Arron Jamond Coleman v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00215-CR
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ARRON JAMOND COLEMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 372nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1555524

Before Kerr, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

After pleading guilty to the first-degree-felony charge of aggravated robbery

with a deadly weapon, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03, Arron Jamond Coleman was

placed on ten years’ deferred adjudication in December 2021. In April 2022, the State

petitioned to proceed to adjudication, alleging that about a week earlier, Coleman had

violated the terms of his deferred adjudication by committing the offense of murder

and possessing a firearm. The State amended its petition in May 2024 to add two

additional offenses, for a total of four.

In June 2024, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to proceed to

adjudication, found that Coleman had violated the terms of his deferred adjudication

as the State alleged, adjudicated Coleman guilty of aggravated robbery with a deadly

weapon, and sentenced him to sixty years’ imprisonment. 1 See id. § 12.32 (providing

punishment range of five to ninety-nine years for first-degree felony). Coleman timely

appealed, and the trial court appointed appellate counsel for him.

After determining that Coleman’s appeal was frivolous, Coleman’s court-

appointed appellate attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and, in support of

that motion, a brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396,

1400 (1967). Counsel’s motion and brief meet the requirements of Anders by

presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no

The trial court did not impose any fines or restitution, and its judgment
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credited outstanding reparations, court costs, and attorney’s fees for time served.

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arguable grounds for relief. See id. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Additionally, in compliance

with Kelly v. State, counsel provided Coleman with copies of the brief and the motion

to withdraw; he informed Coleman of his right to file a pro se response, to review the

record, and to seek discretionary review pro se should this court declare his appeal

frivolous; and he sent Coleman a form motion for pro se access to the appellate

record. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Coleman had the

opportunity to file a pro se response to the Anders brief but did not do so. 2 In lieu of a

brief, the State filed a letter waiving its right to respond to the Anders brief.

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief and have determined

that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record

that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–

28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006) (approving use of unpublished memorandum opinion in context of Anders

brief with which court of appeals agrees). We therefore grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

On May 23, 2025, this court received Coleman’s motion for access to the
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appellate record. We ordered the trial-court clerk to make the record available to
Coleman by June 9, 2025, and upon receiving the trial-court clerk’s notice that it sent
the record to Coleman on June 6, 2025, we informed Coleman that his pro se
response had to be filed by August 5, 2025, and that if he failed to meet that deadline,
we would assume that he did not intend to file a response.

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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 28, 2025

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