Bonham v. Bonham

2026 UT App 141
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
EMILY C URTIS BONHAM ,
Appellee,
v.
BRANDON R EYNOLDS B ONHAM ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240597-CA
Filed September 11, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Richard D. McKelvie
The Honorable Coral Sanchez
No. 194905447
Troy L. Booher and Taylor P. Webb,
Attorneys for Appellant
Julie J. Nelson, Michael J. Teter, and Bryant J.
McConkie, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. O RME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	Brandon 	Reynolds 	Bonham 	appeals 	from 	the 	district
court’s decree of divorce dissolving his marriage to Emily Curtis
Bonham. Brandon1 argues that the decree contained multiple
errors—some introduced by Emily in her proposed findings of
fact—in valuations and divisions of property and awards of
1. For convenience, we refer to the parties by their first names,
with no disrespect intended.

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20240597-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 141
attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND2
Petition for Divorce
¶2 	Emily and Brandon married in July 1998 and separated in
July 2019 after Brandon admitted to an extramarital affair that
resulted in the birth of a child. Emily petitioned for divorce, citing
irreconcilable differences and the affair. The parties had four
children together, three of whom were minors at the time of
Emily’s petition. They shared a large marital estate, including a
home and a business, RMT Equipment (RMT).
¶3 	Brandon moved for the entry of temporary orders on
custody and financial issues. In a declaration in support of his
motion, he stated that his father, Brent Bonham, was “purchasing
a property in February 2020” that Brandon planned “on renting
from him, with a plan to purchase the property from him after the
divorce has been finalized.” Brent3 did purchase a house (the
Haven Oaks house) around that time for Brandon to live in, and
less than a year later—long before the divorce was finalized—
Brandon bought it from Brent.
2. On appeal from a bench trial, “we view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the
facts 	consistent 	with 	that 	standard,” 	presenting 	“conflicting
evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on
appeal.” Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, n.3, 525 P.3d 534
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).
3. We also refer to Brent by his first name, again with no disrespect
intended.

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20240597-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 141
¶4 	The court entered a stipulated temporary order awarding
Emily possession of the marital home and ordering Brandon to
continue to operate RMT, while listing Emily as a general
employee and paying her a salary of $2,000 per month. The court
also ordered Brandon to pay Emily $4,000 per month as “family
support,” which was “intended . . . to cover child support and
spousal support.” The court also ordered him to pay Emily’s
expenses for “fuel and maintenance on her automobile . . . in the
same manner and to a similar degree as she has used it in the
past.” Additionally, the court directed Brandon to pay Emily’s
and the children’s health insurance costs. Each party was also
“awarded their personal effects and personal items.” And the
temporary order required the parties to “share equally the costs
of 	the 	extracurricular 	activities 	the 	children 	are 	already
participating in.”
¶5 	Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that Brandon would
pay $25,000 toward Emily’s attorney fees. Emily’s parents covered
the fees she incurred beyond this amount as well as what the court
later found amounted to $55,000 of her living expenses while the
divorce was pending.
Pretrial Disclosures
¶6 	Before trial, the parties submitted financial disclosures. In
his first disclosure, filed in December 2019, Brandon did not list
the Haven Oaks house as he had not yet purchased it from Brent.
But on May 13, 2022, he submitted a second financial disclosure,
in which he did list the Haven Oaks house as his real property.
He stated that he had purchased the house in November 2020.
This second financial disclosure also listed two substantial debts:
$700,000 RMT owed to Zions Bank in Brent’s name and $500,000
Brandon still owed to Brent for the purchase of RMT. In his third
and final financial disclosure, Brandon listed a new house (the
Rolling Brook house) as his real property, which he purchased in

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20240597-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 141
August 2022 using the equity from the sale of the Haven Oaks
house.
¶7 	As 	relevant 	here, 	Emily 	filed 	her 	second 	financial
disclosure on the same day as Brandon’s second disclosure. As
part of her income, she listed the $4,000 in “family support” and
the $2,000 salary paid by RMT. But she claimed that, after taxes,
she actually received “two deposits of $898 per month” from
RMT. Emily also listed the Haven Oaks house as her real property,
though she indicated that Brandon’s name was on the title. Her
estimated value of the Haven Oaks house was “[b]ased on 2021
CMA and mortgage statement.”
Trial
¶8 	At a four-day bench trial held in August and September
2022, the parties presented extensive evidence regarding the
marital estate. We summarize that evidence below, insofar as it is
relevant to our analysis.
Findings of Fact and Divorce Decree
¶9 	At the close of the trial, the district court ordered each of
the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law in lieu of closing arguments. Of note, in his proposed
findings, 	Brandon 	pointed 	out, 	with our emphasis, 	that 	he
“testified he would be willing to purchase Emily’s interest in RMT
for $1,500,000,” though he stated just a few lines later that he
should be awarded the business at a “fair market value of
$1,500,000.”
¶10 	The court largely adopted Emily’s proposed findings. The
court ordered Brandon to pay Emily $1,926 per month in child
support—an amount calculated to provide for the parties’ one
child who remained a minor. The court also awarded Emily
alimony. Regarding Emily’s need for alimony, although the court

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20240597-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 141
found that she “could potentially earn gross income between
$1,950 and $3,089 per month,” the court also found that because
she “was and still is a full-time homemaker and caretaker for the
parties’ 	minor 	child, 	who 	requires 	special 	attention 	due 	to
lingering medical issues,” and because she was also “pursuing
educational 	opportunities,” 	she 	was 	“not 	voluntarily
unemployed.” The court thus concluded that she should not be
imputed any income. And the court found that her monthly need
was $9,107.
¶11 	In addressing Brandon’s ability to pay alimony, the court
found that he “had the ability to earn $23,133.80 per month.” The
court assumed a 20% tax rate on this income, reasoning that
“Emily’s suggested rate of 10%” was “low,” while “Brandon’s
estimate of 25%” did “not account for the fact that some of the
income included in the calculation . . . (i.e., the personal expenses
paid by the company)” was taxed under the business. And the
court 	stated 	that 	Brandon’s 	claimed 	monthly 	expenses 	of
“$14,137.69 (not counting expenses paid by his business) . . .
appear to be inflated.” The court noted that Brandon’s claimed
expenses 	“appear 	to 	include 	significant 	expenses 	for” 	his
girlfriend and her four children, two of whom are also Brandon’s.
¶12 	The court next listed several reductions that should be
made to the claimed expenses. For instance, the court found that
Brandon’s claimed childcare expense of $1,275 for the four other
children “should be eliminated entirely.” But the court did not
deduct the various reductions it listed or provide a specific
number for what Brandon’s reasonable monthly expenses should
be. The court found that “Brandon’s expenses are inflated by at
least $4,000 per month” because he included as an expense the
family 	support 	payments 	he 	made 	pursuant 	to 	the 	court’s
temporary 	order. 	The 	court 	also 	determined 	that 	“Brandon
inflated the expenses . . . for his mortgage, HOA fee, electricity,
natural gas, water, sewer, garbage, paid television, and internet.”
But the court did not say by how much. The court next held that

