State of Texas, Maxx Juusola, Tracy Martin, and Alan Crider v. City of Dallas, Kimberly Bizor Tolbert, in Her Official Capacity as the Interim City Manager for the City of Dallas and the State Fair of Texas

ACCEPTED
15-25-00122-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/9/2026 4:32 PM
NO. 15-25-00122-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
IN THE
15th COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
COURT OF APPEALS 1/9/2026 4:32:06 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
FOR THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Clerk
_____________________________________________
STATE OF TEXAS, MAXX JUUSOLA, TRACY MARTIN, AND ALAN CRIDER,
Appellants,
v.

CITY OF DALLAS, KIMBERLY BIZOR TOLBERT, IN HER OFFICIAL CA-
PACITY AS THE INTERIM CITY MANAGER FOR THE CITY OF DAL-
LAS, AND THE STATE FAIR OF TEXAS,
Appellees.
_____________________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE 298TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
DALLAS COUNTY
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE FAIR OF TEXAS
_____________________________________________
Robert B. Smith James B. Harris
State Bar No. 00786248 State Bar No. 09065400
3838 Oak Lawn Avenue Bryan P. Neal
Suite 1000 State Bar No. 00788106
Dallas, Texas 75219 Dina W. McKenney
(214) 522-5571 State Bar No. 24092809
(214) 522-5009 (Fax) HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
1722 Routh Street
Suite 1700
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 969-1700
(214) 964-9501 (Fax)
COUNSEL FOR STATE FAIR OF TEXAS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant: State of Texas
State’s Counsel: Ernest C. Garcia
ernest.garcia@oag.texas.gov

Canon Parker Hill
canon.hill@oag.texas.gov

Melissa Juarez
melissa.juarez@oag.texas.gov

Steven Ogle
Steven.Ogle@oag.texas.gov

Patrick Todd
Patrick.todd@oag.texas.gov

Alexander Comsudi
alexander.comsudi@oag.texas.gov

Keegan J. Howe
keegan.howe@oag.texas.gov

Administrative Law Division
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
Telephone: (512) 936-1838

Individual Appellants: Maxx Juusola, Tracy Martin, and Alan Crider

ii
Individual Appellants’ Tony K. McDonald
Counsel: tony@tonymcdonald.com

Connor Ellington
connor@tonymcdonald.com

The Law Offices of Tony McDonald
1308 Ranchers Legacy Trail Fort
Worth, Texas 76126

Appellees: City of Dallas and Kimberly Tolbert in her of-
ficial capacity as Interim City Manager for
the City of Dallas:

Appellees’ Counsel: Jeffrey Tillotson
jtillotson@tillotsonlaw.com

Anne M. Johnson
ajohnson@tillotsonlaw.com

Megan M. Coker
mcoker@tillotsonlaw.com

Nathaniel D. Buchheit
nbuchheit@tillotsonlaw.com

Tillotson, Johnson & Patton
1201 Nain Street, Suite 1300
Dallas, Texas 75202

Appellee: State Fair of Texas

iii
Appellee’s Counsel: James B. Harris
Jim.Harris@hklaw.com

Bryan P. Neal
Bryan.Neal@hklaw.com

Dina W. McKenney
Dina.McKenney@hklaw.com

Cole Browndorf
Cole.Browndorf@hklaw.com

Holland & Knight LLP
1722 Routh Street, Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201

Robert B. Smith
robert@smith-firm.com

3838 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1000
Dallas, Texas 75219

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................ ii
Table of Contents ...................................................................................... v
Index of Authorities.....................................................................................
Statement of the Case ............................................................................... 1
Statement Regarding the Record .............................................................. 2
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...................................................... 2
Issues Presented........................................................................................ 3
Introduction ............................................................................................... 4
Statement of Facts .................................................................................... 7
I. Factual Background ......................................................................... 7
II. Procedural Background.................................................................. 12
Summary of the Argument ..................................................................... 15
Argument ................................................................................................. 18
I. Relevant Legal Standards Regarding Firearms............................ 18
A. Legal Background on Firearms Laws and Related
Trespassing Provisions. ........................................................ 18
B. The OAG Previously—and Correctly—Agreed that
Section 411.209 Does Not Apply to Decisions Like that
of SFOT Because Property Law Allows Private Parties
(such as SFOT) to Exclude Those with Firearms from
Property They Control. ......................................................... 26
II. The State No Longer Advances Three of Its Four “Causes of
Action,” Leaving Only the Section 411.209 Claim. ....................... 33
III. The Court Should Dismiss the Individual Appellants’
Appeal, As They Have No Claim Under Section 411.209. ............ 35
IV. The Court Should Affirm the Trial Court’s Grant of
Summary Judgment in Favor of the Appellees ............................. 36
A. There Was No Violation of Section 411.209. ........................ 36

v
1. The City did not “take any action” prohibited by
section 411.209. ............................................................ 36
2. The State’s “take action” theories lack merit. ............. 39
B. The Trial Court Correctly Excluded Evidence of SFOT
Mistakenly Preventing a Peace Officer from Entering a
Previous Fair. ........................................................................ 50
Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................ 55
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................ 57

Appendix

A – Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(CR2:937) ................................................................................. Tab A

B – Order Granting SFOT’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Sustaining Evidentiary Objections (CR2:938-39) ................... Tab B

C – Order Granting the City and Kimberly Bizor Tolbert’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (CR2:942) ....................................... Tab C

D – Texas Government Code Section 411.209 .................................. Tab D

E – Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0108 (2016) (CR1:153-56). .................... Tab E

F – Firearms Statutes Chart ............................................................ Tab F

vi
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

BPX Operating Co. v. Strickhausen,
629 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. 2021) ................................................................ 41

Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
531 U.S. 288 (2001) ............................................................................. 34

Craig v. Mixon,
No. 07-97-0350-CV, 1998 WL 466133 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 11, 1998, pet. denied) ............................................ 30, 44

Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers,
282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009) .......................................................... 31, 36

Fla. Retail Fed., Inc. v. Att. Gen. of Fla.,
576 F. Supp.2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. July 28, 2008) .................................. 45

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,
687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) ........................................................... 45

Houle v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.,
570 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, pet. denied) .................... 51

Johnson Cty. Sheriff’s Posse, Inc. v. Endsley,
926 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. 1996) .......................................................... 30, 44

Kukis v. Newman,
123 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.) ............................................................................................... 30, 44

Levesque v. Wilkens,
57 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no
pet.) ......................................................................................... 29, 30, 44

Pacesetter Corp. v. Barrickman,
885 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ) .............................. 54
Paxton v. Garza,
No. 15-25-00116-CV, --- S.W.3d ----, 2025 WL 3764955
(Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Dec. 30, 2025) ................................................ 38

Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz,
940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1997) .................................................................. 34

Rogers v. Bagley,
623 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. 2021) ................................................................ 36

Rundus v. City of Dallas and State Fair of Texas,
634 F.3d 309 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 821 (2011) ......... passim

Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
268 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) ............................ 43

Severance v. Patterson,
370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012) ................................................................ 45

Smith v. Estill,
28 S.W. 801 (1894) .............................................................................. 41

State of Texas v. The City of Dallas,
No. 15-24-00103-CV (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Sept. 24,
2024) .................................................................................................... 13

In re State,
698 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. 2024) ........................................................ passim

Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Saintes,
No. 15-24-00092-CV, 2025 WL 1710798 (Tex. App. [15th
Dist.] June 19, 2025) ........................................................................... 52

Third Coast Servs., LLC v. Castaneda,
No. 23-0848, --- S.W.3d ----, 2025 WL 3558839 (Tex. Dec.
12, 2025) .............................................................................................. 36

Willis v. Donnelly,
199 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................ 40

i
Statutes

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 2.1305 .............................................. 17, 22, 52

Tex. Gov’t. Code § 411.171 ...................................................................... 18

Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.203 ................................................................. 25, 39

Tex. Gov’t. Code § 411.209 .............................................................. passim

Tex. Gov’t Code § 808.003 ....................................................................... 38

Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(35) .................................................................. 19

Tex. Penal Code § 30.05 .............................................................. 19, 22, 33

Tex. Penal Code § 30.06 .................................................................. passim

Tex. Penal Code § 30.07 .................................................................... 19, 20

Tex. Penal Code § 46.03 ........................................................ 15, 20, 21, 24

Tex. Tax Code § 142.009.......................................................................... 38

Tex. Util. Code § 162.058 ........................................................................ 38

Rules

Tex. R. App. P. 44.1 ................................................................................. 55

Tex. R. Evid. 401 ..................................................................................... 51

Other Authorities

Action, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/acti
on ......................................................................................................... 37

Action, COLLINS DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/actio
n ........................................................................................................... 37

52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 328 (2024) ............................................. 45

ii
Matthew R. Entsminger, Wrongful Exclusion of Concealed
Handgun License Holder Complaint – No Violation,
Tex. Att’y Gen. (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/opn/3006_lett
ers/2016-11-10 ..................................................................................... 28

Possessory Interest, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).................. 44

Ratification, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ............................. 40

Take Action, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/tak
e-action ................................................................................................ 37

Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0108 (2016) ................................................ passim

Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0240 (2019) ................................................. 29

Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Req. RQ-0097-KP (2016) ................................... 26, 27

Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Req. RQ-0558-KP (2024) ......................................... 28

Tex. S.B. 1065, 89th Leg. (Tex. 2025) ..................................................... 46

iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the State of Texas (the “State”) and three indi-

viduals (the “Individual Appellants”) against the City of Dallas (the

“City”), Kimberly Bizor Tolbert, in her official capacity as the then-In-

terim City Manager for the City of Dallas, and State Fair of Texas

(“SFOT”). CR1:271-91. The State challenged SFOT’s policy prohibiting

firearms at the annual State Fair of Texas exposition in Dallas (the

“Fair”) and sought penalties and declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. Af-

ter the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, the trial court (298th

Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas) (1) denied the Appellants’ motion

for summary judgment, (2) granted the Appellees’ motions for summary

judgment, and (3) sustained the Appellees’ evidentiary objections.

CR2:937-42.

1
STATEMENT REGARDING THE RECORD
The record on appeal consists of:

• the two-volume clerk’s record filed in this Court on July 29, 2025,
which will be cited as (CR[Vol.]:[page]);

• the one-volume supplemental clerk’s record filed in this case on No-
vember 12, 2025, which will be cited as SCR:[page]); and

• the one-volume reporter’s record filed in this Court on August 26,
2025, which will be cited as:
o For portions of a hearing transcript, (RR, [page]); and
o For non-paginated exhibits to a hearing transcript, (RR,
[Ex.]).

