Mobil Pipe Line Company and ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, LLC v. Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., Orbit Gulf Coast NGL Exports, LLC, and Energy Transfer GC NGL Pipelines, LP F/K/A Lone Star NGL Pipeline, LP

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-23-00075-CV
________________

MOBIL PIPE LINE COMPANY AND EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE
COMPANY, LLC

V.

SUNOCO PIPELINE, L.P., ORBIT GULF COAST NGL EXPORTS, LLC,
AND ENERGY TRANSFER GC NGL PIPELINES, LP F/K/A LONE STAR
NGL PIPELINE, LP

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 75th District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23DC-CV-00046
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this accelerated appeal, Mobil Pipe Line Company and ExxonMobil

Pipeline Company, LLC (Exxon) appeal a temporary injunction granted by the trial

court in favor of Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., Orbit Gulf Coast NGL Exports, LLC, and

Energy Transfer GC NGL Pipelines, LP f/k/a Lone Star NGL Pipeline, LP (Energy

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Transfer).1 In September 2023, Energy Transfer filed a motion with this Court

requesting that the appeal be dismissed, arguing the appeal had become moot,

because the construction of the pipeline the subject of the temporary injunction was

complete. In response, Exxon rejected Energy Transfer’s request, arguing that

although this construction had been completed, there are still judiciable issues before

this Court that need to be decided. On appeal, Exxon acknowledges that some

sections of the temporary injunction are moot because of the completed construction

but argues that the issuance of the temporary injunction resulted in millions of

dollars in damages to Exxon and that the language in two paragraphs extends beyond

the temporary injunction because it is vague, overbroad, and in violation of Texas

Rule of Civil Procedure 683. We reverse and remand.

Background

The undisputed facts are as follows. Energy Transfer owns and operates four

pipelines in Liberty County. Two of the pipelines are 12 and 14 inches in diameter

and were classified by the parties as “vintage” pipelines. Two other pipelines are 20

inches in diameter and were classified as “20 inch” pipelines. Exxon began a pipeline

project entitled the “Beaumont Connector Pipeline Project” that, upon its

completion, would span 57 miles underground and allow the company to move

1
On appeal, the parties agree the names of the individual companies are of no
concern to the outcome of the accelerated appeal, and we adopt the global names the
parties use in their briefs to the Court as identifiers of the appellants and appellees.
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petroleum products to the Beaumont refining market. Before construction, Exxon

met with Energy Transfer about this project, Exxon’s easements, and their proximity

to Energy Transfer’s existing pipelines and easements.

Energy Transfer filed suit against Exxon contending that Exxon’s activities

and “refus[al] to comply with [industry-]standard safety requirements[]” in building

the Beaumont pipeline “increas[ed] the risk of a break, leak, rupture, or other

damage” to their pipelines, forcing Entergy Transfer to file suit and seek an

injunction to stop “further unsafe construction practices by Exxon.”

First, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order against Exxon.

Exxon challenged the TRO, and the matter was set for a temporary injunction

hearing. In the interim, Energy Transfer continued to assert that Exxon continued to

exercise unsafe construction practices in violation of the TRO and requested an

emergency hearing and modification of the temporary restraining order.

Subsequently, the parties reached a settlement, executing the “Compromise &

Settlement Agreement” (Settlement Agreement) and modifying the temporary

restraining order to include the Settlement Agreement. The trial court issued a new

temporary restraining order incorporating the Settlement Agreement. Energy

Transfer continued to allege that Exxon violated the Settlement Agreement and the

TRO by interfering with Energy Transfer’s easement rights during the construction

of the Beaumont Pipeline. Energy Transfer then filed pleadings to have the trial court

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enforce the Settlement Agreement and requested injunctive relief. The trial court set

the case for another temporary injunction hearing for March 2023. At the temporary

injunction hearing, the trial court heard testimony and ultimately issued a temporary

injunction. Exxon timely filed this interlocutory appeal.

