PD-0001-26 MATTHEWS, CHRISTOPHER ERIN FROM DALLAS COUNTY - 05-24-01304-CR — CONCURRING OPINION JUDGE FINLEY [ PDF/284 KB ]

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0001-26
CHRISTOPHER ERIN MATTHEWS, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
CONCURRENCE TO REFUSAL OF
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS COUNTY
Finley, J., filed a concurring opinion.
C O N C U R R I N G O P I N I O N
In Ex parte Roark, this Court concluded that “scientific knowledge has
evolved regarding [shaken baby syndrome].” 707 S.W.3d 157, 185 (Tex. Crim. App.
2024). In three petitions for discretionary review refused today, each appellant

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challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions in light of
Roark. See Matthews v. State, No. PD-0001-26; Morales-Gomez v. State, No. PD-0171-
26; Franklin v. State, No. PD-0269-26. I agree with the Court’s decision to refuse
review in each case on each appellant’s sufficiency challenge and write separately
highlighting why the Court is correct to refuse review and also to discuss how, in my
view, the bench and bar should address “shaken baby syndrome” moving forward.
I. 	Factual Background
a. Trial
J.T., the seventeen-month-old son of Appellant’s girlfriend, appeared normal
during a medical appointment and afterward at home. He had an adrenal-gland
condition and breath-holding spells that could resemble seizures, but his doctor
observed no neurological, respiratory, cardiovascular, or head-trauma symptoms
that morning. J.T.’s mother then left him in Appellant’s care. About forty-five
minutes later, Appellant reported that J.T. had experienced a seizure, thrown his
head backward, and struck a wall. J.T. was unresponsive, not breathing, and without
a pulse when paramedics arrived. He showed no brain activity upon reaching the
hospital and died three days later.
The State charged Appellant with first-degree felony injury to a child. See
Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a)(1), (e). The State alleged that he intentionally or

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knowingly caused serious bodily injury to J.T. by striking him with and against an
unknown object.
At trial, the State’s theory was that Appellant applied violent blunt force to
J.T.’s head shortly before he became unresponsive. J.T. had a new skull fracture with
corresponding scalp bruising, facial and ear bruising and swelling, a subdural
hemorrhage, brain swelling, and healing skull and rib fractures. The child-abuse
pediatrician testified that forces applied to J.T.’s head caused a brain injury and
prolonged oxygen deprivation, while the medical examiner attributed his death to
blunt-force head trauma. They testified that the described wall impact or simple fall
could not account for his injuries and that the fatal event occurred shortly before he
became unresponsive. The State also presented evidence identifying Appellant as
the perpetrator: J.T. had been acting normally before being left in Appellant’s
exclusive care, Appellant gave differing accounts of what occurred, and he told J.T.’s
grandmother that he was sorry and did not mean to hurt J.T.
Appellant presented a competing medical expert who relied in part on J.T.’s
prior head injury. Approximately four months earlier, J.T. had suffered a skull
fracture after presenting with vomiting and seizure-like activity, but the CT scan
showed no brain bleed, and his subsequent doctors found no indication of ongoing
neurological 	compromise. 	The 	defense 	expert 	interpreted 	the 	hematoma’s

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discoloration and collagen deposition as showing that it was at least one month old.
He described the darker blood as a rebleed that could have occurred spontaneously
or after a minor impact, questioned whether the skull fracture had been reliably
identified as new, and concluded that the thin hematoma did not cause J.T.’s death.
He could not identify an alternative cause of death.
On rebuttal, the medical examiner testified that she had reexamined the
photographs, reports, and microscopic slides after learning that her opinion had been
questioned. She continued to reject the defense expert’s interpretation of the
hematoma as chronic, explaining that the red blood cells appeared fresh and would
not have remained visible for weeks, but she acknowledged that a preexisting
subdural hematoma could rebleed. She agreed, however, that the thin hematoma did
not cause J.T.’s death. The jury found Appellant guilty.
b. Appeal
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. Matthews v. State, No. 05-24-01304-
CR, 2025 WL 3461933, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 2, 2025) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). The court of appeals distinguished Roark, reasoning that
“J.T. did not die because of swelling from the subdural hematoma, which was the
cause of the victim’s permanent brain damage in Roark” and “that J.T. suffered a
skull fracture; the child victim in Roark did not.” Id. at *4. The court of appeals also

