Robert Taylor Krieg v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00025-CR
___________________________

ROBERT TAYLOR KRIEG, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1675721

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Robert Taylor Krieg appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating

him guilty of unlawful restraint with exposure to serious bodily injury and sentencing

him to three years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 20.02(c)(2)(A). In

multiple overlapping issues and subissues, he challenges (1) the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the revocation of his deferred adjudication community

supervision, including the admission of “inadmissible and unreliable evidence”; (2) the

trial court’s alleged bias or “lack of attention”; and (3) the imposition of sex-offender

evaluation and treatment conditions in violation of his due-process rights.1 Because

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Krieg’s community supervision

and adjudicating him guilty, we affirm.

I. Background

Krieg was charged with sexual assault, indecency with a child by sexual contact,

and unlawful restraint with exposure to serious bodily injury—all arising from the

same underlying facts and alleging the same victim. 2 Pursuant to a plea bargain, the

State waived the sexual-assault and indecency charges, Krieg pled guilty to unlawful

restraint with exposure to serious bodily injury, and the trial court sentenced him to

1
We lay out the issues in Krieg’s brief as we have construed them. Indeed, some
of the arguments in the brief are hard to follow, and it is not clear precisely which of
the trial court’s grounds for revocation Krieg challenges.

The underlying facts involved Krieg’s having choked his victim during a sexual
2

encounter.

2
five years’ deferred adjudication community supervision. Among the conditions of his

community supervision, Krieg was required to submit to a sex-offender treatment

evaluation; to attend, fully participate in, and successfully complete sex-offender

treatment; to “[a]ssume responsibility” for his offense; and to pay monthly

community supervision fees. There is no record that Krieg objected to these

conditions at the time they were imposed.

Approximately two years later, Krieg was unsuccessfully discharged from his

sex-offender treatment program, and the State filed a petition to proceed to

adjudication. In its petition, the State alleged that Krieg had violated the terms and

conditions of his community supervision by (1) being unsuccessfully discharged from

sex-offender treatment; (2) failing to take responsibility for his offense; and (3) failing

to pay monthly community supervision fees for several months from July 2022 to

February 2024.

At the contested hearing on the State’s petition to adjudicate, Krieg pled not

true to the allegations that he had been unsuccessfully discharged from sex-offender

treatment and that he had failed to take responsibility for his offense. He pled true to

the allegation that he had failed to pay monthly community supervision fees.3 During

the State’s case, Sean Braun, a licensed professional counselor and licensed sex-

offender treatment provider who supervised Krieg’s sex-offender evaluation and

3
Although Krieg pled true to this violation and does not challenge it directly on
appeal, we will not reach it based on our disposition below. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

3
treatment, described Krieg’s evaluation and treatment and explained that Krieg was

discharged from treatment because he violated the conditions of his “treatment

contract.” During the defense’s case, Robert Buker, Krieg’s father, testified that he did

not agree with the terms of Krieg’s community supervision and that his son had done

nothing wrong. Rather, Buker blamed Krieg’s “circumstances” on the victim, the

attorney who had represented Krieg at the time that he pled guilty to the offense, and

the trial judge, whom Buker had referred to as “a piece of crap.”

The trial court found all three alleged violations true, revoked Krieg’s

community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of unlawful restraint with exposure to

serious bodily injury, and sentenced him to three years’ confinement.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt with the same standard we

use to review a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.108(b). We review a trial court’s decision to revoke

community supervision for an abuse of discretion. Powe v. State, 436 S.W.3d 91, 93

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d). In a revocation proceeding, the State must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated at least one of

the terms and conditions of his community supervision. Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86,

93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

4
The trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to

be given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

trial court’s ruling. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);

Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). If the State meets its

burden of proof, the trial court’s finding of a single violation of a condition of

community supervision is sufficient to support adjudication. Garcia v. State, 387

S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d).

Due process is implicated in the revocation of community supervision because

it involves the loss of liberty. Caddell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App.