Before this opinion was issued, Energy Transfer made a request with this

Court asking for a dismissal, arguing the controversy between the parties had

become moot. According to Energy Transfer, the construction project at the heart of

the injunction was completed, rendering the temporary injunction moot. We

permitted Exxon to respond to the motion, in which Exxon contested the mootness

of the appeal, stating that there are still portions of the temporary injunction that

remain “active” after completing the construction project and damages Exxon

sustained from the “egregious” temporary injunction.

Mootness

When an appeal is moot, we must dismiss it, because appellate courts lack

jurisdiction to decide moot controversies. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.

Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (citation omitted). Since mootness implicates

our jurisdiction to consider this appeal, we address it first.

Exxon acknowledges in its response that portions of the temporary injunction

are rendered moot by the completion of the pipeline construction but argues that

paragraphs 8(5) and 8(6) of the temporary injunction live on beyond the completion

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of the pipeline. Exxon contends that the language in the temporary order “contains

commands that make no mention of construction and extend beyond its

completion[,]” and the temporary injunction “prohibits Exxon from ‘interfering’

(whatever that means) with the Energy Transfer’s easements.” According to Exxon,

both parties have competing legal rights to easements in the areas surrounding the

pipelines owned by both Exxon and Energy Transfer. In its original brief, Exxon

argued that paragraphs 8(5) and 8(6) are “[v]ague, [c]onclusory, and [o]verbroad[,]”

and in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683.

Exxon also contends that it sustained damages from the issuance of the temporary

injunction because the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily setting Energy

Transfer’s bond at $100,000.

Although Energy Transfer asserts the controversy between the parties is moot

because of the completion of the Beaumont pipeline, our review of the temporary

injunction does not reveal that its terms were limited to the duration of the pipeline

construction. As we explain below, we agree with Exxon that there are still live

controversies to be addressed in the temporary injunction and the appeal is not moot,

maintaining our jurisdiction to determine these issues on appeal. See Wimbrey v.

Worldventures Mktg., LLC, No. 05-19-01520-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 10025,

**11-13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (determining that

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although parts of the injunction were moot due to the passage of time, some

controversies extended past the expiration of the moot provisions).

Standard of Review

“A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the

litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,

84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). To obtain a temporary injunction, an applicant

must show: (1) a cause of action against the defendant, (2) a probable right to the

relief sought, and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Id.;

Mattox v. Jackson, 336 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no

pet.). The temporary injunction applicant bears the burden of production to offer

some evidence of each of these elements. See In re Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation

Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Camp v. Shannon, 348 S.W.2d

517, 519 (Tex. 1961)); Dallas Anesthesiology Assocs., P.A. v. Tex. Anesthesia

Group, P.A., 190 S.W.3d 891, 897 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). The applicant

need not establish that it ultimately will prevail at trial, only that it is entitled to

preservation of the status quo pending trial on the merits. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863

S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993); Dallas Anesthesiology Assocs., 190 S.W.3d at 897.

The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction rests within the trial

court’s sound discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. We review the evidence

submitted to the trial court in the light most favorable to its ruling, drawing all

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legitimate inferences from the evidence, and deferring to the trial court a resolution

of conflicting evidence. CRC-Evans Pipeline Int’l, Inc. v. Myers, 927 S.W.2d 259,

262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). Our review of the trial court’s

decision is limited to the validity of its temporary injunction order; we do not

consider the merits of the underlying case. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62

(Tex. 1978). However, a temporary injunction will be dissolved if it is based on an

erroneous application of the law to the facts. See Dallas Gen. Drivers,

Warehousemen and Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., 295 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. 1956).

Issue One

Paragraphs 8(5) and 8(6)

In their response to Energy Transfer’s motion to dismiss, Exxon agrees that

parts of the temporary injunction are moot upon completion of the pipeline project

but contend that paragraphs 8(5) and 8(6) extend beyond the completion of

construction.