2
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
In granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, the trial

court applied a clear, unambiguous statute to undisputed facts. The facts

are straightforward and the law is clear. Accordingly, SFOT agrees with

the Appellants that oral argument is not necessary.

2
ISSUES PRESENTED
• Whether section 411.209 of the Government Code prohibits those
leasing property owned by a city from banning firearms in the ab-
sence of action by the city stating or implying that firearms are pro-
hibited at the leased property; and

• Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding as irrele-
vant evidence that was of no consequence in determining whether
section 411.209 of the Government Code had been violated.

3
INTRODUCTION
The parties agree that this case turns on the meaning of section

411.209 of the Government Code. And they agree that the plain or ordi-

nary meaning of the words used in that section control. They disagree

about the plain meaning, with SFOT focusing on the actual text of the

statute and the State focusing on public policy arguments and misguided

contentions about what it asserts the Legislature meant to, but did not,

say in the text. At bottom, the State, as it has throughout this litigation,

advances a position that would require the Court to redraft the statute.

Section 411.209(a) makes it unlawful for a political subdivision,

such as the City, to “take action…that states or implies [a licensed gun

holder] is prohibited from entering or remaining on a premises or other

place owned or leased by the [political subdivision].” The plain meaning

of those words does not describe the actions of a private entity. They only

describe a political subdivision taking action.

It is undisputed that SFOT is a private entity that operates a 24-

day private event—the Fair—at Fair Park, which is owned by the City

and leased to SFOT for use in SFOT’s business: operating the Fair. It also

is undisputed that it was SFOT alone that decided to prohibit firearms

4
at the Fair. The City of Dallas took no action that states or implies that

firearms are prohibited at the Fair. It is not surprising then that the

State’s brief fails to identify any action that the City took to state or imply

that firearms are prohibited, at least as the words “take” and “action” are

ordinarily understood.

The State’s brief instead largely repackages arguments previously

rejected by this Court and the Supreme Court in an earlier interlocutory

appeal. But those arguments fail to come to grips with the statutory text.

The State’s brief also fails to cite to the record in support of numerous

purportedly factual statements. In addition—and much more problem-

atic for an appellant seeking reversal of a summary-judgment decision,

the State chose to file its brief without the evidentiary record presented

to the trial court even being in the Clerk’s Record. SFOT has now cor-

rected that error. But its earlier absence means that the State cannot

possibly have properly addressed the summary-judgment record, includ-

ing sworn testimony that goes to multiple issues in the case such as the

lack of any City involvement in adopting the policy at issue.

Finally, as to SFOT, the State still runs head-long into the main

problem that now-Chief Justice Blacklock posed in his concurrence to the

5
denial of the State’s prior petition for a writ of mandamus: it fails entirely

to explain why, even if everything the State says about the City is correct,

SFOT as a private entity cannot lawfully bar handguns from the property

it controls, which is the result the State hopes to achieve in this litigation.

See In re State, 698 S.W.3d 904, 904-905 (Tex. 2024) (Blacklock, J., con-

curring”).

In the absence of the City taking action to state or imply that fire-

arms are prohibited at the Fair, there can be no violation of section

411.209. There was no such action by the City. Accordingly, the district

court correctly granted SFOT’s motion for summary judgment and denied

the State’s motion.

6
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

SFOT is a private nonprofit entity. SCR:95:6-9. It organizes and op-

erates the annual Fair. SCR:105:12-13. SFOT, or a predecessor entity,

has done so for over 100 years. SCR:94:25-95:5. SFOT currently conducts

the Fair on property, Fair Park, that the City owns and that it uncondi-

tionally allows SFOT to possess and control under a lease. SCR:99:16-

100:16.

The Fair is a 24-day private event. SCR:94:16-95:9. During the time

of the Fair, the grounds are gated. SCR:110:17-20. Fair Park is not an

open “park” during that time period. Id. Admission requires a ticket and

entry through one of the ticketing gates and security checkpoints. SCR:

106:25-107:2, SCR:110:17-20.

1 At the summary-judgment stage, the parties agreed that they could use

the evidence adduced at the hearing on the temporary injunction.
CR1:296. In accordance with that agreement, SFOT filed a Joint Appen-
dix Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. That Joint Appen-
dix was omitted from the initial Clerk’s Record, and so was not present
when the State filed its brief. SFOT then requested that it be added. It
now is contained in the Supplemental Clerk’s Record.

7
SFOT operates the Fair independently of any state agency or polit-

ical subdivision. SCR:98:14-23. Every court that has reviewed the rela-

tionship between SFOT and the City—including as explained further be-

low, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—agrees. See, e.g.,

Rundus v. City of Dallas and State Fair of Texas, 634 F.3d 309 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 565 U.S. 821 (2011).

There is no overlapping leadership structure between SFOT and

the City. SCR:96:11-97:24. None of SFOT’s officers are City employees or

officials or representatives of the City. SCR:96:17-25. SFOT is currently

governed by a 20-person board of directors, none of whom are government

employees, government officials, or government appointees. SCR:97:1-13.

SFOT alone selects its board of directors without involvement by or ap-

proval from the City. SCR:97:14-24. The independently selected board of

directors, not the City, oversees SFOT’s decision- and policymaking func-

tions. SCR:98:4-23.

SFOT’s authority does not extend beyond its own operations.

SCR:98:24-99:15. SFOT has no authority to enter into contracts on behalf

of the City or otherwise take any actions on the City’s behalf. SCR.98:24-

99:5. SFOT is not an agent of the City, nor has the City delegated any of

8
its powers to SFOT. SCR:99:6-11. The only authority SFOT has with re-

spect to Fair Park is its rights as a lessee of that land. SCR:99:12-15.

SFOT is financially independent of and does not receive any money

from the City to host the Fair. SCR:111:25-112:5. In fact, SFOT pays sub-

stantial sums to the City. SCR.102:1-13. SFOT pays rent and other fees,

makes certain tenant improvements in Fair Park, and provides funds to

the City to pay for capital improvements in Fair Park, though only ones

that benefit the Fair. Id.

SFOT likewise reimburses the City for the services it receives.

SCR:106:2-21. For example, the Dallas Police Department (“DPD”) main-

tains a significant presence at the Fair. SCR:105:20-22. SFOT fully reim-

burses the City for all DPD officers at the Fair, as well as, among other

services, first responders such as Dallas Fire and Rescue. SCR:106:2-21.

SFOT leases Fair Park pursuant to an agreement with the City,

known as the Fair Park Contract. SRC:99:12-19, 229. In all respects, the

Fair Park Contract is an arms-length agreement, similar to a long-term

commercial lease. SCR:130:21-132:4, 134:14-136:18, 229.

Pursuant to the Fair Park Contract, during the 24-day period of the

Fair—the only time relevant for this lawsuit—SFOT takes occupancy,

9
possession, and control of all areas of Fair Park except for certain venues

referred to as Cultural Facilities. SCR:115:10-14, 133:2-8. Those facilities

are owned by the City but are leased to and operated by private organi-

zations other than SFOT. SCR:100:17-101:13.

During the 24-day period of the Fair, SFOT’s control over the leased

property is exclusive. SCR:99:20-100:16. SFOT maintains complete con-

trol over the areas of Fair Park it leases, SCR:100:12-16; decides what

persons to admit, not admit, or ask to leave those premises, SCR:109:15-

110:5; pays for the utilities provided during the Fair, SCR:241-42; and

receives all revenues generated by activities on the leased premises,

SCR:103:2-10.

As part of that exclusive control, SFOT has independently devel-

oped policies governing conduct for fairgoers. SCR:107:13-108:2, 579.

Those policies are posted at entrances to the Fair and on SFOT’s website

and are referenced on the backs of tickets for admission. SCR:107:13-

108:18, 110:6-12, 577-79. Fairgoers agree to abide by SFOT’s policies

when they attempt to enter the Fair. SCR:579. SFOT retains the right to

refuse to admit individuals that refuse to follow the rules of conduct.

SCR:109:20-110:5, 579. The City has no involvement in determining who

10
SFOT allows to enter the Fair and had no influence in developing SFOT’s

conduct rules. SCR:109:20-110:16.

SFOT also does not rely on the City or its services to enforce SFOT’s

conduct rules. SCR:116:12-17. To be clear, DPD’s role at the Fair is to

keep the peace and enforce the laws and ordinances of the State and City.

SCR:119:16-20. DPD does not enforce SFOT’s conduct rules. SCR:116:18-

21. SFOT does. SCR:116:12-17. Of course, when a violation of SFOT’s

conduct rules escalates into a violation of an applicable law or ordinance,

DPD or other law enforcement officers respond accordingly. SCR:117:18-

118:11. That is the very purpose of law enforcement.2

SFOT made the independent decision to prohibit fairgoers (other

than active or retired peace officers or paid private licensed security per-

sonnel) from carrying firearms onto the fairgrounds. SCR112:6-114:2.

That limitation applied only during the 24 days of the Fair, which began

on September 27, 2024 and concluded on October 20, 2024. SCR:112:13-

2 See Rundus, 634 F.3d at 312, 314 & n.6 (discussing police presence at

the Fair and that the police do not enforce SFOT’s rules).

11
19. SFOT does not dispute that this policy was still in effect for the 2025

Fair. See App’x 1 to State Br.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 13, 2024, the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”)

sent a letter to the City concerning SFOT’s decision to prohibit firearms

at the 2024 Fair as required before filing a lawsuit. SCR:220-21; see TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 411.209(f). That letter threatened to “file suit to seek in-

junctive relief and collect civil penalties” if the City did not cure any al-

leged violation within fifteen days. SCR.221. On August 28, 2024, the

City responded to the OAG’s letter correctly indicating no violation of

section 411.209 had occurred because the property at issue is leased to

SFOT and SFOT alone had made the complained-of decision. SCR:222–

23.

On August 29, 2024, the State filed this lawsuit. CR1:14-27. On

September 19, 2024, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the

State’s application for temporary injunction. SCR:7. During the hearing,

witnesses testified on behalf of each party. SCR:11. The district court re-

lied on counsel’s arguments, the pleadings, responsive briefing, and the

12
evidence submitted. CR1:192. At the conclusion of the hearing, the dis-

trict court signed an order denying the State’s application for temporary

injunction. Id.

The State appealed the denial of the temporary injunction to this

Court, which denied the State’s motion for an emergency temporary in-

junction order. CR1:193; Order, State of Texas v. The City of Dallas, No.

15-24-00103-CV (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Sept. 24, 2024). The Texas Su-

preme Court denied the State’s subsequent petition for writ of manda-

mus. In re State, 698 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. 2024).

