In re M.M.

2026 UT App 105
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF M.M.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
M.M.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20250665-CA
Filed July 16, 2026
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Rick T. Westmoreland
No. 1191183
Emily Adams, Anna Grigsby, and Monica Maio,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jason E. Greene,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE R YAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. M ORTENSEN and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 	After 	adjudicating 	M.M. 	delinquent 	on 	multiple
misdemeanors, the juvenile court placed him in the custody of
Juvenile Justice and Youth Services (JJYS). M.M. now appeals the
court’s decision to place him in custody, asserting that the
decision was statutorily impermissible and that his attorney
(Counsel) 	rendered 	constitutionally 	ineffective 	assistance 	by
failing to argue that a custody decision was statutorily barred.

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20250665-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 105
¶2 	M.M. acknowledges, however, that this issue has been
rendered moot because he is no longer in custody on these
charges. M.M. asks us to address the issue anyway, pursuant to
an exception to the mootness doctrine. In our view, however, this
exception does not apply in this case, because the precise issue
raised by M.M.—whether Counsel rendered ineffective assistance
on the specific facts presented here—is unlikely to recur in the
future. We therefore dismiss M.M.’s appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND1
¶3 	In September 2024, the State filed a petition against M.M.—
who was fourteen years old at the time—alleging that he had
committed retail theft (a class B misdemeanor) and had failed to
stop at the command of a police officer (a class A misdemeanor).
We refer to this as the First Retail Incident. M.M. later admitted to
the State’s allegations, and the juvenile court adjudicated him
delinquent. The court then placed him on house arrest “until
released by further court order,” ordering him to remain “at home
when not in school” and specifying that “[l]ack of [school]
attendance [would] constitute a home detention violation.”
¶4 	About a week later, the court held a review hearing at
which M.M.’s probation officer (Probation Officer) informed the
court that M.M. “ha[d] not attended school all week” and that she
had “concerns other than truancy that she [felt] merit[ed] home
detention with electronic monitoring.” She also suggested that if
the court did not believe that M.M. was qualified for house arrest
with 	electronic 	monitoring, 	then 	it 	should 	place 	him 	“in
detention.” The court deferred ruling on the issue and scheduled
another hearing for a few weeks later. At that hearing, Probation
Officer reiterated her concerns and asked the court to order that
1. “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court findings.” In re R.G., 2023 UT App 144, n.1, 540 P.3d 1148
(cleaned up).

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20250665-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 105
M.M. 	be 	taken 	into 	detention. 	The 	court 	agreed 	with 	that
recommendation 	and 	ordered 	that 	M.M. 	be 	“committed 	to
detention for a period of thirty days to commence immediately,”
with an additional thirty days of house arrest to follow. In
addition, the court ordered M.M. to, among other things, “attend
and successfully complete [the] Weber Human Services Early
Psychosis program.”
¶5 	M.M. served his thirty days in detention. But soon after
starting his thirty days of house arrest, he violated the terms of the
court’s order by leaving home without permission on multiple
occasions. 	During 	this 	same 	time 	period, 	M.M. 	met 	with
Probation Officer while “under the influence of an intoxicating
substance,” later admitting to having “us[ed] a dab on the way to
the courthouse.” In response to these actions, the State asked the
court to require M.M. to appear before the court and “show cause
why [he] should not be found in contempt of court.” At a hearing
on the issue, M.M. admitted to the allegations and received his
first adjudication for contempt of court (Contempt 1). As a
sanction, the court ordered M.M. to serve three days in detention
followed 	by 	fourteen 	additional 	days 	of 	house 	arrest 	and
continued formal probation, among other things.
¶6 	M.M. served his three days in detention, and when he
returned home, he violated the terms of his house arrest almost
immediately by missing an appointment with Weber Human
Services. A few days later, he was about thirty minutes late for a
probation appointment, didn’t return home by the required time,
and failed to schedule a subsequent probation appointment.
Additionally, during the fourteen-day house-arrest period, he left
home without permission on at least six of those days. In response
to these actions, the State filed another request for an order to
show cause (Contempt 2), and the court set a hearing to consider
these new issues. Before that hearing could take place, the State
filed yet another request for an order to show cause, this time
alleging that M.M. had failed to attend another appointment with