Paragraphs 8(5) and 8(6) of the injunction contain the following language:

8. Plaintiffs have vested legal rights it seeks to protect and a probable
right to the relief sought in its claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ Application.
Plaintiffs will suffer probable injury if the Court does not enter a
temporary injunction.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants, Defendants’ agents,
servants, employees, affiliates, or those in active concert with
Defendants, or with actual knowledge of the Order, be and hereby are
RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from:

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(5) otherwise interfering and preventing Plaintiffs from
accessing the Vintage Pipelines or Dual 20-inch Pipelines;
and

(6) engaging in, encouraging or participating in any other
activity that interferes with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment
of Plaintiffs’ easements associated with the Vintage
Pipelines or Dual 20-inch Pipelines.

According to Exxon, the language in these two paragraphs violates Rule 683

as the general language “interfering” with Energy Transfer’s easement is both

“vague and overbroad.” Exxon argues that this language would not be a problem if

Energy Transfer maintained exclusive easements, but Exxon owns the pipelines,

“subject to [Energy Transfer’s] limited partial assignments.” Exxon states that these

assignments, including the Dual 20-inch pipelines noted in the temporary injunction

are subject and subordinate to the prior easements of Exxon. Therefore, Exxon

argues any prohibition that “prohibit[s] [or] prevent[s] Exxon from ‘interfering’ with

[Energy Transfer’s] access or enjoyment of easements is improper.”

Exxon also argues that the temporary injunction violates Rule 683 because it

“must describe the acts to be restrained in reasonable detail and ‘not by reference to

the complaint or other document.’” Exxon contends this is impossible as it requires

the review and assessment of extrinsic documents by workers in the field to locate

and analyze Energy Transfer’s easements to determine whether Exxon “interferes”

with Energy Transfer’s rights.

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In response, Energy Transfer argues that the Temporary Injunction is not

vague or overbroad, “is plainly aimed at preventing obstructions impairing access

to, or otherwise hindering patrol of, Energy Transfer’s pipelines—while

simultaneously allowing Exxon’s construction to progress[.]” Energy Transfer

contends that the word interference is a “definite, clear, and precise term.” Finally,

Energy Transfer argues that the Temporary Injunction does not violate Rule 683 as

“[t]he location of these pipelines are marked on the surface, and their subsurface

location can be accurately determined with 100% certainty using a probe[,] [and]

Exxon knows the location of Energy Transfer’s pipelines, as reflected on its own

survey alignment sheets.”

We agree with Exxon that paragraphs 8(5) and 8(6) are not sufficiently

specific to comply with Rule 683 in that they do not describe in reasonable detail

and by reference to the complaint or other document the act or acts sought to be

restrained. Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. Rule 683 requires specificity as to the prohibited acts

because “[a] temporary injunction should inform a party of the acts he is restrained

from doing without requiring inferences or conclusions about which persons might

disagree and which might require additional court hearings.” Cooper Valves, LLC v.

ValvTechnologies, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 254, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2017, no pet.); (citing Computek Comput. & Office Supplies, Inc. v. Walton, 156

S.W.3d 217, 220-21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)); see also Villalobos v.

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Holguin, 208 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1948). “Further, an injunction must be narrowly

tailored to address the offending conduct—it must not be so broad that it would

enjoin a defendant from acting within its lawful rights.” TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v.

Inhance Techs., LLC, 540 S.W.3d 202, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,

no pet.).

Vagueness

Enjoined parties should be able to review a temporary injunction order,

understand it, and not guess about what they are prohibited from doing upon threat

of contempt. See id. at 213 (“Requiring that an enjoined party search for evidence to

understand what conduct is enjoined undermines the purposes of an injunction,

which are to remedy specific harm and to provide notice of the prohibited conduct.”).

Given the easement rights of Exxon and Energy Transfer, along with competing

interests of maintaining and use of their easements, specificity is necessary. Here, it

is undisputed that Exxon has its own easements, either in conjunction with, or close

to Energy Transfer’s easements, and the prohibition of “interfering and preventing”

Exxon from “accessing the Vintage Pipelines or Dual 20-inch Pipelines;

and…engaging in, encouraging or participating in any other activity that interferes

with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs’ easements associated with the

Vintage Pipelines or Dual 20-inch Pipelines[]” is too vague. The temporary

injunction fails to provide adequate notice to Appellants of the specific acts they are

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enjoined from performing in terms not subject to reasonable disagreement. See id. at

