In the Matter of D.A. v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00566-CV
___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF D.A.

On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 323-124131-24

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In a single point in this appeal from the modification of a juvenile-court

disposition, Appellant D.A. contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

“arbitrarily refusing to consider the entire range of punishment” in committing her to

the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(a).

We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In September 2024, D.A. signed a written stipulation that she had engaged in

delinquent conduct by committing state-jail-felony theft and Class A misdemeanor

evading arrest. She and the State agreed to a disposition of one year’s probation,

which the trial court adopted. As part of her probation, the trial court ordered that

physical custody of D.A. was to be placed with her aunt.1 Some of her probation

conditions were (1) that she not run away or live elsewhere without permission,

(2) that she report to her probation officer regularly, (3) that she obey a curfew and

attend school regularly, and (4) that she submit to electronic monitoring.

Early in her probation period, D.A. absconded for three weeks. She later

absconded for eight months. During the latter four months of the eight-month

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Before the case began, D.A. was living with her grandmother, who had
voluntarily taken custody of D.A. after CPS “g[o]t involved with” D.A.’s mother
when D.A. was nine years old. D.A.’s aunt had agreed to be D.A.’s supervisor during
her probation.

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period, she lived with her mother. During those eight months, D.A. never reported

to her probation officer; she was eventually arrested after she had asked her mother to

enroll her in school.

D.A. tested positive for marijuana on the day she was placed on probation and

twice more before she absconded for eight months. She also tested positive after her

arrest. During that time, she used marijuana every other day.

After the State filed a motion to modify disposition, D.A. signed another

written stipulation agreeing that she had violated three conditions of her probation:

running away or living elsewhere without permission, failing to abide by a curfew, and

failing to comply with the trial court’s electronic monitoring terms. She also agreed

that she was a child in need of rehabilitation and that a disposition was necessary.

The trial court held a hearing at which it took judicial notice of its entire file

and questioned D.A. extensively. In response to the trial court’s question, “So your

own mother was hiding you from probation?” D.A. answered, “Yes, Your Honor.”

Ultimately, the trial court committed D.A. to TJJD for an indeterminate

sentence even though D.A.’s probation officer had recommended that a placement

search be completed.2 The trial court explained its reasoning:

I’m going to tell you why. As long as your mom is accessible to you, she
will lead you down the wrong path. She will make sure that you break

2
D.A.’s probation officer testified that, in the absence of a placement search,
the juvenile department recommended “[a] secured and structured environment”
because of D.A.’s “runaway history and the supervision concern[s]” at her home.

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the law. She will ignore the rules of probation. She will enable you. If
you think that the problems in your life[,] how you’ve become the
person that you are[,] is because of your mother.

All right. You need to separate yourself from your mother and all
the problems she brings into your life. She is the worst thing that could
happen to you. I’m grateful she gave you life, but everything that she
taught you about life has been wrong. Whatever you --

[D.A.]: I didn’t do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You won’t. At this point, this is all you know, and so
the fact that your mother is even here disturbs me. All right. She is
entitled to be here, but the fact that she even showed up tells me that she
is going to do whatever she can to return you back to your life and lead
you down the wrong path.

I think the best thing for your future is when you get out of
TJJD -- and you will -- is that you respectfully tell your mother this is not
the time, this is not the place, she has to take care of her problems and
you have to take care of yours. You’ll be released on parole, and I hope
one of the conditions of parole is to have no contact with your mother.

I think your aunt and your grandmother are good influences, but I
think your mother has poisoned you and ruined you enough to the point
you will always run away. . . .

D.A. filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s modification order.

III. DISCUSSION

In a single point on appeal, D.A. contends that “[t]he trial court abused its

discretion by arbitrarily refusing to consider the entire range of punishment.”

According to D.A.’s brief, the trial court’s pretrial decision to deny a psychological

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evaluation3 foreclosed the possibility of its later ordering “something other than

commitment to TJJD” as a disposition, see id. § 54.04(d); thus, this pretrial decision

“precluded the trial court from considering the entire range of punishment.”