[Panel Op.] 1980). It would offend due process if a defendant were discharged from

his therapy program for a wholly inappropriate reason and that reason were then used

as a basis to revoke the defendant’s community supervision. Leonard v. State, 385

S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (op. on reh’g). If a defendant’s compliance

with the terms of his community supervision is dependent on the discretion of a third

party, we must also examine the third party’s use of its discretion to confirm that the

discharge was for a reason connected to the purpose of the defendant’s community

supervision. Id.

III. Analysis

Krieg asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation of his

deferred adjudication community supervision. He argues that the trial court relied on

5
inadmissible and unreliable evidence to revoke his community supervision, that the

trial court “displayed bias and lack of attention during hearings,” and that the

revocation violated his right to due process “because he was set up for failure from

the beginning.”

From what we can glean from Krieg’s brief, he attempts to challenge the

imposition of community supervision conditions related to his sex-offender

evaluation and treatment.4 Indeed, the argument woven throughout his brief is that he

should not have been required to undergo a sex-offender evaluation or participate in

sex-offender treatment.

A. Unobjected-To Conditions of Community Supervision

Krieg argues that, due to his “medical conditions”5 and because he did not

“plead[] to a sex crime,” neither the conditions of his community supervision related

to sex-offender evaluation and treatment nor his dismissal from sex-offender

treatment were justified. He contends that “[h]e was treated as and forced to accept

4
Most of Krieg’s brief discusses the administration of a penile plethysmograph
(PPG) test that he underwent as part of his sex-offender evaluation. See S.V. v. R.V.,
933 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Tex. 1996) (observing that a PPG test is “a test for determining
what subjects cause arousal in a man”). In each section of his brief and within each
issue, Krieg mentions the PPG test in at least some capacity—the test itself, his being
“forced” to undergo the test, the test’s results and their reliability and admissibility, his
sex-offender treatment based on the results, and alleged judicial bias related to the
results.
5
Krieg asserts that his conditions—ADHD, anxiety, depression, below-average
IQ, and a heart condition requiring a Viagra prescription—were “directly relevant to
[his] ability to comply” with his community supervision requirements.

6
that he was a sexual predator” in violation of his due-process rights. Because Krieg

did not raise his complaints when the community supervision conditions were

imposed, he has forfeited them.

1. Preservation of Error

To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial

court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if

not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1);

Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The party must then

obtain an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or object to the trial court’s

refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2020). Because it is a systemic requirement, this court should

independently review error preservation, and we have a duty to ensure that a claim is

properly preserved in the trial court before we address its merits. Dixon, 595 S.W.3d at

223.

Community supervision conditions must be challenged when they are imposed.

Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 534–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Donovan v. State, 508

S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014) (op. on reh’g), aff’d, No. PD-0474-14,

2015 WL 4040599 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 2015) (not designated for publication). If a

defendant fails to complain of a condition at the time it is imposed, the complaint is

forfeited. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. State, 444 S.W.3d 21, 23–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014);

Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 534–35. But see Rickels v. State, 108 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Tex. Crim.

7
App. 2003) (recognizing exception to the general rule of error preservation when the

defendant does not have the opportunity to object to the condition at the time it is

imposed). Further, a defendant forfeits a constitutional complaint by not raising it at

the time the community supervision conditions are imposed. Donovan, 508 S.W.3d at

354, 357; see Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 670–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Clark v.

State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

2. Error Not Preserved

The record shows that Krieg has forfeited his complaints. As part of his guilty

plea, Krieg agreed to the sex-offender evaluation—part of which included a PPG

test—and to sex-offender treatment, even though he pled guilty only to unlawful

restraint, a facially nonsexual offense that, as here, may involve a sexual component.

The conditions of his community supervision were initially imposed on June 10, 2022.

