124 South Oak Street LLC and John Lanahan v. Town of Pecos City

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
————————————
No. 08-24-00418-CV
————————————

124 South Oak Street LLC and John Lanahan, Appellants
v.
Town of Pecos City, Appellee

On Appeal from the 143rd District Court
Reeves County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23-08-24909-CVR

M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N

The Town of Pecos City sold property to Willmar Land LLC without soliciting sealed bids

or conducting a public auction. The city sued Willmar and subsequent purchasers, Appellants 124

South Oak Street, Pecos, Texas 79772, LLC and John Lanahan, seeking a declaration that the

conveyances were void for violations of the Local Government Code. After a bench trial, the trial

1
court granted Pecos’s request for declaratory relief, found that the conveyance from Pecos to

Willmar was in violation of the Local Government Code and held the subsequent two deeds in the

chain of title void. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 2019, the West of the Pecos Museum, Inc., conveyed property located in

downtown Pecos and known as 118 South Oak Street to the City of Pecos by general warranty

deed. Willmar expressed an interest in purchasing 118 South Oak Street for the purpose of

rehabilitating the property, and it agreed to pay the $35,000 asking price set by Pecos. 1 Willmar’s

proposed purchase was presented to the Pecos City Council on January 28, 2021. The Council

voted to sell the property to Willmar and passed a resolution to that effect. The property was deeded

from Pecos to Willmar in May 2021.

Before Willmar was able to renovate 118 South Oak Street, its manager suffered a stroke.

Unable to carry out its planned renovations, Willmar approached Rod Ponton—who at the time of

the sale from Pecos to Willmar was Pecos’s city attorney—about selling the property. Ponton was

the sole owner and member of 124 South Oak LLC, which had previously purchased and renovated

the property located at 124 South Oak Street—a property that shared a wall with 118 South Oak

Street. Willmar conveyed the property to 124 South Oak.

Pecos filed its suit against Willmar and 124 South Oak in August 2023. 2 Pecos claimed

that “[p]ursuant to Sections 253.008 and Sections 272.001 of the Local Government Code, the

1
The record reflects that Pecos was motivated to sell the property given the expense involved in rehabilitating it and
the lack of support from the community to do so.
2
Pecos’s impetus for bringing the lawsuit is not clear from the record. However, 124 South Oak asserted in its
pleadings that the “lawsuit appears to be a politically motivated attempt to undermine Mr. Ponton.” Appellants also
stated that the lawsuit was brought only after Ponton purchased the property and that the “newest batch of Council
members and replacement City attorney held political animus [against Ponton].”

2
governing body of a municipality may sell real property owned by the municipality only by public

auction or by sealed bid with notice being published in the newspaper of general circulation of the

county in which the land is located.” Further, Pecos maintained that because the initial conveyance

from Pecos to Willmar did not comply with these provisions, the sale was not done by any “valid,

legal procedure,” and the deed was void. Because the initial deed was void, Pecos alleged that the

subsequent deed from Willmar to 124 South Oak was also void.

In its answer, 124 South Oak argued that the conveyance did comply with § 272.001 by

falling under an exception to the notice and bidding requirements found in § 272.001(g), which

relates to the development of low-income or low to moderate-income housing projects. 124 South

Oak also claimed that it is a bona fide purchaser for value and, even if the deed is voidable, their

status as a bona fide purchaser protects them. 124 South Oak additionally maintained that the

doctrine of estoppel by deed precluded Pecos from denying the validity of the initial conveyance

from Pecos to Willmar as well as the subsequent purchasers.

After filing suit, Pecos filed a notice of lis pendens on the subject property in September

2023. About a month later, 124 South Oak sold 118 South Oak Street to Lanahan. Pecos amended

its petition in June 2024 to add Lanahan as a defendant, arguing that the conveyance to him was

also void. Lanahan filed a counterclaim for inverse condemnation, arguing that Pecos’s attempt to

cancel his deed amounted to an unlawful taking or inverse condemnation.

