Walter Lee Raines, Jr. v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker and Coleman
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
WALTER LEE RAINES, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 0835-95-2 	JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
MAY 7, 1996
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Timothy J. Hauler, Judge
D. Gregory Carr (Bowen & Bowen, P.C., on
brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
In this criminal appeal, Walter Lee Raines contends that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for petit
larceny and vandalism. 	We hold that the evidence is sufficient
and we affirm the defendant's convictions.
At trial, Belinda Castaneeda testified that she witnessed
the defendant and another man break into a car parked at an
apartment complex where Castaneeda's fiance resided and take the
car's stereo. 	The defendant did not object to the admissibility
of Castaneeda's identification of him as the thief, but he
contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support
the convictions because the identification was "unreliable." 	He
argues that without a reliable identification the only other
* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

- 2 -
evidence tending to connect him with the crime was the fact that
his car was located near the apartments where the crimes were
committed, which is insufficient to prove that he committed the
crimes.
In determining the reliability of identification evidence,
the reviewing court must consider
the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of
the witness' prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation, and the
length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.
Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 331, 362 S.E.2d 650, 663
(1987) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988). 	Although the defendant does
not contest the admissibility of Castaneeda's identification, the
factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers are also relevant in
determining whether identification evidence is sufficient,
standing alone or in combination with other evidence, to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 	See Smallwood v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 527, 530, 418 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1992)
(applying the Neil v. Biggers analysis even though the accused
did not appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress
the identifications).
Here, Castaneeda testified that the parking lot where the
crimes occurred was "well-lit" and that she viewed the suspects
from a distance of thirty to thirty-five feet. 	She initially saw

- 3 -
the two men "walking through the parking lot" and continued to
watch them as they broke into the car and took the stereo.
Therefore, despite Castaneeda's admission on cross-examination
that the light was not "shining directly" on the two men, the
evidence indicates that she had an opportunity to view the
perpetrators and focused her attention on them at all times
during the commission of the crimes.
Most significantly, Castaneeda was unequivocal in her
identification of the defendant. 	Cf. Smallwood, 14 Va. App. at
532, 418 S.E.2d at 569 (holding that there were "significant
inconsistencies between [the witness'] pre-trial description of
[the accused] and her acknowledgment of his actual appearance at
trial," and that her testimony at the preliminary hearing was
less certain than it was at trial). 	Contrary to the defendant's
assertion at oral argument, Castaneeda did not merely state that
the defendant's profile was similar to that of one of the men who
broke into the car. 	Defense counsel used the term "similar" in
questioning Castaneeda, but the record is clear that Castaneeda
positively identified the defendant and confirmed that there was
"[n]o question in [her] mind" that he was one of the two men she
saw break into the car. 	Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220,
250, 421 S.E.2d 821, 839 (1992) ("Of the most significance on the
subject of [the witness'] level of certainty . . . is the fact
that her in-court identification of [the accused] was
unequivocally positive"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993).

- 4 -
The fact that Castaneeda first confronted the defendant at a
court proceeding prior to trial and admitted that she knew that
he was standing where defendants normally stand does not taint
her identification and render it unreliable. 	See Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 859, 434 S.E.2d 319, 324-25 (1993)
(holding that the fact that the defendant was handcuffed during
the showup and wearing "jail garb" at the preliminary hearing did
not invalidate the identifications), aff'd en banc, 18 Va. App.
454, 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994). 	Furthermore, the identification is
not invalid merely because there is evidence that the initial
confrontation occurred more than one month after the crimes were
committed. 	"[T]he lapse of time alone is not sufficient to
render an identification unreliable as a matter of law."
Satcher, 244 Va. at 250, 421 S.E.2d at 839.
Finally, the fact that Castaneeda did not see a front view
of the defendant's face, but identified him by his profile
affects the weight to be accorded the identification rather than
its reliability. 	The trial court is capable of "measur[ing]
intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has
some questionable feature. . . . 	The defect, if there be one,
goes to weight and not to substance." 	Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 116-17 (1977).
In light of "the totality of circumstances in this case," we
find that Castaneeda's in-court identification of the defendant
was reliable. 	Satcher, 244 Va. at 250, 421 S.E.2d at 839.

- 5 -
Accordingly, Castaneeda's testimony that the defendant was one of
the men who broke into the car, combined with the evidence that
the defendant's vehicle was located less than one mile from the
apartment complex where the crimes were committed, is sufficient
to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.