O'Dea v. Olea

2009 UT 46
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Cody M. O’Dea, No. 20070818
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
Ashley Olea,
Respondent.
__________________________________
Adoption Center of Choice, F I L E D
Third-Party Intervenor
and Appellee. July 28, 2009
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy
No. 064903925
Attorneys: Michael J. Boyle, Daniel S. Drage, Ogden, for
appellant
Larry S. Jenkins, Lance D. Rich, Salt Lake City, for
appellee
---
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
NEHRING, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Petitioner Cody O’Dea appeals the district court’s
order dismissing his claim to establish paternity. The
underlying issue in this case is whether the district court erred
when it concluded that Mr. O’Dea waived any rights in relation to
his child, including the right to assert paternity, the right to
notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption
of his child, and the right to consent to the adoption of his
child. The district court concluded that Mr. O’Dea did not
strictly comply with the criteria set forth in Utah Code section

1 In 2008, substantive changes were made to Title 78 of the
Utah Code; therefore, we cite to the version in effect at the
time that the events giving rise to this appeal occurred.
No. 20070818 2
78-30-4.14 (Supp. 2006)1 after he was made aware that the birth
mother was in Utah and therefore had no standing to assert any
rights in relation to his child. Accordingly, the district court
granted the Adoption Center for Choice’s motion to dismiss.
¶2 Mr. O’Dea raises four issues on appeal. These are
(1) whether the district court had an obligation to give full
faith and credit to Mr. O’Dea’s registration with the putative
father registry in Wyoming; (2) whether a choice of law analysis
should be used in applying Wyoming law since the most significant
contacts during the relationship between Mr. O’Dea and the mother
of his child were in Wyoming; (3) whether sections of the Utah
Adoption Act unconstitutionally extend personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state putative fathers, including Mr. O’Dea; and
(4) whether sections of the Utah Adoption Act are facially
unconstitutional because they do not provide immediate notice or
a pre-deprivation hearing to putative fathers before preliminary
placement of the child.
¶3 Mr. O’Dea did not raise any of these issues before the
district court, and therefore they are not preserved on appeal.
Furthermore, Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(11) is very clear that
an unmarried putative father cannot maintain a right to consent
to the adoption of his child unless he strictly complies with
Utah law. Mr. O’Dea failed to comply strictly with Utah Code
section 78-30-4.14(6) and has therefore waived all rights he may
have had in relation to his child. The decision of the district
court to grant the Center’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
¶4 While living in Sheridan, Wyoming, Mr. O’Dea and Ms.
Olea were involved in an intimate relationship that resulted in
Ms. Olea becoming pregnant in the fall of 2005. Sometime after
learning she was pregnant, Ms. Olea moved to Buffalo, Wyoming.
It was not until after Ms. Olea moved to Buffalo that Mr. O’Dea
became aware of the pregnancy. Mr. O’Dea visited Ms. Olea in
October and learned that she was considering an abortion. He
attempted to change her mind and offered to help pay medical
expenses and to provide a home for Ms. Olea.
¶5 Three weeks later, Ms. Olea contacted Mr. O’Dea and
told him that she miscarried the child. At the time Mr. O’Dea
believed this statement to be true, but in mid-May of the next

2 It seems Mr. O’Dea’s registration with the Montana
putative father registry is in dispute. This question of fact,
however, has no bearing on our analysis.
3 No. 20070818
year, Mr. O’Dea learned from a friend that Ms. Olea was possibly
still pregnant. Mr. O’Dea contacted Ms. Olea and discovered that
she was still pregnant and was planning on placing the child for
adoption. On May 24, Mr. O’Dea indicated to Ms. Olea his desire
to maintain a relationship with the child. Mr. O’Dea also
contacted LDS Family Services in Montana, the agency with which
he believed Ms. Olea would place the child, and notified them of
his intent to maintain a relationship with the child. As a
result, LDS Family Services in Montana terminated its adoption
placment services to Ms. Olea.
¶6 By early June, Mr. O’Dea had placed his name on the
putative father registries in both Wyoming and Montana.2 Mr.
O’Dea also sent a letter to Dennis Ashton of LDS Family Services
in Utah informing him of his intent to maintain a relationship
with the child on the belief that Mr. Ashton was the regional
director of LDS Family Services in Montana, Wyoming, and Utah.
At some point thereafter Ms. Olea traveled to Utah. On June 15,
2006, Mr. O’Dea received a call from Ms. Olea that originated
from a blocked number. During the conversation, Ms. Olea told
Mr. O’Dea,
You will listen and you will not speak.
First of all I want you to stop harassing me
and that includes your mother. I am in Utah.
You will not father this child. You will pay
child support until the child is in college.
You will never see this baby. Do you
understand?
Mr. O’Dea stated that he did not understand, and Ms. Olea asked
again if he understood. Mr. O’Dea again stated that he did not
and asked if Ms. Olea meant that she was not placing the child
for adoption. Ms. Olea responded, “If you understand what I have
told you, that is all I have to say.” She then terminated the
call. Since the number was blocked, Mr. O’Dea could not call
back.
¶7 Mr. O’Dea took this conversation to mean that Ms. Olea
was not placing the child for adoption because she referred to
him having to pay child support. As a result of the
conversation, Mr. O’Dea was both “relieved” and “encouraged.”
Mr. O’Dea doubted the truth of Ms. Olea’s statement regarding her
residence in Utah because of her past misstatements and thus did