In an opinion concurring in the denial of that petition, now-Chief

Justice Blacklock, joined by former-Justice Hecht and Justice Young

noted that the State had not explained why SFOT lacks the authority to

prohibit guns at the Fair. Id. at 904 (J. Blacklock, joined by C.J. Hecht

and J. Young, concurring). That opinion also noted that a 2016 Attorney

General Opinion, discussed more fully below, had concluded that private

parties leasing government property can exclude handgun carriers “by

invoking the traditional authority of a tenant to control entry to the prop-

erty and to exclude non-compliant visitors as trespassers.” Id. And alt-

13
hough the 2016 Attorney General Opinion had been withdrawn, “with-

drawing the Opinion is not the same thing as repudiating its analysis or

explaining why it was wrong, which the State ha[d] not attempted to do

in [the Texas Supreme Court].” Id.

Back in the trial court, the parties conducted no discovery and re-

lied on the record from the temporary injunction proceeding in presenting

cross-motions for summary judgment. CR1:296. As relevant to its appeal,

the State sought to introduce evidence regarding a complaint it had re-

ceived from an off-duty police officer in connection with the 2022 Fair.

CR1:437-38, 440, 442-43. Because that complaint concerned a different

statutory scheme not at issue in the litigation (one specific to peace offic-

ers as discussed below) and was not relevant to whether the Appellees

had violated Section 411.209, the Appellees objected to that evidence.

CR2:789-90, 812-20.

After a hearing (RR, 1) the trial court sustained SFOT’s evidentiary

objections and granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.

CR2:937-42. This appeal followed. CR2:943-52.

14
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case concerns a straightforward application of an unambigu-

ous statute. The State alleges the City—and somehow SFOT as well—

violated Texas Government Code section 411.209. That statute provides

that governmental entities “may not take any action…that states or im-

plies that a [firearm] license holder…is prohibited from entering or re-

maining on a premises or other place owned or leased by the governmen-

tal entity” other than property where carrying a handgun is inde-

pendently unlawful. Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.209(a); see Tex. Penal Code

§ 46.03(a).

The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the Appel-

lees. The City did not violate section 411.209. By its clear terms, the stat-

ute prohibits “taking any action…that states or implies that” firearms at

not permitted at the Fair. But the State’s theories for how the City vio-

lated this section are unconnected to the plain language of the statute.

Indeed, although the State’s brief says that it is applying the plain lan-

guage of the statute, it instead relies on convoluted theories that treat

inaction as action, misapply the term “implies” in a way that omits that

what must be stated or implied is that license holders are prohibited from

15
entering or remaining on premises, and depend heavily on an incorrect

but irrelevant assertion about supposed public policy. At bottom, all of

the State’s arguments seek judicial redrafting of the statute, contrary to

established law.

The State’s (newly raised on appeal) “implicit ratification” theory

still requires that the City have taken some affirmative action. It does

not turn inaction into action. And the City failing to somehow override

SFOT’s decision to prohibit firearms (despite the absence of any legal au-

thority to do so) is not taking action, even with the State’s newly applied

label of “ratification” to its earlier arguments.

The State’s assertion that the City entering into a lease (years be-

fore the statute was enacted) that was neutral regarding the ability of

the lessee to prohibit firearms fares no better. Entering into a lease may

be taking an action, but when the lease says nothing about firearms, it is

not taking action that states or implies that firearms are not allowed at

the Fair.

Finally, the fact that if the City controlled Fair Park during the Fair

the City could not prohibit firearms does not mean a lessee is bound by

the same restriction. The statutory limitation is specific to who is taking

16
action with respect to specific property, not to the property by itself. The

plain language shows as much—“a state agency or political subdivision

of the state may not….” It does not say “Firearms may not be prohibited

on property owned by a governmental entity,” for example. Further, prop-

erty law is clear that restrictions that apply to an owner of land because

of the owner’s status are not applicable to a lessee of the that owner’s

property.

The State’s separate argument that the trial court improperly ex-

cluded evidence fares no better. That argument concerns exclusion of a

2022 complaint by a peace officer that he was denied entry by SFOT (not

the City) to the 2022 Fair with his service weapon. But that complaint

has nothing to do with SFOT’s 2024 policy at issue in this lawsuit. Be-

sides long predating that policy, the 2022 complaint was not based on

section 411.209 at all. Instead, it was based on Code of Criminal Proce-

dure article 2.1305, which is specific to peace officers and (unlike section

411.209) affirmatively grants them a right to carry firearms on certain

premises that are open to the public. Additionally, contrary to the State’s

argument, the City’s response to the 2022 complaint does not suggest any

level of control of SFOT. Simply put, that evidence is irrelevant to any

17
issue in this case, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding it.

ARGUMENT
I. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS REGARDING FIREARMS

A. Legal Background on Firearms Laws and Related
Trespassing Provisions.

To fully appreciate the flaws in the State’s arguments, it is helpful

to briefly review the various laws regulating the intersection of the right

to carry firearms and property rights. For the Court’s convenience, SFOT

has attached a chart of various firearm statutes to its brief as Appendix

F.

Texas Government Code Chapter 411, Subchapter H, has long pro-

vided a process by which certain Texas residents could apply for and re-

ceive a license to carry a handgun (either concealed or open ). Tex. Gov’t.

Code §§ 411.171, et seq.3 The Penal Code provides another important el-

ement of the firearm and property-rights framework. It provides one way

3 The need for a license under Subchapter H was significantly reduced in

2021 with the adoption of the Firearm Carry Act, commonly referred to
as the “constitutional carry bill,” which eliminated the need for Texas
residents to have a license in order to carry a handgun. That law is not

18
by which those controlling real property owners may, consistent with

common law and constitutional rights, restrict access to their property by

those carrying firearms. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 30.05–.07. In summary,

those cumbersome statutes provide:

• Section 30.05 of the Penal Code is the state’s general crim-

inal trespass law. It makes it an offense to enter property

of another where the “owner,” which includes a lessee,4 pro-

vided “notice that the entry was forbidden” or to remain on

property after the owner provides “notice to depart.” Id.

§ 30.05(a).

• Section 30.06 of the Penal Code is a special trespassing

relevant here given the State’s abandonment on appeal of any constitu-
tional claim and that section 411.209 is expressly limited to license hold-
ers.
4 The Penal Code broadly defines “owner” to include: “a person who:
(A) has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful
or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor;…”
Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(35). A “person” is defined in the Penal Code to
include an “association” a “corporation,” and an “association” in turn is
defined to include “a government or governmental subdivision or agency.”
Id. § 1.07(a)(6), (38). Under these definitions, SFOT is an owner.

19
statute for licensed concealed carriers. It makes it an of-

fense to enter property with a concealed handgun after re-

ceiving written or oral notice that entry with a concealed

handgun is prohibited by the owner. Id. § 30.06(a)–(b). It

also provides a specified form of written notice. Id.

§ 30.06(c)(3).

• Section 30.07 of the Penal Code is a special trespassing

statute for licensed open carriers. It follows the same ap-

proach for them as section 30.06. See id. § 30.07(a), (b),

(c)(3).

Each provision also contains exceptions and defenses, some of

which involve special circumstances pertaining to firearms. For example,

under sections 30.06(e) and 30.07(e) on property “owned or leased by a

governmental entity,” a handgun license-holder will not be deemed to

have committed the offense of criminal trespass under sections 30.06 or

30.07 simply by ignoring a 30.06 or 30.07 notice. Instead, on property

that is “owned or leased by a governmental entity,” it is a criminal offense

to possess a handgun pursuant to sections 30.06 or 30.07 only if that

property is specifically identified in Texas Penal Code section 46.03.

20
Penal Code section 46.03 lists several locations where it is a crime

for an individual to take a firearm. See id. § 46.03 (covering, for example,

amusement parks and sporting events). That section does not purport to

be an exclusive list of places where an individual may not take a firearm,

or where firearms may be prohibited; it is an exclusive list of locations

where possessing a firearm is a crime. Stated slightly differently, section

46.03 says nothing about what actions an owner of property may take to

prohibit firearms, nor does it say anything about the types of properties

where firearms may be prohibited.5

The same is true of sections 30.05, 30.06, and 30.07. Those three

sections describe the type of notice that is sufficient to create a criminal

offense in circumstances involving entry with a handgun or firearm. They

simply define in what circumstances the tort of trespass constitutes a

5 Previously in this litigation, the State devoted a significant amount of

time discussing the reach of section 46.03 to conclude that it does not
describe the entirety of the property that SFOT leases. That is not a point
in dispute: SFOT does not contend that the entirety of the grounds on
which the Fair is conducted fall within section 46.03. Parts of it do, but
the entire area does not. Regardless, the State appears to have aban-
doned its previous misguided argument that SFOT could prohibit fire-
arms only in areas covered by section 46.03.

21
crime and identify in what circumstances such a crime exists when a fire-

arm is involved. They do not prohibit other types of notices. They do not

prohibit any actor from posting a notice that might be ineffective for any

reason. At most, an invalid or noncompliant notice would affect the de-

fenses available to a criminal prosecution. The poster would not have it-

self violated any law.

The three sections also prohibit independent crimes, despite the

overlap in subject matter. That an individual has not violated one section

does not mean they have not violated another section. Thus, for example,

an individual who has not violated sections 30.06 or 30.07 by entering

property with a firearm because of a lack of proper notice under those

sections may still violate section 30.05 by remaining on property when

asked by the owner to leave—regardless of the owner’s reason for asking

the person to leave. See Tex. Penal Code § 30.05(a)(2). The statute recog-

nizes that fact by providing for enhanced punishment in the event of such

a failure to depart. Id. § 30.05(d–3).

Importantly, those sections do not grant individuals an affirmative

right to enter private or governmental property with a firearm even if a

notice invoking those provisions is for any reason invalid. Cf. Tex. Code

22
Crim. Pro. art. 2.1305 (prohibiting many privately-owned establishments

from restricting a peace officer or investigator from carrying a firearm

regardless of whether the officer or investigator is on duty). Again, those

sections address only when a criminal trespass prosecution can occur.

They do not prevent any party that possesses and controls property, ei-

ther public or private, from prohibiting firearms on that property when

in control of that property.