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20250665-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 105
Weber Human Services, refused to attend school, violated a
curfew set by Probation Officer, and vaped marijuana in a Youth
Services program lobby, resulting in his termination from the
program (Contempt 3).
¶7 	At a hearing on Contempts 2 and 3, M.M. admitted to the
allegations, and the court placed him on house arrest for another
fourteen days2 and scheduled a review hearing to take place later.
That same day, following the hearing, M.M. left home without
permission, and the next morning he was absent from school. In
response 	to 	these 	two 	new 	violations, 	the 	State 	filed 	two
additional requests for orders to show cause (Contempts 4 and 5),
which the court granted, and M.M. eventually admitted to these
allegations as well.
¶8 	In addition to all of this, on the day after the hearing on
Contempts 2 and 3, M.M. jumped through a fast-food restaurant’s
drive-thru window and attempted to pry open a locked cash
register. The police were called, and a responding officer (Officer)
saw M.M. and commanded him to stop. M.M. refused to comply
with this command, instead “turning and running the other way.”
Officer chased M.M. “on foot for several blocks,” eventually
catching up to him and grabbing him by the legs. M.M. then
punched Officer in the arm. M.M. was subdued and arrested, and
he was later charged with failing to stop at the command of a
police officer, interference with an arresting officer, assault on a
police officer, and attempted burglary (collectively, the Fast-Food
Incident).3 M.M. later admitted to most of the charges stemming
2. The court also committed M.M. to immediate detention for six
days but gave him credit for time served.
3. 	M.M. 	was 	also 	charged 	with 	possession 	of 	a 	controlled
substance, but that charge was later dropped.

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20250665-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 105
from the Fast-Food Incident, and after temporary detention in
JJYS custody, he was once again placed on house arrest.
¶9 	A few weeks later, the State charged M.M. with a new
count of retail theft, a class A misdemeanor4 (the Second Retail
Incident), and it placed M.M. in temporary JJYS custody. At a
hearing 	on 	this 	new 	charge, 	M.M. 	denied 	the 	retail 	theft
allegation, 	and 	the 	court 	stated 	its 	preference 	to 	“hold
disposition” for the Fast-Food Incident and Contempts 4 and 5
until the Second Retail Incident had been adjudicated “so that
disposition [could] be completed at one time.” Consistent with
this preference, the court ordered M.M. to remain in detention,
and it set the matters for a pretrial and disposition hearing.
¶10 	In 	preparation 	for 	the 	disposition 	hearing, 	the 	court
requested that “counsel review and discuss the possibility of
contempt findings qualifying as misdemeanor adjudications” for
purposes of assessing whether M.M. should be committed to
custody, and it asked the parties to “be ready to address this at
the next hearing.” See Utah Code § 80-6-703(2)(b)(ii) (“If a minor
is adjudicated [delinquent] under [this section], the juvenile court
shall only commit the minor to the division . . . if . . . the minor is
adjudicated under this chapter for . . . a misdemeanor when the
minor 	has 	five 	prior 	misdemeanors 	or 	felony 	adjudications
arising from separate criminal episodes . . . .”). Before the hearing,
the State filed a memorandum in response to the court’s request,
stating its position that “contempt of court adjudications and
probation violations likely cannot be considered misdemeanor
violations for purposes of determining whether [M.M.] may be
committed 	to” 	detention. 	And 	the 	State 	argued 	that 	M.M.
therefore did not yet qualify for commitment to JJYS custody
because he did “not have the requisite number of misdemeanor
4. This count was originally charged as a class B misdemeanor,
but it was later upgraded to a class A misdemeanor due to the
existence of prior qualifying offenses.