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“Brandon should not be permitted to claim marital money to
spend on the children he had with [his girlfriend] as an expense
where such reduces his ability to pay alimony.” For example, the
court noted that Brandon’s claimed “$950 per month on food and
household supplies” was inflated “[t]o the extent that [he] has
claimed expenses associated with taking” his girlfriend and her
children “out to dinner.” But the court did not say by how much.
The 	court 	further stated 	that 	any 	expenses associated 	with
clothing 	for 	the 	girlfriend’s 	children 	“should 	be 	eliminated
entirely.” And the court stated that Brandon’s expenses for pet
care and repairing the Haven Oaks house should be “reduced
significantly.” But again, the court did not state by how much.
¶13 	Despite not providing a specific figure for Brandon’s
reasonable 	monthly 	expenses, 	the 	court 	did 	determine 	that
subtracting the $1,926 in child support from Emily’s monthly
needs left her with $7,181 in monthly expenses. The court ordered
Brandon to pay this amount in alimony to Emily for 21 years,
corresponding to the length of the parties’ marriage.
¶14 	Next, the court addressed arrearages on the child support
and alimony awards. The court found that pursuant to its
temporary order, Brandon had paid Emily $228,000 in child
support and alimony during the pendency of the divorce. This
was based on the $4,000 per month in “family support” and the
$2,000 monthly payment to her as a listed general employee of
RMT. The court found that Emily received only about $1,500 per
month from RMT after taxes. Overall, the court found that,
accounting for the new amounts for child support and alimony,
and accounting for the amount that Emily actually received,
Brandon owed her $127,959 for past unpaid child support and
alimony.
¶15 	The court then awarded Emily the marital home and
ordered that its equity be divided equally between Brandon and
Emily. Addressing the Haven Oaks house, the court found that

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 141
Brandon had “used marital money to upgrade and repair the
home” and had purchased it from his father in November 2020
but did not disclose the purchase to Emily until April 2022.
Brandon later sold the Haven Oaks house and purchased the
Rolling Brook house using the Haven Oaks equity. Although
Brandon claimed that Brent gifted him money to help with the
purchase of the Rolling Brook house, the court concluded that the
equity in the house should nevertheless be divided equally
between the parties “as a sanction for Brandon’s failure to
appropriately disclose his interest in the Haven Oaks home until
more than 17 months after he had purchased it.”
¶16 	The court awarded RMT to Brandon. The court determined
that “the best evidence of the value of the business, which is
supported 	in 	great 	part 	by 	[Emily’s 	expert’s] 	testimony, 	is
Brandon’s evaluation 	as the 	owner.” 	Pointing 	to 	Brandon’s
willingness to purchase Emily’s interest in RMT for $1.5 million,
the court found that “Brandon’s own testimony and proposed
findings suggest a value of” $3 million. The court reduced that
valuation by the $500,000 debt Brandon owed Brent from the
purchase of the business, making the total valuation $2.5 million.
But the court declined to deduct from the valuation the alleged
$700,000 debt RMT owed Zions Bank because “no documentation
was 	provided 	verifying 	this 	debt 	and 	no 	payments 	were
demonstrated.” Alternatively, the court gave Brandon the option
of selling RMT and equally dividing the proceeds with Emily.
¶17 	The court addressed other marital assets, including a
piano, 	which 	the 	court 	valued 	at 	$15,000, 	and 	Brandon’s
mountain bikes, which the court valued at $10,000. And in a
spreadsheet attached to its findings, the court accounted for other
marital assets, including 3 1/3 water shares, the total value of
which the court found to be $10,000. The spreadsheet also listed
Brandon’s membership in a professional organization, YPO, as
having a $2,000 value.

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20240597-CA 	8 	2026 UT App 141
¶18 	The court noted that the “parties were subject to the
injunction set forth in Rule 109 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,” which prevented them from disposing of any marital
property without the consent of the other party. And the court
noted that its temporary order indicated that “the parties may not
dissipate or liquidate any marital assets.” But the court found that
“Brandon intentionally violated the Rule 109 injunction and the
Court’s temporary orders on multiple occasions.” The court
found that “Brandon spent thousands of dollars on expensive
toys, lavish gifts, vacations and other purchases during the
litigation” and disclosed them only “after Emily independently
discovered the purchases.” And the court found that he “has not
provided a full accounting of marital funds used to purchase the
items.”
¶19 	The court found that Brandon dissipated “at least $367,599
from the marital estate and that he likely dissipated much more.”
The court listed as dissipation a host of Brandon’s expenditures
during the pendency of the divorce, including, as relevant here,
an Airstream trailer, a BMW for one of the parties’ daughters,
jewelry for each of the parties’ daughters, improvements to the
Haven Oaks house, and paying off Emily’s Yukon.4
¶20 	Thus, 	the 	court 	held Brandon 	“in 	contempt 	of 	court
pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-3 et seq.” The court determined
that sanctions were also appropriate under rule 26.1(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure because Brandon failed to disclose these
dissipated assets. Accordingly, the court ruled that
rather 	than 	paying 	Emily 	one-half 	of 	the
amount . . . , Brandon should pay Emily 75% of the
determined value . . . as a sanction for intentionally
violating 	the 	Rule 	109 	injunction 	on 	multiple
4. Emily concedes that this last expense should not have been
included as dissipation. See infra note 8.

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20240597-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 141
occasions, for intentionally violating the Court’s
temporary orders on multiple occasions, and for
failing 	to 	disclose 	information 	sufficient 	to
accurately 	assess 	the 	marital 	estate 	or 	identify
purchases that he made with marital funds.
¶21 	Finally, the court determined that Emily was entitled to an
award of attorney fees. The court found that except for the $25,000
Brandon stipulated to pay prior to trial, Emily’s parents had
covered her legal fees for her. But the court found that Brandon
had paid his attorney fees out of the marital estate and that Emily
should have that same opportunity. In calculating the amount of
her attorney fees award, the court again noted that Emily should
not be imputed any income because she was caring for the parties’
remaining minor child, “who requires special attention due to
lingering medical issues,” and because she was pursuing further
education. Thus, the court found that “Emily lacked the financial
resources necessary to pay her basic living expenses during the
litigation” and she lacked the “resources necessary to pay the
additional expense directly associated with litigation.”
¶22 	In contrast, the court pointed out that Brandon had paid
his attorney fees through RMT, “with marital funds using marital
resources,” and thus, “Emily has in fact paid for one-half of
Brandon’s costs and fees.” The court reasoned, “Emily should be
permitted to pay her expert witness costs and attorney fees with
marital funds using marital resources.” The court also found that
“Brandon in fact has the ability to pay Emily’s fees and costs” as
he would “have significant excess income each month even after
he pays his child support and alimony obligations.” Therefore, the
court concluded that “Emily should be allowed to pay her fees
from the marital estate,” minus the $25,000 she had already
received for fees.
¶23 	The court then issued a decree of divorce memorializing its
findings and conclusions.

