Edward Gene Moody Jr. v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-25-00119-CR
___________________________

EDWARD GENE MOODY JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 297th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1838738

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Edward Gene Moody Jr. appeals his conviction for driving while

intoxicated (DWI) third or more. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b)(2). In

two issues, he argues (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress

evidence related to his blood draw because the search warrant for the blood draw was

based on an affidavit that failed to establish probable cause and (2) that the evidence

was insufficient to establish the two jurisdictional prior DWI convictions.

Because we conclude (1) that the magistrate had a substantial basis for

determining that probable cause existed and (2) that the evidence sufficiently

established the two jurisdictional priors, we affirm.

I. Background

In August 2024, Moody was involved in a major accident with another vehicle.

Mansfield Police Officer Nicholas Barlette responded to the scene and identified

Moody as the driver of one of the vehicles. Moody had struck the back of the other

vehicle while it was stopped at a temporary construction-signal light.

When he arrived on scene, Officer Barlette heard from another officer and one

of the fire department “guys” on scene that they had smelled alcohol coming from

Moody. And a few witnesses reported that they had seen Moody throwing beer cans

into the nearby ditch. When Officer Barlette approached Moody, he smelled a strong

odor of alcohol on Moody’s breath. Moody told him that he had had only two

2
24-ounce beers, which he “stuck with” throughout the encounter. Officer Barlette

opined that Moody was cordial and cooperative with him.

As he spoke with Moody, Officer Barlette located the beer cans that had been

thrown into the ditch next to Moody’s vehicle. Moody admitted that he had thrown

the cans into the ditch and that two of them were his. Officer Barlette then found

more beer cans inside the vehicle. He asked Moody for his consent to perform

standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs), and Moody complied. Based on the results

of the SFSTs and on Officer Barlette’s overall observations, Officer Barlette

determined that Moody was intoxicated and arrested him for DWI.

Officer Barlette subsequently requested Moody’s consent to draw his blood,

and he refused to sign the consent form for a blood draw. Officer Barlette then

prepared an affidavit and a search warrant for the blood draw, had the warrant signed

by a magistrate, and took Moody to the hospital for a nurse to collect the blood

sample, which was sent for a blood-alcohol test. Moody’s blood-alcohol concentration

was 0.163.

Moody was charged with DWI felony repetition. 1 Before trial, he filed a motion

to suppress the blood-draw evidence, asserting that the search-warrant affidavit

prepared by Officer Barlette failed to show that his blood “would contain evidence of

DWI or that [he] committed DWI.” The trial court heard the motion and denied it,

1
The indictment also included a habitual offender notice, which Moody does
not challenge on appeal.

3
allowing the evidence to be admitted at trial. The trial court also allowed the State to

admit—over Moody’s objections—evidence of Moody’s two jurisdictional priors: a

1995 DWI conviction and a 2022 DWI second conviction.

After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Moody guilty, and the trial court

sentenced him to forty years’ confinement. Moody timely appealed.

II. Motion to Suppress

In his first issue, Moody argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion

to suppress the evidence of his blood draw. He contends that the search-warrant

affidavit failed to establish probable cause that his blood “would contain evidence of

intoxication.” We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The police may obtain a defendant’s blood for a DWI investigation through a

search warrant. Farhat v. State, 337 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011,

pet. ref’d). The search warrant cannot issue unless it is based on probable cause that

evidence of that offense will be found through the execution of the warrant. Hyland v.

State, 574 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Farhat, 337 S.W.3d at 306.

Probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant exists when, under

the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will

be found at a particular location. State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2022). This is not a demanding standard. Id. A search-warrant affidavit must be

read in a commonsense and realistic manner, and a magistrate may draw reasonable

4
inferences from the facts and circumstances contained in the four corners of the

affidavit. Martin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 749, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also State v.

Elrod, 538 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“[T]he magistrate’s determination

of probable cause must be based on the facts contained within the four corners of the

affidavit.”).

