Shane Lilly v. the State of Texas

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00529-CV

Shane Lilly, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. C-1-CV-25-002926, THE HONORABLE ERIC SHEPPERD, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Shane Lilly, the owner of a dog named Major Lilly (Major), appeals pro se from

the trial court’s final Order of Disposition (Order) determining that Major “shall be humanely

destroyed in accordance with Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.003(e)” due to the court’s

finding that Major caused serious bodily injury to a person. See Tex. Health & Safety Code

§ 822.003(f). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Order.

BACKGROUND

Austin/Travis County Animal Protection requested a seizure warrant for Major

from the Austin Municipal Court pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code Sections 822.002

and 822.003 after the dog allegedly attacked Julissa Alvarez on March 31, 2025, and bit her arms

in several places. The warrant request was supported by the affidavit of Elayna Grove, who

serves as the Animal Protection Serious Bodily Injury Lead Investigator for the City of Austin.
The municipal court issued a seizure warrant, and Major was taken into custody by the Austin

Animal Center (Center). The municipal court conducted a hearing on July 14, 2025, after which

it found that Major had caused serious bodily injury to Alvarez and ordered that he should be

humanely euthanized. Lilly posted the required bond and appealed the municipal court’s order

to the county court at law (trial court). After a de novo hearing, the trial court found that Major

had caused serious bodily injury to Alvarez and ordered that he be humanely euthanized. Lilly

timely perfected an appeal from the Order in this Court.

The trial court admitted several exhibits into evidence, including a police report

from the incident, Alvarez’s medical records, Alvarez’s affidavit, and Grove’s seizure affidavit.

The following witnesses testified: Grove; APD Officer Steven Odom; Erin Coleman, who serves

as the “animal health technician lead” at the Center; Melody Courtney, the “senior animal

protection officer” at the Center; and Lilly. According to Grove’s and Alvarez’s affidavits,

Alvarez had been driving when she noticed a woman helping a loose and injured dog, who was

later identified as Major. Alvarez stopped to help the woman corral Major to keep him from

entering the street and learned that the woman had called animal control but that it would be two

hours before help would arrive. The woman wanted to take Major to the vet herself rather than

wait because Major was yelping in pain and favoring his back leg. As Alvarez helped to corral

Major, he bit her right arm, then bit her left arm, and again bit her right arm and held on for a

while, after which Alvarez stumbled away and into an adjacent business. EMS was called and

responded to the scene, rendering first aid and pain medications to Alvarez and then transporting

her to the hospital.

Lilly testified that on the date of the incident, a “hit and run” driver injured Major

while he and the dog were crossing Montopolis Avenue on their way to pick up a muzzle for

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Major that was being delivered to Lilly’s former residence. Lilly wanted a muzzle for Major

because the dog had been growling at people on the bus when they stepped on the dog’s feet or

kicked him and he wanted to “avoid any more altercations” and “the possibility of a bite.” After

Major was hit and injured, Lilly panicked and left injured Major alone in front of his former

residence to go get his phone to call for help because he “couldn’t pick him up.” Lilly testified

that he is currently homeless and living in a tent. He does not have a car and either walks or uses

public transportation. He testified that his uncle has offered to give him a house with an

enclosed yard or a car to contain Major.

Lilly testified that he previously paid $12,000 to Lonestar Malinois to train Major

for a six-week period but that he picked up Major “early” and that Major did not finish his

training there. Lilly did not explain why Major did not finish his training. He testified that he

had a “solution” as an alternative to euthanasia for Major: a different trainer, Precision Canine,

would receive the dog directly from the Center and “fix” him with proper training until he could

be reintegrated into society. Lilly explained that after Precision Canine works with Major, Grove

could interact with the dog and give her “blessing,” if appropriate; if at that point Major was

not able to be reintegrated into society, then Lilly understood that Major would have to be

euthanized. But Lilly believed that Major should be given another chance to be rehabilitated

through another training program.

Grove testified that she investigates dangerous-dog cases under the Texas Health

and Safety Code. She estimated that she has worked on thousands of dangerous-dog cases and

that “hundreds” of them have involved dogs that “have been alleged to have committed a serious

bodily injury on a person.” She testified that Major is of the Belgian Malinois breed, which is

used in police work and is a “very powerful breed” known to “chase and take down people” and

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to have a “powerful bite.” After APD informed her about the incident, Grove spoke with

Alvarez by phone and sent one of her field officers to obtain a medical release and affidavit from

her. After obtaining Alvarez’s medical records and reviewing the photos that Alvarez shared of

her injuries, Grove learned that Alvarez was transported to the hospital and suffered lacerations

requiring three staples in her right arm. She explained that staples are typically used rather than

stitches for wider wounds. Grove determined that seizure of Major was justified after reviewing

Alvarez’s records and speaking with her because her injuries “qualify as serious bodily injury

under the law.”