The relevant condition required Krieg to “[s]ubmit to sex[-]offender treatment

evaluation as directed by the supervision officer” and to “[a]ttend and participate fully

in and successfully complete . . . treatment . . . for sex offenders . . . as specified by or

approved by the [trial] court or the supervision officer.” Both Krieg and the trial court

signed the conditions when they were imposed.

In July 2022, Krieg was referred to Psychotherapy Services & Yokefellows

(PSY) for a sex-offender evaluation, which included intake questions about his mental

health and medical conditions, personality and IQ testing, and the PPG test. From his

evaluation, it was determined that Krieg had a “very high risk” of reoffending. The

8
trial court subsequently modified the conditions of Krieg’s community supervision to

include, “[a]s recommended by the evaluation,” sex-offender treatment at PSY and

the requirement that he assume responsibility for his offense. The trial court explicitly

struck any sex-offender-registration requirements.6 The modified conditions were

imposed on September 29, 2022, and both Krieg and the trial court signed them when

they were imposed.

In January 2023, Krieg was arrested following alleged violations of his

community supervision. Days later, Krieg filed a “Motion to Release Defendant and

Set Reasonable Bail.” The trial court modified the conditions of his community

supervision to include placement in an Intermediate Sanction Facility (ISF) and

successful completion of an ISF aftercare program. A few days later, Krieg filed a

motion to set bond and moved for the removal of placement in an ISF program as a

condition of his probation. The trial court subsequently modified the conditions of

his community supervision to “[r]escind attend and complete ISF and ISF aftercare”

and to include sixteen days’ confinement in jail.

On June 26, 2023, just over one year after the sex-offender evaluation and

treatment conditions were imposed, Krieg filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of

6
On June 13, 2022—three days after the conditions were initially imposed—
Krieg filed a motion for new trial asserting that he had been notified that he would be
required to register as a sex offender, which had not been contemplated or agreed
upon as part of the plea. It is not clear from the record how or from where Krieg
received this notice, and the record contains no ruling or order on the motion for new
trial.

9
Terms and Conditions of Probation” complaining of—for the first time—the PPG

test. In his motion, he did not raise a due-process complaint but argued that the

results were not admissible or credible. However, there is no record that Krieg

presented his motion to the trial court or that the trial court ruled on it, and the

attorney who filed the motion on Krieg’s behalf subsequently withdrew as his counsel

for “[i]rreconcilable differences.”

On May 29, 2024, almost two years after the sex-offender evaluation and

treatment conditions were imposed, Krieg filed a “Motion for Modification of

Conditions of Community Supervision.” In the motion, he complained about the

PPG test’s administration and results, asserting—for the first time—that his due-

process rights had been violated. He also asserted—for the first time—that he was

administered the PPG test “against his will.” Krieg claimed that he “would not have

accepted the plea deal” had he known that it would “result” in the modified

conditions related to sex-offender treatment. However, there is no record that Krieg

presented this motion to the trial court or that the trial court ruled on it.

We conclude that Krieg had the opportunity to object to the sex-offender

evaluation and treatment conditions at the time they were imposed but chose not to

do so. Just days after the conditions were initially imposed, Krieg filed a motion for

new trial challenging any sex-offender-registration conditions as part of his

community supervision, but he did not challenge the sex-offender evaluation or any

contingent sex-offender treatment. Approximately seven months later, Krieg was

10
arrested and the trial court modified his community supervision to include ISF

conditions. Days after his arrest, Krieg moved for his release and for bail, and a few

days later, he moved to have the ISF conditions removed from his community

supervision.

It was not until over a year after both he and the trial court signed the sex-

offender evaluation and treatment conditions and almost a year after he participated

in the PPG test that Krieg finally objected to those conditions by filing a motion for

reconsideration. It was not until almost two years after the conditions were imposed

that he raised a due-process complaint or claimed that the PPG test had been

administered “against his will.” And the record does not show that he ever presented

his objections or complaints to the trial court or obtained a ruling on them.

Moreover, Krieg accepted the unobjected-to conditions by participating in a

sex-offender evaluation and in sex-offender treatment for approximately two years.