No. 20070818 4
not take any further action at the time to assert his parental
rights in Utah.
¶8 Ms. Olea gave birth to a girl later that same day. The
next day, she signed a document of Birth Mother Relinquishment.
¶9 Prior to the birth, the Adoption Center of Choice had
begun preparing the legal framework for the adoption and sought
to determine if notice of paternity for the child had been filed
in the state of Wyoming. On June 15, the Center received a
letter from Wyoming’s Department of Family Services notifying the
agency that Mr. O’Dea had filed a notice with Wyoming’s putative
father registry. The Center also regularly contacted the Utah
Department of Health until July 6 to determine if proceedings to
establish paternity had been initiated in Utah. The department’s
response was always negative.
¶10 Mr. O’Dea claims that he continued to search for Ms.
Olea. He left multiple messages that were not returned and
eventually asked the Buffalo police to investigate. The police
informed Mr. O’Dea that they eventually spoke to Ms. Olea but
that the baby was not with her. On July 23, Mr. O’Dea and his
family created an Internet Website seeking information about the
infant. Six days later, Ms. Olea’s mother left a message on the
Website that the child was born in Utah, placed for adoption, and
the attorney was Larry S. Jenkins. The next day, July 30, Mr.
O’Dea sent a letter to Mr. Jenkins requesting information
regarding the adoption. Mr. Jenkins responded that an adoption
had taken place but that Mr. O’Dea’s action was too late because,
under Utah law, he was required to file a paternity action in
Utah within twenty days after becoming aware of a “qualifying
circumstance,” which in this case was that Ms. Olea temporarily
resided in Utah. Mr. Jenkins informed Mr. O’Dea that because he
failed to take the necessary action to establish paternity
following Ms. Olea’s phone call, no more information about the
child could be provided.
¶11 On August 14, Mr. O’Dea filed proceedings in the state
of Utah along with an affidavit stating his plan to parent the
child as required by Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(6)(b) (Supp.
2006). The following day, Mr. O’Dea signed a Notice of
Commencement of Paternity Proceedings form that he intended to
send to the state registrar of vital statistics within the Utah
Department of Health. The acquaintance he charged with mailing
the form, however, neglected to send it. On September 5, Mr.
O’Dea signed a new form, which was received by the Utah
Department of Health on September 8. The receipt of the form was
more than eighty days after the birth of the child.

5 No. 20070818
¶12 Shortly thereafter, Mr. O’Dea served a subpoena upon
the Adoption Center to appear and testify in an October
deposition. The subpoena requested that the Center reveal the
attorneys who represented Ms. Olea in the adoption and any other
documents or information it had concerning the adoption. The
Center moved to quash the subpoena on the basis that the
information sought was privileged and that Mr. O’Dea had waived
his paternity rights by not strictly complying with the
requirements found in section 78-30-4.14(6) within the twenty-day
window prescribed in section 78-30-4.14(10)(b)(ii)(B)(I).
¶13 A hearing on the motion to quash was held January 10,
2007. Commissioner Arnett, who heard the motion, recommended
that the motion be granted because Mr. O’Dea had waived his
rights by not strictly complying with Utah’s legal requirements.
Mr. O’Dea filed an objection, but the district court adopted the
recommendation at the end of January. Mr. O’Dea requested oral
arguments on February 21. The Center opposed the motion and
maintained that the district court’s order was a final ruling.
¶14 In April, the district court held a status conference
in which it heard arguments on the issue. Based on the
arguments, the district court issued an order stating that the
commissioner’s recommendation to quash was not itself dispositive
of Mr. O’Dea’s parental rights. The court set the matter for
evidentiary hearing to determine the Center’s status as a party
and to consider a proper motion to dismiss. The next day, the
Center filed a motion to intervene as a party in the proceedings
in order to move to dismiss the petition. The court granted the
petition to intervene since Ms. Olea had relinquished her
parental rights and the Center was an interested party. At the
end of August, the court heard arguments regarding the motion to
dismiss. The district court granted the Center’s motion to
dismiss. The court held that Mr. O’Dea was without standing
because he failed to comply strictly with section 78-30-4.14(6),
(10) and accordingly waived his rights in relation to the child.
Mr. O’Dea appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which certified
the appeal to us pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
43(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-
102(3)(b) (2008).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 “We review a district court’s interpretation of a
statute for correctness. We review a district court’s findings
of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. And we review a
district court’s ruling regarding a statute’s constitutionality
for correctness.” H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, ¶ 19, 203 P.3d
943 (citations omitted). We recognize, however, that generally

