Cedric M. Scott, PhD v. General Land Office of the State of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00217-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/25/2025 3:53 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS CLERK
AT AUSTIN, TEXAS FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/25/2025 3:53:47 PM
CASE NO. 15-25-00217-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
(Transferred from the Third Court of Appeals)

CEDRIC M. SCOTT, PhD
Appellant, Pro Se

v.

GENERAL LAND OFFICE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee

On Appeal from the 250th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-25-000006

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE “GLO’S MOTION TO
DISMISS APPEAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION”

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Cedric M. Scott
Cedric M. Scott, PhD
901 Hidden Valley Drive, #9204
Round Rock, Texas 78665
cedricscott41@gmail.com

Appellant, Pro Se
TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant, Cedric M. Scott, PhD1, files this Motion to Strike the General

Land Office’s (GLO) Motion to Dismiss, and respectfully shows the Court as

follows:

I. RELEVANT FACTS

GLO’s Motion To Dismiss should be denied because:

1. It rests entirely on orders entered by a judge who was aware at the time of

his appointment that he was legally disqualified but did not recuse himself

from Appellant’s case until November 21, 2025;

2. GLO has never answered the operative Second Amended Petition and

remains in procedural default and has not re-joined the issue; and

3. There is no valid waiver, or consent that exists to support dismissal.

The record before the Court demonstrates structural defects that taints every

adverse ruling issued below and renders dismissal improper as a matter of law.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Motion to Dismiss Cannot Stand Because the Trial Court’s Orders
Are Void Due to Judicial Disqualification

Judge Cory R. Liu previously represented GLO in matters substantially

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Plaintiff’s first name is pronounced See-Drick and not Said-Drick. Gender is female, and pronouns are
she, her, and hers.

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related to federal CDBG-DR funds, compliance oversight, and civil-rights

enforcement—the same categories of governmental conduct that underlie

Appellant’s whistleblower claims.

Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(1)(B), mandatory disqualification exists where

a judge “served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom

the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer

concerning the matter.” Such disqualification is automatic and jurisdictional.

Texas law is unequivocal that a disqualified judge is “without authority to

act in the case,” and any orders entered are “void, not voidable.” In re Union Pac.

Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998); In re City of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506,

510 (Tex. 2021). A disqualified judge has no authority to act. In re Union Carbide

Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 155–56 (Tex. 2008). Parties cannot waive or forfeit a

judge’s disqualification—silence is irrelevant. Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982). Any order signed by a disqualified judge

is void whether or not the parties object. Cox v. Cox, 183 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex.

1944).

Judge Liu presided over this case for seven months knowing that he

previously represented GLO, denied Appellant’s summary judgment motion,

refused to rule on default judgment and sanctions, compelled Appellant’s

deposition, and managed scheduling—all before recusing himself on November

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21, 2025, only after Appellant provided supporting evidence of the conflict. These

rulings form the very procedural posture on which GLO now relies in seeking

dismissal. Because all such orders are void ab initio, they cannot support dismissal

in this Court. Disqualification is a structural defect, not an evidentiary one. A judge

must sua sponte (of one's own accord) to recuse himself when a disqualification

ground exists. Judges cannot wait for litigants to discover the conflict. See Tex. R.

Civ. P. 18b, Canon 3B(1).

B. GLO Cannot Seek Dismissal Because It Has Not Re-Joined the Issue
and Remains in Procedural Default

Appellant filed her Second Amended Petition on August 12, 2025, adding

new allegations including retaliation, cronyism, blacklisting, data-breach

nondisclosure, anti-discrimination training nondisclosure, and contract-

management deficiencies. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 62–65, an amended pleading that

alleges new matters requires a new answer. GLO never filed any answer to this

operative petition. Failure to answer renders a party in default, and all allegations

in the amended petition are deemed admitted. See Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d

679, 682 (Tex. 1979); Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494

(Tex. 1988).

A defaulting party may not request affirmative relief, challenge the merits, or

move for dismissal until it has properly answered and rejoined issue. Stoner, 578

S.W.2d at 682. GLO’s continuing refusal to answer strips it of standing to seek
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dismissal of Appellant’s claims. Its Motion to Dismiss is procedurally improper on

this ground alone.

C. Appellant’s Earlier Email Cannot Constitute a Knowing Waiver Under
Texas Law

GLO attempts to rely on an informal email sent early in the appellate process

in which Appellant expressed no opposition to dismissal. However, this argument

fails for several reasons. First, waiver of a fundamental right cannot occur where

the proceedings were tainted by structural judicial errors. The United States

Supreme Court has held that structural defects—such as judicial bias or

disqualification—“defy harmless-error analysis” and are not subject to waiver.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886–87 (2009). Texas courts

follows the same rule: a party cannot consent to or ratify proceedings conducted by

a disqualified judge. Buckholts ISD v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982).

Second, conference emails do not constitute a binding waiver, stipulation, or

Rule 11 agreement. A valid waiver must be intentional, knowing, and based on full

knowledge of the relevant facts. Appellant’s earlier email stating she did not

oppose dismissal cannot constitute a waiver because it was sent before she

discovered the full extent of Judge Liu’s conflict of interest and structural

disqualification. Throughout the litigation, Appellant consistently raised concerns

that Judge Liu was prejudging her case, displaying favoritism toward GLO, and

disregarding her motions for default, sanctions, and protection. At the time,
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Appellant did not yet understand the legal significance of these irregularities

because she had not yet connected them to the evidence in her possession—

specifically, documents revealing Judge Liu’s prior representation of GLO in

matters substantially related to the present dispute. It was only during her

preparation of the mandamus record that Appellant recognized the full

implications: that the judge who issued all adverse rulings was legally disqualified

ab initio under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(1)(B).