See Harness v. State, No. 11-14-00301-CR, 2016 WL 4118794, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Eastland July 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(“Appellant accepted the [condition] by participating in sex[-]offender treatment for

almost two years.”); see also Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 534 (“[C]onditions not objected to are

affirmatively accepted as terms of the contract.”). Then at the conclusion of the

adjudication hearing, Krieg’s counsel urged the trial court to maintain him on

community supervision “with the same conditions.” See Harness, 2016 WL 4118794, at

*3 (noting that appellant asked for his community supervision to be reinstated but not

11
for sex-offender conditions to be removed or modified and overruling due-process

complaint about conditions following conviction for nonsexual offense); Donovan, 508

S.W.3d at 356 (similar).

Because the record shows that Krieg did not challenge the sex-offender

evaluation and treatment conditions at the time they were imposed—despite being

represented by counsel and clearly having the opportunity to do so—we hold that he

has forfeited his complaints about the unobjected-to conditions. See Phi Van Do v.

State, No. 14-18-00600-CR, 2022 WL 17687307, at *1, *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Dec. 15, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding

error not preserved when appellant signed terms of community supervision and did

not complain about conditions imposed); Harness, 2016 WL 4118794, at *3 (agreeing

with Donovan); Donovan, 508 S.W.3d at 355–56, 357 (holding that appellant forfeited

his due-process complaint about imposition of sex-offender conditions because he

did not take steps to object to conditions until almost a year after he signed them,

despite opportunities to do so, and record did not show that trial court heard or ruled

on his objection before adjudication hearing); Lopez v. State, 46 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (“[W]e are prohibited from hearing on appeal a

challenge to the validity of a condition of community supervision unless an objection

to that condition was made at the time the condition was imposed, presumably at

sentencing . . . .”). We thus overrule his complaints about the conditions of his

community supervision.

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B. Evidence Supporting Revocation

Krieg contends that the evidence was insufficient to support revocation. He

argues that the trial court “relied upon inadmissible evidence” to revoke his

community supervision—testimony about the PPG test and the results of a polygraph

administered during his sex-offender treatment.

Because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Krieg

violated the condition of his community supervision requiring him to attend, fully

participate in, and successfully complete sex-offender treatment, the trial court’s

finding of true as to this violation was sufficient to support adjudication.

1. Revocation Hearing

At the revocation hearing, Braun testified that the results of Krieg’s

sex-offender evaluation indicated that he had a “very high risk” of reoffending.7

Braun explained that from Krieg’s results, and after reviewing the facts included in the

police report from the offense, PSY developed a sex-offender treatment plan and

discussed it with Krieg. He was given a treatment contract, which he signed, that

provided the terms and conditions of his treatment plan and what was expected of

him during treatment. Braun testified that the goal of treatment was “to have no more

victims.”

7
Braun described—over Krieg’s objection—the purpose of a PPG test and
how the results may be used to develop a sex-offender treatment plan to reduce
recidivism. He then described—over Krieg’s objection—the results of Krieg’s PPG
test.

13
Braun described Krieg’s participation in sex-offender treatment as “[p]oor,”

explaining that he “rarely participated.” He testified that Krieg had problems

complying with the conditions of his treatment “[f]rom the very beginning.” For

example, he was restricted from being around children without a chaperone, from

viewing social media, and from viewing pornography. Just four months into his

treatment, it was discovered that Krieg had been unchaperoned around children, that

he had been using the internet on unmonitored devices, that he had been watching

“Pornhub” approximately twice a week, and that he had been lying about these

behaviors “for the last four months.”

Krieg also “den[ied] any wrongdoing in his offense” despite the condition of

his treatment plan requiring him to take responsibility for his offense. While he

admitted to his actions at one point during treatment, he subsequently refused to

admit to any wrongdoing. Braun testified that Krieg had become “unsympathetic,

very apathetic towards [his victim],” stating that “if he saw her, he would tell her to

fuck off.”