No. 20070818 6
an appellant must properly preserve an issue in the district
court before it will be reviewed on appeal. Badger v. Brooklyn
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998); see also Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(5).
ANALYSIS
¶16 We first address whether Mr. O’Dea preserved the four
issues he has raised on appeal. We conclude that he did not
preserve any of the four. Next, we address whether Mr. O’Dea has
waived all rights in relation to his child, including consent to
the adoption and notice of any relevant hearing under Utah Code
section 78-30-4.14(11) (Supp. 2006). We conclude that Mr. O’Dea
was obligated to comply strictly with Utah law, that he failed to
comply, and therefore he waived all rights in relation to his
child.
I. MR. O’DEA DID NOT PRESERVE VARIOUS ISSUES BECAUSE HE FAILED
TO RAISE ANY OF THE ARGUMENTS IN THE DISTRICT COURT, AND HE DID
NOT PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR AN EXCEPTION
¶17 In his appeal, Mr. O’Dea raises four issues. These are
(1) whether the district court had an obligation to give full
faith and credit to Mr. O’Dea’s registration with the putative
father registry in Wyoming, (2) whether a choice of law analysis
should be used in applying Wyoming law since the most significant
contacts during the relationship were in Wyoming, (3) whether the
Utah Adoption Act unconstitutionally allows a Utah court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state fathers, and
(4) whether sections of the Utah Adoption Act are facially
unconstitutional because they do not provide immediate notice or
a pre-deprivation hearing to putative fathers before preliminary
placement of the child. To show these issues were preserved to
the district court, Mr. O’Dea has referenced the Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena, Objection to Commissioner’s
Recommendation, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Intervene
and to Dismiss, and other related motions and memoranda made to
the district court. After reviewing the record, we find that
none of the issues were raised in the district court and
therefore were not properly preserved.
¶18 “[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party
must first raise the issue in the trial court,” because “a trial
court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue.”
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). The
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that an appealing
party’s brief provide either “(A) [a] citation to the record
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or (B) a
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved

7 No. 20070818
in the trial court.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B). To
properly preserve an issue at the district court, the following
must take place: “(1) the issue must be raised in a timely
fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority.” Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The purpose of such requirements is to put the judge
on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.” Id.
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
presence of a constitutional issue does not excuse an appellant
from complying with the preservation rules set by this court and
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346.
¶19 The four arguments Mr. O’Dea now presents on appeal
were not presented at the district court level. As a result, the
district court did not have the opportunity to give full
consideration to the issues at that time. Not only did Mr. O’Dea
fail to raise the issues to the district court, but he also
omitted from his appellate brief a statement of grounds for
seeking review of the unpreserved issues, such as an assertion of
exceptional circumstances or plain error, as required by rule
24(a)(5)(B). We will review each of Mr. O’Dea’s issues and the
citations to the record that he claims preserves them.
A. Mr. O’Dea Failed to Preserve His Claim That the District
Court Had an Obligation to Give Full Faith and Credit to Mr.
O’Dea’s Registration with the Putative Father Registries in Other
States
¶20 In his brief, Mr. O’Dea argues that Utah should give
full faith and credit to any paternity determination made by
Wyoming. We find no such argument raised in the pleadings
referenced by Mr. O’Dea or in any other pleading filed with the
district court. The record explains Wyoming’s law concerning
putative fathers and the steps Mr. O’Dea took to have his name
put on the Wyoming and Montana putative father registries. It
does not, however, provide a basis to believe that the district
court was alerted to Mr. O’Dea’s full faith and credit claim. We
conclude therefore that the claim was not preserved, and we will
not consider it.
B. Mr. O’Dea Has Failed to Preserve His Claim That a Choice of
Law Analysis Should Be Used
¶21 Second, Mr. O’Dea argues the district court erred in
not applying a choice of law analysis. His citation to the
record, however, does not address a choice of law argument.