That is where Government Code section 411.209 comes in. It pro-

vides:

[A] state agency or a political subdivision of the state
may not take any action, including an action consisting of
the provision of notice by a communication described by Sec-
tion 30.06 or 30.07, Penal Code, that states or implies that
a license holder who is carrying a handgun under the au-
thority of this subchapter is prohibited from entering or
remaining on a premises or other place owned or leased
by the governmental entity unless license holders are pro-
hibited from carrying a handgun on the premises or other
place by Section 46.03, Penal Code, or other law.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.209(a) (emphasis added).6

6 SFOT previously noted as an aside that the only proper grammatical

construction of the phrase “leased by” in “owned or leased by” is that
“leased by” refers to property owned by another that is leased by a polit-
ical subdivision for its own use, not government-owned property leased

23
By its terms, the statute prohibits the government—and only the

government—from taking action that states or implies that a person car-

rying a handgun under a license7 may not enter or remain on property

owned or leased by the government except for areas covered by Penal

Code section 46.03 where the government, as the government, can ex-

clude firearms. It also carries an implied causation requirement. That is,

for government action to be prohibited by section 411.209, the reason for

the action has to be because the person is carrying a handgun. The statute

does not prohibit, for example, a governmental entity from removing an

individual from property for engaging in criminal conduct, or barring an

unauthorized individual from entry, simply because that individual hap-

pens to be a license holder carrying a handgun. Equally important, sec-

tion 411.209 does not impose on a state agency or a political subdivision

a duty to allow the carrying of a handgun on governmental property.

to another entity. SFOT stands by its understanding as the only reason-
able reading of the statute. But it does not matter: there is no dispute
that the City owns the property at issue here, so the meaning of “leased
by” is immaterial.
7 Again, the statute is limited to licensed carry; it does not apply to pro-

hibitions on those who would exercise “constitutional carry.”

24
In fact, Subchapter H of the Government Code, which includes sec-

tion 411.209, recognizes the right to exclude. Section 411.203 provides

that nothing within Subchapter H limits the right of any employer—pub-

lic or private—to prohibit license holders from carrying a handgun on the

premises of the business. Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.203. Because all or nearly

all governmental entities are employers, there is an apparent tension be-

tween section 411.203, which appears to allow any employer (including a

public employer) to exclude license holders (employees or nonemployees)

from its premises, and section 411.209, which prohibits a governmental

entity from stating or implying that a license holder may not enter a place

owned or leased by the entity.

Section 411.209 may simply represent a significant exception to

411.203, such that the former effectively removes the right provided by

the latter to the City to deny persons entry to locations where the City

conducts business. That view would reinforce that section 411.209 was

intended to regulate governmental entities only, not private parties, such

as SFOT, which are still covered by section 411.203 (assuming the private

party is an employer, as SFOT is, SCR:93:11-15, 118:15-119:5).

25
At bottom, however, reconciling the tension between section

411.203 and section 411.209 is unnecessary. That is because—separate

from the special Penal Code provisions relating to firearms—SFOT’s

right to exclude license holders (and anyone else) from its controlled prop-

erty derives from longstanding property law rights, with or without stat-

utory reinforcement of those rights—as the OAG at one time agreed. See

infra Subpart I.B, Subpart IV.A.

B. The OAG Previously—and Correctly—Agreed that
Section 411.209 Does Not Apply to Decisions Like that
of SFOT Because Property Law Allows Private Parties
(such as SFOT) to Exclude Those with Firearms from
Property They Control.

In 2016, the Erath County Attorney submitted a request for an

opinion from the OAG regarding the ability of a non-profit agency oper-

ating on land it leases from the government to prohibit handguns pursu-

ant to sections 30.06 and 30.07. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Req. RQ-0097-

KP (2016). The non-profit agency was the only tenant on the city-owned

land. The request further specified that “[t]he City has no authority as to

the operation of the non-profit and all decisions are made by an independ-

26
ent board of directors.” Id. at 1. In other words, the non-profit had exclu-

sive control over the city-owned property and made policy decisions au-

tonomously, without government oversight.

In response, the OAG issued Op. KP-0108. See CR1:153-56 (App.

E). That opinion correctly notes “the prohibition in subsection 411.209(a)

applies only to ‘a state agency or political subdivision of the state.’”

CR1:154 (App. E) (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.209(a)). Op. KP-0108

suggests that in situations where “a private entity is operating jointly

with a governmental entity or has been hired by the governmental entity

to perform certain governmental functions, fact questions could arise

about which entity effectively posted a notice prohibiting the carrying of

guns.” But outside of that scenario, “[a]s long as the state agency or po-

litical subdivision leasing the property to the nonprofit entity has no con-

trol over the decision to post such notice, the state agency or political

subdivision lessor would not be the entity responsible for the posting and

would therefore not be subject to civil penalty under section 411.209.”

CR1:154 (App. E).

Later, the OAG reinforced its opinion in dismissing citizen com-

plaints arising from property of the kind covered in the opinion. See CR1:

27
157-58; SCR:458–60, 461–63. For example, concerning the Fort Worth

Zoo, the OAG determined that the section 30.06 signs at issue were per-

missible because they were “posted by the [Fort Worth Zoological Associ-

ation], which possesses the exclusive right to post signage on the zoo

premises under the terms of its fee-for-services management contract

with [Fort Worth].” CR1:158.8

Because here, as discussed further below, there is no record evi-

dence that the City and SFOT operate the Fair jointly and the evidence

was undisputed that the decision at issue was SFOT’s alone, the situation

in this case fits squarely within Op. KP-0108. The City did not violate

section 411.209.

After the OAG notified the City of its belief of a section 411.209

violation with respect to SFOT’s prohibition on firearms, however, two

legislators requested an opinion from the OAG on the issue. See Tex. Att’y

Gen. Op. Req. RQ-0558-KP (2024). Then—the day before the State had

8 See Matthew R. Entsminger, Wrongful Exclusion of Concealed Handgun

License Holder Complaint – No Violation, Tex. Att’y Gen. (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/opn/3006_letters/2016-11-10
-Fort_Worth_Zoo.pdf.

28
originally scheduled its hearing on the temporary injunction—the OAG

“withdrew” Op. KP-0108, purportedly “pending issuance” of an opinion in

response to that request.9 This, despite longstanding policy of the OAG

not to issue opinions involving disputed facts or during litigation10 and

despite the lack of any precedent in the OAG for withdrawing an opinion

simply because someone has requested another opinion.

The conclusion reached in Op. KP-0108 was an express recognition

of longstanding Texas property laws: “As a general rule, a lessor relin-

quishes possession or occupancy of the premises to the lessee.” CR1:154

(App. E) (quoting Levesque v. Wilkens, 57 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)). Levesque reinforces that Op. KP-

0108 is a correct interpretation of the law:

The law is well settled that when land is leased, the lessee
becomes the possessor and occupier of the land, and the les-

9 See KP-0108, TEX. ATT’Y GEN., https://www.texasattorneygen-
eral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0108.
10 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0240 (2019) at 1 (“The attorney general

opinion process does not resolve disputed fact questions or settle private
disputes.”); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0118 (2016) at 2 (explaining that
“[d]eclining to answer a question that is the subject of pending litigation
is a long-standing policy of this agency” and citing attorney general opin-
ions dating back to 1947).

29
sor’s liability for…conditions on the premises generally termi-
nates. A lease grants a tenant exclusive possession of the
premises as against the owner….When the lessor has no con-
trol over the premises, the lessor has no liability for injuries
stemming from leased premises within the control of a tenant.

Levesque, 57 S.W.3d at 504–05 (internal citations omitted); see also John-

son Cty. Sheriff’s Posse, Inc. v. Endsley, 926 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex. 1996)

(“[A] lessor relinquishes possession or occupancy of the premises to the

lessee.”); Kukis v. Newman, 123 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (same); Craig v. Mixon, No. 07-97-0350-CV,

1998 WL 466133, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 11, 1998, pet. denied)

(same).

Finally, Op. KP-0108 correctly determined that the question of

whether sections 30.06 and 30.07 “make it an offense for a person carry-

ing a handgun to enter property leased by a nonprofit entity from a state

agency or political subdivision” was a separate issue. On that issue, de-

spite apparent contrary legislative history, the OAG determined that the

words of the statute must be followed and those words state that govern-

ment ownership of the property is an exception to trespassing under

those sections. That conclusion followed from the well-settled principle

that “[e]nforcing the law as written is a court’s safest refuge in matters

30
of statutory construction, and we should always refrain from rewriting

text that lawmakers chose.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282

S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009).

In sum, Op. KP-0108 squarely answered the question whether

under the circumstances here SFOT has the right to bar firearms from

its private event. In re State, 698 S.W.3d at 905 (J. Blacklock, joined by

C.J. Hecht and J. Young, concurring) (“The Opinion concluded that a

private party in such a position likely could prohibit guns in this way

under Texas law”).

Yet the OAG filed this action on behalf of the State in direct conflict

with the OAG’s previous position as expressed in Op. KP-0108. As all are

aware by now, the OAG then (under what SFOT contends are suspicious

circumstances) withdrew the opinion. Regardless of the reason for the

withdrawal, the act of withdrawing does not eliminate the underlying

legal principles on which Op. KP-0108 relied. As now-Chief Justice

Blacklock noted in his earlier concurrence, withdrawing an opinion is not

the same as repudiating its analysis or explaining why it was wrong. In

re State, 698 S.W.3d at 904 (J. Blacklock, joined by C.J. Hecht and J.

Young, concurring).

31
The State now appears to try to respond to Chief Justice Blacklock’s

challenge by arguing that Op. KP-0108 is now inapposite because it

addressed a prior version of the statute. State Br. 45. The problem is that

the statutory amendment did not in any way impact the legal principles

that Op. KP-0108 relied on, which still apply today.

Specifically, the version of the section 411.209(a) that was in effect

at the time that Op. KP-0108 was issued (the 2015 version) provided:

A state agency or a political subdivision of the state may not
provide notice by a communication described by Section 30.06,
Penal Code, or by any sign expressly referring to that law or
to a concealed handgun license, that a license holder carrying
a handgun under the authority of this subchapter is prohib-
ited from entering or remaining on a premises or other place
owned or leased by the governmental entity unless license
holders are prohibited from carrying a handgun on the prem-
ises or other place by Section 46.03 or 46.035, Penal Code.

The State appears to identify two changes in the 2019 amendment as

justifying the withdrawal of the opinion: (1) forbidding any action that

states or implies exclusion and (2) subjecting violators to daily civil

penalties, mandamus, and other equitable relief. State Br. 43. But the

State makes no attempt to explain why these changes matter in the

context of Op. KP-0108’s reasoning. They don’t.

32
Op. KP-0108 reached its conclusion by looking to (1) property law

and (2) whether the state agency or political subdivision has control over

the decisions of the lessee. SCR:455. As explained above, these core

principles mandate the same result in Op. KP-0108, regardless of the

changes the State identifies. Thus, the opinion’s analysis remains correct,

despite its withdrawal: SFOT’s rights under property law authorize it to

prohibit firearms at its private event.

