Winegar v. Springville City

2018 UT App 42
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WADE S. WINEGAR AND S ANDRA WINEGAR ,
Appellants,
v.
S PRINGVILLE C ITY , BILL C HILD, AND JASON R IDING,
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20160364-CA
Filed March 22, 2018
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Claudia Laycock
No. 070401317
Wade S. Winegar, Attorney for Appellants
Robert C. Keller and Timothy J. Bywater, Attorneys
for Appellees
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in
which JUDGES K ATE A. TOOMEY and R YAN M. HARRIS concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶1 	Wade S. Winegar and Sandra Winegar appeal the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Springville City
(the City), Bill Child, and Jason Riding. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	The 	Winegars 	owned 	vacant 	property 	along 	Hobble
Creek in Springville, Utah. In May 2005, without the Winegars’
knowledge or permission, the City moved heavy equipment
across the Winegars’ property as part of an effort to clear an up-
stream 	obstruction 	in 	the 	creek, 	damaging 	the 	Winegars’
property.

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¶3 	Approximately eight months later, on January 27, 2006,
the Winegars filed a notice of claim for damage to their property
with the Springville City Clerk. The clerk transferred the notice
of claim to the City Attorney, who began communicating with
the Winegars about their claim.
¶4 	On March 20, an entity named Utah Risk Management
Mutual Association (URMMA) sent a letter to the Winegars,
which read:
Our investigation into the claim you have made
against 	Springville 	City 	for 	damage 	to 	your
landscaping and property . . . is now complete.
Our investigation indicates that Springville City
would not be held legally liable for any damages
you may have sustained. The City has an easement
on the property which allows [it] to enter the creek
bed. [It] also [has] authority to take measures to
clean out and maintain the creek bed to prevent
flooding 	that 	might 	damage 	other 	property
downstream.
Because the City would not be held liable, we must
respectfully 	decline 	to 	make 	any 	voluntary
payments on this claim.
The letter was signed by Lyle Kunz, a claims adjuster, and a
copy was sent to the City Attorney.
¶5 	A few weeks later, on April 9, Mr. Winegar sent a letter to
the City Attorney, purportedly following up on a telephone
conversation from the previous Friday, April 7. Mr. Winegar
indicated that he needed to amend his claim to include the
names of the individual employees “involved in cutting trees on
the subject property” and “the names of all those involved in the
decision-making 	process, 	direction 	and 	supervision 	of 	this

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project.” According to the letter, the City Attorney had advised
the Winegars to request those names in writing.
¶6 	URMMA responded to the Winegars’ letter on April 20:
Your letter dated April 9, 2006, addressed to [the
City 	Attorney], 	has 	been 	referred 	to 	us 	for 	a
response . . . .
Your claim was denied on March 20, 2006. We are
not prepared to continue negotiations with you by
providing the information you have requested in
your letter. If you [choose] to not accept our denial
and if you [choose] to move this claim to the next
step, your attorney can gather this information
through 	the 	discovery 	process 	of 	the 	court
[system].
¶7 	On April 24, Mr. Winegar sent a letter to URMMA and the
City Attorney, in which he acknowledged URMMA’s “outright
denial of the claim.” Nevertheless, Mr. Winegar reiterated that
he needed to include the employees’ names on the notice of
claim and recounted his April 7 conversation with the City
Attorney: “In our conversation on April 7, [the City Attorney]
and I discussed what would happen if these names were not
provided. We concluded the only alternative was for me to
amend my claim . . . to include the unidentified employees . . . .”
Mr. 	Winegar 	stated 	that, 	by 	means 	of 	his 	letter, 	he 	was
“amend[ing the] claim to include not only Springville City but
all the unidentified employees who participated in any aspect of
the work done at the above listed property, participated in the
decision-making to do such work[,] or carried trees or timber off
the property.” He also requested that URMMA or the City
Attorney notify him immediately “[i]f you believe I must follow
a different process to amend my claim.”