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 105
adjudications.” Counsel did not file a memorandum on the
subject 	on 	M.M.’s 	behalf, 	either 	in 	response 	to 	the 	court’s
suggestion or in response to the State’s memorandum.
¶11 	The court began the disposition hearing by addressing
whether it had the authority to place M.M. in JJYS custody,
expressing “heartburn” about the issue and, in particular, about
interpreting the relevant statute. As noted, that statute allows a
court to place a juvenile into custody only if the juvenile has been
“adjudicated . . . for . . . a misdemeanor when the minor has five
prior misdemeanors or felony adjudications arising from separate
criminal episodes.” Id. M.M. had certainly been adjudicated for a
misdemeanor. So the relevant question was whether, under the
statute, 	M.M. 	had 	“five 	prior 	misdemeanors 	or 	felony
adjudications arising from separate criminal episodes.” Id. And
here, this question turned on whether M.M.’s many adjudications
for contempt could count as “prior misdemeanors . . . arising from
separate criminal episodes.” Id.
¶12 	The court explained that, in attempting to interpret that
statute, it had located an unpublished appellate opinion—State v.
Wheeler, 2005 UT App 255U—that it believed supported the
notion 	that 	contempt 	adjudications 	could 	count 	as 	“prior
misdemeanors” for purposes of determining whether to place
M.M. in custody. During the ensuing argument, Counsel did not
take a position on whether the court had authority to commit
M.M. to JJYS custody based on the prior contempt adjudications,
but Counsel did raise concerns that M.M. had not been given
adequate 	notice 	before 	being 	put 	into 	detention. 	Counsel’s
position at the hearing was that M.M. should be again placed on
probation in keeping with Probation Officer’s recommendations.
For her part, Probation Officer did not agree with the court’s
position that the contempt adjudications could count as prior
misdemeanors that could satisfy the statutory requirement, but
she stated that she would be “okay with whatever” the court
decided to do. The State did not present further argument on the

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 105
issue, beyond what it had already stated in its written filing, and
said it would also submit to the court’s ruling.
¶13 	After hearing the parties’ positions, the court concluded
that M.M.’s prior contempt adjudications could qualify as prior
misdemeanors and that it therefore had authority, under the
circumstances, to place M.M. in JJYS custody. Based on this
interpretation of the statute, the court ordered that M.M. be placed
in JJYS custody for disposition of the Fast-Food Incident, and it
ordered M.M. to serve three days of detention each for Contempts
4 and 5, with credit for time served. The court then terminated
probation for all prior incidents, marking them as unsuccessful
and closing out the matters.
¶14 	Following placement into custody, M.M. admitted the
allegations stemming from the Second Retail Incident, and the
court committed him to additional JJYS custody for disposition of
that incident. And although this fact is not clear from the record
submitted to us, the parties agree, in their briefing, that M.M. is
no longer in custody related to the First Retail Incident, the Fast-
Food Incident, or any of the contempt adjudications.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 	M.M. now appeals the juvenile court’s decision to place
him into JJYS custody following the disposition hearing on the
Fast-Food Incident and Contempts 4 and 5. As M.M. sees it, the
underlying problem with the court’s decision is that the court
interpreted the governing statute incorrectly. But all parties to this
appeal agree that M.M. failed to properly preserve any objection
to the argument that the statute allows for contempt adjudications
to count as prior misdemeanors.5 In light of this, M.M. asks us to
5. The preservation question is certainly closer than the parties
make 	it 	appear. 	The 	juvenile 	court 	asked 	for 	briefing 	and
(continued…)

