
Tex. Fam. Code §§ 231.101–104;
(iii) enter written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law under Rules
296–299a detailing the evidence relied upon;
(iv) treat OAG standing as a threshold issue that must be resolved before any
enforcement or collection activity may proceed; and
(v) bar reinstatement of enforcement mechanisms, including contempt,
license suspension, or wage withholding, unless and until those findings
affirm lawful jurisdiction, verified standing, and equitable compliance.

Part B – Custodial Parent (CP):
The trial court shall:
(i) require the Custodial Parent to produce verified evidence that all court-
ordered visitation, communication, and access have been honored and are
current;
(ii) enter written findings confirming full compliance with the Standard
Possession Order or any modified order of the court;
(iii) treat ongoing or willful interference with possession as a material breach
barring any enforcement of reciprocal financial obligations until cured; and
(iv) affirm that child-support enforcement and visitation enforcement are
inseparable components of a single judicial duty, each must support the
other, as both serve the child’s best interest.

All parties must enter the House of Justice with clean hands, or not enter at all.

30
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

17.This case presents a historically significant constitutional challenge: one
that questions the lawful boundaries of state authority within domestic
relations and the proper separation of powers under both the Texas and
United States Constitutions. It implicates issues that reach beyond the
immediate parties, touching on centuries-old principles of liberty, due
process, and the limitation of government power first articulated in our
founding jurisprudence. Should this Honorable Court determine that any
issue raised herein requires further clarification, or that oral argument would
assist in resolving the constitutional questions presented, Appellant stands
fully prepared to provide such clarification or appear for oral argument at the
Court’s discretionary convenience.
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
dismissal, certify the constitutional questions, and stay enforcement pending
full judicial review, letting justice be done, though the heavens fall.
Respectfully submitted,

10/20/2025

Neil George Switkowski
Appellant Pro Se
2203 Post Oak Rd
Rockdale, Texas 76567
E-mail: ns512atx@gmail.com
Date: October 20, 2025

31
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Certificate of Service
I certify that on October 20, 2025, a true and correct copy of this Motion was
served by electronic service through the Court’s e-filing system.

Neil George Switkowski

Mr. Deterrean Gamble
Assistant Attorney General
Child Support Division
P. O. Box 12017, Capitol Station
Austin, TX 78711-2017
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Ms. Courtney Sinclair Archbold
227 E Bell Ave.
Rockdale, TX 76567
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

32
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Appendix 1: Calculation of Denied Visitation under
the Texas Standard Possession Order
I. Applicable Law
Under Texas Family Code §§ 153.312 – 153.317, a Non-Custodial Parent
(NCP) residing within 100 miles of the child is entitled to the Standard
Possession Order (SPO), consisting of:
1. First, Third, and Fifth Weekends each month (Friday 6 p.m. – Sunday 6
p.m.)
2. Thursday Evenings each week (6 p.m. – 8 p.m.)
3. Thirty (30) Days Summer Possession each year
4. Alternating Holidays (Spring Break, Thanksgiving, and Christmas periods)
The combined statutory minimum averages ≈ 90 days of possession per
year.
If the Expanded SPO (overnight Thursdays + extended weekends) applies, the
total increases to ≈ 168 days per year (≈ 46% time share).
II. Time Frame Measured
April 1, 2021 – October 19, 2025 = approximately 4 years and 6½ months =
4.54 years total.
III. Quantitative Analysis

Annual Days Total Approx.
Years Equivalent
Scenario Entitled Days Incidents of
Covered Weeks
Under SPO Denied Interference ¹

Standard ≈ 409
90 days / yr 4.54 yrs ≈ 58.4 weeks ≈ 400 violations
SPO days

Expanded ≈ 763
168 days / yr 4.54 yrs ≈ 109 weeks ≈ 700 violations
SPO days

33
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Quantification of Loss of Consortium
A. Conversion of Missed Possession into Measurable
Harm
Each missed day of court-ordered visitation represents 24 hours of lost
parental consortium. Consistent with established tort-valuation methods used in
wrongful-death and personal-injury cases (where consortium and companionship
are valued as non-economic damages), Appellant assigns a conservative valuation
of $100 per hour for each hour of denied parent-child access.

