In re S.K.A.

2017 UT App 12
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF S.K.A,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
S.K.A.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Memorandum Decision
No. 20150918-CA
Filed January 20, 2017
Third District Juvenile Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Elizabeth A. Lindsley
No. 1032415
Monica Maio and David L. Johnson, Attorneys
for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN authored this Memorandum
Decision, in which J UDGES S TEPHEN L. R OTH and JILL M.
POHLMAN concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶1 	S.K.A. appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order,
which included suspended jail time. We affirm.
¶2 	In April 2015, when S.K.A. was seventeen years old, the
State filed a delinquency petition in the juvenile court alleging
that S.K.A. had committed assault, an offense that would be a
class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2012). The State later alleged

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that S.K.A. was in contempt of court for failing to appear at a
hearing related to the assault, and the juvenile court issued a
warrant for S.K.A.’s detention.
¶3 	At a pretrial hearing held in October 2015, after S.K.A.
had turned eighteen, he admitted to the assault, and the court
dismissed 	the 	contempt 	allegation. 	At 	the 	hearing, 	a 	Utah
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) representative
remarked that given S.K.A.’s age, history, and nature, S.K.A.
“would probably be best served through [DCFS’s] aftercare”
program “rather than [by] . . . remaining in [DCFS] custody.”
S.K.A.’s probation officer remarked that S.K.A. “was gone [from
his home placement] for two to three months” and that he
“[c]learly . . . does not want to be in State custody anymore.” She
expressed concern that “keeping him in custody is just going to
maybe make him run some more or just fly under the radar.”
She further observed that S.K.A. “owe[d] a lot of community
service hours” and asked “that those be converted to a fine, and
a fine on [the assault offense] as well as restitution to be taken
under advisement.” The guardian ad litem stated that S.K.A.
“want[ed] to be released from DCFS’s custody” and that he was
“not interested in any of the support that being in state custody
can offer him.” Finally, S.K.A.’s attorney commented that S.K.A.
“really isn’t interested in any help from DCFS. He would like to
be terminated. His plan is to return to his father’s home, if the
Court, 	indeed, 	terminates 	DCFS 	custody.” 	S.K.A.’s 	attorney
further 	stated, 	“We 	don’t 	believe—because 	this 	allegation
happened when [S.K.A.] was under the age of 18, we don’t
believe 	the 	court 	has 	the 	authority . . . to 	order 	jail 	as 	a
dispositional sentence.”
¶4 	The juvenile court ultimately released S.K.A. from DCFS
custody; converted S.K.A.’s ninety-nine remaining community
service hours into a $495 fine; fined S.K.A. an additional $325 for
the assault; and sentenced S.K.A. to ten days in the Salt Lake
County Jail, “suspended upon compliance with court orders.”
S.K.A. appeals.

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¶5 	S.K.A. 	contends 	that 	the 	juvenile 	court 	“erred 	in
concluding 	that 	the 	Salt 	Lake 	County 	Jail 	constitutes 	an
‘alternative 	to 	detention’ 	under 	Utah 	Code 	section
78A-6-117(2)(f).” “Whether a juvenile court properly interpreted
a 	statute 	presents 	a 	question 	of 	law 	that 	we 	review 	for
correctness.” In re O.P., 2016 UT App 181, ¶ 5, 380 P.3d 69
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶6 	Utah Code section 78A-6-117 states, in relevant part: “The
court 	may 	commit 	a 	minor 	to 	a 	place 	of 	detention 	or 	an
alternative to detention for a period not to exceed 30 days subject
to the court retaining continuing jurisdiction over the minor.
This commitment may be stayed or suspended upon conditions
ordered by the court.”1 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-117(2)(f)(i)
(LexisNexis 2012). 	Thus, 	pursuant 	to 	section 	78A-6-117, 	the
juvenile court was permitted to commit S.K.A. to either “a place
of detention or an alternative to detention.” See id.
¶7 	The question, then, is whether adult jail constitutes either
“a place of detention or an alternative to detention.” See id. This
court recently resolved this exact question in In re O.P., 2016 UT
App 181.
¶8 	In 	that 	case, 	we 	concluded 	that 	under 	the 	relevant
statutory provisions, an adult jail cannot be considered “a place
of detention”:
The Juvenile Court Act defines detention, in part,
as 	“secure 	detention 	as 	defined 	in 	Section
62A-7-101 for the temporary care of a minor who
requires secure custody in a physically restricting
1. “‘Minor’ means: (a) a child; or (b) a person who is: (i) at least
18 years of age and younger than 21 years of age; and (ii) under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
105(24) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014).