II. THE STATE NO LONGER ADVANCES THREE OF ITS FOUR “CAUSES
OF ACTION,” LEAVING ONLY THE SECTION 411.209 CLAIM.

At the district court level and on appeal of the temporary injunction

issue, the State advanced what the State labeled as four separate “causes

of action”: (1) a claim that Appellees violated section 411.209, (2) a re-

quest for a declaratory judgment that SFOT may not post section 30.06

or 30.07 signs, (3) a request for declaratory judgment that SFOT may not

post section 30.05 signs, and (4) a claim for violation of the Texas Consti-

tution.11

11 SFOT pointed out that those were not all “causes of action,” specifically

the requests for declaratory relief.

33
On appeal, the State challenges only the dismissal of its claim that

SFOT’s policy prohibiting firearms violates section 411.209. It abandoned

the request for relief regarding posting and, importantly, abandoned any

constitutional claim. See State Br. at xiv (identifying the issue presented

as “was the State entitled to summary judgment against the City and the

[SFOT] under Section 411.209”).

Nevertheless, the State still cites to authority addressing the state-

action doctrine. See State Br. 30 (citing, e.g., Republican Party of Tex. v.

Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. 1997)). But the state-action doctrine is a prin-

ciple of constitutional law, under which “state action may be found if,

though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the

challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated

as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch.

Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). This Court should reject the

State’s attempt to conflate principles surrounding a constitutional claim

that it has abandoned with its claim under section 411.209. Regardless,

the Fifth Circuit has already held that there is no state action in the op-

eration of the Fair. See Rundus v. City of Dallas and State Fair of Texas,

634 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 821 (2011). Tellingly,

34
citing cases applying the state-action doctrine, the State offers no re-

sponse to Rundus.12

III. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE INDIVIDUAL APPELLANTS’ AP-
PEAL, AS THEY HAVE NO CLAIM UNDER SECTION 411.209.

The Individual Appellants did not file a separate appellate brief and

notified this Court that they intend to rely on the State’s brief. But the

Individual Appellants do not have standing to bring a claim for violation

of section 411.209. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.209(g) (“If the attorney gen-

eral determines that legal action is warranted and that the state agency

or political subdivision has not cured the violation within the 15-day pe-

riod provided by Subsection (f)(3), the attorney general or the appropriate

county or district attorney may sue to collect the civil penalty provided by

Subsection (b).” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court should dis-

miss the appeal filed by the Individual Appellants.

12 The State—as it has with every brief it has filed in this case—has also

modified its arguments on the section 411.209 issue. For example, it no
longer argues that any role the City’s police officers would have in remov-
ing an individual that SFOT decided was no longer welcome at the Fair
would violate that provision. Presumably, the State does so because of
Justice Blacklock pointing out the flaws with that position. See In re
State, 698 S.W.3d at 904 n.1 (J. Blacklock, joined by C.J. Hecht and J.
Young, concurring).

35
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES

A. There Was No Violation of Section 411.209.

1. The City did not “take any action” prohibited by
section 411.209.

The proper method of interpreting a statute is settled:

The meaning of a statute is a legal question, which we review
de novo to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.
Where text is clear, text is determinative of that intent. This
general rule applies unless enforcing the plain language of the
statute as written would produce absurd results. Therefore,
our practice when construing a statute is to recognize that
“the words [the Legislature] chooses should be the surest
guide to legislative intent.” Only when those words are am-
biguous do we “resort to rules of construction or extrinsic
aids.”

Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 437. Indeed, the Texas Supreme

Court recently reaffirmed these principles just weeks ago, noting that

courts “‘presume the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care,

including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting

words not chosen.” Third Coast Servs., LLC v. Castaneda, No. 23-0848, -

-- S.W.3d ----, 2025 WL 3558839, at *3 (Tex. Dec. 12, 2025) (quoting Rog-

ers v. Bagley, 623 S.W.3d 343, 352 (Tex. 2021)).

Applying the undisputed facts to the statutory text resolves the

State’s claim of a violation of section 411.209. To begin, the statute only

36
prohibits conduct by the government—a governmental entity may not

take action that states or implies that a licensed handgun carrier is pro-

hibited from entering government property with the handgun. SFOT is a

private entity; it therefore plainly is not covered by section 411.209. The

State does not appear to dispute that proposition but argues that SFOT

is responsible for the City’s alleged section 411.209 violation. That argu-

ment fails, however, because the City has not violated section 411.209:

the City did not take any action that states or implies that firearms are

prohibited on the Fair grounds.

“Action” means “doing something for a particular purpose.”13 It is

“the process of doing something, especially when dealing with a problem

or difficulty.”14 Similarly, the collocation “take action” means, as one

would guess, to do something.15 Doing nothing is the opposite of doing

something. The Legislature knows how to and does distinguish between

13 Action, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dic-

tionary/english/action.
14 Action, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cam-

bridge.org/us/dictionary/english/action.
15 Take Action, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cam-

bridge.org/us/dictionary/english /take-action.

37
acting and failing to act when it means to.16 See Paxton v. Garza, No. 15-

25-00116-CV, --- S.W.3d ----, 2025 WL 3764955, at *4 (Tex. App. [15th

Dist.] Dec. 30, 2025) (“Because the Legislature has expressly granted

rulemaking authority to the Attorney General in numerous other

statutes and clearly knows how to expressly grant rulemaking authority

when it intends to do so, we cannot conclude Section 41.006 grants

express rulemaking authority here.”).

Here, the City did nothing regarding SFOT’s decision to prohibit

firearms at the Fair. It is undisputed that only SFOT adopted the

prohibition on firearms. SCR:113:24-114:10, 132:16-20. The City did not

do so. Id. It did nothing to adopt the prohibition, and did nothing to state

or imply that firearms were prohibited. Section 411.209 does not require

16 E.g., Tex. Util. Code § 162.058 (addressing perfecting defectively orga-

nized organizations where the organization “files defective articles of in-
corporation or fails to take an action necessary to perfect its corporate”
(emphasis added)); Tex. Tax Code § 142.009 (“A person may not challenge
… an action or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumen-
tality of this state, or any political subdivision of this state, on the ground
that the action or inaction is inconsistent with the agreement.” (emphasis
added)); Tex. Gov’t Code § 808.003 (“In a cause of action based on an ac-
tion, inaction, decision, divestment, investment, company communica-
tion, report, or other determination made or taken in connection with this
chapter … .” (emphasis added)).

38
the City to ensure firearms are allowed on property: it prohibits only the

specified action by the City.

2. The State’s “take action” theories lack merit.

On appeal, the State advances three separate theories for how the

City took action. All are incorrect.

First, the State maintains that the City has taken action through

what it for the first time refers to as “implicit ratification” of SFOT’s

policy. State Br. 27–30. Put another way, the State argues that “the City

has never attempted to clarify with SFOT that the Fair Park Contract

does not allow it to institute its ban at issue.” Id. 28. And elsewhere, the

State suggests that the City should have terminated its contract with

SFOT to prevent SFOT from continuing its policy. Id. at 38.

As an initial matter, the lease does not prohibit SFOT from

prohibiting firearms. Section 411.209 applies only to the City. There is

no State law that prevents SFOT from prohibiting licensed holder from

entering its business—the Fair. In fact, section 411.203 explicitly allows

SFOT to do so. Additionally, the City had no legal basis to terminate the

lease because SFOT did so, and the State does not identify any, given

39
that SFOT was not in violation of the lease or State law by prohibiting

firearms.

As to the State’s newly labeled “implicit ratification” argument,

that theory fails for multiple reasons. As an initial matter, the State does

not explain why the legal doctrine of ratification even applies here, much

less how it would translate to a violation of section 411.209. “Generally,

ratification is a doctrine of agency law, and allows a principal to be bound

by an agent’s unauthorized contract in circumstances where the principal

becomes aware of the contract and retains benefits under it.” Willis v.

Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 273 (Tex. 2006); Ratification, Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Confirmation and acceptance of a previous

act, thereby making the act valid from the moment it was done … .”). But

this agency-law principal has no connection to section 411.209, which

asks only whether the City has taken an action stating or implying that

firearms are not permitted during the Fair. That is all the more the case

because SFOT is not the agent of the City.

Additionally, SFOT’s firearm policy is not “unauthorized,” a core

requirement for ratification. As explained below, SFOT’s firearm policy

did not violate the lease, and so it was not unauthorized. See infra.

40
Moreover, ratification, implicit or otherwise, generally requires

some affirmative act, just as does section 411.209. Indeed, in the case the

State relies on as supporting its implicit-ratification theory there was a

necessary affirmative act supposedly justifying ratification: the cashing

of checks. See BPX Operating Co. v. Strickhausen, 629 S.W.3d 189, 200

(Tex. 2021); Smith v. Estill, 28 S.W. 801, 805 (1894) (“To constitute a

ratification, it must appear that the acts relied upon were done with a

full knowledge of all the facts, and with intent to adopt the unauthorized

act in question.” (emphasis added)). The State identifies no similar

affirmative act by the City that could be viewed as ratification. The City

did nothing. The State agrees. Its complaint—that the City sat idle, did

not try to intervene, and failed to terminate the lease—represent

inaction.17

17 Although there may be rare cases where ratification was found based

on “[p]rolonged silence or inaction,” ratification in such circumstances
can occur only “when the circumstances create some obligation to speak
up or act.” BPX, 629 S.W.3d at 208. But here, the City had no obligation
to speak up or act. Section 411.209 simply required that it not take any
action that states or implies that firearms are banned at the Fair. The
statute does not contain any obligation to disclaim or otherwise disagree
with SFOT’s policy.

41
Perhaps most crucially, even if inaction could constitute

“ratification” in certain circumstances (not present here), that

ratification would be insufficient to constitute a violation of section

411.209. Again, for section 411.209 to be violated there must be an action.

The State cannot slap the “ratification” label on inaction and magically

turn inaction into action. In this regard, the State’s appeal to the

importance of the plain meaning of the statute, e.g., State Br. 23, proves

to be nothing short of lip service. The State cannot rewrite section

411.209 to prohibit inaction to achieve its desired policy. That is the

province of the legislature.

Second, the State asserts that the City took action “through its

unlawful grant of authority to prohibit license holders carrying guns

through the Fair Park Contract.” This theory fails as well. Entering the

contract, although an “action,” does not state or imply that firearms are

prohibited on the premises. In fact, the State itself explicitly

acknowledges this very point: “The Fair Park Contract is silent

regarding license holders carrying handguns on the premises of Fair

Park, but it does contain a provision stating that it shall be construed

according to the laws of Texas.” State Br. 28 (emphasis added). But as

42
already established the laws of Texas actually allow private landholders

and employers, such as SFOT, to prohibit even licensed holders from its

business—the Fair. The OAG concluded the same in its previous opinion:

“As long as the state agency or political subdivision leasing the property

to a nonprofit entity has no control over the decision to post such notice,

the state agency or political subdivision lessor would not be the entity

responsible for the posting and would therefore not be subject to a civil

penalty under section 411.209.” CR1:154 (App. E). And section 411.209

does not prohibit action by the City that merely “makes possible” a

private prohibition on handguns.

