Norman Agnew v. the State of Texas

CourtListener 10291367Txctapp509.12.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Dismissed and Opinion Filed December 9, 2024

In the
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-01208-CR

NORMAN AGNEW, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F23-24937

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
Opinion by Justice Carlyle
Appellant appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a

felon. Pursuant to a plea bargain that reduced the range of punishment, appellant

pleaded guilty to the alleged offense and pleaded true to one

punishment-enhancement paragraph. The trial court sentenced appellant to twelve

years’ imprisonment. We conclude we lack jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal

for want of jurisdiction.1

1
Appellant’s appeals in cause numbers 05-24-01206-CR and 05-24-01207-CR remain pending before
this Court.
Appellant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The

offense is a third-degree felony punishable by imprisonment for two to ten years.

See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.34, 46.04(a), (e). The indictment also alleged two

punishment-enhancement paragraphs, which increased the range of punishment to

imprisonment for twenty-five to ninety-nine years or life. Id. § 12.42(d).

The record shows appellant and the State entered into a plea bargain whereby

the State abandoned one of the enhancement paragraphs, which reduced the range

of punishment from twenty-five-to-ninety-nine-years to two-to-twenty-years, and

appellant pleaded guilty to the offense and true to the remaining enhancement

paragraph. See id. §§ 12.33(a), 12.42(a), (d). After hearing evidence on punishment,

the trial court sentenced appellant to twelve years’ imprisonment. The trial court

signed a certification of appellant’s right of appeal stating, “I certify that this

criminal case is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.”

A criminal defendant cannot appeal from a plea bargain except in specific,

limited circumstances:

A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the
rules hereinafter prescribed, provided, however, before the defendant
who has been convicted upon either his plea of guilty or nolo
contendere before the court and the court, upon the election of the
defendant, assesses punishment and the punishment does not exceed
the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the
defendant and his attorney may prosecute his appeal, he must have
permission of the trial court, except on those matters which have been
raised by written motion filed prior to trial.

–2–
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.02. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure set out

further limitations:

In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was
guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the
punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the
defendant—a defendant may appeal only:

(A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and
ruled on before trial,

(B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or

(C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).

Plea bargains include agreements to plead guilty in exchange for the State not

pursuing enhancement paragraphs. See Gordon v. State, No. 05-19-00658-CR, 2020

WL 3071705, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 10, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem op.; not

designated for publication). The State’s agreement to abandon one of the

enhancement paragraphs, which reduced the range of punishment, constitutes a plea

bargain under Rule 25.2. None of the three grounds for jurisdiction listed in Rule

25.2(a)(2) apply in this case.

When an appeal from a plea bargain is not authorized by Rule 25.2, “[a] court

of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-

bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal

without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.” Chavez, 183 S.W.3d

675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

–3–
Rule 25.2(d) also requires the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal if there is

no certification from the trial court showing the defendant has the right of appeal.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). The certification in this case affirmatively shows appellant

does not have the right of appeal, and the certification is supported by the record.

Therefore, we must dismiss the appeal. Id.; Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

We conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we dismiss this appeal

for want of jurisdiction.

/Cory L. Carlyle//
CORY L. CARLYLE
241208f.u05 JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

–4–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

NORMAN AGNEW, Appellant On Appeal from the 195th Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-24-01208-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F23-24937.
Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Goldstein and Breedlove
participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED for
want of jurisdiction.

Judgment entered this 9th day of December, 2024.

–5–

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