214 (concluding injunction was impermissibly vague where it failed to adequately

identify acts that it restrained); Cooper Valves, 531 S.W.3d at 266 (noting injunction

“should inform a party of the acts he is restrained from doing without requiring

inferences or conclusions about which persons might disagree and which might

require additional court hearings.”); Austin Hous. Fin. Corp. v. Friends of

Brykerwoods LLC, No. 01-20-00314-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 4583, at *13 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding temporary

injunction’s prohibition of “any construction activities” was too vague as it failed to

provide adequate notice of restrained activities in terms “not subject to reasonable

disagreement.”); Dickerson v. Acadian Cypress & Hardwoods, Inc., No. 09-13-

00299-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3889, at **19-20 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr.

10, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding temporary injunction violated Rule 683

as it failed to adequately define the “current clients” restrained party could not

contact).

Overbroad

We also agree the prohibition in paragraphs 8(5) and 8(6) are overbroad. It is

undisputed that Exxon has a lawful right to conduct activities on its own pipelines

within the same corridor and has the right to maintain its pipelines within its

easements. The restriction to not interfere with Energy Transfer’s “use and

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enjoyment” is overly broad. “A trial court abuses its discretion by entering an overly-

broad injunction which grants more relief than a plaintiff is entitled to by enjoining

a defendant from conducting lawful activities or from exercising legal rights.” Supar

Starr Int’l LLC v. Fresh Tex Produce, LLC, 531 S.W.3d 829, 849 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.); see also TMRJ Holdings, 540 S.W.3d at 214

(reversing a permanent injunction because the prohibited conduct was so broad, it

restrained lawful conduct); Jowell v BioTE Med., LLC, No. 05-21-00166-CV, 2021

Tex. App. LEXIS 8387, **33-36 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 15, 2021, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (Reversing a temporary injunction because “a party’s acts are divisible, and

some acts are permissible and some are not, an injunction should not issue to restrain

actions that are legal or about which there is no asserted complaint.”); Legacy Home

Health Agency, Inc. v. Apex Primary Care, Inc., No. 13-13-00087-CV, 2013 Tex.

App. LEXIS 11782, **19-20 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi – Edinburg Sept. 19, 2013,

pet. denied) (Dissolving a temporary injunction that was overbroad as “[t]he clause

does not identify specific unlawful acts and is thus improper[.]”).

Rule 683 Compliance

Finally, while Energy Transfer argues that the injunction is not overly broad,

and that Exxon can locate the pipelines on the ground by physical markers and maps,

this action violates Rule 683 as it requires review of extrinsic documents in the field

outside the temporary injunction. See Clark v. Hastings Equity Partners, LLC, 651

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S.W.3d 359, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (Explaining that

Rule 683 requires the temporary injunction to “describe in reasonable detail and not

by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be

restrained.”). Here, both Exxon and Energy Transfer agree that finding and locating

the pipelines requires review of documents outside the temporary injunction or the

attached Settlement Agreement. This reference to extrinsic documents violates Rule

683’s mandatory notice requirement. See In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Tex.

2021) (“These requirements ‘are mandatory and must be strictly followed.’”); Clark,

651 S.W.3d at 372 (internal quotations omitted) (“The purpose of Rule 683 is to

ensure the order itself notifies all restrained parties ‘unambiguously and with a

reasonable degree of specificity, of the conduct to be restrained.’”). Simply put, this

means that “[r]estrained parties should be able to pick up a temporary injunction

order, read it, understand it, and not have to guess about what they are prohibited

from doing upon threat of contempt.” Id.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. We sustain this issue.

Conclusion

We conclude the trial court’s order violates Rule 683’s mandatory

requirements, we declare the temporary injunction order void, dissolve the

injunction, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. We do not address Appellant’s remaining issues. See Arterberry

v. Willowtax, LLC, No. 05-21-00238-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1123, **13-14

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(Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem op.); City of Navasota v.

Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 01-08-00915-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 290, **3-4

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

JAY WRIGHT
Justice

Submitted on September 11, 2023
Opinion Delivered June 13, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

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