This second theory also overlooks that at the time the lease was

first entered, in 2003, section 411.209 did not exist.18 And once the lease

was entered the City could not legally force SFOT to accept an

amendment. Basically, the State is arguing that the City’s failure to take

an act it could not take is ratification. That assertion collapses on itself.

18 Section 411.209(a) does not purport to be and is not retroactive. See

Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 268 S.W.3d 190, 203 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2008, no pet.) (“Unlike the United States Constitution, the Texas
Constitution has a specific prohibition against retroactive laws.”).

43
Third, the State’s argument that SFOT cannot exclude firearms

because its rights as a lessee are limited by statutory constraints on the

City (the lessor) is incorrect.19 In Texas a leasehold estate, in the absence

of contrary language in the lease, divests the fee owner of all possession

and control of the property governed by the lease and grants it to the

tenant.20 Johnson Cty. Sheriff’s Posse, Inc. v. Endsley, 926 S.W.2d 284,

285 (Tex. 1996) (“[A] lessor relinquishes possession or occupancy of the

premises to the lessee.”); Kukis v. Newman, 123 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (same); Levesque v. Wilkens, 57

S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Craig v.

Mixon, No. 07-97-0350-CV, 1998 WL 466133, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

Aug. 11, 1998, pet. denied) (same). As a result, the fee owner has

19 SFOT does not disagree that the Legislature can regulate lease terms,

if consistent with the state’s police power, and control how public lands
are to be leased. See State Br. 35–37. But section 411.209 by its terms
does neither. It addresses only who a state agency or political subdivision
can exclude from public property when the state agency or political sub-
division has possession and control of the public property.
20 To have a possessory interest is defined as “[t]he present right to con-

trol property, including to exclude others, by a person who is not neces-
sarily the owner.” Possessory Interest, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024).

44
transferred and no longer possesses one of the most essential and

treasured rights associated with real property — the ability to exclude

others. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. 2012). The right

to occupy to the exclusion of others is a key characteristic of a leasehold.

52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 328 (2024). For all practical purposes a

lease is equivalent to absolute ownership, the primary right missing

being the ability to sell the leased property. Id.

And, as multiple courts have recognized, the right to exclude others

from property includes the right to exclude those with firearms. See, e.g.,

GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir. 2012)

(“[A property owner’s] right, rooted in the common law, to forbid

possession of firearms on its property is entirely consistent with the

Second Amendment.”); Fla. Retail Fed., Inc. v. Att. Gen. of Fla., 576 F.

Supp.2d 1281, 1295 (N.D. Fla. July 28, 2008) (“But a private business’s

banning of guns on its own property plainly is not unconstitutional; there

is no constitutional right to bear arms on private property against the

owner’s wishes.”). A lessee’s right to exclude is not limited by any

constraints the owner may have based on its status. As much as the State

would like it to say so, Section 411.209 does not say that licensed holders

45
cannot be prohibited from entering or remaining on property owned or

leased by the governmental entity. Nor does it grant an affirmative right

to enter as the peace-officer statute does. Instead, it says the

governmental entity, here the City, cannot take action to prohibit their

entering or remaining. It imposes what amounts to a personal restriction

on a particular type of owner based on their status—here being a

governmental entity.21

Under the State’s argument a host of property-related restrictions

on individual conduct would somehow transform into restrictions on

subsequent owners or lessees of property. For example, if a private

landowner is prohibited from lawful possession of a firearm because of a

felony conviction then a lessee of that property is likewise prohibited from

21 The Legislature seems to agree that section 411.209’s reach was based

on the status of the owner and did apply to governmental property that
was leased to a private party. In the 2025 session, a bill introduced to
address SFOT prohibiting firearms would have done so by adding a new
status section applicable to contractors that leased governmental prop-
erty. See S.B. 1065, 89th Leg. (Tex. 2025). In other words, the bill’s author
read section 411.209 exactly as does SFOT and the City of Dallas. Section
411.209 applies only when the City as the City takes action as a govern-
mental entity. That bill made it out of the Senate but died in the House.
See https://legiscan.com/TX/bill/SB1065/2025.

46
possessing a firearm. Or, if a homeowner subject to a protective order

requiring him or her to stay away from a nearby neighbor moves and

leases the property, the tenant would be subject to the order. Title II of

the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits owners of businesses that

operate public accommodations from discriminating on various grounds.

Those prohibitions are tied to the nature of the property—is it being

operated as a public accommodation? To accept the State’s view asserted

here, that even though the prohibition concerns whether the land is being

used for a particular type of activity (operating a public accommodation),

it would automatically transfer to a tenant or subsequent owner who does

not operate the property as a public accommodation. Good policy or not,

that simply is not the law. The restriction under that statute, just like

section 411.209, is purely personal to the operator of a public

accommodation. It does not attach to the land.22

22 Making the point even more starkly, the State’s view would mean that

a city could never sell property without it being encumbered by the sec-
tion 411.209 prohibition. So if the City had surplus real property and sold
it in compliance with applicable law, under the State’s view the section
411.209 restriction would necessarily transfer to the new owner. That
example shows why the State’s contention is nonsense. It would conflict
with the statutory language.

47
For that reason, the State’s “bundle of sticks” discussion fares no

better. The State contends that the right to exclude is one of the sticks in

the “bundle of sticks” that define an estate in land and that if a fee owner

does not have that right neither does a tenant. But that conclusion is true

only if the land, as opposed to the owner, is so restricted. Section 411.209

only restricts state agencies and political subdivision from excluding

licensed handgun owners from public property; it does not say licensed

handgun owners cannot be excluded regardless of who possesses the right

to exclude. As already explained, it is hornbook law that once property is

leased the lessor no longer controls who can be admitted or excluded.

That right exists exclusively in the tenant

The State suggests that Lightning Oil is to the contrary by

selectively quoting from the opinion without reference to the facts.

According to the State, Lightning Oil stands for the proposition that a

leasehold estate has the same restrictions as the fee estate. Not so. In

Lightning Oil a fee owner had severed the mineral estate, and the owner

of the mineral estate had in turn entered into an oil and gas lease with

Lightning. The owner of an adjacent property had entered into an oil and

gas lease with Anadarko but Anadarko could not use the surface.

48
Anadarko entered into an agreement with the owner of the surface of the

mineral estate in which Lightning had a lease to directionally drill to the

area covered by Anadarko’s oil and gas lease. Lightning claimed

Anadarko could not drill through the mineral estate that Lightning was

leasing. The issue in Lightning Oil had nothing to do with whether an oil

and gas lessee’s rights were limited by a fee owner’s rights. Rather, the

question was what rights does an oil and gas lease convey. That question

has nothing to do with what rights are conveyed by the lease of real

property. The Supreme Court concluded that the rights conveyed in an

oil and gas lease from a mineral interest owner included only the right to

develop, and did not include the right to possess the specific place or

places where the minerals were located. As a result, Anadarko was free

to drill through the mineral estate. As noted above, in the lease of real

property, as opposed to an oil and gas lease, the tenant does have

exclusive possession and control of the leased land. In short, Lighting Oil

has no application to this matter.

__________________________________

At the end of the day, the State still cannot answer the question

posed by now-Chief Justice Blacklock: why does Texas law obligate

49
SFOT, a private entity that acts independently of the City, to allow

handguns at the Fair. See In re State, 698 S.W.3d at 904 (J. Blacklock,

joined by C.J. Hecht and J. Young, concurring). It cannot answer the

question because the answer is that state law does not prohibit SFOT

from banning firearms during its private event, any more than it bans an

individual who owns or leases property from imposing the same

restriction on his or her guests. The trial court therefore properly granted

SFOT’s motion for summary judgment and denied the State’s motion.

B. The Trial Court Correctly Excluded Evidence of SFOT
Mistakenly Preventing a Peace Officer from Entering
a Previous Fair.

Although the State cites to various exhibits in its brief,23 it appears

as though the only exhibit about which it complains on appeal is the

23 In support of the State’s argument that it had attached to its summary

judgment motion “evidence concerning the State’s previous litigation in-
volving SFOT’s systematic exclusion of armed off-duty peace officers from
the premises of Fair Park in violation of Texas Law,” the State cites to
CR1:454-60, 466-68, and 480. State Br. 39-40. But the exhibits at those
record cites do not relate to the exclusion of the armed off-duty peace of-
ficer. Instead, CR1:466-68 (Ex. 1-G to the State’s motion) is Mr. Garner’s
complaint about the State Fair policy at issue in this litigation, and was
largely admitted as part of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 17 in the joint appendix.
SCR:203-04. CR1:454-60 (Ex. 1-E to the State’s motion) is a March 2024
complaint from Mr. Garner about the signs posted at the Music Hall,
which is not leased to SFOT and is not at issue in this litigation or on

50
City’s response to a letter the OAG had sent to the City on February 21,

2023, which was attached to the State’s motion for summary judgment

as Exhibit 1-B and addressed the SFOT’s mistake in keeping a peace of-

ficer out of the Fair with his handgun. See CR1:440; State Br. 40.24 Under

the rules, evidence is relevant where “it has a tendency to make a fact

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the

fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Tex. R. Evid. 401.

This Court reviews the decision to exclude summary judgment evi-

dence for an abuse of discretion. Houle v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.,

570 S.W.3d 364, 369 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, pet. denied). As this Court

recently explained, “[a] court abuses its discretion if it acts without ref-

appeal. And CR1:480 (Ex. 2 to the State’s motion) is a declaration from
Mr. Garner, which addresses the State Fair policy at issue in this litiga-
tion and the Music Hall, which (again) is not at issue. None of these ex-
hibits concern the exclusion of a police officer from Fair Park.
It appears as though the State may have intended to cite to Exhibits
1-A, 1-B, and I-C from its motion for summary judgment, which can be
found at CR1:437-38, CR1:440, and CR1:442-43.
24 To the extent the State is challenging the exclusion of Exhibit 1-A and

Exhibit I-C, the exclusion of those letters was not error for the same rea-
sons the exclusion of Exhibit 1-B was not error.

51
erence to any guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily and unrea-

sonable.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Saintes, No. 15-24-00092-CV, 2025

WL 1710798, at *3 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] June 19, 2025).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the City’s

February 21, 2023 letter because that letter is not relevant for three sep-

arate reasons.