No. 20070818 8
Rather, he references the steps he took to locate Ms. Olea and
subsequent attempts to comply with Wyoming and Montana laws. He
further lists the steps Ms. Olea took to mislead him about her
pregnancy. We are, however, unable to find a point in the record
in which Mr. O’Dea raised this argument or indicated that the
district court’s failure to adopt a correct choice of law
approach was error. Because Mr. O’Dea did not raise this
argument below, he did not preserve it and we will not address
it.
C. Mr. O’Dea Has Failed to Preserve His Claim That the Utah
Adoption Act Is Unconstitutional as It Applies to Out-of-State
Putative Fathers
¶22 Mr. O’Dea argues that Utah Code section 78-30-4.14 is
unconstitutional because it exercises personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state putative fathers based on the infant’s presence in
Utah and contains no other requirement that putative fathers have
other contacts with the forum state. Utah Code section 78-30-
7(4)(a) states, “If a person whose consent for the adoption is
required under Section 78-30-4.14 cannot be found within the
state, the fact of the minor’s presence within the state shall
confer jurisdiction on the court in proceedings under this
chapter as to such absent person . . . .” As evidence that this
issue was raised below and sufficiently preserved, Mr. O’Dea
directs us to facts presented to the district court. The facts
include Mr. O’Dea’s and Ms. Olea’s residencies at the time of
conception and during the pregnancy, Mr. O’Dea’s presence in
Wyoming at the time Ms. Olea relinquished the child, and
obstacles preventing Mr. O’Dea’s ability to comply with Utah law
including Ms. Olea’s travel between Wyoming, Montana, and Utah.
These statements do not speak to the matter of personal
jurisdiction and, therefore, do not sufficiently preserve Mr.
O’Dea’s argument that section 78-30-4.14 unconstitutionally
exercises personal jurisdiction over Mr. O’Dea or putative
fathers generally. Mr. O’Dea has only argued that, due to the
facts of this case, he should not have been required to comply
strictly with the laws of Utah. Because Mr. O’Dea did not
sufficiently raise this issue below, it is not preserved and we
will not address it.
D. Mr. O’Dea Has Failed to Preserve His Claim That the Utah
Adoption Act Is Facially Unconstitutional Because It Does Not
Provide Notice or a Right of Hearing for Putative Fathers
¶23 Mr. O’Dea next argues that sections of the Utah
Adoption Act are facially unconstitutional. He argues that
because the Utah Adoption Act does not require that a putative
father who has strictly complied with Utah Code section 78-30-

9 No. 20070818
4.14 receive a pre-deprivation hearing before the petitioner for
adoption or adoption agency is given custody of the child, Utah
Code section 78-30-4.22 (2002), which allows the child to be
placed with the petitioner for adoption or an adoption agency
after an adoption petition has been filed, but before a final
hearing has been scheduled, is facially unconstitutional. Again,
Mr. O’Dea failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal. We
cannot find in the record an instance in which Mr. O’Dea argued
to the district court that Utah code section 78-30-4.22, or any
related section, is unconstitutional on its face. Rather, in the
district court, Mr. O’Dea argued that because he manifested an
intent to retain his parental rights throughout Ms. Olea’s
pregnancy and because Ms. Olea was deceptive concerning the state
of her pregnancy and her location, it would be “fundamentally
unfair” to require Mr. O’Dea to comply strictly with the Utah
Adoption Act.
¶24 These arguments, however, do not address the facial
constitutionality of section 78-30-4.22. As further evidence
that the argument was not made below, the district court found in
the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss that Mr. O’Dea “does not
challenge the constitutionality of Utah’s adoption statute.”
Because the arguments made below do not sufficiently raise the
argument for purposes of preservation that section 78-30-4.22 is
unconstitutional on its face or that the district court erred in
failing to address the issue, we will not address the issue.
II. MR. O’DEA HAD THE REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE THAT MS. OLEA
TEMPORARILY RESIDED IN UTAH, AND ACQUISITION OF THAT KNOWLEDGE
REQUIRED HIM TO COMPLY STRICTLY WITH UTAH LAW TO RETAIN ANY
RIGHTS IN RELATION TO THE CHILD
¶25 Mr. O’Dea did not sufficiently preserve the claims
described in Section I of this opinion. Mr. O’Dea presented
those arguments as an attempt to collaterally challenge the
effect of his failure to comply strictly with the requirements
imposed by Utah law for an unmarried biological father to retain
rights in relation to the child. Because Mr. O’Dea’s failure to
comply strictly with Utah law formed the basis of the district
court’s Order to Dismiss, we will now address whether the
district court correctly determined that Mr. O’Dea failed to
secure rights in relation to his child based on his failure to
comply with Utah law. Although Mr. O’Dea did not explicitly
appeal the district court’s application of the facts to the
relevant statutory framework in his appellate brief, we do so
here to address Mr. O’Dea’s consistent argument that section 78-
30-4.14(10) (Supp. 2006) allows expectant mothers to “forum
shop,” and that he was not required to comply strictly with Utah
law.