The trial court held a bench trial during which Ponton, the city manager, and Lanahan

testified. The trial court found that the sale of 118 South Oak Street from Pecos to Willmar was

“in violation of the statutory requirements of Sections 253.008 and 272.001 of the Texas Local

Government Code.” It also found that the deed from Pecos to Willmar did not fall under the notice

and bidding exception since it was “not for the public purpose of the development of low-income

3
or moderate-income housing.” The trial court declared the original deed and the two subsequent

deeds void, ordered that Pecos be granted title to 118 South Oak Street, and declared that all

defendants have “no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in or to” 118 South Oak Street, thus granting

Pecos’s request for declaratory relief.

124 South Oak and Lanahan (Appellants) appealed. 3 They raise four issues: (1) that the

trial court erred when it voided the original deed from Pecos to Willmar; (2) that it was error to

declare void the subsequent deeds ignoring “bona fide purchasers”; (3) that the trial court

incorrectly “applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed when voiding the original conveyance from

Pecos to Willmar, after the property had been sold by Willmar to subsequent bona fide purchasers

for value”; and (4) that the court erred “in failing to grant Appellant Lanahan counterclaims for

inverse condemnation and unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation” in

violation of the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Section 272.001(g) exception

Section 253.008 of the Local Government Code requires that municipalities sell real

property by sealed bid or public auction. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 253.008(a). Municipalities

and other local government entities may sell real property through a sealed bid procedure that

involves the government providing notice of the sale. See id. § 272.001(a). Section 253.008(b)

details the procedures to be used should the municipality choose to sell property by public auction.

Id. § 253.008(b).

3
Willmar is not party to this appeal.

4
There are, however, statutory exceptions that authorize municipalities to convey property

without following the requirements of § 253.008(b). Pertinent to this case is an exception

authorizing the sale of property to be used for low-income or moderate-income housing:

A political subdivision may acquire or assemble land or real property interest,
except by condemnation, and sell, exchange, or otherwise convey the land or
interests to an entity for the development or low-income or moderate-income
housing. The political subdivision shall determine the terms and conditions of the
transactions so as to effectuate and maintain the public purpose. If conveyance of
land under this subsection serves a public purpose, the land may be conveyed for
less than its fair market value. In this subsection, ‘entity’ means an individual,
corporation, partnership, or other legal entity.

Id. § 272.001(g).

B. Standard of review

Appellants argue that § 272.001(g) applies and excepted the city’s sale of the property from

bidding and auction requirements. 4 An appellate court reviews pure questions of law de novo.

HNMC, Inc v. Chan, 683 S.W.3d 373, 380 (Tex. 2024); W&T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu, 610

S.W.3d 884, 896 (Tex. 2020). To the extent that an issue involves a question of statutory

construction, the proper standard of review is de novo as well. Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich

American Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. 2022). We further review the trial court’s

application of the law to the facts de novo. In re San Jacinto River Auth., No. 14-21-00228-CV,

2021 WL 1778076, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)).

4
Appellants state in their summary of argument that they “challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial
court’s ruling.” They do not argue, however, about the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s ruling,
but about whether the trial court correctly construed and applied § 272.001.

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C. Analysis 5

The parties agree that the conveyance from Pecos to Willmar was not done by sealed bid

or auction. The dispute is whether the Pecos to Willmar conveyance was “for the public purpose

of the development of low-income or moderate-income housing . . . .” The trial court found that

the exception did not apply. We agree.

There is no evidence that Pecos’s purpose in selling the property was to provide housing

for low-income or moderate-income people. The agenda and minutes from the January 28, 2021

Pecos City Council meeting make no mention of low-income or moderate-income housing as being

a purpose for the sale of the property. The resolution passed by the City Council makes no mention

of housing at all. Rather, the resolution merely states that Pecos purchased the buildings “for the

purposes of rehabilitating the building to aid in the revitalization of the downtown and to expand

the downtown park boundaries . . . ” and that the buyer would follow through with these intentions.

Indeed, at the January 28 meeting the city manager said that the city purchased the property “for

the intention of expanding the park” and of “having a Downtown meeting area, Event Center type

of thing in the downtown.” At trial, the city manager reiterated that the city was wanting to expand

an adjacent park and was considering a conference room and locating the Chamber of Commerce

at 118 South Oak Street.