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 105
review the statutory interpretation issue through one of the
exceptions to our preservation doctrine: ineffective assistance of
counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance presents a question of
law, “which we determine in the first instance as a matter of law.”
State v. Thomas, 2025 UT App 145, ¶ 15, 579 P.3d 416.
¶16 	But 	before 	we 	confront 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	ineffective
assistance question, we must address the State’s assertion that the
appeal has been rendered moot by the fact that M.M. is no longer
in 	custody 	on 	the 	relevant 	charges. 	In 	response, 	M.M.
acknowledges that subsequent events have rendered his appeal
moot, but he contends that we should nonetheless reach the
merits of his ineffective assistance claim under an exception to the
mootness doctrine. Because an appellate mootness issue, by
definition, arises for the first time on appeal, “our decision is not
governed by any standard of review, and we decide the matter as
argument on the relevant statutory interpretation question, and
then it made a square ruling on that point after considering the
parties’ input. There is a decent argument to be made that the
question was indeed preserved. See State v. Ramos, 2025 UT App
70, ¶ 11 n.1, 571 P.3d 807 (“The main point of our preservation
rules is to afford a trial court the opportunity to rule on a disputed
issue, and where a trial court actually makes a ruling on an issue,
it has had that opportunity.” (cleaned up)), cert. denied, 574 P.3d
525 (Utah 2025). We acknowledge, however, that Counsel didn’t
object to or oppose the court’s musings, and non-opposition is
often the foundation for a determination that a matter has not
been properly preserved. See Bluffdale City v. Verive, 2026 UT App
101, ¶¶ 38–47 (holding that an issue was not properly preserved
for appellate review, even though the trial court eventually relied
on the evidence in question, when the attorney failed to lodge a
proper objection to the admission of the evidence). We need not
delve deeper here, though, because the parties agree that the issue
is unpreserved, and we follow their lead on that point.

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 105
a question of law.” Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview, L.C., 2024
UT 20, ¶ 12, 554 P.3d 863 (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
¶17 	In this appeal, M.M. seeks to challenge the juvenile court’s
decision to place him in custody. But all parties agree that M.M. is
no longer in custody on the charges at issue here. And all parties
agree that this fact renders M.M.’s appellate challenge moot
unless an exception to our mootness doctrine applies. After all,
“an 	appeal 	is 	moot 	if 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	the 	appeal
circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated,
thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal
effect.” Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit
Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 14, 289 P.3d 582 (cleaned up). And here,
circumstances have changed, because M.M. is no longer in
custody on the relevant charges, and therefore the controversy
M.M. wishes to bring to our attention—whether the court was
barred 	from 	placing 	him 	in 	custody—has 	been 	eliminated,
rendering the relief he seeks impossible or of no legal effect.
¶18 	“The 	doctrine 	of 	mootness 	is 	not 	a 	mere 	matter 	of
convenience or judicial discretion.” State v. Dowhaniuk, 2025 UT
App 100, ¶ 33, 574 P.3d 1000 (cleaned up). Rather, the doctrine “is
a constitutional principle that implicates our judicial power to
adjudicate cases,” and if an issue has been “rendered moot by
subsequent events,” courts are powerless to hear the issue unless
an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Id. (cleaned up);
accord Ramirez v. Landau, 2026 UT App 17, ¶ 15, 586 P.3d 536.
¶19 	In this case, M.M. invokes an exception to the mootness
doctrine, and he asks us to consider the merits of his appellate
challenge despite its mootness. The exception M.M. points to here
has three elements: “(1) the case must present an issue that affects
the public interest; (2) the issue presented must be likely to recur
in the future; and (3) the issue must be one that . . . is likely to

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 105
evade review in the future.” State v. Seat, 2022 UT App 143, ¶ 33,
523 P.3d 724 (cleaned up). “The burden of demonstrating the
existence of these elements falls upon the party invoking the
exception.” Ramirez, 2026 UT App 17, ¶ 15.
¶20 	As is evident from the three elements just recited, the
applicability of this exception is analyzed on an issue-by-issue
basis. See Seat, 2022 UT App 143, ¶ 33; see also Mukhtar v. Lambrecht,
172 F.4th 836, 842 (10th Cir. 2026) (“In assessing mootness,
[appellate courts] take a claim-by-claim approach and decide
whether a case is moot as to each form of relief sought.”(cleaned
up)); Harman v. 105 Partners, LLC, 2024 UT App 109, ¶ 26, 556 P.3d
669 (explaining that “the mootness doctrine largely turns on the
continuing availability of the relief requested,” and that “Utah’s
mootness cases have commonly looked to the precise terms of the
plaintiff’s pleadings . . . to determine the nature of the requested
relief” (cleaned up)); Utah R. App. P. 37(a) (indicating that
circumstances may render moot “one or more of the issues” an
appellant attempts to raise on appeal (emphasis added)). We must
therefore examine M.M.’s appellate claims to ascertain what the
precise issue is that he brings to us for review.
¶21 	M.M. attempts to frame the pertinent issue as one of
statutory interpretation. In particular, he argues that his grievance
centers on the “interpretation of a statute,” namely, the provision
that allows a court to place a juvenile into custody only if the
juvenile has been “adjudicated . . . for . . . a misdemeanor when
the minor has five prior misdemeanors or felony adjudications
arising from separate criminal episodes.” See Utah Code § 80-6-
703(2)(b)(ii). 	He urges us to interpret this statute and give
guidance to “attorneys and juvenile courts” about “when and
how” juveniles can be committed to custody in similar situations.
¶22 	But as noted, all parties agree that M.M. failed to properly
preserve the statutory interpretation issue for appellate review.
Thus, while M.M.’s underlying grievance is indeed that the