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noted that “J.T. was also brain dead immediately upon arrival at the hospital,
whereas the child victim in Roark improved after blood was drained from her
subdural space to relieve pressure on her brain and was ultimately released to out-
patient rehabilitation.” Id. Based on this evidence, the court of appeals concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. See id. at *5.
II. 	Applicable Law
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction, reviewing courts consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom, a rational juror could have found that the State has proven the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331,
341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
When drawing inferences, the trier of fact may use common sense, common
knowledge, personal experiences, and observations from life. Acosta v. State, 429
S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When the record supports conflicting
reasonable inferences, we presume that the trier of fact resolved those conflicts in
favor of the conviction, and we defer to those resolutions. Dunham v. State, 666
S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

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This standard applies whether the case was proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 520–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This
standard gives full responsibility to the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the
testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic to
ultimate facts. Id. at 522. A factfinder may believe all, some, or none of a witness’s
testimony. Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). As the
reviewing court, we do not sit as the metaphorical “thirteenth juror.” See McPherson
v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We cannot substitute our
judgment for that of the trier of fact by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the
evidence. Id. We must affirm the conviction if the inferences necessary to establish
guilt are reasonable based upon the “cumulative force” of all the evidence when
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900,
903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
III. 	Sufficiency Discussion
The court of appeals correctly decided that the evidence was sufficient to
support Appellant’s conviction under the appropriate Jackson standard of review.
The State presented evidence of physical abuse inflicted upon J.T.—a skull fracture
and brain death upon arrival at the hospital. The State further presented evidence
that J.T. had corresponding scalp bruising, facial and ear bruising and swelling, a

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subdural hemorrhage, brain swelling, and healing skull and rib fractures. The State’s
medical expert testified that J.T.’s cause of death was blunt-force head trauma,
rather than “shaking.” They testified that the described wall impact or simple fall
could not account for his injuries and that the fatal event occurred shortly before he
became unresponsive. The State also presented evidence identifying Appellant as
the perpetrator: J.T. had been acting normally before being left in Appellant’s
exclusive care, Appellant gave differing accounts of what occurred, and he told J.T.’s
grandmother that he was sorry and did not mean to hurt J.T.
The entire record supports a rational juror’s ability to find that Appellant
intentionally or knowingly inflicted serious bodily injury through blunt-force trauma.
Even with the competing expert presented by the defense, the jury was entitled to
credit the State’s interpretation of the injuries suffered by J.T. Roark’s general
recognition that chronic hematomas can rebleed does not establish that J.T. had a
chronic hematoma, that a rebleed caused his collapse, or that the State’s case-
specific opinions possessed no probative value. Importantly, both experts agreed that
the hematoma did not cause J.T.’s death. Thus, the possibility of a rebleed did not
negate the State’s evidence that recent blunt-force trauma caused the fatal brain
injury. Under the appropriate Jackson standard, this evidence is sufficient to support

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Appellant’s 	conviction 	for 	injury 	to 	a 	child 	even 	in 	light 	of 	the 	scientific
developments recognized in Roark.
IV. 	Shaken Baby Syndrome Moving Forward
a. Recent developments in the law
Roark is by no means a “stand-alone” case when it comes to judicial
recognition of scientific changes in the understanding of shaken baby syndrome.
i. 	In re Moore, — Cal. Rptr. 3d —, No. D086215, 2026 WL 2640657 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2026).
Jason Harley Moore was charged with one count of assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury on a child resulting in death pursuant to
California Penal Code section 273ab after his infant daughter, Charlotte, sustained
fatal head injuries while in his care. Id. at *1. He was convicted and sentenced to
twenty-five years to life in prison. Id.
At trial, Dr. Mark Massi, the forensic pediatrician that examined Charlotte,
testified Charlotte’s injuries were “[a]bsolutely” inconsistent with a short fall from
a bed and such a fall “would not account for her condition.” Id. at *7. The appellate
court further restated Dr. Massi’s testimony:
[Charlotte’s] injuries were “more consistent with the forces to which
an infant would be subjected in a car crash or a fall from multiple
stories.” He stated the level of force required to cause Charlotte’s
injuries was such that “if there were an observer in the room [when