Additionally, Krieg was prohibited from being verbally or physically aggressive

towards staff members, therapists, and other treatment participants at PSY. Braun

testified that, in violation of that condition, Krieg was disrespectful, he would ignore

the other participants, and he refused to accept any feedback. Braun explained that

Krieg’s behavior affected PSY’s ability to provide treatment to other participants.

14
In January 2023, PSY addressed Krieg’s behavior and outlined additional

guidelines for him to follow so that he could remain in sex-offender treatment. One

guideline required him to submit to a polygraph test. Braun testified—over Krieg’s

objection—that polygraphs were used in sex-offender treatment as a tool to hold

offenders accountable and that the “most basic” polygraph questions were whether

the offender had “commit[ted] this offense” or had “d[one] what [he or she] pled

guilty to.” Braun later testified that Krieg had not passed his polygraph for his

offense.8

In July 2023, PSY sent a letter to the probation department expressing

concerns about Krieg’s sex-offender treatment. Braun explained that the letter had

informed the probation department that Krieg had not been in compliance with his

treatment plan and that he had continued to deny any culpability for his offense. But

Krieg remained in treatment; PSY continued to try to work with him to give him an

opportunity to complete his treatment plan.

Per his treatment plan, Krieg was required to complete assignments once a

month, such as writing out what had happened during his offense. In the two years

that he received treatment at PSY, Krieg submitted only four assignments. Braun

testified that on multiple occasions, Krieg expressed that he did not need sex-offender

treatment. When asked how Krieg’s behavior had affected PSY’s ability to provide

8
Krieg did not object to this testimony or to any other testimony about his
polygraph, specifically.

15
treatment, Braun testified that “[i]f he[ was] not receptive to any treatment, then he[

was] not going to make any changes and therefore, there[ was] no reason for him to

be in the community [at PSY] if he[ was] not going to . . . reduce his risk to reoffend.”

Braun then testified about an incident that ultimately led to Krieg’s

unsuccessful discharge from his sex-offender treatment. In July 2024, during a group

session, Krieg told another treatment participant to “fuck off” in response to

“feedback on being honest.” Braun tried to calm Krieg down but was unable to do so.

Because he would not calm down, Krieg was asked to leave the group session. When

he left, he slammed the door, causing a clock to fall off the wall, hit another

participant, and break on the floor. After this incident, PSY decided to discharge

Krieg.

Krieg was unsuccessfully discharged from his sex-offender treatment on July

30, 2024. At the time that Krieg was discharged, PSY had documented the following

violations of his treatment contract: (1) his failure to assume responsibility for his

offense; (2) his failure to pass a polygraph; (3) his failure to pay $546 in fees; (4) his

failure to regularly submit his monthly assignments; and (5) his July 29, 2024 verbal

assault of another participant.

Braun testified that Krieg had not made progress to reduce his risk to reoffend

sexually and that his behavior during treatment had “significantly increased” his risk

to the community. He described Krieg as impulsive and untruthful, and he expressed

concern over Krieg’s inability to regulate his emotions or to control himself. When

16
asked for his recommendation, Braun testified that Krieg should be sent to prison

because it was “the best place for [his] behavior to be managed at th[at] time.”

As the judge of the witnesses’ credibility, the trial court was entitled to find

unconvincing Buker’s testimony that Krieg had not violated any conditions of his

community supervision, particularly when Buker testified that his son had not done

anything wrong and that he should not have been required to comply with any of the

conditions of his community supervision. Asserting that he had “an associate’s degree

in counseling,” Buker denied that Krieg needed counseling or had any “sexual deviant

issues.” He also asserted that Krieg was “a kid who had sex one time.” When asked

whether, if Krieg were allowed to continue his community supervision, he would help

Krieg comply with the community supervision conditions “despite [his] belief that

they [were] unfair,” Buker testified that he would.