Nor do the conveyances themselves require that the property be developed for low-income

or moderate-income housing. There is no evidence that Willmar purchased the property with the

intention of developing low-income or moderate-income housing. Ponton himself admitted that

5
Appellants argued that Pecos’s initial argument was waived for inadequate briefing. We hold that briefs must “be
liberally, but reasonably, construed so that the right to appeal is not lost by waiver.” Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC
v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. 2020); see Los Compadres Pescadores, LLC v. Valdez, 622 S.W.3d
771, 780 (Tex. 2021) (“We generously construe our rules to avoid finding briefing waiver in this Court.”). Courts
should refrain from resolving cases based on procedural defects and instead work to resolve cases on their merits. See
St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 595 S.W.3d 211, 213–14 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).

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the deed did not bind Willmar to develop housing. The city manager also admitted that the

conveyance did not require Willmar to construct low-income or moderate-income housing at 118

South Oak Street. According to the manager, there were no stipulations regarding the development

of 118 South Oak Street, other than it be remodeled.

Appellants do not dispute any of these facts but argue that inferences of the parties’

intentions were sufficient for the conveyance to meet the statutory exception:

While the City did not follow the precise language of Local Government Code
§ 272.001(g) when carrying out the transaction, a clear record exists showing that
the City had previously assembled properties for sale to private entities capable of
carrying out development of property for housing as an established policy, with
Willmar certainly voicing a desire [to] undertake such redevelopment. The Court
can follow the trajectory of the sale to conclude that the original conveyance was a
valid attempt at an exempt sale under the applicable statute.

They further contend that the record indicates that the backdrop for the conveyance to Willmar

was that Willmar sought to undertake redevelopment efforts in “the same fashion as the

neighboring 124 S Oak Property [which] had been refurbished and turned into housing and offices

by Rod Ponton.”6 Ponton had purchased 124 South Oak Street and developed four apartments

there. According to Appellants, Ponton received a loan from Pecos to purchase 124 South Oak

Street that was meant to facilitate redevelopment and economic vitality in the downtown area.

By Ponton’s own admission, the loan he obtained for 124 South Oak Street had nothing to

do with 118 South Oak Street. But even if it did, there is no evidence that Ponton was specifically

charged with developing “low-income or moderate-income housing.” See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code

Ann. § 272.001(g). In fact, part of the loan to Ponton was for office space for his law firm.

Ponton testified that, when he was serving as Pecos’s city attorney, he and the city manager

believed that 118 South Oak Street was “being sold for economic development, [and therefore] it

6
Ponton testified that Pecos sold the property to Willmar “[f]or the purpose of doing the same thing for the housing
on this property as 124 South Oak Street, LLC, had done for housing on 124 South Oak Street, an adjacent property.”

7
was a lawful transaction for the city to sell the property the way it was sold.” But the statute does

not apply to “economic development” generally. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 272.001(g);

TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011) (“We presume that

the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose,

while purposefully omitting words not chosen.”). Pecos may have wanted to develop housing and

revitalize the downtown area, 7 but an unspoken, unstated purpose cannot provide the basis to avoid

the sealed bid or auction procedures. The statute is specific. It requires that the property is to be

developed not only for housing, but for low-income or moderate-income housing. Even if the

purchasers of the property were “capable of carrying out development of property for housing as

an established policy” and had “a desire [to] undertake such redevelopment” as Appellants argue,

the requirements of § 272.001(g) were simply not met.

Finally, Appellants contend that the conveyance from Pecos to Willmar was valid since the

sale was a duly noticed item on the City Council agenda, was approved unanimously by open

session vote of the City Council and received “legal scrutiny” from Permian Basin Abstract 8—the

entity that issued title insurance. These facts have nothing to do with low-income or moderate-

income housing and therefore do not meet the exception to the requirements that the sale of public

property must be by auction or sealed bid. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 272.001(g).

