In the Interest of E.A.G. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00234-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF E.A.G.

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On Appeal from the 1A District Court
Jasper County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 41213
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

L.H. (“Linda”) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her

seven-year-old son, E.A.G. (“Edward”) 1 The trial court found, by clear and

convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for the termination of Linda’s

parental rights and that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interest

of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P), (2).

1
To protect the child’s identity, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child and
the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). The trial court’s Order of Termination
also terminated the child’s father’s parental rights, but the father is not a party to this
appeal.
1
Linda’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which he contends that there

are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-right termination

cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and

explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The

attorney filed a letter with this Court indicating that he gave Linda a copy of the

Anders brief he filed, notified Linda of her right to file a pro se brief, and included

the appellate record in an appendix to the Anders brief filed with this Court. The

Court notified Linda of her right to file a pro se response and of the deadline for

doing so. Linda did not file a response with the Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by

Linda’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.).

Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal,

and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d

at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it

considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error

but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate

2
Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it

unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford

v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Linda’s parental

rights.2

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on November 4, 2025
Opinion Delivered November 6, 2025

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

2
We note that if Appellant decides to pursue review in the Supreme Court of
Texas, counsel may satisfy his obligations to Appellant “by filing a petition for
review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24,
27-28 (Tex. 2016).
3