2. Sufficient Evidence

The trial court heard testimony that Krieg was unsuccessfully discharged from

his sex-offender treatment on July 30, 2024. From the start of his treatment, Krieg

refused to follow the plan outlined by PSY in his treatment contract and refused to

make the changes necessary to successfully complete treatment. Instead of taking

responsibility for his offense, and despite having pled guilty, Krieg denied any

wrongdoing and expressed that he did not need sex-offender treatment—a sentiment

that was boldly echoed by his father. Krieg’s behavior not only affected his own

treatment but also affected the treatment of other PSY participants.

17
Braun testified about Krieg’s multiple violations of the conditions of his

treatment and about his final violation—a verbal assault of another treatment

participant—that ultimately led to his unsuccessful discharge. Braun told the trial

court that, despite multiple opportunities from PSY and chances to remain in

treatment, Krieg had not made progress in his sex-offender treatment and had

become an increased risk to the community.

The evidence indicates that Krieg’s unsuccessful discharge from his sex-

offender treatment was connected to his participation in—and violation of—the

conditions outlined by PSY in his treatment plan, the purpose of which was to reduce

his risk to reoffend, thereby reducing the risk to the community. Thus, Krieg’s

unsuccessful discharge from PSY does not offend notions of due process. See Leonard,

385 S.W.3d at 577; Rico v. State, No. 02-23-00343-CR, 2024 WL 5083187, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

As for Krieg’s evidentiary complaints, we agree with his assertion that

polygraph results are generally inadmissible. See Nesbit v. State, 227 S.W.3d 64, 66 n.4

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Russell v. State, 798 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

1990, no pet.). However, Krieg did not object to any questions or answers about the

results of his polygraph, and he failed to raise any complaints at all about the testimony

specifically pertaining to his polygraph. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1) (providing that,

to preserve a complaint for our review, a party must present to the trial court a timely

objection); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring party to object as soon as basis for the

18
objection becomes apparent). Further, apart from his single objection to the general

testimony about the use of polygraphs in sex-offender treatment, he did not object

every time polygraph testimony was offered or obtain a running objection to the

testimony. See Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (requiring

party to object each time the objectionable evidence is offered); Leday v. State, 983

S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding a trial court’s erroneous admission

of evidence will not require reversal when other such evidence was received without

objection); Gardner v. State, No. 02-09-00360-CR, 2010 WL 4569899, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Nov. 4, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(holding appellant forfeited complaint about admission of evidence of polygraph

results because he failed to object each time questions about polygraph results were

asked or to obtain a running objection to evidence of results). Thus, Krieg has failed

to preserve his complaint for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).

Even if Krieg had preserved his complaint about the polygraph testimony, the

State explained that it was not offering the testimony to suggest that Krieg’s

community supervision should be revoked but to explain how polygraphs were used

in sex-offender treatment and in Krieg’s treatment, specifically. Moreover, the trial

court heard testimony that Krieg had violated the conditions of his treatment plan in

several other ways that had nothing to do with his polygraph. See Bussell v. State, No.

12-16-00117-CR, 2017 WL 2962834, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 12, 2017, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding the record supported an

19
inference that polygraph results were not the deciding factor in decision to discharge

appellant from treatment when appellant violated conditions in other ways).

Regarding his lengthy complaint about the PPG test testimony, we disagree

with Krieg’s assertion that the trial court relied on this evidence to revoke his

community supervision. Nothing in the record indicates that Krieg was discharged

from sex-offender treatment because of his PPG test, nor that the State offered the

testimony to suggest that the results of Krieg’s PPG test had somehow violated either

the terms of his sex-offender treatment or the conditions of his community

supervision. Rather, the record shows that the PPG test helped PSY develop the

treatment plan from which Krieg was ultimately discharged because of his multiple

violations—none of which involved the administration or results of his PPG test.