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20240597-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 141
Motions to Amend
¶24 	Emily filed a motion urging the court to amend its findings
of fact. As relevant here, she argued that the award for the child
support arrearage accounted for only one child, though for at least
part of the pendency of the divorce, more than one of the parties’
children were minors. As a result, she argued that the child
support arrearage award and the total equalization payment
would need to be increased.
¶25 	Brandon filed his own motion asking the court to alter or
amend its findings and the decree in several respects. First, he
addressed the sanctions the court imposed. He argued that he had
properly disclosed his purchase of the Haven Oaks house and so
the sanction awarding Emily equity in the Rolling Brook house
was improper. And he argued that he had disclosed much of what
the court characterized as his dissipation—including the purchase
of the Airstream trailer, a dirt bike, paying off Emily’s Yukon, and
providing 	for 	his 	girlfriend 	and 	other 	children—making
inappropriate 	the 	sanction 	of 	awarding 	75% 	of 	the 	total
dissipation to Emily. Brandon also argued that the court had set
the wrong date from which retroactive alimony was to run. And
he argued the court had not properly addressed his ability to pay
alimony.
¶26 	Brandon further complained about the total arrearage the
court had awarded to Emily. He argued that the line item for
extracurricular activities for the parties’ remaining minor child
should be reduced and that the court failed to account for the
amounts he had paid for those extracurriculars, Emily’s health
insurance, and her auto maintenance and fuel. And Brandon
argued that the court had incorrectly found that Emily received
only $1,500 of the $2,000 ordered to be paid from RMT because
she had testified at trial that she received approximately $1,800
per month. Finally, he argued that “it would be error and double
counting to require” him to repay what Emily’s parents paid for

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 141
her living expenses when the court had “specifically calculated
the arrears to reflect what Brandon legally owed Emily.”
¶27 	Brandon also argued that the court “correctly accepted
[his] valuation of RMT but utilized the incorrect number when it
did so.” He urged that he had “repeatedly testified at trial that
RMT had a value of $1.5 million” and “never once indicated the
value was $3 million.” He argued that the court’s findings
introduced the $3 million valuation and that it should amend that
finding to align with his consistent trial testimony.
¶28 	Brandon also argued that he did not owe Emily any money
for attorney fees because Emily’s fees had been paid by her
parents, who testified at trial that they intended it to be a gift to
her. And he argued that the court had incorrectly calculated the
amount he dissipated.
¶29 	Brandon’s motion to amend also addressed the court’s
$10,000 valuation of the water shares awarded to Emily, asserting
that the shares were worth $10,000 each rather than in total. He
asked the court to amend its findings to reflect this. He also
argued that the court improperly “singled out” the piano, the
mountain bikes, and his YPO membership in assigning them
separate values. He argued that these items had already been
awarded to him and should not be valued, but that even if they
were, the court’s valuations were not supported by the evidence.
And he asserted that the YPO membership should have been
allocated to him as an expense rather than an asset.
¶30 	In responding to Brandon’s motion to amend, Emily
conceded that several of his claimed errors had merit. She agreed
that the court should not have required Brandon to both pay the
arrearage and reimburse Emily’s parents for the $55,000 they paid
for her living expenses during the pendency of the divorce. She
agreed 	that 	her 	after-tax 	income 	from 	RMT 	had 	been
miscalculated and that Brandon should receive credit for paying

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 141
for her auto fuel during this period. And she recognized that,
based on Brandon’s testimony, the water shares should be valued
at $10,000 each rather than $10,000 total, and she did “not object
to the court making this edit.”
¶31 	But the court did not address any of these conceded errors
in its order on the parties’ motions to amend. The court agreed
with Emily on several fronts. As relevant here, the court agreed
that the child support arrearage should be increased to address
the periods of time during the divorce when more than one of the
parties’ children were minors. The court found that only one of
Brandon’s claimed errors merited consideration: the retroactive
start date for alimony. The court thus issued a supplemental
divorce decree that clarified the date from which alimony should
retroactively run. The court also corrected the amount of the
support 	arrearage, 	finding 	that 	because 	Emily 	should 	have
received 	a 	“child 	support 	and 	spousal 	support 	amount 	of
$366,815,” and because she had received only $209,000 during the
pendency of the divorce, Brandon owed her $157,815 rather than
the 	initial 	award 	of 	$127,959. 	The 	court 	adjusted 	the 	total
equalization payment accordingly.
Post-Trial Attorney Fees5
¶32 	As noted, the court awarded Emily attorney fees in the
decree, reasoning that it was equitable to do so where Brandon
had paid his legal fees from the marital estate. The court also later
5. At this point in the proceedings, Judge Richard D. McKelvie,
who entered the original and amended divorce decrees retired
and was replaced by Judge Coral Sanchez, who entered the
post-trial attorney fees award.

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20240597-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 141
awarded her attorney fees for litigating Brandon’s post-trial
motion to amend.6
¶33 	The court stated that the post-trial award of fees was
proper under rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows the court to grant attorney fees “to enable the moving party
to prosecute or defend the action” where it finds, among other
things, that “the moving party lacks the financial resources to pay
the costs and fees,” “the nonmoving party has the financial
resources to pay the costs and fees,” “the costs and fees are
necessary for the proper prosecution or defense of the action,” and
“the amount of the costs and fees is reasonable.” Utah R. Civ. P.
102(a)–(b). In addressing these factors, the court stated that “as
was true during the pendency of the divorce,” Emily “currently
cannot afford to pay the attorney fees” because she “continues to
be a stay-at-home, full-time caretaker for the parties’ child, who
requires special attention due to medical issues” and because she
was 	“pursuing 	her 	educational 	opportunities 	and 	was
unemployed.” The court also noted that Emily’s alimony award
“was calculated to only meet her monthly needs” and that “her
share of the marital estate was not done in one lump sum” but
would be distributed “over a ten-year period.” In contrast, the
court found that Brandon “has the entirety of his share of the
marital 	estate 	at 	his 	disposal” 	and 	“continues 	to 	have 	the
business.” And the court noted that Brandon had “not indicated
that his financial condition has significantly changed” since the
previous finding about his ability to pay attorney fees.
¶34 	The court also found that the fees Emily incurred were
necessary to allow her to defend against Brandon’s post-trial
motion. And the court found that the affidavits filed by Emily’s
counsel had “descriptive information associated with the entries,”
that the fees were “appropriate given [her attorneys’] level of
6. Emily did not request fees incurred in connection with her own
post-trial motion.

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20240597-CA 	14 	2026 UT App 141
experience,” and that her counsels’ representation had resulted in
“a favorable result on behalf of” Emily “given that the court fully
denied” Brandon’s “motion except one point” conceded by Emily.
The court stated that “in looking closely at his motion to alter or
amend the judgment,” Brandon had “raised about two dozen
separate issues and was unsuccessful in all but one, the length of
alimony.” Thus, the court was “not persuaded that the only
reason he filed his motion was to address some errors that were
introduced 	by” 	Emily. 	The 	court 	later 	entered 	a 	judgment
memorializing the post-trial award of fees to Emily.
¶35 	Brandon appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶36 	Brandon first argues that the district court erred in not
correcting several conceded calculation errors in its amended
findings of fact and amended divorce decree. Because the parties
agree on the propriety of a remand to remedy these errors, we
grant the remand to allow the court to address these errors in the
first instance.
¶37 	Next, Brandon argues the court improperly sanctioned him
by awarding Emily equity in the Rolling Brook house and 75% of
the total value of the assets the court found he dissipated. We
review the award of equity as a sanction based on rule 26.1(f) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for correctness. See Bailey v.
Bailey, 2024 UT App 51, ¶ 21, 548 P.3d 519 (“A district court’s
interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for
correctness. For this reason, a court’s decision regarding the
adequacy of the party’s disclosures is reviewed for correctness.”)
(quotation simplified). And we review the court’s dissipation
determinations for an abuse of discretion, though “we cannot
affirm its determination when the trial court abuses its discretion
by failing to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	15 	2026 UT App 141
financial determinations.” Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 4,
316 P.3d 455 (quotation simplified).
¶38 	Brandon challenges the court’s valuation of RMT and
various other assets as well as the court’s awards of alimony and
the support arrearage on several fronts. We afford the district
court “considerable discretion” in its “valuation of the marital
property, the manner in which it distributed that property, and its
alimony determination.” Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2023 UT App 50,
¶ 33, 531 P.3d 225 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1011
(Utah 2023). The court exceeds the sound exercise of its discretion
“only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
district court, that is, if a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulted in substantial and prejudicial error, if the court’s
factual findings are clearly erroneous, or if the award is so
seriously inequitable as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.”
Id. (quotation simplified).
¶39 	Lastly, Brandon challenges the court’s awards of initial and
post-trial attorney fees to Emily. “In divorce cases, both the
decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are
within the trial court’s sound discretion.” Miner v. Miner, 2021 UT
App 77, ¶ 108, 496 P.3d 242 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I. Conceded Calculation Errors
¶40 	Brandon argues that the district court failed to correct what
amounted to “over $100,000” in calculation errors, which he
partially faults Emily for introducing in her proposed findings. In
particular, he argues that the court (1) erred in requiring him to
both pay the arrearage and reimburse Emily’s parents for $55,000
of expenses they paid on her behalf during the pendency of the
divorce, (2) miscalculated the amount of after-tax pay Emily