Ordinarily, we apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a

motion to suppress evidence. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019). But when reviewing a magistrate’s determination of probable cause to issue a

search warrant, we apply a highly deferential standard of review because of the Fourth

Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant over

warrantless searches. State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);

see also Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130 (“[R]eviewing courts give great deference to a

magistrate’s probable[-]cause determination to encourage police officers to use the

warrant process.”). We will uphold the probable-cause determination “so long as the

magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that a search would uncover

evidence of wrongdoing.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331

(1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736 (1960),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980));

see Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (applying Gates

standard of review).

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In our review, we are limited to the four corners of the affidavit. Martin, 620

S.W.3d at 766 n.24. Our duty is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial

basis for determining from the facts and circumstances contained in the affidavit that

probable cause existed. See Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130. When in doubt, we should

defer to all reasonable inferences the magistrate could have made, including the

magistrate’s implicit findings. Id.; McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271–72. We will “not

invalidate a warrant by interpreting an affidavit in a hyper-technical rather than

commonsense manner.” Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130; see also State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d

349, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting that a reviewing court must review a search-

warrant affidavit “realistically[] and with common sense”).

B. The Search-Warrant Affidavit

In the affidavit, Officer Barlette states that he is a peace officer for the

Mansfield Police Department and that he responded to the accident involving Moody

and another driver. He identifies Moody as the suspected party and Moody’s “human

blood” as the property to be searched. Specifically, Officer Barlette states that

Moody’s blood “constitutes evidence that the offense . . . was committed and that . . .

[Moody] committed the offense.” He then describes the offense and his investigation

as follows:

[Moody] operate[d] a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated by
not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of
the introduction of alcohol, controlled substance, drug, or dangerous
drug into the body.

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....

. . . I arrived on scene and observed what appeared to be a rear-
end collision at a red light. I approached a male, identified as
Moody, . . . who was standing in front of a black sedan, which appeared
to have rear-ended the vehicle in front of it. [Moody] stated that he was
the driver of the vehicle. I observed [Moody] to have unsteady balance
and I also detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from [his]
mouth as he was talking to me. I asked [Moody] if he had consumed any
alcoholic beverages and [he] stated he drank 2 beers, approximately 24
ounces each . . . . It should be noted that a witness on scene observed
[Moody] take multiple cans of beer out of his vehicle and throw them in
the ditch on the side of the road before we arrived on scene. [Moody]
did admit this to me and stated two of those beer cans were his.

I then asked [Moody] to . . . perform SFST[]s. . . . [He] advised me
that he is diabetic and may have trouble performing the tests. I then
performed the SFST[]s on [Moody] and my observations of his
performance are listed below. It should be noted while speaking to
[Moody], the odor of an alcoholic beverage persisted, and grew stronger
when he spoke, emitting from his mouth.

At the conclusion of [Moody’s] SFST[]s, he was placed under
arrest for [DWI]. Due to the totality of the circumstances, my
observations, and the results of his SFST[]s (HGN), I determined that
[Moody] had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties due
to the introduction of an intox[ic]ant into his body. . . . I read the DIC-
24[2] out loud to [Moody]. After reading the DIC-24, [Moody] denied
consent to the drawing of a specimen of his blood.

In the section outlining his observations, Officer Barlette checks several boxes

related to Moody’s performance of the SFSTs and to his signs of intoxication. For

example, on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Officer Barlette checks “[l]ack of

2
The DIC-24 is the Texas Department of Public Safety’s standard form that
contains written warnings that must be read to an individual arrested for DWI before
a police officer can request a voluntary blood or breath specimen from that individual.
See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.015; State v. Neesley, 239 S.W.3d 780, 782 n.1 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).

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smooth pursuit” for both of Moody’s eyes, and in the walk-and-turn test, Officer

Barlette checks “[c]an’t balance during instruction,” “[s]tarts too soon,” “[s]teps off

line,” and “[w]rong number of steps.” On his one-leg-stand test, Moody “[p]uts foot

down” and “[c]annot perform test.” For the signs of intoxication, Officer Barlette

checks the boxes indicating that Moody had a “[s]trong” odor of alcohol, that his

speech was slow and moderately slurred, that his balance and walking was unsteady,

that his eyes had a glassy appearance, and that he admitted to drinking alcohol.