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Charlotte was injured], the observer would have been distressed by the
violence with which these injuries were inflicted.” He further explained
Charlotte’s retinal hemorrhaging was different from hemorrhaging
seen outside of the child abuse context and Charlotte’s hemorrhaging
was “not characteristic of any other process” besides abuse. Given the
nature of Charlotte’s injuries, he testified “something much more
traumatic [than a fall from the bed] had happened to her.” He twice
stated, “This was a major traumatic event.”
Id. Two other state’s experts testified that a short fall could not have caused the
injuries, stating that “there’s no convincing evidence to me that a child could sustain
a fracture from . . . a fall of that height” and that Charlotte’s injuries were not
“consistent with a three-month-old who allegedly sustained a short fall of 26 inches
or so onto a carpeted surface.” Id.
Moore filed a writ of habeas corpus, claiming (1) “the prosecution’s expert
trial testimony has been undermined by scientific developments since trial and, thus,
the testimony constitutes false evidence,” (2) “the scientific developments have
created a significant dispute in the medical community in Moore’s favor,” and (3)
“the scientific developments constitute new evidence of Moore’s innocence.” Id. at
*1. Upon a review of the trial evidence and the developments in shaken baby
syndrome science, the appellate court concluded that “experts now agree scientific
developments have established a short fall can cause the types of injuries Charlotte
suffered, even if rare.” Id. at *8. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that

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the trial testimony of the medical experts, “which was essential to their opinions that
Moore abused Charlotte, was false.” Id.
ii. 	Georgia v. Smith, Case No. 02-B-2388-6 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 21, 2026)
Danyel Smith was convicted of felony murder and aggravated battery in
connection with the death of his two-month-old son, Chandler, based on a diagnosis
of shaken baby syndrome. The trial evidence showed that on April 29, 2002,
Chandler became unresponsive and “was not breathing.” Smith v. State, 657 S.E.2d
523, 524–25 (Ga. 2008). When Chandler was taken to the hospital, a CT scan of his
brain “revealed a skull fracture, a hematoma, and swelling of the brain.” Id. at 525.
“Based on the CT scan as well as Chandler’s broken wrists, retinal hemorrhages,
and the quick onset of his symptoms, Chandler was diagnosed as a ‘shaken baby,’
who had been subjected to vigorous shaking that was probably coupled with impact.”
Id.
The state’s theory at trial was one of abuse. The prosecutor argued that
“there’s no other explanation that the doctors might look for that would explain
these symptoms, other than non-accidental trauma; that is, child abuse.” The
consulting pediatric neurosurgeon, Dr. William Boydston, who saw Chandler at the
hospital, testified about his diagnosis: “Unless somebody could tell me something
else was going on with this child, guys, I don’t — You know, I think he was a shaken

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baby. I’ll be happy if somebody can tell me something else.” Smith was convicted
and sentenced to twenty years’ confinement on each count.
Smith then filed an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, arguing that the science surrounding the diagnosis of brain
injuries in infants has dramatically evolved since his trial and pointing to a new expert
affidavit ruling out shaken baby syndrome as the cause of Chandler’s death. Smith v.
State, 922 S.E.2d 6, 11 (Ga. 2025). In July of 2026, the Superior Court of Gwinnett
County granted Smith’s extraordinary motion for a new trial. See Order at 14,
available at https://tinyurl.com/3my9btwy (last visited Oct. 7, 2026). The trial court
recognized a “fundamental shift in the diagnostic approach to brain findings in
infants,” from “the prevailing approach” in 2003 that “treated [shaken baby
syndrome] as a presumptive diagnosis” to the “current medical and scientific
standards [which] require a comprehensive differential diagnosis that considers
alternative, non-abusive causes before concluding abuse.” Id. at 8. On the issue of
materiality, 	the 	trial 	court held 	that 	because 	Smith “presented 	a 	coherent,
comprehensive, and medically and scientifically supported alternative explanation
for Chandler’s death, corroborated by five medical specialists,” which would have
supported Smith’s non-abuse theory at trial. Id. at 13. Consequently, because “a