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	16 	2026 UT App 141
received from RMT by $11,400, (3) failed to credit Brandon for
$15,200 he paid for Emily’s auto fuel, and (4) undervalued the
water shares Emily received by $23,000. Brandon faults the court
for failing to correct these issues without explanation despite
Emily’s post-trial concessions of error. He argues we should
remand for the district court to do so now.
¶41 	On appeal, Emily acknowledges that the “district court
rejected [her] concessions but did not explain why.” And she
“agrees the lack of factual findings” on these issues “is inadequate
for appellate review and suggests this court remand.” Given the
parties’ agreement, we remand to allow the district court to
address these issues, making adequate findings in doing so. See
Krajeski v. Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 30, 565 P.3d 544 (“There
must be adequate factual findings to reveal how the court reached
its conclusions and to establish that the court’s judgment or decree
follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.”)
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025).
II. Sanctions
¶42 	The district court sanctioned Brandon by awarding Emily
half of the equity in the Rolling Brook house and 75% of the value
of assets it found he dissipated. We reverse both sanctions and
remand for the district court to make further findings regarding
both the Rolling Brook house and Brandon’s dissipation.
A. 	Equity in the Rolling Brook House
¶43 	Based on Brent’s and Brandon’s testimony at trial, the
district court found that Brent purchased the Haven Oaks house
for Brandon in January 2020 and that Brandon purchased it from
Brent in November 2020 but “did not disclose the fact that he had
purchased the home to Emily until April of 2022.” The court also
found that Brandon later sold the Haven Oaks house and used the
equity to purchase the Rolling Brook house. Although Brandon

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 141
asserted that a portion of the funds used to purchase the Rolling
Brook house were a gift from Brent, the court stated that it “need
not determine” the particulars of Brent’s gift or whether the
Rolling Brook house “was Brandon’s separate property” because
it was “appropriate to award” equity in the Rolling Brook house
to Emily “as a sanction for Brandon’s failure to appropriately
disclose his interest in the Haven Oaks house until more than 17
months after he had purchased it.”
¶44 	The court relied on rule 26.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires each party to “serve on all other parties
a 	fully 	completed 	Financial 	Declaration,” 	along 	with
“[d]ocuments verifying the value of all real estate in which the
party has an interest.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26.1(c), (c)(5). And rule
26.1(f), which the court directly cited, provides that “[f]ailure to
fully disclose all assets and income in the Financial Declaration . . .
may subject the non-disclosing party to sanctions under Rule 37
including an award of non-disclosed assets to the other party,
attorney’s fees, or other sanctions deemed appropriate by the
court.”
¶45 	Brandon argues that rule 26.1(f) does not provide a basis
for awarding Emily equity in the Rolling Brook house. He points
out that “an award of non-disclosed assets to the other party . . .
or other sanctions deemed appropriate by the court”—the only
potential 	bases 	for 	this 	sanction—are 	not 	actually 	listed 	as
sanctions available under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as the language of rule 26.1(f) suggests. See id. R. 37(b).
And he argues that even if the sanction imposed here was
somehow drawn from rule 37, sanctions under that rule are
available only “upon motion” based on a “violation of a specific
court order”—neither of which were present here. Bailey v. Bailey,
2024 UT App 51, ¶ 27, 548 P.3d 519 (quotation simplified). See id.
(“Rule 37 . . . is not self-executing: a party wishing to take
advantage of its more expansive sanctions menu must first obtain
a discovery order from the court.”); Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) (“[T]he

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	18 	2026 UT App 141
court, upon motion, may impose appropriate sanctions for the
failure to follow its orders[.]”). We take Brandon’s point.7 But we
need not answer the question posed by the rules because even
assuming that awarding equity in the Rolling Brook house to
Emily was a sanction available to the court under rule 26.1(f), it
was 	improperly 	imposed 	here, 	where 	Brandon 	technically
complied with the disclosure requirements of the rule.
¶46 	When Brandon filed his first financial disclosure, he was
not yet the owner of the Haven Oaks house and so did not disclose
it. But by the time he filed his second financial disclosure, he was
the owner of the house and he disclosed as much. To the extent
that the court imposed this sanction out of concern for this
disclosure’s tardiness, Emily was not harmed. Brandon filed his
second disclosure on May 13, 2022, several months before trial.
Emily’s second financial disclosure—filed on the same day as
Brandon’s—included the Haven Oaks house. She argues she
“could not have known that Brandon shifted from ‘renter’ to
‘owner’ without him saying so,” but logically speaking, she had
to have had prior knowledge of Brandon’s interest in the Haven
7. Much of the parties’ briefing was devoted to highlighting the
procedural problem with rule 26.1(f) and rule 37 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, namely, whether sanctions imposed under
rule 26.1(f) must follow the procedure laid out in rule 37(b),
despite rule 26.1(f)’s inclusion of sanctions not listed in the
“expansive sanctions menu” under rule 37(b). Bailey v. Bailey, 2024
UT App 51, ¶ 27, 548 P.3d 519. See id. ¶ 31 n.7 (“[I]t is far from
apparent to us that the language of rule 26.1(f) authorizes rule 37
sanctions in the absence of a court order[,] . . . especially given the
plain language of rule 37(b) and our case law.”). Though we leave
this procedural problem for another day, we urge the Utah
Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure to address and clarify the interplay between these
rules.

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	19 	2026 UT App 141
Oaks house to include it in her own disclosure. And the record
indicates that she did. In his request for a temporary order,
Brandon stated his intent to purchase the Haven Oaks house,
albeit after the divorce was finalized. Emily’s listing of Brandon
as the owner of the Haven Oaks house and valuing it “[b]ased on
2021 CMA and mortgage statement” shows that she anticipated
Brandon following through with his plan.
¶47 	Because Brandon disclosed his ownership of the Haven
Oaks house, there was no basis to award Emily equity in the
Rolling Brook house—which Brandon purchased during the
divorce using, in part, his equity in the Haven Oaks house—as a
sanction. We thus reverse and remand this issue for the district
court to determine in the first instance whether the Rolling Brook
house is Brandon’s separate property and to adjust its property
distribution accordingly. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT
App 11, ¶ 15, 176 P.3d 476 (stating that in making a property
distribution, the district court must first “identify the property in
dispute and determine whether each item is marital or separate
property”).
B. 	Dissipation
¶48 	The district court found that Brandon dissipated at least
$367,599 from the marital estate, but it ordered that
rather 	than 	paying 	Emily 	one-half 	of 	the
amount . . . , Brandon should pay Emily 75% of the
determined value . . . as a sanction for intentionally
violating 	the 	Rule 	109 	injunction 	on 	multiple
occasions, for intentionally violating the Court’s
temporary orders on multiple occasions, and for
failing 	to 	disclose 	information 	sufficient 	to
accurately 	assess 	the 	marital 	estate 	or 	identify
purchases that he made with marital funds.