B. Calculations
Days of Possession Hours Denied (× 24 Value per Total Loss
Scenario
Denied hrs/day) Hour ($)

Standard
409 days 9,816 hours $100 /hr $981,600
SPO

Expanded
763 days 18,312 hours $100 /hr $1,831,200
SPO

C. Conceptual Basis for Tort Recognition
1. Analogous Precedent:
Texas courts already recognize loss of consortium in spousal and parent–
child wrongful-death contexts (Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.
1990)). The harm here is identical in nature, permanent deprivation of
companionship and emotional bond, yet without any civil remedy when
caused by willful interference rather than death or physical injury.
2. Deterrence and Equity:
The absence of a civil cause of action incentivizes custodial parents to
ignore visitation orders with impunity. Recognition of a civil tort for
interference-based loss of consortium would align civil and criminal

34
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

accountability, providing restitution where the State refuses to enforce its
own penal statutes.
3. Constitutional Mandate:
Denying a parent any remedy for this class of injury violates Article I, § 13
of the Texas Constitution (“open courts” provision) and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, both guaranteeing access to a forum for
redress of recognized injuries.

D. Summary of Aggregate Harm
Between April 2021 and October 2025, Appellant has been deprived of
approximately:
• 9,816 to 18,312 hours of parent-child interaction;
• Representing an economic equivalent of $981,600 to $1,831,200 in
irreplaceable time lost;
• Alongside immeasurable emotional and developmental harm to the children
themselves.
This quantification is not a request for monetary enrichment but a necessary
metric to demonstrate the severity and measurable magnitude of the deprivation
and to justify judicial recognition of Loss of Consortium (Parent–Child) as a
new civil tort under Texas common law.

Extension of the Tort to Minor Children
A. Legal Foundation
Texas precedent already recognizes a child’s right to recover for loss of
parental consortium. In Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990), the
Supreme Court of Texas held that a minor child may recover damages for the loss
of a parent’s love, affection, protection, emotional support, and companionship
when that relationship is impaired by the wrongful act of another.
The Court’s reasoning rested on two pillars:

35
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

1. The relationship itself is a protected interest deserving of civil redress;
and
2. The injury to the child is distinct and personal, not merely derivative of
the parent’s claim.
The same principle applies where a custodial parent, acting intentionally and
with full knowledge of the harm, destroys the child’s relationship with the other
parent by systematically violating court-ordered possession. The injury to the
child’s emotional and developmental well-being is no less real than if the parent
had been killed or incapacitated.
B. Children as Independent Plaintiffs
1. Each affected minor child should hold an independent cause of action for
Loss of Parental Consortium Due to Intentional Interference, permitting
the child to recover damages for:
o Loss of affection, guidance, and nurturing;
o Emotional distress resulting from the severed relationship; and
o Long-term developmental harm traceable to the custodial parent’s
misconduct.
2. The cause of action would parallel existing consortium doctrines, with the
custodial parent’s interference serving as the actionable “wrongful act.”
3. Damages would be measured by the same hourly valuation of denied
companionship used for the parent’s claim, multiplied by the number of
affected children.

36
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

C. Calculation of Aggregate Child Loss

Hours Denied Value /
Loss per If Two Children →
Scenario (Apr 2021 – Oct Hour
Child Aggregate Loss
2025) ($100)

Standard
9,816 hrs $100 $981,600 $1,963,200
SPO

Expanded
18,312 hrs $100 $1,831,200 $3,662,400
SPO

Accounting, Offset, and the Doctrine of Unclean
Hands
Appellee now claims a right to collect approximately $23,000 in alleged
child-support arrears. Appellant does not dispute that such a figure appears on the
State’s accounting ledger; rather, he submits that the court cannot enforce that
balance without first reconciling the vastly greater compensatory exposure
Appellee faces for her sustained, willful interference with court-ordered
possession. Under ordinary civil-accounting principles, where two parties hold
competing claims arising from the same relationship, the court may certify all
amounts through a standard offset and renouncement process, ensuring that any
verified obligation of one party is reduced or extinguished by the quantified
damages owed to the other.
Here, the disparity between the parties’ positions is extreme. Even under
conservative calculation, Appellee’s continuing violations of Texas Penal Code §
25.03 have produced an estimated $981,600 – $1,831,200 in compensable loss of
consortium—forty to eighty times greater than the sum Appellee seeks to collect.
Until those counter-claims are adjudicated and certified, it would be inequitable
and legally unsound for the judiciary or the Executive Branch, through the Office
of the Attorney General, to execute enforcement on her behalf. To do so would
sanction one party’s lawlessness while punishing the other’s victimization.