3 A “qualifying circumstance” is an event, defined by Utah
Code section 78-30-4.14(10)(a), that triggers the obligation of
an unmarried putative father to comply strictly with Utah’s
paternity statute to secure rights in relation to his child.
No. 20070818 10
¶26 The district court determined that Mr. O’Dea was
required to comply strictly with Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(6)
because he had the requisite knowledge of a “qualifying
circumstance,”3 which in this case was Ms. Olea’s temporary
residence in Utah. The district court held that under the
statutory framework of Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(10), Mr.
O’Dea was required to comply strictly with Utah law regardless of
whether he complied with Wyoming law because he knew of a
“qualifying circumstance.”
¶27 We affirm the district court and hold that a qualifying
circumstance existed in this case and that the phone call made by
Ms. Olea to Mr. O’Dea informing him that she was “in Utah” gave
Mr. O’Dea knowledge that a qualifying circumstance, Ms. Olea’s
temporary residence in Utah, existed. Because Mr. O’Dea had the
requisite knowledge of the qualifying circumstance, he was
required to comply strictly with Utah law before the latter of
Ms. Olea’s relinquishment of the child or twenty days after Mr.
O’Dea received notice of the qualifying circumstance in order to
retain any rights in relation to the child. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
30-4.14(11) (“An unmarried biological father who does not fully
and strictly comply with the requirements . . . is considered to
have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child
. . . .”). Because Mr. O’Dea did not comply with section 78-30-
4.14(6) within the statutory time limit, Mr. O’Dea waived any
rights he had in relation to the child, including the right to
consent to the adoption and the right to receive notice of a
hearing. Id. § 78-30-4.14(11); C.F. v. D.D. (In re B.B.D.), 1999
UT 70, ¶ 12, 984 P.2d 967. After a discussion of the statutory
framework applicable to Mr. O’Dea, we discuss the district
court’s determination.
A. The Statutory Framework for Unmarried Biological Fathers
Applicable to Mr. O’Dea
¶28 Under Utah law, an unmarried biological father of a
child under six months of age waives all rights in relation to
his child, including rights associated with consent to adoption
and notice of a hearing, if he does not strictly comply with the
requirements set forth in section 78-30-4.14(6). Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4.14(11). An unmarried biological father can only
establish himself as a person who must consent to the adoption of

11 No. 20070818
the child if he strictly complies with the following
requirements:
(a) initiates proceedings to establish
paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45g, Utah
Uniform Parentage Act;
(b) files with the court that is presiding
over the paternity proceeding a sworn
affidavit:
(i) stating that he is fully able and
willing to have full custody of the
child;
(ii) setting forth his plans for care of
the child; and
(iii) agreeing to a court order of child
support and the payment of expenses incurred
in connection with the mother’s pregnancy and
the child’s birth;
(c) consistent with Subsection (7), files
notice of the commencement of paternity
proceedings with the state registrar of vital
statistics within the Department of Health,
in a confidential registry established by the
department for that purpose; and
(d) offered to pay and paid a fair and
reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in
connection with the mothers’ pregnancy and
the child’s birth, in accordance with his
financial ability, unless:
(i) he did not have actual knowledge of
the pregnancy;
(ii) he was prevented from paying the
expenses by the person or authorized
agency having lawful custody of the
child; or
(iii) the mother refuses to accept the
unmarried biological father’s offer to
pay the expenses described in this
Subsection (6)(d).
Id. § 78-30-4.14(6)(a)-(d). These requirements must be completed
before the day on which the birth mother executes her consent for
the adoption or relinquishes the child for adoption. Id. § 78-
30-4.14(6).
¶29 Two statutory exceptions excuse the unmarried
biological father from strict compliance. The first exception
addresses unmarried biological fathers who “did not know, and
through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have