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	20 	2026 UT App 141
Brandon asserts that several of the purchases he made during the
pendency of the divorce—including the Airstream trailer, the
BMW, jewelry for the parties’ daughters, improvements to the
Haven Oaks house, and cars for him and his girlfriend—did not
amount to dissipation in the first place. And he argues that using
the dissipation award to impose this sanction was inappropriate.
¶49 	In assessing whether dissipation occurred, courts should
consider several factors:
(1) how the money was spent, including whether
funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses
or individual expenses; (2) the parties’ historical
practices; (3) the magnitude of any depletion; (4) the
timing of the challenged actions in relation to the
separation and divorce; and (5) any obstructive
efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets.
Hillam v. Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 46, 554 P.3d 1137 (quotation
simplified). This is “a case-specific inquiry that’s best determined
by the district court in the first instance.” Id. ¶ 64. And “its use
must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that
explain the . . . court’s basis for such deviation” from the general
rules regarding division of marital property. Rayner v. Rayner,
2013 UT App 269, ¶ 21, 316 P.3d 455 (quotation simplified).
¶50 	Here, the district court’s findings do not show that the
court 	considered 	the 	above 	dissipation 	factors, 	other 	than
Brandon’s “obstructive efforts that hinder[ed] the valuation of the
assets.” Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 46 (quotation simplified). And
even in doing that, the court considered the obstructive efforts
only as to certain expenditures. The court’s findings also do not
“disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion” regarding
the value of the various expenditures was reached. Krajeski v.
Krajeski, 	2025 	UT 	App 	19, 	¶ 30, 	565 	P.3d 	544 	(quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025). For instance, the

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	21 	2026 UT App 141
court found that Brandon dissipated $60,000 in buying the
Airstream trailer. Elsewhere in its findings, the court concluded
that, based on Brandon’s testimony, “he made $25,000 in profits
from the sale of” the trailer. The court found that Emily should
“be awarded $12,000 representing her interest in the Airstream”
and stated that this “amount is incorporated into the $60,000
amount” of dissipated funds. But the court did not later discuss
how it reached the $60,000 figure. Similarly, the court listed the
cost of installing a cement pad and garage doors for the Haven
Oaks house as $11,500 and $7,000 respectively. The court stated
that these figures came from “Exhibit 37,” which we take to mean
Emily’s trial exhibit. But in looking at that trial exhibit, there are
different figures listed for the cement pad and garage door. The
court did not explain why it chose these particular figures.
¶51 	To be sure, “unstated findings can be implied if it is
reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered the
controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve
the 	controversy, 	but 	simply 	failed 	to 	record 	the 	factual
determination it made.” Cox v. Cox, 2023 UT App 62, ¶ 33, 532 P.3d
128 (quotation simplified). But “we will not imply any missing
finding where there is a matrix of possible factual findings and
we 	cannot 	ascertain 	the 	trial 	court’s 	actual 	findings.” 	Id.
(quotation simplified). And “it is not our responsibility to comb
the record” to do so. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey, 2026 UT App 39, ¶ 23, 588
P.3d 329.
¶52 	This lack of detail requires a remand for the court to
reconsider 	its 	dissipation 	determination, 	making 	adequate
findings in doing so. See Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 23. But
because the issue will arise again on remand, we address the
propriety of the sanction the court chose: awarding Emily 75% of
the 	total 	dissipation 	amount. 	See 	Young 	H2ORE 	v. 	J&M
Transmission LLC, 2024 UT App 10, ¶ 48, 543 P.3d 1264 (offering
“guidance” on “issues . . . certain to arise again on remand”).

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	22 	2026 UT App 141
¶53 	“Where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value
or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, in the
exercise of its equitable powers . . . hold one party accountable to
the other for the dissipation of marital assets.” Goggin v. Goggin,
2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified). “[W]hen
the 	court 	conducts 	its 	equitable 	distribution 	of 	the 	marital
property, the other spouse should receive a credit for his or her
share of the assets that were dissipated.” Id. Because “marital
property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing
spouses,” “the amount of that credit . . . should ordinarily be half
of the dissipated marital funds.” Ball v. Ball, 2025 UT App 200,
¶ 16, 584 P.3d 330 (quotation simplified). See Goggin, 2013 UT 16,
¶ 47 (“Generally, each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his
or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.”)
(emphasis added; quotation otherwise simplified). Thus, we
conclude that awarding Emily 75% of the dissipation total as a
sanction was improper—no matter the rule on which the award
was premised.
¶54 	On remand, after determining what dissipation occurred,
the court should award Emily half of the total.8
III. Property Valuations
A. 	RMT
¶55 	Brandon argues that the court “purported to accept” his
$1.5 million valuation of RMT but mistakenly “used the wrong
number”—$2.5 million—in its findings and decree. And he
8. Brandon conceded at trial that he dissipated $61,000. And on
appeal, he appears not to challenge an additional $49,556 that the
court found he dissipated. Emily also conceded post-trial and on
appeal that the $40,000 Brandon paid on her Yukon should not
have been included as dissipation. In reassessing its dissipation
award, the court should account for these figures.

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	23 	2026 UT App 141
argues that this valuation should have accounted for the $700,000
debt RMT owed to Zions Bank through Brent. We disagree on
both fronts.
¶56 	The district court did not wholesale “accept[] Brandon’s
valuation and reject[] Emily’s,” as Brandon argues. Because the
court found that Brandon’s expert’s testimony about the value of
the business was “unhelpful” and “unreliable,” it gave the
testimony “little weight,” as was its prerogative. See Wadsworth v.
Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 59, 507 P.3d 385, cert. denied, 525
P.3d 1259 (Utah 2022). On the other hand, the court found that
Emily’s expert’s testimony was “helpful” and “credible,” though
the court noted that “it can’t be said that any of the predictions are
100% accurate, and indeed are not held out to be.” Accordingly,
the court found that “the best evidence of the value of the
business, which is supported in great part by [Emily’s expert’s]
testimony, is Brandon’s evaluation as the owner.”
¶57 	But Brandon’s valuation was inconsistent. He testified at
trial that RMT was worth $1.5 million. And in his proposed
findings he stated that he “should be awarded RMT . . . for a fair
market value of $1,500,000,” though he stated a few lines later in
those same proposed findings, with our emphasis, that “he would
be willing to purchase Emily’s interest in RMT for $1,500,000,”
suggesting a value of $3 million if Emily’s share equates to $1.5
million. At oral argument before this court, Brandon’s counsel
referred to this latter statement as an erroneous “one-off.” Yet the
district court found that “Brandon’s own testimony and proposed
findings suggest a value of” $3 million. And this comported with
Emily’s expert’s valuation of $3,444,000. Accounting for the
$500,000 debt the court found that RMT owed Brent, the $2.5
million valuation was “within the range of values established by
all the testimony.” Id. ¶ 64 (quotation simplified). See Knowlton v.
Knowlton, 2023 UT App 16, ¶ 60, 525 P.3d 898 (“Merely failing to
accept one party’s proposed valuations does not constitute an