D. Void or voidable

Having found that Pecos did not comply with § 272.001, we turn to whether this violation

renders the deed from Pecos to Willmar void or voidable—a purely legal question that we review

7
From approximately 2017 or 2018 until 2021, there was a major housing shortage in Pecos.
8
They further contend that the insurer “required satisfaction that the sale of the Property by the City was undertaken
validly, i.e., that the Pecos [sic] had legal authority, through following statutory process and receiving council
approval, to convey the Property.”

8
de novo. HNMC, 683 S.W.3d at 380; Fredieu, 610 S.W.3d at 896. Whether a deed is void or

voidable turns on its effect upon the title when it was executed and delivered. Poag v. Flories, 317

S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied) (citing Slaughter v. Qualls, 162

S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. 1942)). A “void” act “is one which is entirely null, not binding on either

party, and not susceptible of ratification.” Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542, 547

(Tex. 2016) (quoting Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80, 85 (1852)). A void deed is “without vitality

or legal effect.” Flories, 317 S.W.3d at 825 (citing Qualls, 162 S.W.2d at 674). But a “voidable

act is one which is obligatory upon others until disaffirmed by the party with whom it originated,

and which may be subsequently ratified or confirmed.” HSBC Bank, 505 S.W.3d at 547 (quoting

Cummings, 8 Tex. at 85). A voidable deed “operates to accomplish the thing sought to be

accomplished, until the fatal vice in the transaction has been judicially ascertained and declared.”

Flories, 317 S.W.3d at 825–26 (quoting Qualls, 162 S.W.2d at 674).

If an instrument is void, an action to quiet title can be brought at any time to set it aside.

HSBC Bank, 505 S.W.3d at 547. But “[w]hen a deed is merely voidable, equity will not intervene

as the claimant has an adequate legal remedy.” Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615,

618 (Tex. 2007).

Appellants’ principal contention is that for Pecos to show that the deed was void, it needed

to demonstrate that the transaction involved forgery. Appellants further contend that, in the

absence of evidence of forgery, Pecos could only have attempted to establish that the deed was

voidable, by making a showing of “fraud, mutual mistake, failure of consideration, duress, undue

influence, and or false representation.” But Appellants contend that Pecos did not assert any

forgery allegations and produced no evidence to establish that the deed was voidable.

9
We are guided by this Court’s decision in Bowling v. City of El Paso, 525 S.W.2d 539

(Tex .App.—El Paso 1975), writ ref’d n.r.e., 529 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1975). There we held that

property conveyances from the City of El Paso were void because the City failed to comply with

notice requirements of the predecessor statute to § 272.001 of the Local Government Code. Id. at

540–41 (discussing language formerly contained in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5421c-12); 9 see

also McKinney v. City of Abilene, 250 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1952, writ ref’d

n.r.e.) (holding that failure to comply with the charter provisions that dealt with notice and hearing

rendered the transaction void). Section 263.007 of the Local Government Code similarly governs

the sale of government-owned land, but unlike § 272.001 which applies to political subdivisions

generally, § 263.007 applies exclusively to county governments. 10 See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann.

§ 263.007; Collins v. Canty. of El Paso, 954 S.W.2d 137, 148 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet.

denied). So closely aligned are the two provisions that this Court said that the two provisions

9
The statute read in relevant part:

No land owned by a political subdivision of the State of Texas may be sold without first publishing
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the land is located or in an adjoining
county, if there is no such newspaper, a notice that the land is to be offered for sale to the general
public, its description, its location and the procedures under which sealed bids to purchase the land
may be submitted. Notice shall be so given at least on two separate occasions and no sale shall be
held less than 14 days after the last notice.

Act of May 1969, 61st R.S., ch.455, § 1, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512 (repealed 1987).
10
It provides in relevant part:

(a) The commissioners court of a county may adopt a procedure by which the county may sell or
lease through a sealed-bid or sealed-proposal procedure any real property, including space in
a building, owned by the county.
. . .

(f) The procedure authorized by this section is an alternative procedure to the procedure authorized
by Section 272.001.

Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 263.007(a), (f).