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reasonable juror could find [Smith’s] newly discovered expert testimony plausible
and persuasive,” Smith met the materiality requirement for a new trial. Id.
iii. 	State v. Nieves, 345 A.3d 1127 (N.J. 2025)
In Nieves, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was “asked to determine whether
expert testimony regarding [shaken baby syndrome] is sufficiently reliable to go
before a jury in two separate cases.” Id. at 1132–33. In both cases,
the young children exhibited symptoms that have come to be associated
with 	[shaken 	baby 	syndrome] 	and 	referred 	to 	as 	the 	“triad 	of
symptoms” 	— 	subdural 	hematoma, 	retinal 	hemorrhages, 	and
encephalopathy. In both cases, after the children were examined by
various medical specialists and a series of tests were run, the same
doctor determined that the children were victims of child abuse,
specifically [shaken baby syndrome]. Because the children were in the
care of their fathers when they began to exhibit the above-mentioned
symptoms, both men were charged with criminal offenses, including
aggravated assault and child endangerment.
Id. at 1133. The trial court in each case excluded the state’s proposed shaken baby
syndrome testimony and expert. See id.
Applying the Frye1 standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, the New
Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the state had failed to meet its burden for
admissibility because the state had failed to show “general acceptance within the
biomechanical community regarding whether shaking without impact can produce
1 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

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the 	‘triad’ 	of 	symptoms 	associated 	with 	[shaken 	baby 	syndrome]: 	subdural
hematomas, multilayered retinal hemorrhages, and encephalopathy.” Id. at 1167.
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that an expert’s testimony that the “only
explanation” for the “triad” of symptoms “is child abuse” is “unreliable” and
“inadmissible” at trial. Id. at 1172.
iv. 	Other cases
People v. Lemons, 22 N.W.3d 42, 63 (Mich. 2024): Reversing conviction,
finding that the trial court abused its discretion in not admitting the defendant’s
proposed expert testimony in shaken baby syndrome prosecution.
State v. Butts, 2023-Ohio-2670, ¶ 102 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2023): Vacating
convictions in shaken baby syndrome prosecutions, concluding that the medical
community’s understanding of shaken baby syndrome has “clearly changed” since
2003 and the state’s original retinal-hemorrhage testimony “was incorrect and can
no longer be supported by science.”
People v. Ackley, 870 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Mich. 2015): Reversing conviction for
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to investigate adequately and to
attempt to secure appropriate expert assistance in the preparation and presentation
of the defendant’s defense in a shaken baby syndrome prosecution.

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b. What could and should be done
The major theme that comes through the instant petitions for discretionary
review and the other shaken baby syndrome cases listed above is that, in many cases,
trial counsel failed to meaningfully challenge the State’s shaken baby syndrome
evidence at trial. This creates two readily apparent problems. First, regardless of
Roark, subsequent sufficiency challenges on appeal will always fail so long as there is
some evidence that permits a rational juror, when viewing that evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, to find all the necessary elements of the offense. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Second, at least for these three appellants—and others
similarly-situated post-Roark—a Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.073 habeas
claim is almost certainly precluded because Roark and the advances in shaken baby
syndrome are not new science for purposes of Article 11.073. After all, Roark cannot
be “new” if one is prosecuted after Roark was decided. Of course, these appellants
may have recourse in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, but that is by no
means guaranteed.
Defense attorneys should be wary of letting shaken baby syndrome evidence
go unchallenged at trial. For example, to date, no case that has reached this Court
post-Roark has challenged the admissibility of expert testimony at trial under Rule
702. Compare Nieves, supra at 11. All attorneys have an obligation to stay abreast of

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changes in the law, particularly in an evolving area of jurisprudence post-Roark.
Defense attorneys should consider all possible methods of combatting and rebutting
this evidence at trial. Casting a wide net in defense strategies to give reviewing courts
ample opportunity to consider a case on appeal is a much-preferred approach in
shaken baby syndrome cases than simply adopting a “we’ll win on appeal” gamble.
Proper pre-trial investigation and development of defense expert testimony is
paramount 	to 	effective 	representation 	of 	clients 	in 	shaken 	baby 	syndrome
prosecutions. Without these safeguards, defendants face nearly certain affirmance
on sufficiency review and defense attorneys face potential ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims in habeas.
V. 	Conclusion
With these thoughts, I join the Court’s decision to refuse review.
Filed: October 15, 2026
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