No. 20070818 12
known, before the time the mother executed a consent to adoption
or relinquishment of the child for adoption, that a qualifying
circumstance existed.” Id. § 78-30-4.14(10)(b)(i)(A). Fathers
who meet this standard, but who “fully complied with the
requirements to establish parental rights in the child, and to
preserve the right to notice” in the state where the father knew
or should have known the mother resided before relinquishment of
the child or the state of conception, do not waive their rights
to consent to the adoption or to receive notice of a hearing even
if the fathers do not strictly comply with the requirements of
section 78-30-4.14(6). Id. § 78-30-4.14(10)(b)(i)(B).
¶30 The second exception addresses unmarried biological
fathers who “knew, or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, before the time the mother executed
a consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for
adoption, that a qualifying circumstance existed.” Id. § 78-30-
4.14(10)(b)(ii)(A). A father who falls under this second
standard of knowledge must comply with all the requirements
listed in section 78-30-4.14(6) before the latter of the date the
birth mother executed a consent to adoption or relinquishment of
the child or twenty days after the unmarried biological father
knew or should have known through reasonable diligence that a
qualifying circumstance existed. Id. § 78-30-4.14(10)(b)(ii)(B).
Fathers who fall under this exception are not excused from
completing the four requirements listed in section 78-30-4.14(6),
but rather are granted a brief extension of time to complete the
requirements. Thus, the analysis of whether Mr. O’Dea was
eligible to avail himself of this exception depends on whether he
knew, or should have known through reasonable diligence, that a
qualifying circumstance existed. If Mr. O’Dea knew or should
have known a qualifying circumstance existed, strict compliance
with another state’s paternity requirements will not preserve his
parental rights in Utah. Rather, he must still strictly comply
with the requirements listed in section 78-30-4.14(6).
¶31 Because we find that the phone call made by Ms. Olea to
Mr. O’Dea informing him that she was in Utah gave Mr. O’Dea
sufficient notice that a qualifying circumstance existed, we do
not reach whether Mr. O’Dea’s compliance with Wyoming or Montana
law establishes his right to consent to the adoption or to
receive notice of any judicial proceeding concerning the adoption
in Utah. Having established the statutory framework of Mr.
O’Dea’s claim, we now address whether Mr. O’Dea is subject to
strict compliance to Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(6).

4 As the district court noted in its Order to Dismiss, “It
is also possible to conclude that the Petitioner was, or should
have been, aware that Respondent intended to give birth in Utah.”
(continued...)
13 No. 20070818
B. A Qualifying Circumstance Existed Because Ms. Olea
Temporarily Resided in Utah
¶32 Before reaching the question of Mr. O’Dea’s knowledge,
we first discuss the existence of a qualifying circumstance. A
qualifying circumstance under Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(10)(a)
is any of the following that occurs between the date of
conception and the date the mother executes a consent to
adoption:
(i) the child or the child’s mother resided,
on a permanent or temporary basis, in the
state of Utah;
(ii) the mother intended to give birth to the
child in the state of Utah;
(iii) the child was born in the state of
Utah; or
(iv) the mother intended to execute a consent
to adoption or relinquishment of the child
for adoption:
(A) in the state of Utah; or
(B) under the laws of the state of Utah.
In interpreting statutes “we look first to the statute’s plain
language to determine its meaning.” H.U.F. v. W.P.W, 2009 UT 10,
¶ 32, 203 P.3d 943 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We read
the plain language of a statute as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute
and with other statutes under the same and related chapters.”
Id. Accordingly, “[w]e seek an interpretation that renders all
parts of a statute relevant and meaningful, and interpretations
are to be avoided which render some part of a provision
nonsensical or absurd.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
When discerning the plain meaning of the statute, terms that “are
used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the
absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning
which they have for laymen in such daily usage.” Gov’t Employees
Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶33 The Center argues that a qualifying circumstance
existed under section 78-30-4.14(10)(a)(i) because Ms. Olea
temporarily resided in Utah.4 It seems that the district court

4 (...continued)
We do not address whether such a situation exists in this case
because we agree with the district court that “[b]ecause
Petitioner has conceded that he was told that Respondent was in
Utah . . . it is not necessary to conclude that a second
qualifying event also occurred in this case.”
No. 20070818 14
and the parties assumed that Ms. Olea was residing on a temporary
basis in Utah when she made the call to Mr. O’Dea. We address
this conclusion to make clear that a qualifying circumstance must
itself exist before a determination of the father’s knowledge of
the qualifying circumstance is determined.
¶34 This court has defined the term “reside” as “[t]o dwell
permanently or for a length of time; to have settled abode for a
time.” Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980)
(emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
also recognized that the term “resident” “has no precise,
technical, and fixed definition applicable in all contexts and to
all cases.” Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 645 P.2d at 674. With
these previously established concepts in the background, we
interpret section 78-30-4.14(10)(a)(i) in a way that gives
meaning to the term “temporarily” and also takes into account the
unique situation addressed by the Utah adoption framework.
¶35 The time period between conception and relinquishment
of the child for adoption is brief. Childbearing and adoption
also carry unique emotional decisions and considerations. The
legislature has, therefore, specifically stated that “an
unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial
decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to
privacy, and has the right to make timely and appropriate
decisions regarding her future and the future of the child.”
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(b).
¶36 We decline to adopt a rule that establishes a minimum
amount of time a mother must remain in Utah to become a temporary
resident. While it is unclear from the record exactly how long
Ms. Olea was located in Utah around the time of the birth, the
totality of the circumstances in this case suggests that Ms. Olea
temporarily resided in Utah. As discussed below, Mr. O’Dea has
not presented a compelling argument that he was not put on notice
that a qualifying circumstance existed or presented a compelling
argument as to why Ms. Olea’s presence in Utah did not constitute
a temporary residence. We, therefore, find that the district
court was not in error in determining the existence of a
qualifying circumstance.