10
should be read in pari materia. 11 Collins, 954 S.W.2d at 146, 148. Like our conclusion with regard

to § 272.001, courts have concluded that failure to comply with § 263.007 renders a deed void.

See Jack v. State, 694 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding

that with respect to the predecessor statute 12 to § 263.007, failure to comply renders the sale void);

Wilson v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 489 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1972, no writ)

(same).

Finding no reason to conclude differently in this case, we find the transaction in this case

is also void. 13 See also David B. Brooks, 35 Tex. Prac., County and Special District Law § 9.24

(2d ed. 2025) (“The sale of property owned by counties and other political subdivisions is governed

strictly by statute. The conveyance of such property in any other manner is void.”); Cyrus E.

Phillips IV, Common Law Exceptions to Competitive Bidding Requirements in Public Contracts,

11
If two statutes are in pari materia, it means they relate to the same subject matter and that they should be construed
together. In Pari Materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
12
Snyder v. Cowell, No. 08-01-00444-CV, 2003 WL 1849145, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 10, 2003, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (discussing the statutory requirements prescribed in Tex. Loc. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 263.007, formerly
contained in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1577). Article 1577 provided in relevant part: “The Commissioners Court
may . . . appoint a Commissioner to sell and dispose of any real estate of the county at public auction, and notice of
said public auction shall be advertised at least twenty (20) days before the sale . . . .” Act of May 14, 1953, 53rd Leg.,
R.S., ch. 133, § 1, 1953 Tex. Gen. Laws 447, repealed and superseded by Act of May 21, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch.
149, §§ 1, 49(1), 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1037, 1307 (current version at Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 263.001 (Vernon
1988)); see also Brownwood Ross Co. v. Maverick Cnty., 936 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ
denied) (quoting the language formerly contained in Article 1577). One of the main differences between § 263.007
and its predecessor is that the predecessor required bidding by public auction as opposed to a sealed-bid procedure.
Id.
13
Bowling was considered by the Texas Supreme Court on a writ of error. Bowling v. City of El Paso, 529 S.W.2d
509 (Tex. 1975). Although the Court refused the writ of error, finding no reversible error in the judgment, the Court
issued an opinion stating that the Court “reserve[d] the question whether a failure to comply with these statutory notice
requirements renders a transfer void or voidable.” Id. We are bound by our prior judgment even if the void-or-voidable
question was left unanswered by the Supreme Court, because the Supreme Court did not disturb our judgment. See
Chase Home Fin., L.L.C. v. Cal. W. Reconveyance Corp., 309 S.W.3d 619, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, no pet.) (“Absent a decision from a higher court or this court sitting en banc that is on point and contrary to the
prior panel decision or an intervening and material change in the statutory law, this court is bound by the prior holding
of another panel of this court.”) (emphasis added); see also Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022)
(writing that the principle of “horizontal stare decisis” dictates that “three-judge panels must follow materially
indistinguishable decisions of earlier panels of the same court unless a higher authority has superseded that prior
decision”) (emphasis added).

11
10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 228, 229 (1968) (“[W]here competitive bidding is required by

constitution, statute, or charter, it is mandatory; and any contract awarded without complying with

the requirement is void and unenforceable. Thus, strict compliance with competitive bidding

requirements is a condition to the award of the contract.”) (footnotes omitted) (citing CHESTER

JAMES ANTIEAU, 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 10.11 (1967)); cf. Richmond Printing v. Port

of Houston Auth., 996 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (contract

in violation of a statute is void).

In a prior decision regarding § 272.001, we noted that “the procedure outlined in Section

272.001(a) constitutes the ‘default,’ minimally sufficient procedures with which all units of state

government, including counties, must comply in order to conduct a valid sale.” Collins, 954

S.W.2d at 149 (emphasis added). Section 272.001 serves several policy goals: protecting public

property so it will not be disposed of for less than its true value, stimulating competition, and

preventing favoritism. Bell v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Holding the deed merely voidable would provide the parties a chance to

keep the transaction in place, thereby undermining these policy goals. See In re Mabray, 355

S.W.3d 16, 29 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding) (“Texas expresses its

public policy through its statutes.”); cf. Ben E. Keith Co. v. Lisle Todd Leasing, Inc., 734 S.W.2d

725, 727 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (Texas courts will not enforce an illegal

contract and “it is the duty of the court to at once decline to give it any validity.”). As Pecos notes

in its briefing, if the deed were only voidable, compliance with the Local Government Code

provisions would effectively become optional. We agree. See Collins, 954 S.W.2d at 149. We

overrule Appellants’ first issue.