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facility.” “Secure detention,” as defined by section
62A-7-101, requires “a facility operated by or under
contract 	with 	the 	division 	[of 	Juvenile 	Justice
Services].” An adult jail is not such a facility . . . .
In 	re 	O.P., 	2016 	UT 	App 	181, 	¶ 	7 	(alteration 	in 	original)
(citations omitted). But we then concluded that adult jail is a
permissible 	“alternative 	to 	detention.” 	See 	Utah 	Code 	Ann.
§ 78A-6-117(2)(f)(i). More specifically, “[b]ecause jail cannot be
considered a place of detention under section 78A-6-117, it
follows that jail is something different from a place of detention.
Or, 	at 	least 	according 	to 	the 	ordinary 	usage 	of 	the 	term
‘alternative,’ it is an alternative to detention.” In re O.P., 2016 UT
App 	181, 	¶ 	8; 	see 	also 	id. 	(observing 	parenthetically 	that
“alternative” is defined as “offering or expressing a choice” or
“different from the usual or conventional” (citation and internal
quotation 	marks 	omitted)). 	We 	further 	observed 	that 	our
legislature has outlined several specific instances “in which jail
may be an appropriate option for the juvenile court to consider.”
Id. (citing as examples Utah Code sections 78A-6-113(8)(a)–(b),
78A-6-1101, 	62A-7-201(1), 	and 	62A-7-201(2)(a)). 	Finally, 	we
observed that a juvenile court’s authority to commit a minor to
an alternative to detention is not unlimited—“juvenile courts
may 	only 	make 	use 	of 	alternatives 	to 	detention 	that 	are
consistent with the purposes of the juvenile court.” Id.; see also
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) (LexisNexis 2012) (setting forth
the purposes of the juvenile court). Ultimately, we concluded
that 	“the 	legislature 	has 	conferred 	on 	juvenile 	courts 	the
authority to confine a minor to jail in certain circumstances.” In
re O.P., 2016 UT App 181, ¶ 8.
¶9 	“Horizontal 	stare 	decisis . . . requires 	that 	a 	court 	of
appeals follow its own prior decisions.” State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d
393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994); see also id. (“This doctrine applies with
equal force to courts comprised of multiple panels, requiring
each panel to observe the prior decisions of another.”). “[A]
panel may overrule its own or another panel’s decision where

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the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so
as to render the prior decision inapplicable.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Neither of those exceptions
applies here, and we are therefore bound by our previous
decision in In re O.P.
¶10 	The 	only 	remaining 	question 	is 	whether, 	under 	the
specific circumstances of this case, the 	juvenile 	court acted
within its authority when it sentenced S.K.A. to suspended jail
time. One of the pronounced purposes of the juvenile court is to
“promote public safety and individual accountability by the
imposition 	of 	appropriate 	sanctions 	on 	persons 	who 	have
committed 	acts 	in 	violation 	of 	law.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann.
§ 78A-6-102(5)(a).
¶11 	The record on appeal indicates that the offenses related to
the case at bar were not S.K.A.’s only offenses. Indeed, as the
State observes, “[i]n the previous year and a half, S.K.A. had
been adjudicated for possession of marijuana, possession of drug
paraphernalia, truancy, contempt for refusing to comply with
the 	court’s 	order 	to 	participate 	in 	early 	intervention, 	[and]
contempt for leaving his Proctor Home in the middle of the night
without permission.” For several of those offenses, the juvenile
court had ordered S.K.A. to complete a number of community
service hours, ninety-nine of which remained unperformed on
the 	date 	of 	the 	pretrial 	hearing. 	And, 	as 	the 	State 	further
recognizes, “S.K.A. had been in and out of juvenile detention,
had demonstrated an ability to escape that custody in the past,
and [had] expressed his wish that he no longer remain in DCFS
custody.” In apparent recognition of S.K.A.’s aversion to DCFS
services, his desire to be removed from DCFS custody, and his
probation officer’s recommendation regarding the outstanding
community service hours, the juvenile court released S.K.A.
from DCFS custody and converted his ninety-nine remaining
community service hours into a $495 fine. Specifically, the court
stated:

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Well, [S.K.A.], you know, here’s the thing. You
don’t work when you do have a job. The court
report says that your dad was given bus tokens
from [the DCFS representative] so you could get
back and forth to work. You didn’t. You show up
with a dog. You don’t have money to live, but you
have a dog. Your dad thinks you’re smoking dope
in the garage.
You’re not going to have a place to live. You
don’t have the skills to live on your own, but
you’re also not willing to stay where we need to
get you those skills.
I’m not going to force DCFS to try to give
you services . . . if you’re just going to walk away.
I’m 	going 	to 	terminate 	DCFS 	custody 	and
guardianship.
. . . .
I’m 	going 	to 	convert the 	99 	outstanding
community service hours to a fine in the amount of
$495. 	For 	[the 	assault 	offense], 	there’s 	a 	$325
fine. . . .
The court then stated that it was “going to order 10 days in the
Salt Lake County Jail, which are suspended.” The court told
S.K.A., “I am not sending you to jail today. But if you violate the
court order by not getting your fines and fees paid at the time, you
could be going to jail.” (Emphasis added.) Although not explicit,
the juvenile court’s imposition of suspended jail time appears to
have been an effort to encourage S.K.A. to timely pay his fines,
which the court had imposed in lieu of requiring S.K.A. to
complete 	his 	remaining 	community 	service 	hours. 	Put
differently, the court’s order was an apparent attempt to hold
S.K.A. individually accountable for his actions. See Utah Code

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Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(a). Because this motivation is consistent
with the purposes of the juvenile court, we cannot conclude that
the juvenile court misinterpreted Utah Code section 78A-6-117
when 	it 	sentenced 	S.K.A. 	to 	a 	suspended 	jail 	term 	as 	an
alternative to detention.2
¶12 	The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
2. Like the juvenile appellant in In re O.P., S.K.A. contends that
pursuant to Utah Code subsection 78A-6-117(2)(t), “a child may
not be committed to jail.” See 2016 UT App 181, ¶ 10, 380 P.3d 69;
see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-105(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)
(“‘Child’ 	means 	a 	person 	under 	18 	years 	of 	age.”). 	S.K.A.
acknowledges that subsection 78A-6-117(2)(t) “only forbids the
imposition of jail . . . for a ‘child,’ and that [he] was no longer a
child under the statutory definition by the time his case was
adjudicated”; however, he points to the fact that he “was still a
child at the time of the offense.” This issue was settled adversely
to S.K.A.’s position in In re O.P., 2016 UT App 181, ¶ 10.