A. MODIFICATION

Texas Family Code Section 54.05(f) provides that the trial court may modify a

disposition based on a finding that a child has engaged in felony-grade delinquent

conduct by committing the child to TJJD if, after a hearing, the trial court “finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of

the court.” Id. § 54.05(f); see also id. §§ 54.04(d)(2), 54.04013 (both requiring the

factfinder to also make a “special commitment finding that the child has behavioral

health or other special needs that cannot be met with the resources available in the

community”), 54.05(j).4 Section 54.04(d) describes other available dispositions,

among them probation––while in the child’s home, in the custody of a relative or

other fit person, in a foster home, in a non-TJJD licensed treatment facility, or in a

non-TJJD “public or private post-adjudication secure correctional facility.”

3
D.A.’s brief also states that the trial court denied “an opportunity to do a
placement search,” but nothing in the record indicates that the trial court precluded
the juvenile department from conducting such a search. And although D.A.’s
probation officer had recommended that a placement search be completed, the State
argued in closing that it had established the required facts necessary for D.A. to be
committed to TJJD and that “commitment [was] in [her] best interest for
rehabilitation.”
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The trial court made such a finding here. The trial court also made the
required subsection (c) and (i) findings. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(c), (i).

5
Id. § 54.04(d)(1)(B)(i)–(iii). No provision requires that the trial court order a

psychological evaluation before ordering a non-TJJD placement although Section

54.04013 does require that, before ordering a juvenile to be committed to TJJD, the

trial court “should consider the findings of a validated risk and needs assessment and

the findings of any other appropriate professional assessment available to the court.”

Id. § 54.04013; see also id. § 54.05(e) (providing that at modification hearing trial court

“may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees,

[appointed] guardians ad litem . . . , or professional consultants in addition to the

testimony of other witnesses”).5

A juvenile court has considerable discretion to determine the suitable

disposition for a child who has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent

conduct. In re D.T., No. 02-20-00312-CV, 2021 WL 5028769, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). It abuses that discretion when it acts

arbitrarily or unreasonably or without reference to guiding rules or principles, but not

when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence. Id. Thus, we may not conclude

that a juvenile court abused its discretion so long as some evidence of substantive and

probative character exists to support its decision. Id.

Here, the trial court had available to it two social history reports––one
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prepared in 2024 when the trial court placed D.A. on probation and the other
prepared in 2025 for the modification hearing.

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B. ANALYSIS

Although the appellate record does not include an order denying a

psychological examination, D.A.’s probation officer testified that a “psychological”

had been requested and denied. But nothing in the appellate record indicates that

D.A. ever raised a due-process complaint in the trial court based on that denial. Thus,

to the extent that D.A. complains that the trial court’s denial of a psychological

examination violated her right to due process by narrowing the disposition choices

available to it, she failed to preserve this complaint.6 See In re J.P., No. 02-24-00313-

CV, 2025 WL 647336, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

op.); In re I.V., No. 07-23-00410-CV, 2024 WL 3528683, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

July 24, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

But to the extent that D.A. complains that the trial judge prejudged her

disposition,7 nothing in the appellate record indicates that the trial court refused to

consider the full range of choices available to it or that it predetermined a disposition.

See, e.g., Roman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004,

pet. ref’d) (holding that without a clear showing to the contrary, appellate court

presumes that the trial court was neutral and detached). The trial court did not state

6
Additionally, D.A.’s brief cites no authority for the assertion that a
psychological exam is “[a] requirement for a placement.” See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
7
See Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding that
complaint about prejudgment of sentence is a category-two Marin right that cannot be
forfeited merely by the failure to assert it at trial).

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that it would not consider all available disposition options. And D.A.’s request

throughout trial was that the trial court continue her probation; the trial court

questioned her extensively about what she would do differently if he were to place her

on probation again. We conclude that nothing in the record supports D.A.’s

contention. See In re J.A., No. 04-18-00598-CV, 2019 WL 6499226, at *3 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Dec. 4, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d

30, 47 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (noting that in modification proceeding

trial court is not required to exhaust all remedies before committing juvenile to TJJD).

We therefore overrule D.A.’s sole point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled D.A.’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s modification

order.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker
Justice
Delivered: April 16, 2026

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