First, as the State itself has acknowledged in its February 8, 2023,

letter to the City, the incident involving the peace officer did not involve

Section 411.029. CR1:437 (noting that “Texas peace officers are licensed

by TCOLE standards and not under Tex. Gov’t Code Chapter 411”). In-

stead, the February 8, 2023 letter invoked then-effective Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure article 2.1305, which the OAG stated prohibits cer-

tain establishments serving the public from restricting peace officers

from carrying a weapon. CR1:438. The correspondence in 2023 about a

claim that a peace officer was improperly excluded from the 2022 Fair

under the Texas Criminal Code is irrelevant to whether the City took any

action that states or implies that firearms are not allowed at the Fair

under section 411.209 of the Texas Government Code. Accordingly, there

was no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the letter.

52
Second, the State is incorrect that the February 21, 2023 letter

shows that the City has control over SFOT. State Br. 41–42. Even a cur-

sory review of the letter in question shows its complete lack of relevance

to the issue of “control.”

CR1:440.

Contrary to the State’s argument, this letter does not support the

argument that the City can influence or restrain SFOT. See State Br. 42.

The text of the letter is clear: the City received the OAG’s letter and the

City was passing along a response letter from SFOT, which is “a nonprofit

organization that operates the annual State Fair of Texas at Fair Park.”

Id. Nothing in the letter suggests that the City influenced or controlled

SFOT’s response to the OAG’s February 8, 2023 letter. Indeed, SFOT’s

53
response to the OAG appeared on SFOT’s letterhead. CR1:442-443. And

SFOT’s letter makes no reference at all to any influence or control by the

City. Id. The only City action referenced in SFOT’s letter is that the City

had forwarded a copy of the OAG’s letter to SFOT. CR1:442. This is en-

tirely consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s previous conclusion that there is

no state action in the operation of the Fair. See Rundus v. City of Dallas

and State Fair of Texas, 634 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 565

U.S. 821 (2011).25

Third, the State’s argument that the February 21, 2023, letter

shows “deliberate allowance” (whatever that means) “of SFOT’s exclu-

sionary policy” is unmoored from the language of section 411.209, which

prohibits the City from taking action. As explained above, the State’s con-

25 Even if the letter did suggest control (and it does not), that is not evi-

dence that the City exercised any control in regards to the firearms policy
at issue in this litigation. Cf. Pacesetter Corp. v. Barrickman, 885 S.W.2d
256, 263 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ) (“Although habit may be in-
ferred from proof of specific instances of conduct, proof of only two other
incidents does not meet the test of frequency and regularity to be habit
evidence.”). Accordingly, the letter still would not be evidence supporting
the State’s argument that the City somehow controlled SFOT or SFOT’s
decision to ban firearms.

54
tention that the City took action in violation of section 411.209 by allow-

ing SFOT to ban firearms from the Fair is legally unsound and finds no

support in the text of the statute. For these reasons, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in excluding the City’s February 2023 letter.

Moreover, the State has not even tried to explain how the exclusion

of that one letter—even if it had some marginal relevance—could possibly

have constituted harmful error. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. It plainly could not,

especially given that it addressed a complaint years before the issues

here arose and one arising under a different statutory scheme that does

not apply to this case.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court.

55
Dated: January 9, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Bryan P. Neal
James B. Harris
State Bar No. 09065400
Bryan P. Neal
State Bar No. 00788106
Dina W. McKenney
State Bar No. 24092809
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
One Arts Plaza
1722 Routh Street, Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 969-1700
(214) 969-1751 (Fax)
jim.harris@hklaw.com
bryan.neal@hklaw.com
dina.mckenney@hklaw.com

Robert B. Smith
State Bar No. 00786248
3838 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1000
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 522-5571
(214) 522-5009 (Fax)
robert@smith-firm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR
APPELLEE STATE FAIR OF TEXAS

56
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that according to the computer program used to prepare
this document, the document contains 10,821 words, excluding those
items that are not to be included in the word count pursuant to Rule
9.4(i).

/s/ Bryan P. Neal
Bryan P. Neal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was filed and
served electronically through eFile.TXCourts.gov this 9th day of January
2026, on all counsel of record.

/s/ Bryan P. Neal
Bryan P. Neal

57
Tab
A
CAUSE NO. DC-24-14434

STATE OF TEXAS, MAXX JUUSOLA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
TRACY MARTIN, and §
ALAN CRIDER §
§
Plaintijfs, §
§
v. § 298TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
CITY OF DALLAS, KIMBERLY §
BIZOR TOLBERT, in her official §
capacity as the City Manager for the §
City of Dallas, and the STATE FAIR §
OF TEXAS, §
§ DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
Defendants.

~'ORDER

On this day came to be heard Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion").

Having considered the Motion, the evidence and all other matters properly before it, the Court hereby

DE IES the Motion.

IT IS O RDE RED that summary judgment for Plaintiffs is hereby D ENI ED as to Plaintiffs'

claims against D efendant City of Dallas and D efendant Kimberly Bizor T olbert, in her official capacity

as the City Manager for the City of Dallas (collectively, the "City D efendants"); Plaintiffs' claims

against the City D efendants are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

SlGNED this _Bd,l' o f ~. 2025.
,(

ORDER DE YING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIO FOR SUMMARY JUDGME T
Page 937
Tab
B
r

CAUSE NO. DC-24- 14434

STATE OF TEXAS, MAXX J UUSOLA, § IN THE DISTR ICT COURT
TRACY MARTIN, and ALAN CRIDER §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
V. §
§ 298TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
C ITY OF DALLAS, KIM BERLY §
BIZO R TOLBERT, in her official §
capacity as the Interim City Manager for §
the City of Dallas, and the STA TE FA fR §
OF TEXAS, §
§
Defendants. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendant State Fair of

Texas' s ("State Fair") Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, in which

State Fair also makes evidentiary objections and joins in Defendants City of Dallas and Kimberly

Bizor Tolbert's (collecti vely, the "City Defendants") Objections and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs '

Summary Judgment Evidence.

Having considered the above, the pleadings, the arguments, and all other materials properly

before it, the Court rules as follows:

1. Plai ntiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

2. State Fair's evidentiary objections are SUSTAINED.

3. The Court has separately ruled o n the City Defendants' Objections and Motion to

Strike Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Evidence in w hich State Fair joined. That ruling applies

equally to State Fair.

ORDER - Page 1

Page 938
4. Defendant State Fair's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED. All claims and requests for relief of any kind made by Plaintiffs against

State Fair are DISM ISSE D WITH PREJUDI CE.

All relief not expressly granted herein is denied. By this order and previous rulings of the

Court, all claims and requests for relief of all parties have been resolved. Therefore, this is a final

judgment.

SIGNED this

ORDER - Page 2

Page 939
Tab
C
CAUSE NO. DC-24-14434

STATE OF TEXAS, MAXXJUUSOLA, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
TRACY MARTIN, and §
ALAN CRIDER §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § 298TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
CITY OF DALLAS, KIMBERLY §
BIZOR TOLBERT, in her official §
capacity as the City Manager for the §
City of Dallas, and the STATE FAIR §
OF TEXAS, §
§ DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
Defendants.

[Pi.@fQSiO]ORDER

On this day came to be heard D efendants City of D allas and Kimberly Bi7.0r Talbert's (the

"City D efendants") Motion for Traclitional and o-Evidence Summary Judgment (the "Motion").

Having considered the Motion, the evidence, and all other matters properly before it, the Court hereby

GRANTS the Motion.

IT IS ORDERED that summary judgment for the City D efendants is hereby GRA TED on

Plaintiffs' claims against the City D efendants; P laintiffs' claims against the City Defendants are hereby

DI SMISSED with prejuclice.

SIG ED th;, ---1±. day o f ~ , 2025.

ORDER GRA Tl G CITY DEFE DANTS' MOTIO FOR S MMARY J UDGME T
Page 942
Tab
D
§ 411.209. Wrongful Exclusion of Handgun License Holder, TX GOVT § 411.209

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Government Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 4. Executive Branch (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Law Enforcement and Public Protection
Chapter 411. Department of Public Safety of the State of Texas (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter H. License to Carry a Handgun

V.T.C.A., Government Code § 411.209

§ 411.209. Wrongful Exclusion of Handgun License Holder

Effective: September 1, 2021
Currentness

(a) Except as provided by Subsection (i), a state agency or a political subdivision of the state may not take any action, including
an action consisting of the provision of notice by a communication described by Section 30.06 or 30.07, Penal Code, that states
or implies that a license holder who is carrying a handgun under the authority of this subchapter is prohibited from entering or
remaining on a premises or other place owned or leased by the governmental entity unless license holders are prohibited from
carrying a handgun on the premises or other place by Section 46.03, Penal Code, or other law.

(b) A state agency or a political subdivision of the state that violates Subsection (a) is liable for a civil penalty of:

(1) not less than $1,000 and not more than $1,500 for the first violation; and

(2) not less than $10,000 and not more than $10,500 for the second or a subsequent violation.

(c) Each day of a continuing violation of Subsection (a) constitutes a separate violation.

(d) A resident of this state or a person licensed to carry a handgun under this subchapter may file a complaint with the attorney
general that a state agency or political subdivision is in violation of Subsection (a) if the resident or license holder provides the
agency or subdivision a written notice that describes the location and general facts of the violation and the agency or subdivision
does not cure the violation before the end of the third business day after the date of receiving the written notice. A complaint
filed with the attorney general under this subsection must include evidence of the violation and a copy of the written notice
provided to the agency or subdivision.

(e) A civil penalty collected by the attorney general under this section shall be deposited to the credit of the compensation to
victims of crime fund established under Subchapter J, Chapter 56B, Code of Criminal Procedure.

(f) Before a suit may be brought against a state agency or a political subdivision of the state for a violation of Subsection (a),
the attorney general must investigate the complaint to determine whether legal action is warranted. If legal action is warranted,
the attorney general must give the chief administrative officer of the agency or political subdivision charged with the violation
a written notice that:

© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
§ 411.209. Wrongful Exclusion of Handgun License Holder, TX GOVT § 411.209

(1) describes the violation;

(2) states the amount of the proposed penalty for the violation; and

(3) gives the agency or political subdivision 15 days from receipt of the notice to cure the violation to avoid the penalty,
unless the agency or political subdivision was found liable by a court for previously violating Subsection (a).

(g) If the attorney general determines that legal action is warranted and that the state agency or political subdivision has not
cured the violation within the 15-day period provided by Subsection (f)(3), the attorney general or the appropriate county or
district attorney may sue to collect the civil penalty provided by Subsection (b). The attorney general may also file a petition
for a writ of mandamus or apply for other appropriate equitable relief. A suit or petition under this subsection may be filed in a
district court in Travis County or in a county in which the principal office of the state agency or political subdivision is located.
The attorney general may recover reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining relief under this subsection, including court costs,
reasonable attorney's fees, investigative costs, witness fees, and deposition costs.