37
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, a litigant who has engaged in
continuous violations of court orders and felony-grade interference cannot invoke
the court’s power to compel performance from the very parent Appellee has
unlawfully excluded. Equity requires that one who seeks enforcement must first
demonstrate compliance with her own legal obligations. Appellee’s four-year
campaign of alienation has rendered her hands unclean; Appellee may not
simultaneously obstruct the parent-child relationship and profit from the
deprivation Appellee created.
Accordingly, any determination of monetary arrears should be held in abeyance and subjected to
full accounting and offset once the civil tort actions for Loss of Consortium (Parent–Child)
and related claims are adjudicated. Only after that process can a true balance be calculated and
certified, ensuring that the courts do not perpetuate inequity by enforcing a financial claim in
favor of a party whose ongoing misconduct has already caused damages of an exponentially
greater magnitude.

38
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Appendix 2 – Proof of Attempted Service and Return
Receipts
Purpose:

To substantiate that all required filings and notices were properly served
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a(b)(3) and that any claim of “non-
service” or “procedural defect” is factually unfounded. This appendix is
evidentiary support for your paragraph beginning:
“…Multiple USPS tracking confirmations and return-receipt images show timely
attempts at delivery, with written notices left at Appellee’s address of record…”

39
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

40
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

41
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

42
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

43
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

44
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

45
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

46
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

47
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

Appendix 3: Chronological Summary of Preserved
Challenges
The following chronological summary is derived directly from the Milam
County Clerk Records – Court of Appeals Submission Dated August 21, 2025,
which compiles all filings, motions, judicial notices, and orders entered under
Cause No. CV40037 in the 20th Judicial District Court of Milam County, Texas.
This record, transmitted to the Fifteenth Court of Appeals via the Third Court of
Appeals, reflects the complete procedural history and preservation of issues for
appellate review. Each entry below is identified by its date, title, and filing party,
with concise explanatory notes summarizing its legal purpose and relevance to the
constitutional and jurisdictional questions now before this Court.
“This chronology demonstrates Appellant’s consistent effort to
challenge jurisdiction, preserve constitutional objections, and seek judicial
clarification at every procedural stage”
April 23, 2021 – Final Decree of Divorce
• Established child support and visitation terms under a binding contractual decree.
• Serves as the controlling contract defining the rights and obligations of both
parties.
October 30, 2024 – Motion for Enforcement of Child Support (Filed by Office
of the Attorney General)
• The OAG initiated enforcement proceedings under Cause No. CV40037 seeking
collection of alleged arrears.
• Filing marked the beginning of the current chain of enforcement actions now
under appellate review.
December 2, 2024 – Service of Citation and Motion for Enforcement
Completed on Appellant
• Appellant was formally served with the OAG’s enforcement motion and citation.
• This date triggers the 20-day response period under Tex. R. Civ. P. 99(b),
setting the response deadline for December 23, 2024.
December 23, 2024 – Motion to Dismiss for Gross Material Breach of
Contract (Filed by Appellant Neil G. Switkowski)
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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

