Murray City Corporation v. Robinson

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 107
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL ADAM ROBINSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20130925-CA
Filed May 8, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robin W. Reese
No. 135900165
Samuel Adam Robinson, Appellant Pro Se
Briant J. Farnsworth II and Mark S. Richardson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Before JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN,
and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Samuel Adam Robinson appeals his conviction of unlawful
entry onto a controlled access highway, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code section 41-6a-714. Because this appeal is
from a district court decision following an appeal from a justice
court, we have jurisdiction only to consider whether the district
court erred in denying Robinson’s challenge to the charging statute
as unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of his case. See

Murray City v. Robinson
20130925-CA 2 2014 UT App 107
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-118(9) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The decision of
the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the
district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance.”). Our “appellate jurisdiction is limited to only those
issues attacking the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or
statute.” State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). We
affirm.
¶2 “A person may not operate a vehicle onto or from any
freeway or other controlled- access highway except at entrances or
exits established by the highway authority having jurisdiction over
the highway.” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-714 (LexisNexis 2010).
Robinson challenged the statute only as applied to the facts of his
case.
¶3 Robinson was traveling eastbound on 5300 South. The
entrance for eastbound traffic to enter southbound I-15 was closed.
Robinson traveled beyond that entrance and made a sharp right
turn to achieve the angle to enter the entrance intended to allow
westbound traffic to enter southbound I-15. Robinson challenged
the constitutionality of the statute as applied to him, claiming that
the entrance for westbound traffic was an entrance “established by
the highway authority” and it was not clear that he could be cited
for using that entrance while driving his vehicle in an easterly
direction. The district court denied Robinson’s vagueness challenge
as applied to the facts of his case, concluding that “it should be
clear to just about anybody eastbound on 53rd South the way you
get on southbound I-15 was blocked off, and I think it would also
be common sense to most of us that you can’t go down and use the
westbound on-ramp to I-15 southbound.” Robinson claims that the
statute is unconstitutionally vague because it did not give adequate
notice that he was prohibited from using a freeway entrance that
was intended for use by traffic traveling in the opposite direction.
¶4 “A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question
of law that we review for correctness.” Clearfield City v. Hoyer, 2008
UT App 226, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 94. “[W]e presume that the statute is

Murray City v. Robinson
20130925-CA 3 2014 UT App 107
valid and resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.” State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 1218.
“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.” Hoyer, 2008 UT App 226, ¶ 8 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). It is not sufficient for the challenger to
merely “inject doubt as to the meaning of words where no doubt
would be felt by the normal reader.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶5 Robinson has not demonstrated that section 41-6a-714 is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The district court
correctly determined that it would be obvious to a reasonable
person that the blocked freeway entrance was the one intended for
eastbound traffic and that use of an entrance intended for vehicles
traveling in the opposite direction would be prohibited. Under the
circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the statute “fails to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited.” See id. ¶ 10 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Robinson had adequate notice of the
conduct proscribed by the statute, and the statute was
constitutional as applied to him.
¶6 Affirmed.