15 No. 20070818
C. Mr. O’Dea Knew or Should Have Known That Ms. Olea Temporarily
Resided in the State Because She Told Him She Was “In Utah”
¶37 We now answer the question of whether Mr. O’Dea knew,
or with reasonable diligence should have known, that the
qualifying circumstance existed. An unmarried biological father
who knows or “through the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known” that one or more qualifying circumstances existed
waives any right to consent to the adoption or to receive notice
of any related hearings in relation to his child if he does not
strictly comply with section 78-30-4.14(6). Utah Code Ann. § 78-
30-4.14(11).
¶38 The district court held that Mr. O’Dea knew a
qualifying circumstance existed because Ms. Olea told him during
the phone call that she was “in Utah.” By placing a telephone
call to Mr. O’Dea, Ms. Olea did not create a qualifying
circumstance. We conclude, however, that by communicating to Mr.
O’Dea that she was “in Utah,” Ms. Olea called attention to her
whereabouts and placed Mr. O’Dea on inquiry notice to perceive
the true state of affairs concerning Ms. Olea and the child she
was carrying.
¶39 The district court determined that Mr. O’Dea’s
knowledge that a qualifying circumstance existed, which in this
case was Ms. Olea’s temporary residence in Utah, must rise to an
objective level of inquiry notice. We agree with this reasoning.
The plain words of the statute do not require that an unmarried
biological father have the quantum of knowledge sufficient to
form an absolute certainty in the father’s mind free from any
subjective doubt that a qualifying circumstance has existed or
presently exists. Rather, the statute requires only that a
father have knowledge or have received sufficient notice that a
qualifying circumstance existed sufficient to alert him to
conduct further inquiry. Whether the father actually undertakes
further inquiry is irrelevant to his obligation to comply
strictly with Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(6) within the time
limits set forth in subsection (10)(b)(ii) which arises at the
moment he obtains notice that a qualifying circumstance existed.
¶40 The phrase “knew, or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known,” mirrors language we have adopted to
aid in ascertaining whether a plaintiff was aware that a statute
of limitations has began to run. See Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d
1188, 1196 (Utah 1993) (discussing application of discovery rule
to statute of limitations in fraud case). A duty to inquire
further into the existence of a fact may “‘occur when
circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on
guard.’” First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d

5 We agree with the district court that the Center embraced
legal form over substance in this matter. There is evidence to
suggest that the Center knew of Mr. O’Dea’s attempts to assert
paternity in other states. While we acknowledge that an adoption
agency has no affirmative duty to inform an unmarried biological
father that a child exists or that the expectant mother has
chosen to place the child for adoption, we encourage adoption
agencies to take further steps to ensure less chance of
litigation after the child has been placed for adoption. It is
quite possible that the district court was correct in its
statement that by embracing legal form over substance, “the
[Center] may have caused unnecessary harm.”
No. 20070818 16
834, 837 (Utah 1998) (quoting Meyer v. Gen. Am. Corp., 569 P.2d
1094, 1097 (Utah 1977)). It is well established that “[w]hatever
is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his
guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such
inquiry might have led.” Id. at 838 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In other words, “[w]hen a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant
of it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶41 Placing an objective standard on determining whether a
father had notice that a qualifying circumstance existed further
supports the state’s “compelling interest in providing stable and
permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner” and
preserving a birth mother’s entitlement “to privacy . . . [and]
to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and
the future of the child.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(b).
¶42 While we agree that Ms. Olea’s phone call was certainly
abrupt and one-sided, it unequivocally communicated to Mr. O’Dea
that Ms. Olea was in Utah.5 The statement, “I am in Utah” was
stated without condition or exception. Analyzing the statement
objectively, we conclude that it sufficiently put Mr. O’Dea on
inquiry notice that Ms. Olea resided in Utah at least on a
temporary basis. This inquiry notice placed the burden on Mr.
O’Dea to comply strictly with Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(6)
within the time period set forth in section 78-30-
4.14(10)(b)(ii)(B).
¶43 Mr. O’Dea has extensively argued that the phone call
did not constitute notice that Ms. Olea was temporarily residing
in Utah because Ms. Olea deceived him in the past about the state
of her pregnancy and her location. He also argues that Ms.
Olea’s statements made during the phone call, such as her
statement that he would pay child support, negated any indication
that a qualifying circumstance existed. Under Utah Code section