The evidence of Krieg’s multiple violations of the terms of his sex-offender

treatment plan supports the conclusion that the trial court’s revocation of Krieg’s

community supervision was based, in part, on the determination that he did not

successfully complete the PSY program, not on the testimony about his polygraph or

PPG test. See Bussell, 2017 WL 2962834, at *3; see also Rico, 2024 WL 5083187, at *3–4

(concluding testimony showing appellant was unsuccessfully discharged from

treatment program for three reasons connected to purpose of appellant’s community

supervision “d[id] not offend notions of due process” and supported trial court’s

revocation). Accordingly, we overrule Krieg’s evidentiary complaints.

20
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we

conclude that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Krieg violated

a community supervision condition by failing to attend, fully participate in, and

successfully complete sex-offender treatment. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by revoking Krieg’s community supervision and adjudicating him guilty.

C. Judicial Bias or “Lack of Attention”

Krieg asserts that the trial court violated his due-process rights “by failing to

maintain impartiality and attentiveness” and by its “rulings and conduct,” including “a

potential bias” against him. He claims that the trial court did so in four ways: (1) it

erred by overruling Krieg’s objections to the admissibility of polygraph and PPG test

evidence; (2) it failed to adequately consider Krieg’s documented mental health and

developmental challenges; (3) it demonstrated bias by allowing Krieg to be treated as a

sex offender despite his pleading to a nonsexual offense; and (4) it demonstrated lack

of attentiveness and potential bias by denying Krieg’s “Motion to Stay and Set Bond.”

The cumulative effect of these errors, according to Krieg, deprived him of a fair and

impartial hearing. He also asserts that the trial court violated his due-process rights by

“show[ing] little interest in listening to [his] theories and arguments while paying rapt

attention to the State’s case, as if [the judge] had made up her mind prior to a word

being spoken.”

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1. Evidence Rulings

Krieg attempts to disguise his evidentiary complaints as a due-process violation

by arguing that the trial court’s bias or “lack of attentiveness” was shown through its

overruling of his evidentiary objections. We reject his attempt for two reasons. First,

we have already overruled Krieg’s evidentiary complaints.

Second, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias”

because “bias or prejudice is something more than an unfavorable ruling and must

‘connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful

or inappropriate.’” Casas v. State, 524 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no

pet.) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1155 (1994)).

Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were somehow

wrongful or inappropriate; rather, the record indicates that the rulings were merely

“commonplace legal rulings.” See Allison v. State, No. 05-22-00412-CR, 2023 WL

4229541, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 24–25 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2011) (rejecting bias argument based in part on trial court’s

evidentiary rulings), aff’d, 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Indeed, Krieg has

cited no case law for the proposition that a trial court’s admission of relevant

evidence—he did not object in the trial court based on relevance—is sufficient to

show bias. See Santschi v. State, No. 14-15-00771-CR, 2017 WL 3090001, at *4 (Tex.

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App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (reaching similar conclusion).

Accordingly, we overrule Krieg’s bias argument as it relates to the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings.

2. Remaining Claims of Bias or “Lack of Attention”

As for Krieg’s remaining complaints—his being treated as a sex offender, the

trial court’s failure to consider his mental health challenges, the denial of his motion

to stay punishment, his cumulative-error argument, and the trial judge’s “show[ing]

little interest” and “ma[king] up her mind” before the hearing—they have been

waived by inadequate briefing.

The approximately two to three pages of Krieg’s brief addressing these

complaints do not contain “appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” See

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Aside from a single record citation—testimony in which

Braun agreed with Krieg’s counsel’s assertion that Krieg had “ADHD, anxiety, and

depression”—Krieg does not refer us to any pages in the record where the errors

allegedly occurred. Further, he wholly fails to provide any legal authority or argument

to support his complaints. Accordingly, we overrule Krieg’s remaining complaints as

inadequately briefed. See id.; Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 179–80 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

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IV. Conclusion

Having overruled all of Krieg’s complaints and having concluded that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by revoking his community supervision and

adjudicating him guilty, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: November 6, 2025

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