Because her “non-opposition” email (October 24, 2025) predates this

discovery, Appellant lacked the essential factual knowledge required to

intentionally waive a structural constitutional right. The law is clear: no waiver is

possible where a party is unaware of the foundational facts giving rise to the right

at issue, particularly in cases involving judicial disqualification or structural bias.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886–87 (2009) (due-process

violations arising from judicial conflict cannot be waived); Buckholts I.S.D. v.

Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982) (disqualification cannot be waived).

Accordingly, GLO cannot rely on the email as a knowing or voluntary waiver,

and it provides no basis for dismissal.

D. Dismissal Would Improperly Reward Procedural Misconduct and
Deprive Appellant of Meaningful Review

GLO’s “Motion to Dismiss” essentially asks this Court to affirm and adopt

rulings entered by a judge who lacked legal authority to act and to ignore GLO’s
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procedural default. Texas appellate courts refuse to permit litigants to benefit from

the consequences of judicial disqualification or procedural manipulation. In, In re

Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex.

2009), the Supreme Court of Texas emphasized that due process prohibits judicial

actions that undermine public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the

proceedings. Dismissing the appeal under these circumstances—where the record

is structurally compromised and where the Real Party in Interest has never

answered—would violate Appellant’s rights under Tex. Const. art. I §§ 13 and 19

and contradict fundamental principles of appellate review.

III. CONCLUSION

Since the trial court’s orders are void due to Judge Liu’s disqualification and

recusal, GLO remains in procedural default because no legally valid waiver exists,

and because dismissal would reward misconduct and deprive Appellant of her

statutory and constitutional rights. GLO’s Motion to Dismiss must be denied.

PRAYER

For these reasons, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to:

1. DENY the General Land Office’s Motion to Dismiss;

2. Strike and disregard any reliance on orders issued by the disqualified trial

judge;

3. Recognize the Honorable Judge Cory R. Liu’s recusal;

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4. Recognize GLO’s continued procedural default for failure to answer the

operative petition; and

5. Grant all further relief to which Appellant is justly entitled.

Date: November 25, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Cedric M. Scott

Cedric M. Scott, PhD
Appellant, Pro Se
901 Hidden Valley Drive, #9204
Round Rock, Texas 78665
Email: cedricscott41@gmail.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5, I hereby certify that on

this 25th day of November 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion

To Strike GLO’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction was e-filed and

served via electronic service (e-service) to the Court and:

Counsel for the General Land Office

Sara Labashosky
State Bar No. 24129467
slabashosky@bickerstaff.com

Gunnar P. Seaquist
State Bar No. 24043358
gseaquist@bickerstaff.com

Bickerstaff Heath Delgado Acosta LLP
3711 S. MoPac Expressway
Building One, Suite 300
Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 472-8021

/s/ Cedric M. Scott
Cedric M. Scott, PhD
Appellant, Pro Se

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PROPOSED ORDER

CAUSE NO.: 15-25-00217-CV (Transferred from the Third Court of Appeals)

IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS

CEDRIC M. SCOTT, PhD,
Appellant, Pro Se

v.

GENERAL LAND OFFICE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

On Appeal from the 250th Judicial District Court Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-25-000006

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE
GENERAL LAND OFFICE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

On this day, the Court considered Appellant’s Motion to Strike GLO’s Motion

to Dismiss. Having reviewed the Motion, the response (if any), the record before

this Court, and the applicable law, the Court finds that:

1. All trial-court rulings relied upon by the General Land Office were issued by

a constitutionally and statutorily disqualified judge, rendering such rulings

void ab initio under In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1998)

and In re City of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2021).

2. The General Land Office never answered Appellant’s live Second Amended

Petition filed August 12, 2025, which added new allegations including

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cronyism, blacklisting, conflicts of interest, systemic contract-management

deficiencies, data-breach nondisclosure, and discrimination-training failures.

3. Under Tex. R. Civ. P. 62–65 and Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.

1979), a party that fails to answer an amended petition containing new

claims remains in procedural default and may not seek affirmative relief,

including dismissal.

4. GLO’s attempt to seek dismissal while in default, and after having benefitted

from void rulings of a disqualified judge, is procedurally improper and

cannot cure structural error by answering the petition belatedly.

Appellant’s prior email indicating she did “not oppose dismissal” was sent before

she recognized the full implications that Judge Liu who issued all adverse rulings

was legally disqualified under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(1)(B) and therefore cannot

constitute waiver because structural judicial error is not waivable. Caperton v.

A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Buckholts I.S.D. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d

146 (Tex. 1982).

Accordingly, the Court finds the Motion to Strike should be GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. Appellant’s Motion to Strike the General Land Office’s Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED.

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2. The General Land Office’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby STRICKEN in

its entirety and shall not be considered by this Court.

3. The General Land Office remains in procedural default until it properly

answers the live Second Amended Petition in the trial court after assignment

to a lawful, non-conflicted judge.

4. The Court expressly finds that answering the petition at this stage does

not cure structural judicial error or retroactively validate void orders

issued by a disqualified judge.

5. The appeal shall proceed in the normal course.

SIGNED this ____ day of ______________________, 2025.

________________________________
Justice, Fifteenth Court of Appeals

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Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Envelope ID: 108469030
Filing Code Description: Motion - Exempt
Filing Description: Motion To Strike
Status as of 11/25/2025 4:38 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Jeffrey Moore jmoore@bickerstaff.com 11/25/2025 3:53:47 PM SENT

Gunnar Seaquist gseaquist@bickerstaff.com 11/25/2025 3:53:47 PM SENT

Sara Labashosky slabashosky@bickerstaff.com 11/25/2025 3:53:47 PM SENT

Cedric M.Scott cedricscott41@gmail.com 11/25/2025 3:53:47 PM SENT