At the end of the affidavit, Officer Barlette avers that he “determined that

[Moody] was intoxicated and . . . placed him[] under arrest for Driving While

Intoxicated” and that he “requested a sample of blood which [Moody] refused.” He

states that he requests a search-warrant for the blood sample “as evidence that the

offense described was committed and that [Moody] committed said offense.”

C. Analysis

From the four corners of the affidavit, the magistrate could directly find the

following facts: (1) Moody rear-ended another vehicle stopped at a red light;

(2) witnesses saw Moody take beer cans out of his vehicle and throw them into the

nearby ditch; (3) Moody admitted to Officer Barlette that he had thrown the beer cans

into the ditch and that two of those cans were his; (4) Moody admitted that he had

drunk two 24-ounce beers; (5) Moody performed SFSTs and the results indicated that

he was intoxicated; and (6) Moody denied consent to the drawing of his blood after

Officer Barlette read him the DIC-24. Further, Officer Barlette observed that Moody

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had unsteady balance; that a “strong” odor of alcohol was emitting from his mouth,

which grew stronger when he spoke; that his speech was slow and “moderately

slurred”; and that his eyes had a “[g]lassy appearance.” Officer Barlette averred that he

was a peace officer and requested a search warrant for a sample of Moody’s blood

based on his belief that Moody had committed the offense of DWI. Specifically, he

asserted that the blood “constitute[d] evidence” that Moody had committed that

offense.

Given these direct facts and all the reasonable inferences derived from them,

under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate could have reasonably

concluded that there was a fair probability that Moody’s blood would contain

evidence of intoxication. See State v. Jordan, 342 S.W.3d 565, 572 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011) (“Given the symptoms of intoxication described in the affidavit, we hold that

the magistrate had a substantial basis to determine that evidence of intoxication would

probably be found in the [defendant’s] blood . . . .”); Donosky v. State, No. 02-16-

00399-CR, 2017 WL 4819379, at *1, *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 26, 2017, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that magistrate had a

substantial basis for concluding defendant’s blood would probably provide evidence

of intoxication; affidavit stated that defendant involved in car accident admitted to

consuming “two or three” drinks, that her speech was “thick-tongued,” that she

smelled of alcohol, and that she refused to provide a blood sample); State v. Crawford,

463 S.W.3d 923, 929–31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g)

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(holding that reasonable inferences from affidavit gave magistrate “a substantial basis

to conclude a blood test had a fair probability . . . to provide evidence of [defendant’s]

intoxication”; affidavit stated that officer smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath, that

his speech was slurred, that he admitted he had been drinking, that he failed SFSTs,

and that he refused to provide breath specimen); State v. Moore, No. 05-14-00123-CR,

2014 WL 5478209, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 30, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding that magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding defendant’s blood would uncover evidence of her wrongdoing when

affidavit stated that defendant’s breath smelled strongly of alcohol, that she was

“heavy footed,” that she admitted to having one drink, and that officer noticed

package of beer cans in boat); Stovall v. State, 440 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—Austin

2011, no pet.) (concluding that magistrate had a substantial basis for determining

evidence of intoxication would be present in defendant’s blood when affidavit stated

that officers had observed defendant exhibiting signs of intoxication and that

defendant had “performed poorly” on SFSTs); State v. Webre, 347 S.W.3d 381, 386

(Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (concluding that observations described in officer’s

affidavit—bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, swaying, etc.—provided substantial basis

that evidence of DWI would be found in defendant’s blood); Hogan v. State, 329

S.W.3d 90, 95, 96 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (disagreeing with appellant’s

contention that affidavit failed to establish probable cause that his blood would

provide evidence of that offense; affidavit stated that appellant had a “strong odor” of

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alcohol and an unsteady balance, that he showed clues of intoxication on his SFSTs,

and that he refused to provide a breath specimen).