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	24 	2026 UT App 141
abuse of discretion.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d
730 (Utah 2023).
¶58 	And it was reasonable for the court to exclude the claimed
$700,000 debt from this valuation. The court found that the
“unrebutted testimony and evidence at [t]rial” showed that
Brandon owed Brent $500,000 for the purchase of RMT. The court
pointed out that Brent “testified unequivocally that the $500,000
debt is a legitimate debt which he expects to be repaid” and was
the remainder of what Brandon owed him. But the same could not
be 	said 	for 	the 	$700,000 	debt. 	The 	court 	found 	that 	“no
documentation 	was 	provided 	verifying 	this 	debt 	and 	no
payments were demonstrated.” Brandon argues that a Zions Bank
representative’s 	trial 	testimony 	obviated 	the 	need 	for 	such
documentation. 	But “[b]ecause 	determinations regarding 	the
weight to be given to the testimony of witnesses . . . are within the
province of the finder of fact, we will not second guess a court’s
decisions about evidentiary weight and credibility if there is a
reasonable basis in the record to support them.” Barrani v. Barrani,
2014 UT App 204, ¶ 6, 334 P.3d 994. And here the lack of any kind
of documentation of a large debt owed to a bank was certainly a
reasonable basis on which not to credit the representative’s
testimony that such a debt existed.
¶59 	Thus, the court did not exceed its discretion in valuing
RMT.9
B. 	Brandon’s Personal Property
¶60 	Brandon also argues the district court abused its discretion
in “randomly assigning value” to several pieces of his personal
9. We note that had Brandon been of the view that the court was
overvaluing RMT, he could have taken the court up on its
alternative 	suggestion 	to 	sell 	the 	business 	and 	divide 	“all
proceeds equally with Emily.” But he did not.

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	25 	2026 UT App 141
property—including the piano, mountain bikes, and his YPO
membership—and allocating them to his share of the marital
estate. 	He 	argues that 	the 	court’s temporary orders, 	which
awarded the parties “their personal effects and personal items,”
had already disposed of this property and thus there “was no
basis to single out these items previously divided, nor was there
evidentiary support for the assigned values.”
¶61 	But the court did not improperly “single out” these assets
to be valued. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 48, 299 P.3d 1079
(“The court is permitted to look at the marital property in its
entirety and to apportion it in a manner that best facilitates a clean
break between the parties and achieves a result that equitably
divides the marital property as a whole.”) (quotation simplified).
And temporary orders are just that—temporary. See Miner v.
Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶ 101, 496 P.3d 242 (“An arrangement
memorialized in a temporary order can of course be changed, in
a final decree of divorce, after a court hears all of the evidence
during a full trial.”).
¶62 	There was also evidence to support at least the court’s
valuations of the piano and the mountain bikes. Brandon testified
at trial that the parties bought the piano from his parents for
$10,000, while Emily testified that she thought it was worth “40
grand” and that Brandon’s parents had helped them pay for it.
The court’s valuation of $15,000 was thus reasonable—more
closely approximating Brandon’s estimate than Emily’s. As to the
mountain bikes, in her proposed findings, Emily asserted that
Brandon had two mountain bikes worth $5,000 each. The $10,000
value the court assigned to the bikes was thus reasonable,
especially given Brandon’s silence on the matter. See Wadsworth v.
Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 64, 507 P.3d 385 (“Generally, we
will uphold a district court’s valuation of marital assets as long as
the value is within the range of values established by all the
testimony[.]”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1259
(Utah 2022).

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	26 	2026 UT App 141
¶63 	But we can discern no evidence in the record regarding the
$2,000 value the court assigned to Brandon’s YPO membership.
And “without findings from which we can ascertain how the . . .
court categorized and valued the property, we cannot assess the
merits 	of 	the 	challenges 	to 	its 	distribution.” 	Stonehocker 	v.
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 24, 176 P.3d 476. So, while we
affirm the court’s valuation of the piano and the mountain bikes,
we 	remand 	to 	the 	district 	court 	to 	make 	specific 	findings
regarding the value of the YPO membership.10
IV. Alimony and Support Arrearage
¶64 	Brandon argues that the district court abused its discretion
in its calculations of both alimony and the support arrearage
owed to Emily. For the following reasons, we remand for the court
to address both.
A. 	Alimony
¶65 	“The 	appropriate 	amount 	of 	any 	alimony 	award 	is
governed by a multi-factor inquiry, first articulated in Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).” Miner v. Miner, 2021 UT App 77,
¶ 16, 496 P.3d 242. “The so-called Jones factors . . . require a court
to examine (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse; (ii) the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce
income; and (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support.” Id. (quotation simplified). “In all cases, the trial court
must support its alimony determinations with adequate findings
on all material issues.” Id. ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). Brandon
10. Brandon argues that the YPO membership should have been
included as one of his expenses, rather than an asset. But because
we cannot review how the court categorized the membership
without adequate findings, the court may address this argument
on remand.

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	27 	2026 UT App 141
argues the court’s findings did not adequately address two of the
Jones factors—Emily’s need and his ability to pay.
1. 	Emily’s Need
a. 	Imputed Income
¶66 	Brandon 	argues 	that 	the 	court 	should 	have 	imputed
income to Emily when determining her need for alimony. “Trial
courts have broad discretion to select an appropriate method of
assessing a spouse’s income, including determinations of income
imputation.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT App 156, ¶ 51, 560 P.3d
151 (quotation simplified). Because “we will find that the trial
court abused its discretion only if no reasonable person would
take the view” the court did, Brandon “bears a heavy burden”
here. Id. (quotation simplified). And he has not met it. Despite the
court’s findings that “Emily could potentially earn gross income
between $1,950 and $3,089 per month,” it nonetheless concluded
that because she “was and still is a full-time homemaker and
caretaker for the parties’ minor child, who requires special
medical attention due to lingering medical issues,” and because
she was also “pursuing educational opportunities,” she was “not
voluntarily 	unemployed” 	and 	should 	“not 	be 	imputed 	any
income.” We perceive no abuse of discretion on this point.
b. 	Extracurricular Costs
¶67 	In the divorce decree, the court ordered the parties to
“equally 	share 	costs 	associated 	with 	the 	minor 	children’s
extracurricular activities.” The court found this cost to be $490 per
month. Brandon argues that this expense should be reduced
based on the representation by his attorney at trial that the cost of
the parties’ remaining minor child’s soccer was $2,400 per year,
which he works out to total just $100 per month for each parent.
But as far as we can tell, this representation by counsel was not
substantiated by evidence on the record. Nor was there any

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	28 	2026 UT App 141
indication that this was the only extracurricular expense for this
child. And Emily testified that the extracurricular expenses were
“[d]efinitely a bit higher when . . . more children [were] involved,”
although she conceded that with one minor child, “it won’t be as
much.” All things considered, we see no abuse of discretion in
including this extracurricular cost among Emily’s needs.
2. 	Brandon’s Ability to Pay
a. 	Reasonable Monthly Expenses
¶68 	Brandon argues that in calculating his ability to pay
alimony, the court failed to make an express finding of what his
reasonable monthly expenses were. We agree.
¶69 	Brandon 	claimed 	that 	his 	monthly 	expenses 	totaled
$14,137.69. The court found that this was “inflated” and should be
“reduced.” Other than determining that the $1,275 he spent on
childcare for the children he shared with his girlfriend “should be
eliminated 	entirely,” 	the 	court 	did 	not 	specify 	any 	other
reductions. For instance, while the court found that Brandon
“inflated” the cost of “his mortgage, HOA fee, electricity, natural
gas, water, sewer, garbage, paid television and internet” and his
“claimed expenses associated with taking” his girlfriend and
other children “out to dinner,” it did not say by how much. The
court also stated that Brandon’s expenses for pet care and
repairing 	the 	Haven 	Oaks 	house 	should 	be 	“reduced
significantly.” But again, the court did not explain by how much.
And the court did not provide a net number for what Brandon’s
reasonable monthly expenses should be after these reductions.
¶70 	In Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, 379 P.3d 890, the district
court found that a wife’s “claimed monthly expenses . . . were
unreasonably inflated,” but it “did not determine the expenses
that it considered reasonable.” Id. ¶ 28 (quotation simplified). We
concluded that “[t]he lack of detailed findings in this respect