(h) Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this section.

(i) Subsection (a) does not apply to a written notice provided by a state hospital under Section 552.002, Health and Safety Code.

(j) In this section, “premises” has the meaning assigned by Section 46.03, Penal Code.

Credits
Added by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 593 (S.B. 273), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2015. Amended by Acts 2017, 85th Leg., ch. 1143 (H.B.
435), §§ 5, 6, eff. Sept. 1, 2017; Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 469 (H.B. 4173), § 2.44, eff. Jan. 1, 2021; Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch.
784 (H.B. 1791), § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2019; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 809 (H.B. 1927), § 11, eff. Sept. 1, 2021.

Notes of Decisions (12)

V. T. C. A., Government Code § 411.209, TX GOVT § 411.209
Current through the end of the 2025 Regular and Second Called Sessions of the 89th Legislature.

End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
Tab
E
KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

August 9, 2016

The Honorable Lisa Pence Opinion No. KP-0108
Erath County Attorney
100 West Washington Re: Whether a nonprofit entity that has
Stephenville, Texas 76401 offices on land owned by a municipality may
restrict the licensed carrying of handguns on
the property (RQ-0097-KP)

Dear Ms. Pence:

You explain that in-your county "at least two non-profit agencies ... have offices located
on land owned" by a city. 1 You further explain that those agencies are the only entities located on
the specific properties in question, that no governmental offices are located on the properties, and
that the city "has no authority as to the operation of the non-profit and all decisions are made by
an independent board of directors." Request Letter at 1. Given these facts you ask whether
handguns may be prohibited by a nonprofit entity when the entity's offices are located on property
owned by a city or governmental entity. Id.at 2. You·base your questions on section 411.209 of
the Govenunent Code and sections 30.06 and 30.07 of the Penal Code, and we will address each
of these provisions in tum.

The Eighty-fourth Legislature enacted section 411.209 of the Government Code, which
prohibits· state agencies and political subdivisions from providing notice that a licensed handguri
carrier is prohibited from entry to a location other than those articulated in the Penal Code:

A _state agency or a political subdivision of the state may not provide
notice by a communication described by Section 30.06, Penal Code,
or by any sign expressly· referring to that law or to a concealed
handgun license, that a license holder carrying a handgun under the
authority of this subchapter is prohibited from entering or remaining
on a_ premises or other place owned or leased by the governmental
entity unless license holders are prohibited from carrying a handgun
on the premises or other place by Section 46.03 or 46.035, Penal
Code.

'Letter from Honorable Lisa Pence, Erath Cty. Att'y, to Honorable Ken Paxton, Tex. Att'y Gen. at 1
(Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.texasattomeygeneral.gov/opinion/requests-for-opinion-rqs ("Request Letter").

APPENDIXB Page 153
The Honorable Lisa Pence - Page 2 (KP-0108)

TEX. Gov'T CODE§ 411.209(a). A state agency or political subdivision found in violation of this
provision is !liable for a civil penalty administered by the attorney general. Id. § 411.209(b)-(h).

Relevant to your request, the prohibition in subsection 411.209(a) applies only to "a state
agency or political subdivision of the state." Id. § 411.209(a). Section 411.209 does not address
whether a private entity, including an independent nonprofit entity, may provide notice to license
holders that the carrying of handguns is prohibited in its offices. If a private entity is operating
jointly with a governmental entity or has been hired by the governmental entity to perform certain
governmental functions, fact questions could arise about which entity effectively posted a notice
prohibiting the carrying of guns. However, under the facts you describe, the private, nonprofit
entity appears to have an arms-length agreement to lease city property and is not otherwise
affiliated with the city. See Request Letter at 1. "As a general rule, a lessor relinquishes possession
or occupancy of the premises to the lessee." Levesque v. Wilkens, 57 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). In such circumstances, section 411.209 does not apply
to a city that leases property to a nonprofit entity that provides notice that a license holder carrying
a handgun is prohibited from entry. As long as the state agency or political subdivision leasing
the property to the nonprofit entity has no control over the decision to post such notice, the state
agency or political subdivision lessor would not be the entity responsible for the posting and would
therefore not be subject to a civil penalty under section 411.209. See TEX. Gov'T CODE
§ 411.209(a).

Whether sections 30.06 and 30.07 of the Penal Code make it an offense for a person
carrying a handgun to enter property leased by a nonprofit entity from a state agency or political
subdivision is a separate question. See Request Letter at 1. Subsections 30.06(a) and 30.07(a)
make it an offense for a license holder to carry a handgun, either concealed or openly, "on property
of another without effective consent," when the license holder "received notice that entry on the
property by a license holder . . . was forbidden." TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 30.06(a), .07(a).
Subsections 30.06(e) and 30.07(e) create exceptions to the application of those sections if "the
property on which the license holder ... carries a handgun is owned or leased by a governmental
entity and is not a premises or other place on which the license holder is prohibited from carrying
the handgun under Section 46.03 or 46.035." Id.§ 30.06(e); see id.§ 30.07(e). We must therefore
determine whether these exceptions to the offenses apply to property that is owned by a
governmental entity but leased to a private, nonprofit organization.

When the Legislature enacted subsection 30.06(e), its stated focus was on local
governmental entities that were prohibiting concealed handguns from public places. See House
Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 501, 78th Leg., R.S. (May 9, 2003) at 4 (''A city's ban on
concealed handguns in public buildings could make it needlessly difficult for a person lawfully
carrying a concealed handgun to perform necessary tasks such as paying a utility bill or renewing
a car registration."). Nothing in the text of the statute itself nor in the legislative history suggests
that the Legislature considered whether private entities that leased property from a governmental
entity were required to allow the carrying of handguns on the property that they lease. The fact
that the Legislature created a civil penalty in section 411.209 of the Government Code only for
state agencies and political subdivisions provides some contextual support for the idea that the
Legislature may not have intended to require private lessees of governmental property to allow
handguns on that property. See TEX. Gov'T CODE§ 411.209(a).

Page 154
The Honorable Lisa Pence - Page 3 (KP-0108)

Nevertheless, when construing statutes, courts recognize that the words the Legislature
chooses are "the surest guide to legislative intent." Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys.,
Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999). When possible, courts will discern legislative intent from
the plain meaning of the words chosen, and only when words are ambiguous will courts "resort to
rules of construction or extrinsic aids." Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.
2009). The plain language of subsections 30.06(e) and 30.07(e) make an exception if the property
on which the license holder carries a gun "is owned or leased by a governmental entity." TEX.
PENAL CODE§§ 30.06(e), .07(e). These statutes make no exception to that exception for property
owned by a governmental entity but leased to a private entity, and to conclude that carrying a
handgun on such property is prohibited would therefore require reading language into the statute
beyond what the Legislature included. See Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 282 S.W.3d at 443 (noting
that courts "refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose"). Thus, a court would likely
conclude that a license holder carrying a handgun on property that is not a premises or other place
from which the license holder is prohibited from carrying under sections 46.03 or 46.035 of the
Penal Code and that is owned by a governmental entity but leased to a private entity is excepted
from the offenses in 30.06(a) and 30.07(a). 2

2
Such a conclusion would not necessarily preclude a private entity's claim for civil trespass. "Generally, an
owner of realty has the right to exclude all others from use of the property[.]" Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d
705, 709 (Tex. 2012). "[E]very unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass[,] even if no damage is done
or injury is slight." Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 n.36 (Tex. 2008) (quotation
marks omitted). Thus, while criminal enforcement may not be available, we find no authority that prohibits the
private entity from restricting entry onto that leased property for individuals carrying handguns.

Page 155
The Honorable Lisa Pence - Page 4 (KP-0108)

SUMMARY

Section 411.209 of the Government Code creates a civil
penalty for a state agency or a political subdivision that provides
notice that a license holder carrying a handgun is prohibited on
property owned by the governmental entity unless carrying a
handgun in such locations is expressly prohibited under the Penal
Code. Section 411.209 applies only to a state agency or political
subdivision of the State and does not address whether a private
entity, including an independent nonprofit entity, may provide
notice to license holders that the carrying of handguns is prohibited
in the private entity's offices. As long as the state agency or political
subdivision leasing the property to the private entity has no control
over the decision to post such notice, the state agency or political
subdivision lessor would not be the entity responsible for the posting
and would therefore not be subject to a civil penalty under section
411.209.

A court would likely conclude that a license holder who
carries a handgun on property that is owned by a governmental
entity but leased to a private entity and that is not a premises or other
place from which the license holder is prohibited from carrying a
handgun under sections 46.03 or 46.035 of the Penal Code is
excepted from the offenses in subsections 30.06(a) and 30.07(a) of
the Penal Code.

Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

JEFFREY C. MATEER
First Assistant Attorney General

BRANTLEY STARR
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General

VIRGINIA K. HOELSCHER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Page 156
Tab
F
Chart of Key Firearm Statutes
Tex. Penal Code § 30.05: Criminal Trespass
Criminal trespassing = entering or remaining on property of another without consent if:
(1) the actor had notice that entry was forbidden; or
(2) the actor received notice to depart but failed to do so.
Allows posting of a notice that firearms are prohibited.
Provides a defense to prosecution if:
(1) the basis on which entry was forbidden was that entry with a handgun was forbidden;
and
(2) the person had a license to carry a handgun.
Tex. Penal Code § 30.06: Trespass by License Holder with a Concealed Handgun
Special category of criminal trespassing for a person with license to carry a concealed handgun
Criminal trespassing =
(1) carrying a concealed handgun on the property of another without consent; and
(2) after notice that entry with a concealed handgun was forbidden.
Does not apply if the property is owned by a governmental entity and does not fall under a
specific prohibition under Section 46.03.

Tex. Penal Code § 30.07: Trespass by License Holder with an Openly Carried Handgun
Special category of criminal trespassing for a person with license to carry a handgun openly
Criminal trespassing =
(1) openly carrying a handgun on the property of another without consent
(2) after notice that entry with an openly carried handgun was forbidden.
Does not apply if the property is owned by a governmental entity and does not fall under a
specific prohibition under Section 46.03.

Tex. Penal Code § 46.03: Places Weapons Prohibited
Provides list of specific locations where firearms are prohibited—regardless of owner, such as:
schools; election polls; courts; racetracks; airports; prisons; bars; sporting events;
hospitals; and amusement parks
Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.209: Wrongful Exclusion of Handgun License Holder
A political subdivision may not take any action that states or implies that a license holder who
is carrying a handgun is prohibited from entering or remaining on property that is owned or
leased by the governmental entity — other than property subject to a specific prohibition under
Section 46.03 or other law.
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