Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co.

result. Following the accident, Drysdale's family removed the blown tire and accompanying rim from the car and

then had the car towed to a service station near Beaver. Sometime during Drysdale's hospital stay, and apparently

without his knowledge or consent, the proprietors of the service station destroyed the car. It was not until

car was defective, unreasonably dangerous, and unfit for the purpose for which it was sold. Ford moved for

summary judgment, arguing that the car was the most relevant and crucial piece of evidence in this case and that

without it Drysdale could not possibly prove, and Ford could not adequately defend, the case. The trial court

failure to preserve evidence under rule 37(b)(2)(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Drysdale argues that

since the destruction of the car was not willful on his part, the trial court's sanction was an abuse of discretion.

Drysdale further argues that if the dismissal was in fact a summary judgment, it was still improperly granted,

reasoning that the destruction of the car does not preclude him from making out a prima facie case of design

defect, since the alleged defect would be evident in any 1980 Ford Pinto. Drysdale also asserts that the trial

court's findings of fact stating that Ford was "unfairly" and "severely prejudiced" by the destruction of the car

proximate cause of the particular injuries he sustained in the accident. Ford further claims that it cannot properly

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. Finally, summary judgment is proper only

when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

its order is helpful in making this determination. Ford's motion was styled a "Motion for Summary Judgment,"

and the trial court explicitly stated that it was granting "Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment." In its

memorandum in support of its motion, Ford argued that "Drysdale's failure to preserve the vehicle effectively

prevents him from establishing the elements of his claim against Ford." After pointing out the necessity of

proving that an allegedly defective product actually caused injury, Ford argues that Drysdale simply cannot show

this without the car. The trial court adopted these arguments when it stated that it was granting Ford's motion

"for the reasons and on the grounds set forth in the memoranda filed in support of Ford's motion." Clearly, these

are proper claims and relevant arguments in a summary judgment context, and neither Ford in its motion nor the

trial court in its order ever discussed discovery sanctions. Because nothing in Ford's motion or in the trial court's

order leads us to think that Drysdale's claims were dismissed as a discovery sanction, we conclude that Ford's

evidence before the court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery." Mountain States

Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added); see also Krantz

v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah 1991). Prior to the completion of discovery, however, it is often difficult to

ascertain whether the nonmoving party will be able to sustain its claims. In such a case, summary judgment

should generally be denied. See Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 154 (Utah 1990)

(summary judgment premature since nonmoving party might be able, through additional discovery, to prove

different theories of recovery); Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 315 (Utah 1984) (summary judgment not proper

before nonmoving party has carried "already-begun discovery proceedings to completion"); Auerbach's, Inc. v.

Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977) (summary judgment premature because nonmoving party's discovery not

establish the elements of his claim." Ford argues that the car is essential to determine such things as whether

Drysdale's head actually hit the roof, whether Drysdale was wearing a seat belt, whether the springs in the seat

had compressed over the years thereby increasing the headroom, or whether increased headroom would have even

made a difference in this case. Drysdale, on the other hand, asserts that the car is not necessary to sustain his

claims and argues that the alleged design defect "can be proven by expert testimony" relating to other 1980 Ford

is no possibility that Drysdale can prove his case without the car. Much evidence exists other than the car itself

that may prove to be relevant in this case. Such evidence includes the vehicle specifications of all 1980 Ford

Pintos, existing 1980 Ford Pintos, Drysdale's body size and measurements, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards, computer modeling and crash testing, the police report, and photographs of the car and the accident

scene taken by the Utah Highway Patrol. Neither Drysdale nor Ford has the benefit of examining the car, and

both parties would appear to be prejudiced equally, if at all, by its absence. Yet on the basis of the available

evidence only, Drysdale submitted to the trial court three affidavits of experts expressing opinions supporting

Drysdale's claim that all 1980 Ford Pintos are defective in design and that such defective design contributed to

Drysdale's injuries. Nevertheless, despite equal access to all of this evidence, Ford has chosen not to submit any

expert testimony of its own or to use the evidence in any other way to refute any of Drysdale's claims. Rather,

Ford merely asserts that Drysdale cannot support his claims and that Ford cannot defend those claims without the

car. Before summary judgment is considered by the trial court, Drysdale should be afforded every reasonable

opportunity to gather whatever evidence he can in support of his claims. Likewise, Ford should be given every

reasonable opportunity to gather whatever evidence it can to rebut those claims or show that it cannot do so

without the car. At that point, a motion for summary judgment may be appropriate, and the trial court will be

better able to determine the effect of the absence of the car. Therefore, we think that the trial court granted

Chief Justice Zimmerman, Associate Chief Justice Stewart, Justice Howe, and Justice Durham concur in Justice