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¶8 	URMMA responded to the Winegars’ April 24 letter on
May 10:
A review of [the April 24] letter indicates that it
would not qualify as an amended Notice of Claim
since it is not directed to the right department
within the City.
Even if it did qualify as an amended Notice of
Claim, 	we 	do 	not 	believe 	that 	there 	is 	any
significant additional information that would cause
us to change our decision on the City’s liability. We
must therefore stand on the original denial which
was conveyed to you in our letter dated March 20,
2006.
¶9 	On April 24, 2007, the Winegars filed a complaint against
the 	City 	in 	district 	court. 	The 	City 	moved 	for 	summary
judgment, asserting that the Winegars’ April 24, 2007 complaint
was untimely because the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
(the Act) requires a claimant to pursue a civil action within one
year after denial of a claim, and the City had denied the
Winegars’ claim on March 20, 2006. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
403(2) (LexisNexis 2016).1 The district court granted the City’s
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with
prejudice. The Winegars appealed.
¶10 	In Winegar v. Springville City (Winegar I), 2014 UT App 9,
319 P.3d 1, this court vacated the entry of summary judgment
and remanded the case to the district court. Id. ¶ 1. There, the
Winegars 	argued 	that 	URMMA’s 	March 	20 	letter 	was 	not
“actually a denial of their claim because the letter did not
1. The parties cite the 2016 version of the Act, which was the
version in effect at the time they filed their briefs on appeal. We
follow suit.

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explicitly 	say 	the 	claim 	was 	denied 	but 	rather 	stated 	that
URMMA ‘must 	respectfully 	decline 	to 	make 	any 	voluntary
payments on [the] claim.’” Id. ¶ 15 (alteration in original). The
Winegars also argued that under the Act, only the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier can approve or deny a claim, see
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(1)(a), and that “URMMA, not the
City, wrote the March 20 letter and the letter did not identify
URMMA as the City’s insurer,” Winegar I, 2014 UT App 9, ¶ 15.
This court noted that the March 20 letter was on URMMA
letterhead and signed only by a “claims adjuster.” Id. ¶ 20.
Observing that the City had failed to introduce any evidence
establishing that URMMA was its insurer when URMMA sent
the March 20 letter to the Winegars, this court concluded that the
City could not establish, for purposes of summary judgment,
that it had denied the Winegars’ claim in the March 20 letter. Id.
¶11 	On remand, the parties engaged in discovery for the first
time 	and 	took 	the 	depositions 	of, 	among 	others, 	the 	City
Attorney 	and 	Mr. 	Winegar. 	Mr. 	Winegar 	testified 	in 	his
deposition that he “had been working exclusively with [the City
Attorney], and out of the blue got a letter from Lyle Kunz.” He
testified that he had “assumed [Lyle Kunz] was an adjuster” and
that “he had some involvement in the process.” During his
deposition, the City Attorney testified that Lyle Kunz “was a
claims adjuster for URMMA, who was our insurer at the time” of
the March 20 letter. The City Attorney considered the March 20
letter to be a denial of the Winegars’ claim. In May 2015, the
Winegars amended their complaint to include claims against Bill
Child and Jason Riding, two City employees who were involved
in clearing the obstruction in 2005.
¶12 	The City, Child, and Riding (collectively, Defendants)
moved 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	several 	grounds. 	First,
Defendants asserted that the Winegars had failed to strictly
comply with the Act. Specifically, Defendants asserted (1) that
the City had denied the Winegars’ claim on March 20, 2006, and