• Filed within the 20-day response window following service of citation.
• Asserts that Archbold’s willful denial of visitation constitutes a state-jail felony
under Penal Code §25.03.
• Argues that a party in felony violation cannot enforce a civil contract or invoke
court aid while in default.
January 6, 2025 – Motion for Declaratory Relief and to Dismiss Child Support
Enforcement (Switkowski)
• Challenges continuing post-divorce jurisdiction and enforcement absent mutual
consent.
• Invokes constitutional protection for marriage and dissolution under Loving, Yick
Wo, and Bruen.
January 6, 2025 – Motion to Reform Child Support Calculations and
Enforcement (Switkowski)
• Proposes an expense-based calculation model tied to Tex. Fam. Code
§154.001(a).
• Argues that current Title IV-D practices incentivize conflict and violate due
process.
January 6, 2025 – Motion for Sanctions Against the Office of the Attorney
General (Switkowski)
• Raises clean-hands and public-policy violations for aiding a party in felony
violation.
• Identifies Title IV-D financial incentives as an unconstitutional conflict of
interest.
February 5, 2025 – Motion for Default Judgment for Failure to Produce
Discovery (Switkowski)
• Notes Archbold’s continued refusal to provide visitation records.
• Requests adverse inference and judgment by default.
February 5, 2025 – Reset Order on Motion for Enforcement and Suit for
Modification of Support (Court)
• Court resets pending enforcement hearing on OAG’s modification suit.
• Maintains temporary enforcement posture pending further filings.

49
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

March 3, 2025 – Response to OAG Motion to Dismiss (Switkowski)
• Contests OAG standing and authority absent certification of statutory jurisdiction.
• Argues that Title IV-D actions in non-assistance cases constitute fraud upon the
court.
March 3, 2025 – Response to OAG General Denial (Switkowski)
• Rebuts OAG’s blanket denial and insists on judicial certification of constitutional
questions.
• Preserves all procedural and substantive objections for appellate review.
March 27, 2025 – Motion for Default Judgment for Willful Violation
(Switkowski)
• Cites Archbold’s ongoing obstruction of visitation as repeated contempt of
decree.
• Requests judgment recognizing pattern of felony interference under §25.03.
March 27, 2025 – Response to Petitioner’s Motion to Strike and Request for
Sanctions (Archbold/OAG)
• Seeks dismissal of Switkowski’s filings as frivolous or repetitive.
• Requests court sanctions and limitation on future filings.
May 1, 2025 – Notice of Constitutional Challenge (Switkowski)
• Filed under Gov’t Code §402.010 to challenge Title IV-D and Fam. Code §§154
& 157.
• Notifies Attorney General of statewide constitutional questions on jurisdiction
and funding.
May 1, 2025 – Amended Motion to Reform Child Support Calculations and
Enforcement (Switkowski)
• Updates expense-based formula and eliminates income percentage bias.
• Offers model for constitutional compliance and fiduciary neutrality.
May 1, 2025 – Motion for Judicial Certification, Stay of Proceedings, and
Temporary Injunction (Switkowski)
• Invokes Tex. R. App. P. 57.2 requesting certification to the Texas Supreme
Court.

50
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

• Seeks stay of all enforcement and incarceration pending resolution of
constitutional questions.
May 20, 2025 – Order Enforcing Child Support Obligation (Court)
• Finds Switkowski in contempt for arrears and sets purge conditions.
• Entry forms the basis of the current appeal to the Third Court of Appeals.
May 28, 2025 – Judicial Notice: Live and Specific Constitutional Controversy
(Switkowski)
• Asserts live constitutional dispute subject to appellate review.
• Establishes standing for direct judicial consideration.
May 28, 2025 – Judicial Notice: OAG Does Not Represent the Best Interest of
the Child (Switkowski)
• Challenges OAG’s fiduciary legitimacy and statutory role in non-assistance cases.
• Argues that enforcement actions serve state profit, not child welfare.
May 28, 2025 – Judicial Notice: OAG Is a Financially Interested Party
(Switkowski)
• Demonstrates OAG’s dependency on federal Title IV-D reimbursements.
• Establishes constitutional conflict of interest undermining neutrality.
June 13 2025 – Notice of Appeal Filed in Court of Appeals
• Perfects appeal to the Third Court of Appeals under Cause No. 03-25-00416-CV.
• Preserves all constitutional and procedural challenges for higher review.
June 17 2025 – Appearance of Counsel Filed
• Records formal representation and contact information for Appellant.
June 25 2025 – Docketing Statement Filed
• Provides jurisdictional basis and issues on appeal for COA docketing.
June 27 2025 – Document Filed
• Supplemental material entered to complete record for appellate submission.
July 18 2025 – Clerk’s Record Filed with Court of Appeals
• Milam County District Clerk transmits certified record to the Third Court of
Appeals.