Grove testified that Major’s vet records from his impoundment at the Center show

that he must be sedated each time he sees the vet for any reason, even for vaccines, due to his

aggression, which is not normal for a dog. Grove explained that none of the statutory exceptions

apply to the incident at issue involving Major’s attack on Alvarez.1 Grove testified that during

her investigation, Lilly told her that Major had previously bitten other people five or six times.

She testified that at the Center, the staff must take “extra precaution” with Major because he is

very aggressive and has not calmed down in the almost five months he has been there. In her

experience, Major is one of the “more aggressive dogs that we have had to impound” in serious-

bodily-injury cases.

Grove expressed concern for others’ safety if Major were released to Lilly given

that Lilly is unhoused and that Major would likely be around the public more than he might

otherwise be, including while riding public transit. Grove testified that she would “be nervous

1
Section 822.003(f) provides five circumstances under which a dog that has caused
serious bodily injury may not be ordered destroyed, including that the injury occurred during an
arrest or other action of a peace officer while the peace officer was using the dog for law
enforcement. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.003(f).
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about [Major] taking public transportation” and that “him not living in a solid dwelling would set

him up for failure.” Grove did not believe that the alternative of releasing Major to Lilly but

imposing “dangerous dog restrictions”—such as requiring Lilly to maintain $100,000 liability

insurance and keep the dog in a secure enclosure, see Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.043

(“Registration”)—would be feasible under the circumstances. Grove also testified that before

and during the incident, Major appears to have been running loose, which is “highly concerning”

given his breed and aggressive tendencies.

Although Lilly had shared with Grove that he was hoping to send Major to an

obedience-training school if the dog were released to him, Grove did not know much about the

program and was aware from her conversations with Lilly that Major had participated in similar

training in the past. Grove could not opine on whether such additional training or rehabilitation

would be successful, but she was primarily concerned about public safety and bite “escalation”—

meaning that if a dog continues to bite without corrective measures being put into place, the bites

“will only get worse”—given that Major had already bitten several people and the severity of

Alvarez’s injuries.

Coleman testified that Major is a particularly aggressive dog who remains that

way despite his injuries from the incident having healed and that she and the staff at the Center

must deliver medications and treats by dropping them into his kennel because if they get their

fingers near the kennel Major bites the bars and acts like he is going to bite them. Coleman

testified that she is afraid of Major and that in her long career of twenty-six years there have been

perhaps only “ten [dogs] out of tens of thousands” that she has been afraid of. Coleman testified

that she believes Major will bite others if he is out in public.

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Courtney testified that she interacts with Major “kennel side” once or twice a

week at the Center. She said that she tends to “stay away from his kennel, because he does have

aggressive behaviors” and did not appear to have had any training based on her interactions with

him. When Courtney and other staff provide Major treats, they “stand back a couple of feet from

the kennel and toss them into the top,” which is a typical protocol for “serious bodily injury

seized dogs” because staff “don’t come in contact with them.”

DISCUSSION

The statute under which the trial court ordered the euthanasia of Major is Section

822.003, which provides, in relevant part: “The court may order the dog destroyed if the court

finds that the dog caused serious bodily injury to a person by attacking, biting, or mauling the

person.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.003(e). “Serious bodily injury” is defined,

relevantly, as “an injury characterized by severe bite wounds or severe ripping and tearing of

muscle that would cause a reasonably prudent person to seek treatment from a medical

professional and would require hospitalization without regard to whether the person actually

sought medical treatment.” Id. § 822.001(2).

On appeal, Lilly asserts the following issues: (1) the trial court’s order is not

compliant with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162, (2) the trial court’s order is erroneous

because Lilly has not been found guilty of a criminal offense under Health and Safety Code

Section 822.005 and because Alvarez provoked Major’s attack, (3) the trial court erred as a

matter of law in ordering Major’s euthanasia because Lilly is a person with a disability who uses

Major to assist him in connection with that disability, (4) Lilly was deprived of due process

because Alvarez did not testify and the State used “unqualified opinions” and “unverified

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reports” to prove its case, and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering euthanasia when

there were other less punitive alternatives available.2

As to Lilly’s first issue, Rule 162 is simply inapposite to the facts and procedural

history here. Rule 162 applies when a plaintiff seeks to dismiss his case or take a non-suit and

prevents the use of such dismissal or non-suit from prejudicing the rights of an adverse party “to

be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relief.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 162 (“Dismissal or

Non-Suit”). No party here sought a dismissal or filed a non-suit, and thus Lilly’s citation to

the rule and attempt to support his arguments with the rule are without merit. We overrule

Lilly’s first issue.

In his second issue, Lilly argues that the trial court erred in rendering the Order

because (1) Alvarez provoked Major’s attack and (2) Section 822.005 of the Health and Safety

Code requires a finding of criminal negligence before a dog may be ordered euthanized.

However, Section 822.003 contains no requirement that the serious bodily injury be the result of

an unprovoked attack, nor does it provide an exemption for an alleged provoked attack. See Tex.