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that the Winegars had failed to initiate their district court action
within one year of that denial; (2) that the Winegars’ notice of
claim 	failed 	to 	“both 	identify 	the 	name 	of 	the 	individual
employees and describe the nature of [the] claim[s] asserted
against the individual employee[s]”; and (3) that the Winegars’
claims against Child and Riding were untimely, as those claims
were first asserted in May 2015 in the Winegars’ amended
complaint. According to Defendants, these deficiencies deprived
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Next, Defendants
asserted that Child and Riding were immune from liability
because they were acting within the course and scope of their
employment 	when 	they 	cleared 	the 	obstruction. 	Lastly,
Defendants asserted that, under the Act, the City was immune
from the Winegars’ intentional trespass claims and from suits
arising out of the management of its flood waters and the repair
and operation of its storm water system. Defendants submitted
several exhibits in support of their motion, including transcripts
of the City Attorney’s and Mr. Winegar’s depositions.
¶13 	After a hearing, the district court concluded that the
Winegars’ 	“failure 	to 	file 	their 	action 	within 	the 	one-year
statutory time period deprive[d the] court of subject matter
jurisdiction.” 	The 	court 	noted 	that 	it 	“now 	ha[d] 	sufficient
undisputed evidence before it to determine that . . . URMMA
was the insurer of the [City]” in March 2006 and all other
relevant time periods, and that Mr. Winegar had “acknowledged
that he assumed that the letter he received ‘out of the blue’ from
Kunz meant that Kunz was an insurance adjuster.” The court
then determined that the Winegars’ claim had been denied on
March 20, 2006, because the March 20 letter was “sufficiently
clear” and could “only be construed as a denial of claim.” The
court observed that Kunz had “reiterated the denial of claim in
letters dated April 20, 2006 and May 10, 2006.” The court also
noted that, “[e]ven if [it] were to conclude that the March 20,
2006 letter ‘used vague and non-statutory language,’” the April
20, 2006 letter, which was sent more than one year before the

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complaint was filed, “cleared up any possible ambiguity” based
on Kunz’s statement, “Your claim was denied on March 20,
2006.”
¶14 	Additionally, 	the 	court 	concluded 	that 	the 	Winegars’
April 24 letter was not an amended notice of claim for three
reasons: 	(1) 	the 	letter 	was 	delivered 	to 	the 	wrong 	City
department, as it “was served on the city attorney . . . and not on
the city clerk”; (2) the Act “does not provide for an amendment
of claim”; and (3) “there [was] no evidence before the court that
the [City] stipulated to allow the [Winegars] to amend their
notice of claim or to reset the statutory filing requirements of the
[Act].” The court observed that after the Winegars sent the April
24 letter, URMMA sent the May 10 letter notifying them that
“the purported amended notice of claim/letter was sent to the
wrong department, that it was not an amended notice of claim,
and that the claim had originally been denied on March 20,
2006.” The court also rejected the Winegars’ argument that the
City should be “estopped from bringing forth defenses under
the [Act],” observing that URMMA had notified the Winegars on
March 20, April 20, and May 10 that their claim had been denied
and that the City had “never made a written statement which
was inconsistent with the defenses now asserted.”
¶15 	Regarding the Winegars’ claims against Child and Riding
individually, the court concluded that (1) the Winegars had
“failed to provide sufficient information in their notice of claim
to reasonably alert [Defendants] that the [Winegars] were suing
any City employees individually, and certainly not Child and
Riding 	individually,” 	and 	(2) 	the 	Winegars’ 	“purported
amended notice of claim letter from April 24, 2006 fails to
identify the employees and contains no allegations that the
employees’ acts constituted malicious or fraudulent conduct.”
See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2016). The
court also concluded that the Winegars’ claims against Child and
Riding 	failed 	because 	their 	May 	2015 	amended 	complaint

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“added claims not included in the original notice of claim.” In
addition, the court determined that both employees’ conduct
was within the scope of their employment and that “[t]he
undisputed evidence demonstrates that [they] were not acting
willfully or maliciously outside the scope of their employment in
an effort to injure the [Winegars].” Lastly, the court concluded
that 	the 	City 	had 	immunity 	“from 	claims 	arising 	from
intentional trespass” and “from suit for actions relating to the
management of the City’s flood water and the maintenance and
operation of its storm water system.”
¶16 	The 	district 	court 	granted 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for
summary 	judgment 	and 	dismissed 	the 	case. 	The 	Winegars
appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 	The Winegars contend that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. We review
the district court’s “legal conclusions and ultimate grant or
denial of summary judgment for correctness.” Jones & Trevor
Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 630 (citation and
internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	“Summary 	judgment 	is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”
viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶18 	The Utah Supreme Court has “consistently and uniformly
held that suit may not be brought against the state or its
subdivisions unless the requirements of [the Act] are strictly
followed.” Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ¶ 11, 40 P.3d 632
(citation 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	The 	Act