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	29 	2026 UT App 141
makes it impossible for us to determine on review whether the . . .
alimony award was proper.” Id. So too here. “Although the trial
court entered lengthy findings after patiently enduring” the trial,
its failure to make both a numeric global finding about Brandon’s
reasonable monthly expenses and more detailed findings about
exactly what the reductions to those expenses should be leaves us
“hampered in our review.” See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT
App 11, ¶ 18, 176 P.3d 476. On remand, the district court will need
to make such findings.11
b. 	Expenses Paid by RMT
¶71 	In Brandon’s view, the district court should have included
the $4,733.77 he testified that RMT paid on his behalf each month
toward his personal expenses. We disagree. In the decree, the
court 	stated 	that 	“[t]he 	most 	difficult 	part[] 	in 	calculating
Brandon’s income is personal expenses RMT pays on his behalf.”
In trying to determine this, the court found that $2,816.77 of what
RMT paid monthly was used “so that Brandon could go on
vacations” and that “[t]o the extent that the funds were spent to
take [his girlfriend] and their children on vacation, such should
be considered income available to Brandon to pay alimony.”
Thus, it was appropriate for the court to credit this as income and
not as an expense.12
11. In opposing Brandon’s motion to amend the findings, Emily
conceded that the court’s findings and decree did “not include a
number for Brandon’s ability to pay” and she stated that she did
“not oppose the court adding one, after considering, first, the
court’s findings, and second, Brandon’s arguments.”
12. In her briefing, Emily notes that Brandon claimed that his
expenses paid by RMT included the $2,816.77 for vacations, the
$2,000 he paid to Emily as a “general employee” during the
(continued…)

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	30 	2026 UT App 141
c. 	Tax Rate
¶72 	The 	court 	assumed 	“a 	20% 	tax 	rate” 	in 	calculating
Brandon’s income and ability to pay alimony, reasoning that
Emily’s “suggested rate of 10%” was “low,” while “Brandon’s
estimate of 25%” did “not account for the fact that some of the
income included in the calculation . . . (i.e., the personal expenses
paid by the company)” was taxed under the business. Brandon
points out that the 20% rate does not indicate whether it also
encompasses state and federal taxes as well as FICA and Medicare
deductions. We agree, and on remand the district court should
clarify why it chose the tax rate it applied to Brandon’s income.
B. 	Support Arrearage
¶73 	Under the court’s temporary orders, in effect during the
pendency of the divorce proceedings, Brandon was required to
pay Emily $4,000 per month “as family support” and $2,000 per
month as salary from RMT. He was also required to pay for “fuel
and maintenance” on Emily’s car and for her and their children’s
health insurance. And the parties were ordered to “share equally
the costs of the extracurricular activities the children are already
participating in.”
¶74 	Based on Emily’s financial disclosure and trial testimony,
the court found that Emily received only $1,500 per month from
RMT after taxes and, thus, that she received a total of $209,000
from RMT and in “family support” during the pendency of the
divorce. But the court determined that based on its child support
and alimony findings, she should have received a total of $336,959
during that time. Subtracting the $209,000 from that sum, the
court determined that Brandon owed Emily $127,959 in unpaid
pendency of the divorce, and car expenses for his girlfriend that
exceeded the marital standard by $245 per month. She asserts that
removing these amounts left $1,672 of reasonable expenses.

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	31 	2026 UT App 141
support. But in its supplemental decree, the court recognized that
the parties had more than one minor child during the pendency
of the divorce and the child support therefore should have been
higher. The court thus increased the amount owed to $157,815.
¶75 	Brandon argues on appeal that the total arrearage should
be reduced to account for payments he made for Emily’s health
insurance, for her auto fuel and maintenance, and for his half of
their children’s extracurriculars during the pendency of the
divorce. And he argues that the court should not have increased
child support retroactively.
¶76 	As noted, Emily conceded error in the court’s calculation
of her income from RMT and Brandon’s payment of her auto fuel
costs during the pendency of the divorce. See supra ¶ 30. And she
agrees with Brandon that the arrearage should exclude the
amount he paid for her health insurance. So on remand, the court
must alter the total arrearage owed after making the necessary
corrections on these points.
¶77 	But we are not persuaded that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in not reducing the amount of the arrearage based on
auto maintenance, extracurricular costs, or the additional child
support. Brandon argues he should be credited for having paid
$250 	per 	month 	for 	Emily’s 	auto 	maintenance 	during 	the
pendency of the divorce. But there was no evidence that he did
pay that amount. To the contrary, Emily testified at trial that
despite the temporary order requiring Brandon to pay “for
regular maintenance” of her car, when she had to replace the
shocks on the car, she borrowed $6,000 from her parents. There
was likewise no evidence that Brandon was paying his share of
the 	extracurricular 	costs 	during 	the 	course 	of 	the 	divorce
proceeding. Indeed, Emily testified that in an email, Brandon told
her that he would provide a cell phone, car insurance, and health
insurance for the children but had stated, “Other financial support
from me needs to be part of a relationship they each have

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	32 	2026 UT App 141
individually with me.” She also testified that Brandon had
entirely refused to pay extracurricular costs for one of the children
while she was still a minor. And we disagree with Brandon’s bare
assertion that “an increase in the child support amount would
have decreased the alimony amount for the relevant period” and
thus reduced the overall arrearage owed. The court did not treat
child support and alimony interdependently or proportionally
such that increasing one would decrease the other.
V. Attorney Fees
¶78 	Brandon challenges the district court’s initial and post-trial
awards of attorney fees to Emily. While we affirm the court’s
decision to order the initial fee award, we remand for the district
court to reassess the amount. And we reverse the post-trial fee
award 	and 	remand 	for 	the 	court to 	make 	further 	findings
regarding Emily’s request for those fees.
A. 	Initial Fee Award
¶79 	The district court initially awarded Emily attorney fees
based on its conclusion that “where Brandon has paid his expert
witness costs and attorney fees with marital funds using marital
resources, Emily has in fact paid for one-half of Brandon’s costs
and fees” and she “should be permitted to pay her expert witness
costs 	and 	attorney 	fees 	with 	marital 	funds 	using 	marital
resources.” The court further determined, “The attorney fees
Emily incurred were reasonable in light of the relatively complex
nature of the issues and the amount of time necessary to litigate
them.” Brandon argues that the court erred in making this award
without first “making the requisite determinations under [Utah
Code] section 81-1-203 or rule 102.” See Utah Code Ann. § 81-1-203
(LexisNexis 2025); Utah R. Civ. P. 102. And he argues that Emily
provided only “wholly redacted” billing statements, leaving the
court unable to adequately determine the reasonableness of her
requested fees.