51
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

July 21 2025 – Fee Paid
• Payment confirmation for appellate filing fees.
July 24 2025 – Notice of Late Record
• Court issues notice to court reporter for delayed reporter’s record.
July 25 2025 – Court Reporter Notice of Record Status
• Reporter advises no payment arrangements were made for transcript preparation.
August 25 2025 – Brief Received (Oral Argument Requested)
• Appellant’s brief accepted for filing pending final verification.
August 27 2025 – Motion to Quash Filed (Appellant)
• Challenges OAG standing and participation absent judicial certification of
authority.
August 28 2025 – Appellant’s Brief Filed (Oral Argument Requested)
• Consolidates constitutional arguments under Loving, Bruen, and Yick Wo.
• Requests certification of constitutional questions to the Texas Supreme Court.
September 2 2025 – Supplemental Clerk’s Record Filed
• Includes additional motions and judicial notices for complete appellate review.
September 23 2025 – Appellee’s Brief Filed (Office of the Attorney General)
• Defends trial court dismissal under Tex. Fam. Code § 231.016.
• Claims OAG acted within statutory authority and Appellant lacks standing.
September 24 2025 – Letter Issued by the Court
• Acknowledges receipt of Appellee’s brief and sets response timeline.
September 26 2025 – Letter Filed
• Administrative entry confirming notice of Appellee filings.
September 29 2025 – Appellee’s Brief Filed (Courtney Sinclair Archbold)
• Asserts Appellant’s filings were unserved and frivolous.
• Defends enforcement order and requests affirmance.
September 30 2025 – Supplemental Clerk’s Record Filed
• Adds certified orders and trial motions omitted from initial record.

52
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS Cause No. 15-25-00155-CV

October 2 2025 – Appellee’s Brief Filed (Oral Argument Not Requested)
• Final version of OAG’s brief entered into record.
October 13 2025 – Response Filed (Appellant – 15th COA Response)
• Addresses transfer status and procedural issues arising from § 27a letter.
October 15 2025 – Case Transferred to Fifteenth Court of Appeals
• Transfer order issued under Tex. R. App. P. 27a.
• Case renumbered 15-25-00155-CV and jurisdiction accepted by Fifteenth Court.
October 15 2025 – Order Entered (Transfer Order and Notice)
• Official order finalizing transfer and notifying all parties.
October 20 2025 – Appellant’s Reply Brief Filed (Pending Acceptance)
• Seeks reversal of § 231.016 dismissal and certification of constitutional
questions.
• Requests stay of enforcement and acknowledges systemic Title IV-D fraud
impacting similarly situated citizens.
“From the initial Motion to Dismiss for Gross Material Breach of Contract
through the current appeal before the Fifteenth Court, Appellant has raised a single
continuous jurisdictional question: how may the Office of the Attorney General
assert authority in a private contract dispute when neither party has assigned
rights under Tex. Fam. Code §§ 231.101 or 231.104, no public funds have
been expended, and the participating party was herself in felony violation of §
25.03?
Each successive filing, from motions for sanctions, declaratory relief, and
reform, through discovery enforcement has consistently preserved this challenge
and documented the OAG’s ongoing failure to answer. The record therefore
establishes both factual and constitutional fraud: a party in breach and a state
agency acting without jurisdiction joined in a profit-driven enterprise under Title
IV-D.”

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APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO COURTNEY SINCLAR ARCHBOLD’s BRIEF OF
APPELLEE 15-25-00155-CV
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 107067287
Filing Code Description: Other Brief
Filing Description: APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO THE OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Status as of 10/21/2025 7:08 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

COURTNEY ARCHBOLD Courtneyarchbold@gmail.com 10/20/2025 5:21:02 PM SENT

NEIL G.SWITKOWSKI ns512atx@gmail.com 10/20/2025 5:21:02 PM SENT

Deterrean Gamble deterrean.gamble@oag.texas.gov 10/20/2025 5:21:02 PM SENT