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mandates 	that 	“[a]ny 	person 	having 	a 	claim 	against 	a
governmental entity . . . shall file a written notice of claim with
the entity before maintaining an action.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-
7-401(2) (LexisNexis 2016). The notice of claim must be filed
within one year after the claim arises, id. § 63G-7-402, and must
contain (i) “a brief statement of the facts”; (ii) “the nature of the
claim asserted”; (iii) “the damages incurred by the claimant so
far as they are known”; and (iv) “if the claim is being pursued
against a governmental employee individually . . . , the name of
the employee,” id. § 63G-7-401(3)(a).
¶19 	The Act further provides that “[w]ithin 60 days of the
filing 	of 	a 	notice 	of 	claim, 	the 	governmental 	entity 	or 	its
insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the
claim has either been approved or denied.” Id. § 63G-7-403(1)(a).
“A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day
period, the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed
to approve or deny the claim.” Id. § 63G-7-403(1)(b). Once a
claim is denied, “a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the
entity.” Id. § 63G-7-403(2)(a). Importantly, “a claimant shall
commence the action within one year after denial of the claim or
within one year after the denial period . . . has expired.” Id.
§ 63G-7-403(2)(b).
¶20 	At 	oral 	argument 	before 	this 	court, 	the 	Winegars
conceded 	that 	they 	did 	not 	strictly 	comply 	with 	the 	Act’s
requirement that they file suit within one year of the denial of
their claim. See id. They also acknowledged in their briefing that
their notice of claim failed to include the names of the City
employees “who committed damage to the Winegars’ property.”
Nevertheless, the Winegars maintain that the City should be
estopped from seeking dismissal of their complaint. They also
contend that the City failed to strictly comply with the terms of
the Act.

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I. Estoppel
¶21 	The 	Winegars 	contend 	that 	the 	City 	made 	several
“intentional 	misrepresentations” 	and 	should 	therefore 	be
estopped from asserting the one-year limitations period for filing
a complaint, see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(2)(b), and from
seeking dismissal of the case. Specifically, they assert that the
City (1) repeatedly withheld “information needed to properly
file a claim which then created the need for an amendment”;
(2) agreed 	to 	an 	amended 	notice 	of 	claim 	“to 	fix 	their
withholding 	of 	information 	[and] 	then 	repudiat[ed] 	the
agreement”; and (3) misinformed the Winegars that the deemed-
denied period was 90 days rather than the statutory 60-day
period. According to the Winegars, the City should be estopped
from benefitting from this misconduct.
¶22 	“There are three elements to estoppel: (1) an admission,
statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission,
statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement, or act.” Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp.,
2016 UT 10, ¶ 35, 368 P.3d 846 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[T]he usual rules of estoppel do not apply
against the government, however, and courts must be cautious
in applying equitable estoppel against the [government].” Id.
(first alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). “Accordingly, estoppel is applied against the
[government] only if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and
the exercise of governmental powers will not be impaired as a
result.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶23 	In Monarrez, our supreme court noted that in the context
of the Act, “no published case [had] directly addressed what
kind 	of 	statement 	may 	estop 	the 	government 	entity 	from
asserting that a claim was untimely,” but that the court had