Moody concedes that the affidavit “set forth probable cause that a DWI had

been committed.” But according to Moody, the affidavit should have “explain[ed]

why [his] blood would contain evidence of intoxication.” We will not take such a

hyper-technical view of search-warrant affidavits. See Crawford, 463 S.W.3d at 930

(concluding that trial court erred by employing hyper-technical reading of affidavit

that focused on facts not included); Webre, 347 S.W.3d at 386 (rejecting argument that

affidavit should state specifically how defendant’s blood would constitute evidence of

DWI). Indeed, the failure to state the obvious is not a reason to invalidate a search

warrant. Lagrone v. State, 742 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); cf. Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 49.01(1)(B) (defining “alcohol concentration” for purposes of

intoxication offenses, such as DWI, as “the number of grams of alcohol per . . . 100

milliliters of blood”); Webre, 347 S.W.3d at 388 (noting that “[i]t would be nonsensical

to ask a magistrate to ignore the commonly known role that blood testing plays in

driving-while-intoxicated offenses”).

We conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining from

the facts and circumstances contained in the affidavit that probable cause existed.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Moody’s motion to

suppress, and we overrule his first issue.

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III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his second issue, Moody argues that the evidence was insufficient to

establish the two jurisdictional priors for this DWI felony repetition charge. He

contends that the State’s evidence failed to connect him to both prior convictions. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at

2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Hooper v.

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15, 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (permitting “inference stacking” as

long as inferences are reasonable in light of “combined and cumulative force of all the

evidence”).

DWI becomes a third-degree felony when it is shown on the trial of the

offense that the defendant has been convicted twice before of any other offense

related to the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 49.09(b)(2). To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the

12
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and

(2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove

these two elements. Id. There is no “best evidence” rule in Texas that requires that the

fact of a prior conviction be proven with any document, much less any specific

document. Id. Rather, the State may use any type of evidence, including circumstantial

evidence, to meet its burden of proof. Id. at 922; Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 834,

836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh’g).

The proof that is adduced to establish the connection between conviction and

defendant resembles a jigsaw puzzle—the trier of fact fits the pieces together, weighs

the credibility of each piece, and determines if the pieces fit together sufficiently to

complete the puzzle. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923 (citing Human, 749 S.W.2d at 835–36).

The trier of fact looks at the totality of the evidence admitted to determine whether

there was a previous conviction and whether the defendant was the person convicted.

Id. The determination of whether the State has met its burden of proof is made on a

case-by-case basis. See Human, 749 S.W.2d at 835–36.

Here, the indictment alleged, and the State was required to prove, the following

jurisdictional priors: (1) Moody was convicted of DWI on November 8, 1995, in cause

number M95-01718 in the County Court at Law Number 2 of Johnson County, Texas

and (2) Moody was convicted of DWI misdemeanor repetition on April 21, 2022, in

cause number 2210140 in the County Court at Law No. 2 of Ellis County, Texas.

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B. The State’s Evidence

State’s Exhibit 1 is a certified record of an April 21, 2022 conviction for DWI

2nd in cause number 2210140CR in the County Court at Law No. 2 in Ellis County.

The judgment lists the defendant as “Edward Moody” in typed print, but between his

first and last name, “^Gene” is handwritten in, and “, Jr.” is handwritten at the end of

the name. Included with the judgment is a “Certificate of Thumbprint” with the

defendant’s right thumbprint and his signature, which he signed in cursive as “Edward

Moody.” The charging information in that case alleged that the defendant, “Edward

Moody,”3 had previously been convicted of DWI “on the 11/08/1995, in cause

number M95-01718 in the Johnson County Court at Law 2 of Johnson County,

Texas.” The defendant in State’s Exhibit 1 pleaded “guilty” to the information’s

allegations.

State’s Exhibit 2 is a certified record of the November 8, 1995 DWI conviction

against defendant “Edward Gene Moody” in cause number M95-01718 in the County

Court at Law Number 2 in Johnson County, Texas. The judgment has the defendant’s

right thumbprint, though it is not a clear image. The various documents in the record

of that conviction identify the defendant as both “Edward Moody” and “Edward

Gene Moody,” but he signed all the relevant documents in cursive as “Edward G.

Moody Jr.”

The charging information does not have the same handwritten corrections to
3

the defendant’s name as the judgment.

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The jury also heard fingerprint-analysis testimony from Deputy Paul Rojas,

who had worked in the error-resolution unit of the Tarrant County Sheriff’s

Department since 2009 and had completed a 40-hour fingerprint-analysis class.