Health & Safety Code § 822.003. Additionally, Section 822.005 operates independently of

Section 822.003 by providing that the owner of a dangerous dog that makes an unprovoked

attack under specified circumstances commits a criminal offense. See id. § 822.005. Section

822.005 provides an alternative avenue for the euthanasia of a dog that has caused serious bodily

2
The State asserts in its brief that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this
appeal because no statute expressly provides for an appeal from an order of disposition under
Section 822.003. There is no merit to the State’s assertion, and we need not address it in detail
because litigants have a general right to appeal a final order rendered by a county court at law as
a matter of law, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.012; Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.220, and no
express statutory authorization is necessary. Furthermore, this Court has previously reviewed
such orders, implicitly concluding that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Swanson v.
State, No. 03-16-00729-CV, 2017 WL 1832492, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin May 2, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (reviewing county court at law’s order of disposition under Section 822.003).
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injury to another, that is, when its owner is charged with and convicted of a criminal offense.

See id. § 822.005(d). But there is nothing in Section 822.003—the statute at issue in this case—

requiring a finding that the owner has committed a criminal offense under Section 822.005 for a

court to render a euthanasia order. See id. § 822.003. Nor has Lilly identified anything in the

record showing that he was prosecuted for a criminal offense under Section 822.005. We

overrule Lilly’s second issue.

In his third issue, Lilly argues that the trial court erred in rendering its order

because Lilly was entitled to the “defense” provided in Section 822.006(d) because Lilly has

a disability and Major is trained to provide him assistance with that disability.3 See id.

§ 822.006(d). However, that statute expressly provides that the defense applies “to prosecution

under Section 822.005(a).” Id. As already discussed, the record does not reflect that Lilly was

prosecuted under Section 822.005. The defense does not apply, therefore, to the facts in this

case, and we overrule Lilly’s third issue.

In his fourth issue, Lilly argues that he was denied due process because he was

“not given the right to cross-examine the key witness [] who was allegedly injured, and the

prosecution failed to produce this witness for examination,” instead relying on “third party

testimony and opinions” and “unverified claims,” including Major’s biting history. However,

Lilly cites no authority requiring the State to elicit live testimony from the victim of a dog attack

to prove its case, nor have we found any. Moreover, Grove testified that it was Lilly himself

who had told her about Major’s bite history and, although the trial court admitted the bite-history

testimony over Lilly’s objection that it was “unsubstantiated,” Lilly does not make any

3
Lilly testified that he has seizure disorder and that Major assists him with “seizure
response and compulsive behavior interruption.”
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cognizable argument that the court’s ruling was erroneous. Cf. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (appellant

must support appellate issues with clear and concise argument and appropriate citations). The

evidence in the record, including Alvarez’s affidavit and medical records, supports the trial

court’s finding that Alvarez suffered serious bodily injury resulting from Major’s attack, and

Lilly has not demonstrated that he was deprived of his due-process rights. We overrule his

fourth issue.

In his final issue, Lilly argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering

Major’s euthanasia rather than a less punitive alternative such as rehabilitative training, as Lilly

suggested in his testimony. While abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review for

when a statute uses the word “may,” see Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd.,

536 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tex. 2017), as Section 822.003 does, we cannot conclude on this

record that the trial court acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to

guiding rules or principles, see id. Although when testifying Lilly proposed an alternative to

euthanasia—sending Major to a training program for rehabilitation until he receives Grove’s

“blessing” to be reintegrated into society—the trial court, as the trier of fact, was free to weigh

this testimony against the other evidence and make credibility determinations. See McGalliard

v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). Furthermore, Lilly testified that Major had

been enrolled in a training program previously, but this bite occurred nonetheless. The trial

court could reasonably have concluded that subsequent training would not be any more

successful than the previous training.

Moreover, if a trial court chooses not to order that the dog be destroyed, it must

order the dog released to either its owner, the person from whom it was seized, or any other

authorized person. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 822.003(e). Even assuming that Precision

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Canine would be an “authorized person” to whom Major could be released under Section

822.003(e), the statute does not expressly authorize the court to order conditions and

contingencies such as those that Lilly suggested. See id. In any event, on this record the trial

court reasonably exercised its discretion in concluding that the risk to the public would be too

great to release Major to anyone, even to a dog trainer chosen by Lilly whom Lilly represented

would either rehabilitate or euthanize the dog. The trial court did not act unreasonably or

arbitrarily given the evidence of the serious bodily injury that Major inflicted; the testimony

about Major’s continuing aggressive behavior; and Lilly’s recognition even before the incident

that Major should be leashed and muzzled yet failing to keep him under those conditions while

the dog was in public, allowing the attack to occur. We overrule Lilly’s final issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Lilly’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s Order.

__________________________________________
Karin Crump, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis

Affirmed

Filed: February 11, 2026

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