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“insisted on strict compliance with the terms of [the Act] even in
the face of potentially intentional misrepresentations about how
to comply with the notice provisions of [the Act].” Id. ¶ 37.
“Thus, in order to estop [a government entity] from asserting
[the Act’s] one year limitations period as a defense, there must
be a specific, written representation directly related to that issue,
such as a statement that [the complainant] had satisfied [the
Act’s] requirements or that the government would not assert the
defense in litigation.” Id.; see also Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT
16, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 632 (“[G]overnmental entities are estopped from
raising the Immunity Act as a defense where their statements
induce plaintiffs into delay[ing] filing [an] action, or where such
statements 	mislead 	plaintiffs 	into 	filing 	[a] 	notice 	of 	claim
incorrectly.” (second and third alterations in original) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
A. 	Withholding Information
¶24 	The Winegars first assert that the names of the City
employees 	“who 	committed 	damage 	to 	[the] 	Winegars’
property” “were needed to properly file a notice of claim” and
that the City “refused to disclose the names of these employees
in 	order 	to 	file 	the 	notice 	of 	claim.” 	This 	argument 	is
inadequately briefed.
¶25 	Defendants correctly observe that the Winegars have not
cited any “evidence in the record of any occasion during the
more than eight months after May 3 or 4, 2005, when their claims
arose, and prior to January 27, 2006, when they served their
notice, where the Winegars made even the slightest effort to
learn the names of [the employees].” See generally Davis v. Central
Utah Counseling Center, 2006 UT 52, ¶ 48, 147 P.3d 390 (“Plaintiffs
must exercise the diligence necessary to effect strict compliance
with the Immunity Act.”). Additionally, the Winegars have not
cited any record evidence demonstrating that the City refused to
disclose this information before the Winegars filed their notice of

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claim. 	Indeed, 	this section 	of 	the 	Winegars’ 	brief 	does not
contain 	a 	single 	citation 	to 	the 	record. 	See 	Utah 	R. 	App.
P. 24(a)(8) 	(requiring 	an 	appellant’s 	brief 	to 	“explain, 	with
reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and
the record, why the party should prevail on appeal” (emphasis
added)). Because the Winegars have not adequately briefed this
argument, they have failed to carry their burden of persuasion
on appeal.
B. 	Agreement to Amend
¶26 	The Winegars next assert that the City Attorney agreed to
allow them to amend their notice of claim “to remedy the
[City’s] refusal to give individual names to include on it,” that
the City then repudiated the agreement, and that the City
“should be estopped from benefitting from [its] misconduct.”
¶27 	Before we address the merits of the Winegars’ argument,
we make two observations. First, we see nothing in the Act that
permits the amendment of a notice of claim, and the Winegars
have 	not 	directed 	us 	to 	any 	such 	provision. 	Second, 	the
Winegars’ 	assertion 	that 	the 	City 	Attorney 	agreed 	to 	an
amended notice of claim suffers from a lack of evidentiary
support. 	The 	only 	evidence 	the 	Winegars 	point 	to 	is 	Mr.
Winegar’s April 24 letter, in which he recounted his version of
the April 7 telephone conversation with the City Attorney.
According to the April 24 letter, Mr. Winegar and the City
Attorney had “discussed what would happen if [the names of
the individual City employees] were not provided,” and they
“concluded the only alternative was for [the Winegars] to amend
[their] claim.” Mr. Winegar later purported to “amend [his]
claim to include not only [the City] but all the unidentified
employees who participated in any aspect of the work done at
[the Winegars’] property.” However, when the City Attorney
was asked in his deposition whether he “told Mr. Winegar to go
ahead and file an amended claim or that [he] would reconsider

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the denial,” the City Attorney replied, “I don’t believe I would
have done that. Mr. Kunz was handling the claim for us.” He
also testified that he considered URMMA’s March 20 letter to be
a denial of the Winegars’ claim. Based on the foregoing, we are
not convinced that the City Attorney legally could, or did, agree
to an amended notice of claim.
¶28 	But even if the City Attorney did agree to an amended
notice 	of 	claim, 	there 	is 	simply 	no 	“specific, 	written
representation” from the City that the Winegars had “satisfied
[the Act’s] requirements,” that the City would not later assert the
one-year limitations period as a defense, or that the Winegars’
purported amended notice of claim somehow restarted the year-
to-file period. See Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10,
¶ 37, 368 P.3d 846. Indeed, the record demonstrates that upon
receiving the Winegars’ April 24 letter, URMMA sent the May 10
letter notifying the Winegars that their April 24 letter would not
qualify as an amended notice of claim, because it was delivered
to the wrong department within the City.2 URMMA further
explained that even if the April 24 letter qualified as an amended
notice of claim, “we do not believe that there is any significant
additional 	information 	that 	would 	cause 	us 	to 	change 	our
decision on the City’s liability. We must therefore stand on the
original denial which was conveyed to you in our letter dated
March 20, 2006.” Nothing in the May 10 letter can reasonably be
read to mean that the year-to-file period had been restarted, that
2. 	The 	Act 	requires a 	notice 	of 	claim 	to 	be 	“directed 	and
delivered” to the office of “the city or town clerk, when the claim
is against an incorporated city or town.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-
7-401(3)(b)(ii)(A) 	(LexisNexis 2016). 	The 	Winegars sent 	their
purported amended notice of claim, i.e., the April 24 letter, to the
City Attorney, and we therefore agree with the district court that
the April 24 letter was not an amended notice of claim as it “was
not properly served on the city clerk as required.” See id.