Deputy Rojas testified that he had taken Moody’s fingerprints before trial so that he

could compare them to the fingerprints in State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 and to State’s

Exhibit 3—a certified copy of fingerprints from the Tarrant County jail.4 Deputy

Rojas testified that the fingerprints he had taken from Moody before trial matched the

fingerprints on State’s Exhibit 3. He also testified that the identifying information—

Moody’s name, date of birth, race, sex, and county identification number—was

consistent between the two sets of fingerprints.

When asked to compare the two sets of fingerprints with the thumbprint on

State’s Exhibit 1, Deputy Rojas opined that they all matched. He explained that the

prints were a ten-point match; the thumbprint was a “loop print” with an identifiable

scar on it, and the prints had “[s]ome bifurcations, ending ridges.” In other words,

Deputy Rojas testified that the fingerprints that he had taken, the fingerprints from

the Tarrant County jail, and the thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 1—the 2022 DWI

conviction—all relate back to Moody.

As for the thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 2—the 1995 DWI conviction—

Deputy Rojas testified that he was not able to match that thumbprint with any of the

other fingerprints because it was smudged, and the judgment had been photocopied

4
State’s Exhibit 3 was admitted for record purposes only.

15
so many times that the print itself became degraded. But he explained that Moody

could still be identified as the defendant in State’s Exhibit 2 because it had his name

and the same cause number and court information as the prior DWI conviction

alleged in State’s Exhibit 1.

C. Analysis

Moody contends that the State’s evidence failed to connect him to the two

prior convictions because in State’s Exhibit 1, “the names are inconsistent with

‘Edward Gene Moody, Jr.’ added by hand,” and in State’s Exhibit 2, “[t]he fingerprint

is unusable.” He argues that the State “bootstrapp[ed] one into the other through a

case number” to try to prove that the two convictions were Moody’s. We conclude

that the evidence was sufficient.

The defendant in State’s Exhibit 1 had the same name as Moody. While part of

that name may have been handwritten in, it was up to the jury as trier of fact to weigh

the credibility of that piece of the puzzle. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923. In any event,

the jury heard testimony from an experienced fingerprint analyst who identified the

thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 1 as belonging to Moody—a fact that Moody does not

dispute.

Like State’s Exhibit 1, the defendant in State’s Exhibit 2 also had the same

name as Moody. Specifically, the judgment identifies him as “Edward Gene Moody”

and he signed his name as “Edward G. Moody Jr.” Further, the jury could compare

16
the defendant’s signature in State’s Exhibit 2 to the signature in State’s Exhibit 1,

which are arguably similar.

In addition to the name and signature connections, the defendant in State’s

Exhibit 2 is connected to Moody through the conviction record in State’s Exhibit 1.

In State’s Exhibit 1, the State alleged the State’s Exhibit 2 conviction as a prior

conviction, and the defendant—Moody—pleaded guilty to the allegations contained

in State’s Exhibit 1. Moody therefore admitted that he was the defendant in the State’s

Exhibit 2 conviction. See Jones v. State, No. 2-08-298-CR, 2009 WL 1905372, at *2

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 2, 2009, pet. dism’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).

As for Moody’s contention that the evidence was insufficient because the

fingerprint in State’s Exhibit 2 is “unusable,” he cites no authority, and we have found

none, requiring a fingerprint to sufficiently link a prior conviction to a defendant. See

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921, 925 (holding that State’s evidence sufficiently proved prior

DWI conviction even though conviction printout did not contain appellant’s

fingerprints); Nalls v. State, No. 02-16-00328-CR, 2018 WL 651193, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting

argument that State failed to link prior conviction to appellant because judgment did

not contain a fingerprint); see also Turnbow v. State, No. 02-09-00438-CR, 2010 WL

4486223, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2010, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (affirming conviction; State used other evidence

17
to link defendant to prior DWI conviction when certified copy of record for that

conviction did not display identifiable fingerprint).

Considering all the evidence together and viewing it in the light most favorable

to the verdict, we conclude that the State’s evidence sufficiently linked Moody to the

two prior convictions. We therefore hold that the evidence was sufficient to support

the jury’s finding—implied by its guilty verdict—that Moody had previously been

twice convicted of DWI as alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, we overrule

Moody’s second issue.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled both of Moody’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: January 30, 2026

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