17 No. 20070818
78-30-4.15(1), a father “is not excused from strict compliance
. . . based upon any action, statement, or omission of the other
parent or third parties.” Although Ms. Olea was not fully
truthful with Mr. O’Dea during her pregnancy as to the existence
of the pregnancy and her location, this deceit does not negate
the unambiguous notification that she was in Utah under section
78-30-4.15. The statement “I am in Utah” placed Mr. O’Dea on
inquiry notice that Ms. Olea was residing in Utah, even if on a
temporary basis. His compliance with other states’ paternity
laws do not overcome this notice.
¶44 Mr. O’Dea also argues that an affirmance of the
district court’s dismissal of the case will encourage expectant
mothers to “forum-shop” Utah’s adoption laws. While this
argument may have some merit, it is not the place of this court
to question the policy objectives of the legislature. The
legislature has stated that an unmarried biological father only
“has an inchoate interest,” id. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e), and if he
“fails to grasp the opportunities . . . his biological parental
interest may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished . . . by his
failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to
substantiate it,” id. § 78-30-4.12(3)(b). To place a subjective
standard on whether an unmarried biological father knew a
qualifying circumstance existed and to inquire into the expectant
mother’s choices would in most cases unduly hamper the
legislature’s clear policy objectives.
¶45 We, therefore, hold that Mr. O’Dea had notice
sufficient to give him knowledge that a qualifying circumstance
existed, which in this case was Ms. Olea’s temporary residence in
Utah. Mr. O’Dea had twenty days from June 15 to comply strictly
with Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(6). Instead, Mr. O’Dea
completed the requirements to establish paternity more than
eighty days after he received notice Ms. Olea was in Utah.
Therefore, Mr. O’Dea did not timely assert his right to consent
to the adoption or receive notice of a hearing. The district
court’s order granting the Center’s motion to dismiss is
therefore affirmed.
CONCLUSION
¶46 We hold that Mr. O’Dea did not preserve the issues
concerning full faith and credit to compliance with Wyoming law,
choice of law, personal jurisdiction, and facial
constitutionality of sections of the Utah Adoption Act. We
cannot find sufficient objections made on the record and Mr.
O’Dea has not stated sufficient grounds for reviewing an issue
not preserved in the district court. We also hold that the phone
call made to Mr. O’Dea in which Ms. Olea stated “I am in Utah”

No. 20070818 18
gave him adequate inquiry notice that a qualifying circumstance
existed. Because Mr. O’Dea knew or should have known the
qualifying circumstance existed, he was required to comply
strictly with Utah law in order to retain any right in relation
to his child, including his right to consent to adoption or
receive notice of any applicable hearing. Mr. O’Dea failed to
comply, and we therefore affirm the district court’s Order
Granting Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Claim for Lack of
Standing.
---
¶47 Associate Chief Justice Durrant and Justice Wilkins
concur in Justice Nehring’s opinion.
---
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting:
¶48 I respectfully dissent.
¶49 The majority opinion concedes that “[b]y placing a
telephone call to Mr. O’Dea, Ms. Olea did not create a qualifying
circumstance.” Supra ¶ 38 (emphasis added). The opinion also
points out that the trial court and the parties “assumed” that
Ms. Olea was “residing on a temporary basis in Utah” when she
made the call to Mr. O’Dea. The record does not reflect any
facts, other than the telephone call, made on the very day Ms.
Olea gave birth, to support the conclusion that a qualifying
circumstance actually existed. I assume that a one- to three-day
hospital stay in Utah, for the sole purpose of giving birth and
relinquishing an infant for adoption, was not what the
legislature intended by “resided, on a permanent or temporary
basis, in the state of Utah.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-
4.14(10)(a) (Supp. 2006). I further believe there is a legal
distinction between the concept of “residence” and that of a
“visit” or brief “stay.” Absent such a distinction, Utah risks
becoming a magnet for those seeking to unfairly cut off
opportunities for biological fathers to assert their rights to
connection with their children. Not every unmarried biological
father is indifferent to or unworthy of such connections. Many
would marry the mothers of their children if they could, and many
would make suitable and loving parents.
¶50 Thus, while I do not necessarily disagree with the
conclusion that Mr. O’Dea had “sufficient notice” under our
statute, I do conclude that the record in this case is entirely
insufficient to establish that the qualifying circumstance of

19 No. 20070818
residence actually existed. I would, therefore, reverse and
remand for an evidentiary hearing on that question.
---
¶51 Justice Parrish concurs in Chief Justice Durham’s
dissenting opinion.