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the Winegars had satisfied the Act’s requirements, or that the
City 	would 	not 	later 	assert 	a 	limitations 	defense. 	See 	id.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Winegars’ estoppel claim on
this point fails.
¶29 	In a separate but related argument, the Winegars contend
that their complaint against Child and Riding “should not have
been dismissed as the notice of claim and amended notice of
claim were sufficient to include them and maintain the action
against them.” We are not persuaded.
¶30 	The Winegars first identified Child and Riding in their
May 2015 amended complaint (filed after Winegar I) and alleged,
for the first time, that Child and Riding had acted outside the
scope of their employment and violated state and federal law.
The Winegars asserted that Defendants “knew or should have
known that altering or excavating in a streambed, stream bank
or waterway requires permission from the U.S. Army Corp[s] of
Engineers or the State Department of Water Rights, which they
failed to obtain.” The Winegars also sought punitive and treble
damages from Child and Riding for willful misconduct and
injuries to trees.
¶31 	The district court determined that the Winegars failed to
provide sufficient information in their notice of claim that they
would be suing Child and Riding (“[o]r any other John or Jane
Does”) 	individually 	“for 	acting 	outside 	the 	scope 	of 	their
employment or by violating state or federal statutes.” As the
court correctly observed, the notice of claim “makes no mention
of any alleged misconduct of any individual city employee and
contains no reference to any possible violation of a state or
federal statute.” The court also noted that, in their amended
complaint, the Winegars “now seek to impose liability on Child
and Riding for failing to obtain a permit from either the U.S.
Army Corp[s] of Engineers . . . or the State Department of Water
[R]ights 	before 	cutting 	trees 	or 	altering 	the 	streambed.”

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Observing that the Winegars’ claims against Child and Riding
were not stated in the notice of claim filed in January 2006, and
that these were “new claims against new defendants and not
merely an amplification or expansion of existing claims,” the
district court determined that the claims against Child and
Riding individually must be dismissed. See Yearsley v. Jensen, 798
P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (providing that “[t]here must be
enough specificity in the notice [of claim] to inform as to the
nature of the claim 	so that the defendant can appraise 	its
potential liability” and rejecting an amended complaint that
“presented a new claim charging new and different misconduct
from the claim made in the notice”). We agree.
¶32 	Although the Winegars assert that “the original notice of
claim describes the conduct, even though the Winegars could
not 	yet 	state 	names 	or 	specific 	detail 	due 	to 	the 	City’s
withholding that information,” as previously discussed, supra
¶ 25, 	the 	Winegars 	have 	not 	pointed 	to 	any 	evidence
demonstrating that they sought Child’s and Riding’s names (or
that the City withheld any information) before they filed their
notice of claim in January 2006. Nothing in the Winegars’ notice
of claim would have generally alerted the City that the Winegars
were asserting claims against any individual City employees or,
more specifically, that the Winegars were claiming individual
employees had acted outside the scope of their employment or
violated 	state 	and 	federal 	law. 	Accordingly, 	we 	affirm 	the
district court’s dismissal of the Winegars’ claims against Child
and Riding individually.
C. 	Incorrect Notice-of-Claim Form
¶33 	The Winegars next assert that the City’s notice-of-claim
form incorrectly informed them that the deemed-denial period
was 90 days rather than the statutory 60 days and that “[a]
governmental entity should not be able to misinform potential