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 105
juvenile court misinterpreted the statute, here on appeal we are
permitted to assess that issue only through the exceptions to our
preservation rules, and M.M. therefore asks us to interpret the
statute through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel. And
it almost goes without saying that the issue of whether Counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not registering opposition to
the juvenile court’s analysis is not the same as the raw statutory
interpretation issue—whether the court interpreted the statute
correctly. Indeed, “[i]neffective assistance of counsel . . . is a stand-
alone constitutional claim attacking the performance of a criminal
defendant’s counsel.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 22, 416 P.3d
443. And “[w]hile such a claim necessarily requires the court to
look at the substantive issue the defendant argues his [or her]
counsel should have raised, and whether the substantive issue
had any merit, the substantive issue is only viewed through the
lens of counsel’s performance.” Id.; see also Archuleta v. Galetka,
2011 UT 73, ¶ 32, 267 P.3d 232 (“The mere allegation of ineffective
assistance is not enough alone to revive the substantive claim.”).
¶23 	Indeed, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has its
own elements, and these are separate from the merits of the
underlying issue, whatever it might be in a given case. To mount
a successful ineffective assistance claim, defendants must make a
two-part showing: that (1) their attorney’s performance was
deficient and (2) this “deficient performance prejudiced the
defense” by giving rise to “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 694 (1984). The first prong of this analysis involves an
assessment of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s actions, see
State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 35, 462 P.3d 350, and it “requires the
defendant to show ‘that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment,’” State v. Grunwald, 2020 UT
40, ¶ 19, 478 P.3d 1 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “And the
second prong requires the defendant to show that ‘counsel’s

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 105
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687). These elements are, of course, much different from simply
assessing whether the juvenile court correctly interpreted the
statutory provisions at issue.
¶24 	Having 	thus 	identified 	the 	issue 	at 	hand 	as 	one 	of
ineffective assistance of counsel (and not merely one of statutory
interpretation), we now proceed to evaluate M.M.’s assertion that
the three elements of the mootness exception apply to this issue.
We agree with the State that the elements are not all satisfied.
¶25 	The State focuses its resistance to M.M.’s position on the
second element of the exception: whether the issue is “likely to
recur in the future.”6 See Seat, 2022 UT App 143, ¶ 33 (cleaned up).
On this point, the State argues that M.M. has fallen far short of
demonstrating that, in the future, attorneys in Counsel’s position
will be likely to fail to object if the State (or, as here, the court itself)
advances an argument that the relevant statutory provisions
allow a juvenile to be placed in custody under circumstances
similar to those present here. The State’s argument is well-taken.
¶26 	In order to prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, M.M.
must demonstrate that Counsel performed deficiently in this case.
Deficient performance occurs when “counsel’s act or omission
[falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Ray,
6. We also wonder whether the first element is met here. Given
that the issue here is not one of raw statutory interpretation but,
instead, whether Counsel rendered ineffective assistance on the
specific facts of this case, there is a good argument to be made that
this appeal presents only a fact-specific issue that does not
“affect[] the public interest.” See Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of
Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 32, 289 P.3d 582. But
because the State does not advance this argument, we offer no
further analysis on the point.