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20240597-CA 	33 	2026 UT App 141
¶80 	“In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by
statute or by contract.” Silva v. Silva, 2018 UT App 210, ¶ 26, 437
P.3d 593 (quotation simplified). But “in the absence of a statutory
or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power
to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in
the interest of justice and equity.” Id. (quotation simplified). See
Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 34, 299 P.3d 1079 (“A court making
an equitable award of attorney fees must ascertain whether the
equities of a given case justify the use of its inherent and
discretionary power to award fees.”) (quotation simplified).
¶81 	In Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276, a divorcing wife
argued that her husband “was allowed to pay his attorney fees
from marital assets, while she was denied the same privilege.” Id.
¶ 207. Though it concluded that the wife had not preserved the
argument, our Supreme Court “agree[d] that such a result would
be inequitable.” Id. Based on this statement in Dahl, we see no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that here
it would be inequitable to allow Brandon to pay his attorney fees
out of the marital estate while not allowing Emily to do the same.
Cf. Knowlton v. Knowlton, 2023 UT App 16, ¶ 87, 525 P.3d 898
(affirming the district court’s dissipation finding based on the
“obvious 	imbalance” 	resulting 	from 	a 	husband’s 	“virtually
unfettered access to the marital funds during the pendency of
the divorce proceedings and his use of those funds to pay his
legal expenses without providing” his former wife “a similar
benefit”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah
2023).
¶82 	But the amount of those fees must be reasonable. See Silva,
2018 UT App 210, ¶ 26 (recognizing that “a court has inherent
equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees”) (emphasis
added; quotation otherwise simplified). And the district court’s
statement 	that 	“[t]he 	attorney 	fees 	Emily 	incurred 	were
reasonable in light of the relatively complex nature of the issues
and the amount of time necessary to litigate them” glosses over

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	34 	2026 UT App 141
this. So while we affirm the court’s decision to award attorney fees
on an equitable basis, we vacate the amount of the award and
remand for the court to reassess it in light of the detailed findings
it must make to support its award. See CWS, LLC v. Montgomery,
2025 UT App 183, ¶ 49, 583 P.3d 373 (“Utah appellate courts have
consistently encouraged trial courts to make findings to explain
the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an
attorney fee award.”) (quotation simplified).
B. 	Post-Trial Fee Award
¶83 	The district court also awarded Emily attorney fees for
litigating Brandon’s post-trial motion to amend the divorce
decree. Brandon argues that this fee award was based on “the
same flawed reasoning” that the court relied on in making its
initial award and that reasoning no longer applied in the post-trial
context. We have just concluded that the reasoning there was not
flawed. 	And 	while 	that 	reasoning—premised 	on 	equitably
dividing the marital estate—does not apply here, in the post-trial
and post-decree context in which the marital estate has already
been divided, the district court did not rely solely on equitable
considerations in making the post-trial fee award.
¶84 	In its order, the court stated that “[a]fter analyzing the
factors outlined in rule 102, the award of attorney fees” was
“proper.” Rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “either party may move the court for an order requiring the
other party to provide costs, attorney fees, and witness fees . . . to
enable the moving party to prosecute or defend the action.” Utah
R. Civ. P. 102(a). “Such an award must be based on evidence of
the receiving spouse’s financial need, the payor spouse’s ability to
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees.” Krajeski v.
Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 53, 565 P.3d 544 (quotation simplified),
cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025). See Utah R. Civ. P. 102(b).
“When a court decides to award fees, it must make detailed
findings of fact supporting its determination.” Miner v. Miner,

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	35 	2026 UT App 141
2025 UT App 64, ¶ 30, 571 P.3d 788 (quotation simplified), cert.
denied, 574 P.3d 526 (Utah 2025).
¶85 	The court noted that “as was true during the pendency of
the divorce,” Emily could not “afford to pay the attorney fees” as
she was still a stay-at-home mother, caring for the parties’ minor
child, “who requires special attention due to medical issues,” and
pursing her education. The court also stated that the alimony
award was calculated only to meet Emily’s monthly needs and
that she would receive her share of the marital estate over the next
10 years rather than in a lump sum. In contrast, the court found
that Brandon “continue[d] to have the financial resources that he
had at the time of trial to pay” Emily’s fees because he had “the
entirety of his share of the marital estate at his disposal” and
“continue[d] to have the business.” The court also stated that
Brandon had “not indicated that his financial condition has
significantly changed since” the court previously “found he has
the ability to pay.”
¶86 	The court further found that the fees Emily incurred were
necessary to defend against Brandon’s motion to amend and that
they were reasonable. The court stated that it was “not persuaded
that the only reason that [Brandon] filed his motion was to
address some errors that were introduced by” Emily because “in
looking closely at his motion to alter or amend the judgment,”
Brandon “raised about two dozen separate issues and was
unsuccessful in all but one, the length of alimony.”
¶87 	While the court clearly articulated the reasonableness of
making a post-trial fee award, it did not make adequate findings
regarding Emily’s need for the fees, Brandon’s ability to pay them,
or the reasonableness of the fees Emily incurred. And given the
adjustments that will need to be made to the parties’ income and
expenses on remand, the court will also need to make more
detailed findings of fact on these points. See Leppert v. Leppert, 2009

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	36 	2026 UT App 141
UT App 10, ¶ 26, 200 P.3d 223.13 We accordingly reverse the
post-trial fee award and remand for the district court to revisit the
issue after making the necessary findings of fact.
CONCLUSION
¶88 	Based on the foregoing, we remand to the district court to
address several parts of its findings and decree. First, based on the
parties’ 	agreement, 	the 	court 	should 	address 	errors 	in 	its
calculation of Emily’s living expenses, salary from RMT, and her
auto fuel costs during the pendency of the divorce, as well as the
value of the water shares she was awarded.
¶89 	Next, we reverse the award of equity in the Rolling Brook
house to Emily, as Brandon technically complied with his duty to
disclose his ownership of the Haven Oaks house. On remand, the
district court should categorize the Rolling Brook house as either
marital property or Brandon’s separate property and adjust its
property distribution accordingly. We also reverse the court’s
award of 75% of Brandon’s total dissipation and remand for the
court to make adequate findings regarding what dissipation
occurred in the first place, awarding Emily half of that total.
13. Emily also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on
appeal. “Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded
below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be
awarded to that party on appeal.” Duffin v. Duffin, 2025 UT App
136, ¶ 40 n.7, 578 P.3d 751 (quotation simplified). But here, with
both parties having had a measure of success on appeal, the
prevailing party determination is best left to the district court on
remand. See Vanderwood v. Woodward, 2019 UT App 140, ¶ 49, 449
P.3d 983 (“At the conclusion of the proceedings on remand, the
district court should reassess the ‘prevailing party’ issue and
award attorney fees as appropriate at that time.”).

Bonham v. Bonham
20240597-CA 	37 	2026 UT App 141
¶90 	While we conclude that the court did not exceed its
discretion in its valuation of RMT and most of Brandon’s personal
property, on remand the court is instructed to make specific
findings regarding the value it assigned to his YPO membership.
¶91 	While we affirm the court’s determinations regarding
Emily’s need for alimony and her ability to produce income, we
reverse and remand for the court to address Brandon’s ability to
pay—in particular, his reasonable monthly expenses and tax
rate—in greater detail. And on remand, the court will need to
recalculate the support arrearage, incorporating its new findings
regarding Emily’s income from RMT and the auto fuel and health
insurance costs Brandon has already paid.
¶92 	Finally, while we affirm the court’s decision to make an
initial award of attorney fees to Emily, we remand for the district
court to determine the reasonable amount for such an award once
adequate findings have been made. And we reverse the post-trial
attorney fees award and remand to allow the court to make
adequate findings on Emily’s need, Brandon’s ability to pay, and
the reasonableness of the fees Emily incurred, especially in light
of the adjustments necessitated by this opinion.