Winegar v. Springville City
20160364-CA 	16 	2018 UT App 42
claimants 	of 	certain 	time 	limits 	and 	then 	later 	use 	this
misunderstanding to ask the court to dismiss the case.”
¶34 	The Act provides that “[w]ithin 60 days of the filing of a
notice of claim, the governmental entity or its insurance carrier
shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either
been approved or denied.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(1)(a)
(LexisNexis 2016). If a claimant receives no response to the
notice of claim from the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier after 60 days, the claim is deemed denied. Id. § 63G-7-
403(1)(b). After a claim is denied or deemed denied, a claimant
has one year in which to file a complaint in district court. Id.
§ 63G-7-403(2).
¶35 	When the Winegars filed their notice of claim on January
27, 	2006, 	the 	City’s 	notice-of-claim 	form 	incorrectly 	stated:
“UNDER STATE LAW, THE CITY HAS 90 DAYS IN WHICH
TO 	RESPOND 	TO 	A 	CLAIM. 	IF 	THE 	CITY 	DOES 	NOT
RESPOND 	WITHIN 	90 	DAYS, 	THE 	CLAIM 	IS 	DEEMED
DENIED.”3 The Winegars assert that, based on the City’s notice-
of-claim form, they “worked under the assumption [that] they
had 90 days”—until April 28, 2006—“before the claim would be
deemed denied if the City did not respond” and that they had to
“file suit within a year of that date.”4 This argument depends
upon a determination that the Winegars’ claim was not denied
before April 28, 2006; i.e., that the March 20, 2006 letter did not
amount to a denial of the Winegars’ claim.
3. The City’s notice-of-claim form appears to have since been
updated 	to 	include 	the 	correct 	60-day 	denial 	period. 	See
Springville 	City, 	Notice 	of 	Claim 	Form, 	available 	at 	https://
perma.cc/ZZM7-JETT.
4. The Winegars filed suit on April 24, 2007.

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20160364-CA 	17 	2018 UT App 42
¶36 	The district court determined that the Winegars’ claim
was denied on March 20, 2006, because the March 20 letter “was
sufficiently clear” and “could only be construed as a denial of
claim.”5 We agree. The March 20 letter stated:
Our investigation into the claim you have made
against 	Springville 	City 	for 	damage 	to 	your
landscaping and property . . . is now complete.
Our investigation indicates that Springville City
would not be held legally liable for any damages
you may have sustained. The City has an easement
on the property which allows [it] to enter the creek
bed. [It] also ha[s] authority to take measures to
clean out and maintain the creek bed to prevent
flooding 	that 	might 	damage 	other 	property
downstream.
Because the City would not be held liable, we must
respectfully 	decline 	to 	make 	any 	voluntary
payments on this claim.
Although the March 20 letter did not specifically use the words
“deny” or “denied,” see infra ¶ 41, it referred to the Winegars’
claim against the City, stated that the City “would not be held
liable” for their alleged damages, and declined to make any
voluntary payments. When read as a whole, we conclude that
5. As previously discussed, on remand from Winegar I, the
parties conducted discovery and took depositions. The City
Attorney testified in his deposition that “Lyle Kunz was a claims
adjuster for URMMA, who was [the City’s] insurer at the time,”
and the district court concluded that it “now [had] sufficient
undisputed evidence before it to determine that . . . URMMA
was the insurer of [the City]” in March 2006 “and the other
relevant time periods for this case.”