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 105
2020 UT 12, ¶ 36, 469 P.3d 871. And as already noted, to prevail
on this part of his claim, M.M. must show that “counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed [him] by the Sixth Amendment.” See Grunwald, 2020
UT 40, ¶ 19 (cleaned up). We of course must start with the
premise—as the Strickland court did—that most attorneys act
reasonably most of the time. See 466 U.S. at 689 (“[A] court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”). And we
note 	that 	“[s]urmounting” 	the 	Strickland 	standard, 	and
demonstrating ineffective assistance, is a “high bar.” See Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (noting that the Strickland standard,
“although by no means insurmountable, is highly demanding”).
¶27 	But here, if we assume—for purposes of our analysis only
and 	without 	deciding—that 	Counsel’s 	performance 	was
objectively unreasonable, it necessarily follows that such behavior
would be quite unlikely to recur in future similar cases. An issue
satisfies the likely-to-recur prong of the mootness exception only
if there is “a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability
that the same controversy will recur.” Utah Transit Auth., 2012 UT
75, ¶ 36 (cleaned up). And unreasonable attorney behavior is,
almost by definition, unlikely to recur in the future.7 In particular,
7. M.M. resists this point by directing our attention to three
appellate opinions from Illinois that he believes stand for the
proposition that ineffective assistance claims can be likely to
recur. As an initial matter, those cases are not binding on this
court, 	and 	M.M. 	cites 	no 	Utah 	law 	on 	this 	point. 	And
substantively, these cases are readily distinguishable. All three of
them involve a specific Illinois statute regarding involuntary
commitment of mentally ill individuals, which statute contains
specific procedural requirements that must be met before an
individual may be committed. See In re Leo M., 2022 IL App (5th)
(continued…)

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 105
and as applied to this case, it does not seem likely, or even
probable, that an attorney in a similar position in the future will
fail to oppose an argument that a juvenile’s prior contempt
adjudications can qualify as prior misdemeanors for purposes of
assessing 	whether 	the 	juvenile 	can 	be 	placed 	into 	custody
pursuant to relevant statutory provisions. See Utah Code § 80-6-
703(2)(b)(ii).
¶28 	Moreover, ineffective assistance claims are by nature quite
fact-specific, not only as concerns the assessment of whether an
attorney performed reasonably under the circumstances but also
as concerns the assessment of whether any prejudice resulted to
that particular defendant in that particular case. We view it as
extremely unlikely, if possible at all, that this precise issue—
whether this attorney rendered ineffective assistance under these
specific circumstances—will ever recur in the future.
¶29 	At some point, a reasonable attorney will preserve for
appellate review the question of whether a juvenile’s prior
contempt adjudications can qualify as prior misdemeanors for
purposes of assessing whether the juvenile can be placed into
custody pursuant to relevant statutory provisions. And when that
occurs, the statutory interpretation issue that underlies this case
will be squarely presented for appellate guidance. But that is not
the issue M.M. raises. The issue presented here—whether Counsel
190211, ¶ 29, 217 N.E.3d 239; In re Tara S., 2017 IL App (3d) 160357,
¶ 17, 83 N.E.3d 528; In re Sharon H., 2016 IL App (3d) 140980, ¶ 33,
52 N.E.3d 698. None of the cases contains much analysis about
whether unreasonable attorney behavior can be considered likely
to recur. And two of the cases involve application of a mootness
exception much different from the exception at issue here: an
exception for cases in which there is “a reasonable expectation
that the same complaining party would be subject to the same
action again.” See In re Leo M., 2022 IL App (5th) 190211, ¶ 25;
accord In re Tara S., 2017 IL App (3d) 160357, ¶ 16.

In re M.M.
20250665-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 105
rendered ineffective assistance on the specific facts of this case—
is not one that is likely to recur in the future.
¶30 	Accordingly, 	M.M. 	has 	not 	carried 	his 	burden 	of
demonstrating the applicability of the exception to the mootness
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
¶31 	The issue M.M. brings to us for adjudication on appeal—
whether 	Counsel 	rendered 	ineffective 	assistance—has 	been
rendered moot, and M.M. has not demonstrated that an exception
to the mootness doctrine should be applied here. We therefore
lack jurisdiction to adjudicate M.M.’s appeal, and we dismiss it on
that basis.