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E. Bona fide purchasers, estoppel, and inverse condemnation

Our holding that the original deed is void directly bears upon the disposition of Appellants’

other issues. Title generally cannot pass from a void deed. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v.

Nelson, 889 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Even if

Appellants were genuine bona fide purchasers, this would make no difference where the deed is

void. Id.; Sanchez v. Telles, 960 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied); see also

Texas Depot of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex. 2013) (one

cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser when a void deed is in one’s chain of title). The original

deed lacks effectiveness from its creation which means too that estoppel cannot give the deed any

legal effect. See Nelson, 889 S.W.2d at 318; Magas v. Anderson, 310 S.W.3d 567, 571

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied); Ex parte Payne, 598 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 1980, orig. proceeding), disapproved on other grounds, Huff v. Huff, 648 S.W.2d 286

(Tex. 1983). 14 Since title never passed to Lanahan, he cannot make out a claim of inverse

condemnation either. Tex. S. Univ. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 212 S.W.3d 893, 903–04

14
This decision is concerned only with conveyances governed by § 272.001 of the Local Government Code and should
not be construed as a comment on conveyances not governed by § 272.001. See BRYAN A. GARNER, ET AL., THE LAW
OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 84 (2016) (“A decision’s authority as precedent is limited to the points of law raised by the
record, considered by the court, and determined by the outcome.”); id. at 82 (“Although it’s often easy to cherry-pick
a sentence from a case to support an argument, the sentence has no precedential force unless it is relevant ‘to those
points of law which are raised by the record, considered by the court, and necessary to a decision.’”) (quoting HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS § 11, at 49 (1912)). We emphasize this
limitation at a time when the availability of equitable defenses vis-a-vis void instruments and judgments may be
evolving. See, e.g., MAP Res., Inc. v. Mitchell, 706 S.W.3d 924, 934 (Tex. App—El Paso 2024, no pet.) (holding in a
suit where heirs of pre-tax-sale owner of mineral interests in real property filed suit against entities that had purchased
the interests at a tax sale that defendants were entitled to defense of laches regarding a void tax judgment); Leedy v.
Leedy, 399 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (ruling that a “party, by conduct, may
be estopped from challenging a judgment as void.”); see also Mitchell v. Map Res., Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 196 n.16
(Tex. 2022) (listing cases in other states and federal jurisdictions where equitable defenses might be available in
challenges to a void judgment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of JUDGMENTS § 66 cmt. a (1982) (“Although the
parties to an action may not endow an invalid judgment with validity as such, it has long been recognized that under
certain circumstances relief may be denied against a judgment that was rendered without the requisites of validity.”)
cf. Richard E. Flint, Time to Repair the Chain: Void Deeds, Subsequent Purchasers, and the Texas Recording Statutes,
48 St. Mary’s L.J. 1, 24–42 (2016) (discussing instances where despite the rule that innocent purchaser for value status
does not shield one when there is a void deed in the chain of title, Texas courts have carved out certain exceptions).

13
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“To have standing to sue for inverse

condemnation, a party must have a property interest at the time of the alleged taking.”).

We overrule Appellant’s second, third, and fourth issues.

III. CONCLUSION

The record reveals that Pecos did not convey 118 South Oak Street for the purpose of

developing low-income or moderate-income housing. As a result, § 272.001(g) did not apply and

provide an exception to the requirements for the sale of public property under the mandatory

provisions of the Local Government Code. This rendered the subsequent deeds in the chain of title

void. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice

October 14, 2025
Before Salas Mendoza C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

14