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20160364-CA 	18 	2018 UT App 42
the only reasonable interpretation of the March 20 letter is as a
denial of the Winegars’ claim. Certainly, nothing in the March 20
letter can be read as approving the Winegars’ claim.
¶37 	In any event, even if we were to conclude that the March
20 letter was ambiguous regarding the status of the Winegars’
claim, URMMA’s April 20 letter made it clear that the claim had
been denied on March 20. The April 20 letter specifically stated,
“Your claim was denied on March 20, 2006,” and informed the
Winegars that URMMA would not continue negotiations with
them. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that “[i]f
there were any doubts about the status of the Winegars’ claim
against 	the 	City, 	[the 	April 	20] 	letter 	eliminated 	any 	such
doubts.” We also agree with the district court that, “[e]ven if the
Winegars had used this later date (April 20, 2006) as the date
when the City made its intentions clear,” the Winegars’ April 24,
2007 complaint “was still filed four days too late.”
¶38 	“[A] denial—whether by operation of law or by written
notice—can occur only once . . . . Once a claim has been denied
by one mechanism, it cannot be denied again by the other.”
Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 16, 368 P.3d 846.
Here, we conclude that the City denied the Winegars’ claim by
written notice on March 20, 2006, and thus, there was no deemed
denial in this case. See id. (“[A] deemed denial occurs only if the
government fails to issue a written denial . . . .”). Consequently,
the 	fact 	that 	the 	City’s 	notice-of-claim 	form 	incorrectly
“informed [the Winegars] that the deemed denied period was 90
days rather than 60 days,” while unfortunate, is ultimately
immaterial. 	Given 	the 	City’s 	March 	20 	written 	denial, 	the
Winegars could not reasonably rely on the 90-day deemed-
denial period listed on the City’s notice-of-claim form in filing
their lawsuit. The Winegars were required to file their complaint
by March 20, 2007, and because they filed their complaint on
April 24, 2007, their suit was untimely. Based on the foregoing,

Winegar v. Springville City
20160364-CA 	19 	2018 UT App 42
we 	reject 	the 	Winegars’ 	argument 	that 	the 	City 	should 	be
estopped from asserting the one-year limitations defense.
II. Strict Compliance
¶39 	The Winegars next contend that the district court “erred
in not requiring [the City] to ‘strictly comply’ with [the Act]
rather than accepting [its] ‘substantial compliance’ thus allowing
[the City] to introduce further confusion to claimants attempting
to comply with [the Act].”
¶40 	The 	Winegars 	observe 	that 	the 	Act 	mandates 	that
“[w]ithin 	60 	days 	of 	the 	filing 	of 	a 	notice 	of 	claim, 	the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the
claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or
denied.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
According to the Winegars, the City did not strictly comply with
this section of the Act in two ways.
¶41 	First, the Winegars assert that the Act requires “a city (or
its insurer) specifically state a claim is ‘denied’” and that in the
March 20 letter, “URMMA used the vague and non-statutory
language that it will not ‘. . . make any voluntary payments.’”
We are not persuaded. The Winegars fail to cite any authority to
support their assertion that the Act requires the use of specific
words of denial, see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8), and our review of
the Act does not reveal any such requirement. Moreover, as
previously discussed, the March 20, 2006 letter can be reasonably
construed only as a denial of the Winegars’ claim, and any
possible ambiguity in the March 20 letter was resolved by the
April 20 letter confirming that their claim had been denied on
March 20.
¶42 	Second, the Winegars assert that the City failed to strictly
comply with the Act because “[a]n insurer (or City) has the
obligation to use proper statutory language and to identify itself
as the insurer” and “the identity of URMMA was only a guess

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20160364-CA 	20 	2018 UT App 42
when 	the 	letter 	was 	written.” 	As 	previously 	discussed, 	on
remand from Winegar I, the City conclusively established that
URMMA was its insurer during March 2006 (and all other
relevant time periods). Mr. Winegar also acknowledged during
his deposition that he had assumed Lyle Kunz was an insurance
adjustor 	and 	that 	“[Kunz] 	had 	some 	involvement 	in 	the
process.” Although it is unfortunate that URMMA’s status as the
City’s insurer was not readily discernible from the March 20
letter, the Winegars have not cited any authority demonstrating
that the Act requires a governmental entity’s insurance carrier to
identify itself as such when approving or denying a claim, see id.,
and again, our review of the Act reveals no such requirement.
CONCLUSION
¶43 	We conclude that estoppel is not warranted under the
circumstances of this case. We further conclude that the Act does
not require strict compliance from the City in the manner that
the Winegars suggest. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.